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ABSTRACT
Article one of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“P1-1”)  states  that  every  person  is  entitled  to  peaceful  enjoyment  of  his 
possessions. The role of property interests in allowing political participation 
had been highlighted during the Second World War, where the Third Reich 
had  weakened  political  opponents  through  arbitrary  deprivation  of 
possessions. The drafters of the Convention sough to prevent a repeat of this 
political abuse. However, the political element of property is often secondary 
to  its  economic  role,  in  which  intervention  by  the  state  is  necessary  and 
sometimes desirable to allow a national economy to function. How can this 
inherent  conflict  in  the  right  to  peaceful  enjoyment  of  possessions  be 
resolved? 
This thesis aims to demonstrate the development of the role of the property 
right  in  Europe and the  United  Kingdom through a critical  analysis  of  the 
jurisprudence  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  and  the  domestic 
courts  of  the  United  Kingdom.  The  central  thesis  of  this  research  is  that, 
although a framework has been determined within which P1-1 decisions can 
be  taken,  there  is  considerable  work  to  be  done  in  strengthening  the 
parameters  of  that  framework  in  order  to  create  a  protection  that,  whilst 
sufficiently flexible to deal with changes in law and society,  offers a clearly 
defined and meaningful  safeguard against unnecessary intervention by the 
state in every context. 
The conclusion is that a clear decision-making process has been articulated 
through the European jurisprudence and subsequently adopted with qualified 
success in the United Kingdom. This process allows for the P1-1 implications 
of  current  and  foreseeable  events  to  be  explored  with  some  degree  of 
certainty.  However,  the  margin  of  appreciation  afforded  to  states  by  the 
judiciary at certain steps of the process, particularly as regards the purported 
aim  of  state  intervention  and  the  necessity  of  avoiding  payment  of 
compensation in certain situations, compromises the strength of the protection 
as a whole. 
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INTRODUCTION
Article one of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms1 reads as follows:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No 
one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a state to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance 
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties. 
Often referred to as "the property right", P1-1 occupies an unusual position in 
human rights law. The ECHR was conceived by Western European politicians 
substantially in response to the damage inflicted on and by western nations 
during the course of the First and Second World Wars. With the United States 
of  America  emerging  as  a  uniquely  powerful  force  in  the  world  and  the 
accelerated development of the technology of war, there was a sense that 
European nations should gather together to create a basis for peaceful co-
existence  and  co-operation.  The  European  Movement  was  founded  to 
promote this agenda. Creating a benchmark human rights document setting 
out minimum standards to which all member nations would adhere was one of 
the key aims of that Movement, and the ECHR represented the actualisation 
of that aim. 
Placed in context, it can be seen why the ECHR was designed predominantly 
to protect civil and political rights. The substantive articles of the Convention 
begin with the right to life, and go on through the right to liberty, the right to 
freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment,  the right to a fair  trial,  to 
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly amongst a range of other 
protections. The accord was designed to stand in the way of totalitarianism 
1 Hereinafter referred to as P1-1
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and prevent the rise to power of another dictatorship in the mould of Hitler and 
the Third Reich.
Protection of property was considered to have a role to play in achieving this 
broader aim. Ownership of property was seen to be a key element of political 
and  social  freedom.  It  should  not  be  possible  for  a  political  regime  with 
aspirations of power to diminish or silence dissenting voices by confiscating 
land or other possessions, leaving them in a position where they are unable to 
speak. From that point of view, it was agreed that the privileges of ownership 
required to be safeguarded. 
However,  a  right  of  this  kind  is  not  directly  analogous  with  the  other 
protections offered by the Convention. It is possible to argue that ownership of 
property  is,  first  and  foremost,  an  economic  interest.  The  part  it  plays  in 
permitting civil  and political  participation is secondary to its key role in the 
finances of the owner and in the larger society. In a westernised free market 
economy, economic rights are not and cannot be upheld to the same absolute 
standards as civil and political protections. 
The issue could be framed as one of morality. By the standards of the new 
Europe, an exception to the right to life could be justified only in the case of 
the death penalty.  The right to a fair trial is an absolute guarantee with no 
exceptions.  The  right  of  ownership,  on  the  other  hand,  is  subject  to  any 
number of restrictions and qualifications on a daily basis, from the imposition 
of tax to planning regulations to the enforcement of the laws of succession. 
Tax is not a moral issue. State intervention is not only possible, it is necessary 
for society to function.
Accordingly,  there is a fundamental conflict at the heart of P1-1. The right 
must  exist  to  prevent  "bad"  governments  from obtaining  too  much power. 
Conversely,  it  must  not  prevent  "good"  governments  from exercising  their 
power in such a way as to facilitate the existence of an economic and social 
community in promotion of the political will of their electorate.
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Aims and methodology
The aim of this thesis is to analyse how the inherent conflict in P1-1 has been 
understood and negotiated over time to develop P1-1 into the protection it 
represents in the present day, with a particular interest in its application in the 
United Kingdom context. The argument will be made that, over time, the initial 
ambiguity of P1-1 has come to be resolved through the gradual identification 
by the courts of the critical elements of the protection. It will be submitted that 
a five step process has emerged through which it can be understood how 
state  action  has  impacted  on  the  property  rights  of  an  individual  and 
determined whether this interference can be justified in the interests of the 
wider  community.  It  will  be  recognised,  however,  that  this  process  is  still 
evolving: ambiguity surrounding key elements of the protection continues to 
exist  and  progress  must  be  made  in  ensuring  the  right  is  imbued  with 
sufficient strength for it to be a meaningful protection of the type envisaged by 
the authors of the ECHR. 
The central thesis of this research is that, although a framework has been 
established  within  which  determination  of  P1-1  applications  will  be  made, 
there is considerable work to be done in strengthening the parameters of that 
framework in order to create a protection that,  whilst  sufficiently flexible to 
deal with changes in law and society, offers a clearly defined and meaningful 
safeguard against unnecessary intervention by the state in every context. 
The  analysis  will  focus  on  the  judicial  approach  to  the  property  right 
throughout the last five decades. The voluminous case law of the European 
Court  of  Human Rights2 and the former  European Commission of  Human 
Rights3 has, over time, provided guidance as to what interests will fall within 
the protection of P1-1, to what extent that protection will be extended and in 
what  ways  interference  by  a  signatory  state  with  that  protection  can  be 
2 Referred to as the ECtHR.
3 Referred to as the Commission. The Convention initially envisaged two judicial institutions. The Commission would 
hear applications from parties who claimed a rights violation. If  it  decided the application was well-founded, the 
Commission  would  refer  the  case  to  the  Court  for  a  judgment  on  the  merits  and  any  available  remedy.  The 
Commission was abolished by the 11th protocol, which came into force in 1998, and subsequent to which parties 
have made applications directly to the Court. 
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justified. The domestic courts in the United Kingdom have made use of the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence and their own approach to the domestic legislation 
to define and apply the property protection within a United Kingdom context. 
In this research, an analysis of the jurisprudence will be undertaken in order to 
extrapolate the principles on which an application in respect of a violation of 
P1-1 will  be determined. These principles will  then be used as a basis on 
which  to  investigate  the  probable  P1-1  implications  of  issues  of  current 
importance within Scotland or the United Kingdom more generally.
It may also be of use at this initial stage to clarify certain issues which will not 
be  dealt  with  in  the  course  of  this  research.  It  is  recognised  that  the 
development of P1-1 has not taken place entirely within the confines of the 
courts of Strasbourg and the United Kingdom. In particular it is recognised 
that  the  national  courts  of  all  signatory  states  have  contributed  through 
discussion and opinion to the evolution of the principles outlined in this thesis. 
Constraints of time and space, however, make it impossible for a review of all 
relevant  jurisprudence  to  be  undertaken  here.  The  focus  of  this  work  is 
ultimately the United Kingdom, and it is hoped that the thorough analysis of 
the Strasbourg case law will  serve to lessen the impact of the absence of 
other comparative material. Similarly, it is apparent that jurisprudence relating 
to other articles of the Convention has a played a part in the evolution of P1-1. 
The interplay of  the property right with the right to a fair  trial  contained in 
article six, the right to private and family life contained in article eight and the 
freedom from discrimination set out in article 14 is complex. Several of these 
articles are often argued together – indeed, with some considerable degree of 
crossover – in both the Strasbourg and domestic jurisprudence. Similarly, the 
evolution  of  the  other  economic  and  social  rights  contained  within  the 
Convention, particularly the right to marry set out in article 12 and the right to 
education given in article two of the First Protocol, offer some parallels with 
the development of P1-1. Unfortunately, however, it would be impossible to 
treat  these issues with  anything close to  the level  of  depth that would be 
required for the analysis to be meaningful within the constraints of this piece 
of  work.  For  that  reason,  the decision was taken to  focus on P1-1 to  the 
exclusion of the other articles of the Convention.
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Separately it may be useful to clarify that the underlying question of whether a 
property protection should exist in the first place will not be considered herein. 
Although there are valuable issues to be explored surrounding the purpose 
that could be ascribed to such a right and the normative role it could or should 
play, it was recognised that the legal theory underpinning the property right 
could not be properly explored without adequate space and time, neither of 
which was available in the course of this research. Instead, it is accepted that 
the right exists in the wording of the Convention and that the aim of the right is 
essentially that expressed by the authors of the Convention, as explored in 
the first chapter of the thesis.
Structure
As indicated above, the foundation of this thesis is the existing jurisprudence 
of both the Strasbourg institutions and the domestic courts, and analysis of 
that case law forms the backbone of the discussion carried out in this work. 
The thesis is split into five chapters divided to facilitate this analysis. 
Chapter one deals with the background to the property right. Following a brief 
description of the context in which the Convention came to be drafted, this 
chapter  goes  on  to  set  out  the  lengthy  and  somewhat  torturous  process 
through which the property protection came to be realised in its current form. 
Through a review of the debates surrounding the property right at each of the 
various committee stages necessitated by the drafting procedure, it  will  be 
seen  that  the  protection  was  recognised  from  the  beginning  to  create  a 
number  of  political,  ideological  and  practical  difficulties.  The  extent  of  the 
disagreement between the negotiating states made it impossible for a form of 
wording  to  be  agreed  upon  in  time  for  the  right  to  be  included  in  the 
Convention  itself,  hence the  reason it  became the  first  article  in  the  First 
Protocol  to  the  ECHR.  This  chapter  explores  the  compromises  that  were 
necessary in order for  agreement to be reached, and the ambiguity which 
these compromises created in the text of the article which is now known as 
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P1-1. The mechanism by which the right has been incorporated into both UK 
and Scots law is also outlined.
Chapter two is the first stage of analysis of the jurisprudence of the former 
European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights. The aim of 
this chapter is to use the case law as a basis from which definitions of each of 
the key terms of P1-1 can be constructed. The article contains many words or 
phrases which may either have a specific meaning in terms of domestic law 
(for example, "possessions") or alternatively may not have any specific legal 
definition domestically (for example, "control".) Before a determination can be 
made  of  the  decision-making  framework  created  by  the  judiciary,  it  is 
necessary to have an understanding of  precisely how the language of the 
article  has  been  used  and  interpreted.  This  chapter  attempts  to  set  out 
definitions  of  the  terms  natural  or  legal  person,  possession,  peaceful  
enjoyment, deprivation, control and public/general interest. It will be seen that 
the use of  some of these terms is very broad and varies widely  from the 
definitions  which  might  be  expected  based  on  the  use  of  the  words  in 
domestic  law.  It  will  also  be  observed  that  the  jurisprudence  is  of  more 
assistance in permitting the construction of a definition of some terms than it 
is of others.
Chapter three continues the investigation of the Strasbourg case law, building 
upon  the  definitions  set  out  in  chapter  two  and  extrapolating  from  the 
jurisprudence  to  produce  an  outline  of  the  process  through  which  an 
application made in respect of P1-1 will be decided. It will be posited that a 
period of development commencing with  the keynote decision of  Sporrong 
and  Lönnroth  v  Sweden in  1983  and  continuing  to  the  present  day  has 
resulted  in  essentially  a  five  step  process  through  which  every  P1-1 
application will  be taken by the Strasbourg court.  It  will  be argued that the 
framework of P1-1 decision-making, in a much distilled form, is as follows:
1. The Court ascertains whether the applicant holds a “possession” in the 
sense of the autonomous meaning given to this term by the Strabourg 
jurisprudence. 
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2. If such a possession is held by the applicant, the Court ascertains whether 
the state action giving rise to the application amounts to aninterference 
with P1-1. This is done through determination of whether the action can be 
characterised  as  either  a  "deprivation",  a  "control  of  use"  or  a  more 
general  "interference  with  the  peaceful  enjoyment  of  possessions",  as 
each of these categories has been defined by Sporrong and Lönnroth.
3. If  such  an  interference  has  taken  place,  did  it  have  a  clear  basis  in 
domestic law?
4. If such an interference has taken place, did it pursue a legitimate aim in 
the public or general interest?
5. Did the action taken by the state strike a fair balance between the needs of 
the community to be served by the interference and the burden placed on 
the individual applicant? (In other words, has the proportionality test been 
met?)
Again it will be discussed that, although interpretation of case law allows for 
an account of the gradual evolution of this framework, there are certain areas 
within  the  jurisprudence which  seem to  deviate  from this  norm and leave 
some doubt as to the coherency of the Strasbourg dicta in connection with 
certain types of state action. Additionally, it will be observed that the manner 
in  which  the  Strasbourg  court  allows  these  questions  to  be  answered, 
particularly as regards the need for state action to pursue a legitimate aim in 
the  public  or  general  interest,  may  ultimately  suggest  a  weakness  in  the 
supposedly  objective  standard  which  is  intended  to  be  imposed  by  the 
property right. This concludes the analysis of the European jurisprudence. 
Chapter  four  deals  in  detail  with  the  domestic  case  law.  P1-1  has  been 
incorporated into domestic legislation by the Human Rights Act 1998. This 
statute applies throughout the United Kingdom, and accordingly decisions of 
both the Scottish and English courts as well  as judgements issued by the 
House of Lords will be taken into account in this chapter. Consideration will be 
given to the domestic understanding of  the terminology of  the article,  with 
particular reference to the definitions of the key terms set out in chapter two of 
the thesis. It will be noted that the domestic case law on these issues remains 
15
somewhat limited. To date, however, it can be seen that the domestic courts 
have made reasonable attempts to work within the definitions used by the 
European  judiciary  in  determining  P1-1  applications.  The  limitations  and 
ambiguities  in  the  Strasbourg  definitions  are,  naturally,  replicated 
domestically. The chapter then goes on to consider the extent to which the 
framework  outlined  in  chapter  three  has  been  incorporated  into  domestic 
decision-making surrounding P1-1. Again, the shortcomings of the European 
case law have created difficulties for the domestic judiciary. In addition, the 
domestic courts have in some cases failed to apply or ignored the key rules 
set out by the Strasbourg court, particularly as regards their conception and 
application  of  the  test  of  proportionality.  It  will  be  argued  that  such 
incompatibilities serve to further weaken the protection offered by P1-1 and 
that  future domestic  jurisprudence in  this  area must  seek to  adhere more 
closely to the principles encapsulated in the Strasbourg case law, where such 
principles do exist.
The fifth and final chapter will seek to use the conclusions reached in the first 
four chapters of the thesis to analyse current issues in domestic law from a 
P1-1  point  of  view.  Looking  first  at  matters  which  have  repercussions 
throughout the United Kingdom, the chapter opens with a discussion of the 
new banking legislation introduced as a result of the "credit crunch" and the 
collapse of several high street banks in late 2007 and 2008. It will be argued 
that  the  power  afforded  to  the  government  to  restructure  bank  capital  or 
transfer  ownership  of  shares  as  a  result  of  the  Banking  Act  2009  may 
constitute a violation of P1-1 through a lack of proportionality. Consideration 
will be given to the recent decision of R (SRM Global Master Fund and Ors) v 
HM Treasury,4 litigation which arose from the government bail-out of Northern 
Rock.  The chapter then looks at  the new anti-terrorist  financing measures 
introduced by the Terrorism Act 2008, noting that the width of the provisions 
justified a freeze on the assets of an Icelandic bank (Landsbanki) which was 
on the  verge of  insolvency,  and discussing  whether  any question of  P1-1 
implications could really arise here. 
4 [2009] EWCA 788
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The chapter then moves on to analyse more specifically Scottish innovations, 
dealing  firstly  with  the  newly  passed  Climate  Change  Act  and  its 
repercussions on the property rights of owners of environmentally sensitive 
areas of lands, amongst others. It will also be considered whether the Scottish 
government  may  be  under  a  more  general  duty  to  negate  the  impact  of 
climate change in order to allow all Scottish property owners to continue in the 
peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. Finally, a review will be undertaken 
on the proposed reforms to the Scottish system of land registration with a 
discussion of  the P1-1 implications of  the change to a negative system of 
registration and a broader  analysis  of  the compliance of  the Scots  law of 
prescription with the property right. 
The  findings  of  the  thesis  will  be  drawn  together  in  a  conclusion  which 
supports the main argument of the thesis as outlined above.      
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CHAPTER ONE: THE GENESIS OF THE PROPERTY RIGHT
"Begin at the beginning,” the King said, gravely, “and go till you come to the end; then 
stop."5
1.1 Introduction
A useful place to begin an analysis of article one of the First Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights is with an examination of its origins. 
Many of the criticisms most frequently made of the property right – particularly 
as regards uncertainty in its meaning and extent – can be traced back to the 
discussion that took place between members of the newly formed Institutions 
of  Europe at the time when the Convention was drafted.  This chapter will 
accordingly  chart  the  life  the  property  right  from  those  initial  discussions 
through to its current position as an integral part of UK law. 
The chapter will begin with a review of the materials contemporaneous with 
the  drafting  of  the property  right.  These materials  evidence the dissensus 
between European states as to what the nature and extent of the property 
right should be, and demonstrate that this disagreement could not be resolved 
in time for a protection of property to be contained within the Convention itself. 
It will also be seen that overcoming these issues meant the final wording of 
P1-1 represented a compromise which was recognised to be ambiguous from 
its  adoption.  P1-1  was  always  known  to  be  a  right  which  would  require 
development through jurisprudence.  
The chapter will then consider the place occupied by the property right within 
our domestic legal framework. A brief overview will be given of the extended 
period between the ratification of the First Protocol and the coming into force 
of the Human Rights Act 1998. The way in which that legislation operates to 
bring Convention rights into UK domestic law will be explained, and it will be 
noted  that  the  provisions  of  the  Scotland  Act  1998  create  a  somewhat 
different regime in that regard north of the border. 
5 Alice in Wonderland, p105
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It  is hoped that the analysis  contained within this chapter will  give a clear 
grounding as to the aims and intentions of the drafters in including a property 
protection in the ECHR. The background set out here should also operate as 
a starting point for the discussion of how the role of the property right came to 
be  developed  through  jurisprudence  on  the  basis  of  somewhat  shaky 
foundations. 
1.2 Drafting the Convention
Even a cursory inspection of materials which chart the drafting of the ECHR 
will show that the key impetus towards its inception was not nobility of spirit or 
a shift towards worldwide equality at the end of the age of empires, but rather 
fear of both the past and the future. Europe was taking the first difficult steps 
on the  long road of  recovery  from the horrors  of  the Second World War, 
brought about by the extreme right wing thirst for power of Hitler and the Third 
Reich. Ahead loomed a new and potentially more terrifying spectre, that of 
Communism and its threat to the dominance of Western capitalism.
The  Convention  was  designed  to  safeguard  the  fundamental  rights  and 
freedoms of citizens hailing from each of the contracting states. Draft Bills of 
Rights had begun appearing in various forms since the closing days of the 
Second World War,  and the desire to  construct  a definitive version of  the 
same was one of the principal reasons for the foundation of the European 
Movement. In May of 1949, the statute of the Council of Europe was signed, 
with  the  commitment  of  the  European  Movement  to  human  rights  plainly 
stated  at  article  three.6 These  words  were  backed  up  by  action  shortly 
afterwards, when the Consultative Assembly asked their Committee on Legal 
and Administrative Questions (CoLAQ) to put together a draft Convention on 
human rights for consideration by the Council of Ministers. 
The committee, headed by its  rapporteur  M Pierre-Henri Teitgen, and made 
up by political and legal delegates from each of the member states, worked to 
6 Every Member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment of all 
persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
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produce  a  report  which  did  not  set  out  detailed  provisions  in  legislative 
language, but rather sketched out a basic outline of the rights to be included 
for further discussion. In the preamble of the Teitgen Report, as it came to be 
known, it was suggested that:
…‘professional’ liberties and ‘social’ rights, which have themselves an intrinsic value, 
must also, in the future, be defined and protected; but everyone will understand that it 
is necessary to begin at the beginning and to guarantee political democracy in the 
European  Union7 and  then  to  co-ordinate  our  economies  before  undertaking  the 
generalisation of social democracy.8
Even from this initial statement, it can be seen that the inclusion of a right to 
protection of ownership of property was likely to be something of an ill fit with 
the broader aims of the Convention. However, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights had been signed in 1948, and it was decided that this should 
be  the  model  from  which  Europe  worked  when  it  began  drafting  its  own 
charter.  The Universal  Declaration did  include protection of  one economic 
interest, at article 17. 
1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of property.   
               
Accordingly, the property right was on the table from the very beginning of the 
discussion. The deliberations over article 17 by CoLAQ during their drafting 
sessions serve as a useful illustration of the various arguments surrounding 
the  nature  and  extent  of  the  property  right  which  echo  through  the 
jurisprudence even to the present day. 
The arguments against inclusion of a right to property were in various forms. 
Most fundamentally, there was an ideological difficulty with the insertion of an 
economic and social  interest in a Convention designed to protect civil  and 
political  rights.  As  noted  by  Edberg,  a  Swedish  delegate  belonging  to 
domestic socialist party, ideological difficulties also arose taking into account 
7 This is not a reference to the EU as it exists in the present day, but rather a more loose collective term for the 
nations forming part of the European Movement.
8 TP, vol 1, p194 
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the differing legal systems of the various member states. Finding a wording 
that would sit easily in each of the jurisdictions would not be a straightforward 
task.
If it is not possible for men to secure a generally accepted definition of the right of 
property;  if  such a definition cannot be made,  then this point  is  nothing but  pure 
nonsense; and if that is so then it cannot be regarded as anything but a formula for 
political action.9
Eamon  de  Valera,  then  leader  of  the  Irish  Republican  party  Fianna  Fáil, 
approached  the  same  issue  from  a  different  angle,  focussing  on  the 
differences in fact between the various jurisdictions.
While you may own something,  that does not give you the right  to use it  as you 
please to the detriment of other people…The difference between the ownership of 
something and the use that is made of it is vital if we are to have any agreement on 
matters of this kind.10  
Practicality was the final argument in the canon against inclusion. Delegates 
not opposed to the right on grounds of principle were concerned as to its 
workability in practice. The point was put succinctly by the Belgian delegate, 
M. de la Vallée-Poussin:
The right to own property as it is applied nowadays by different European nations is 
an undeniable right, considered by everyone as a relative right. No longer does any 
party defend the absolute right to own property, as it was understood by Roman law, 
and I do not think there is anyone either who is in favour of the completeness of the 
communist theory. 
Consequently,  this right  being a relative right,  we can guarantee it  in  an effective 
manner, but we must examine the extent to which we consider it essential. 
This work has not been done; ideologically,  even, it  has not been done. In these 
circumstances it would be useless to try to protect the right to own property in so 
vague a manner.11  
9 TP, vol 2,  p86
10 TP vol 2, p104
11 TP, vol 2, p 62
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On the other hand, many delegates felt that the property right was essential to 
safeguard the idea of the person as an independent individual. This right of a 
citizen to a home or family life, for example, could not be properly protected 
unless he was allowed to own that home. Again, de Valera: 
I believe that it is a fundamental right necessary to the full development of the human 
being.12   
 An alternative approach was suggested as an attempt to marry the two points 
of view. It had been noted that expropriation of property was often one of the 
first  steps  taken  by  totalitarian  governments  to  weaken  their  political 
opponents.13 Freedom  from  arbitrary  deprivation  of  property  would  be 
sufficient to prevent that type of abuse without going as far as to require an 
absolute right of ownership. Not all  members were satisfied, however,  that 
property  was  a  “relative”  right  designed  purely  to  prevent  the  state  from 
growing too powerful. The use of the word arbitrary was also considered to be 
problematic, since the parameters in the kind of political situations in which 
the right was likely to be invoked were impossible to define with any certainty. 
The argument  was  made more difficult  by the political  divisions  that  were 
evident  amongst  the  delegates.  An  example  comes  from  one  of  the  UK 
delegates, Mr Nally, a member of the socialist Labour government:  
It would be a bad thing if…we had referred to property and had used the right of the 
average man to have little  possessions of  his own in order  to defend a property 
structure in which a tiny handful of people own the means by which millions of others 
live. 14 
The level of political rhetoric used overall was perhaps unhelpful in allowing 
the  discussion  to  reach  the  root  of  the  difficulties,  both  ideological  and 
practical, which had to be worked through if a solution were to be achieved. 
12 TP, vol2, p104
13 TP, vol 2, p70. This proposal was put forward by the Norwegian delegate, M. Sundt.
14 TP, vol 2, p80
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The  extremes  of  view  along  those  lines  are,  perhaps  surprisingly,  both 
illustrated by delegates from the same country, Ireland.   
First, Sean MacEntee of Fianna Fáil:
I think if we accept Lord Layton’s amendment [to exclude the property right], we shall 
in fact seal the triumph of the totalitarian ideologies…we are declaring that the Nazis 
were justified in everything they did to prevent some human beings from perpetuating 
their race and name.15 
On the opposite end of the political spectrum, James Crosbie of Fine Gael, 
the United Ireland party :
I regard M Philip’s proposed amendment to the paragraph dealing with the ownership 
of property as the thin end of the Moscow wedge.16 
In reporting back to the Consultative Assembly, the  rapporteur attempted to 
define the root of the problem.
When it is a question of freedom of assembly, of association, of the press, of thought, 
of individual security, these are easy to control, because in the laws of all civilized 
countries there are common principles which the judge could easily discern, formulate 
and expound. 
When, on the contrary, it is a question of nationalisation, of the financial system, of 
the right of succession, it is much more difficult at the present time to discover the 
general  principles of  law recognized by civilized nations and who, in the different 
national laws, are the persons to resolve this problem.17
The combination of the difficulties in principle and the difficulties in practice 
were not reconciled by CoLAQ at that stage, but it is clear from the report that 
they believed a compromise should and could be reached.   
15 TP, vol 2, p90
16 TP, vol 2, p 106
17 TP vol 2, p126. The “general principles” referred to here are international law principles governing the subject 
matter mentioned: nationalisation, succesion and so forth.
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Progress with the Convention as a whole continued swiftly, but perhaps due 
to its controversial nature, the property right came to be rather overlooked. 
The Teitgen Report  was adopted by the Consultative  Assembly in  August 
1949 and submitted to the Council of Ministers with Recommendation No. 38: 
that a draft Convention be drawn up. In November, the Ministers appointed a 
Committee  of  Experts,  made  up  of  one  “eminent  jurist”  from each  of  the 
member states. The Experts met in March and April of 1950. This committee 
was of the view that its remit was purely administrative, and accordingly that 
any  political  decisions  were  a  matter  for  the  Ministers.  This  led  to  the 
production of a choice of texts for certain articles, dependent on the eventual 
political  line  to  be  adopted by the  Ministers.  The question  of  whether  the 
property right should be included and in what form, having been specifically 
reserved by the Assembly,  was considered to  be beyond the remit  of  the 
committee. In their report, however, the Experts made it clear that they felt it 
important that right should be included in any finalised bill. 
[The Committee of Experts] did call the attention of the Committee of Ministers to 
the…right in question. It was felt that totalitarian regimes had a tendency to interfere 
with the right to own property as a means of exercising illegitimate pressure on its 
nationals.18
In April 1950, the Ministers considered the report of the Committee of Experts 
and convened a conference of senior officials to deal with the political issues it 
highlighted. A further draft of the Convention was prepared in light of those 
discussions. The property right was not included. 
CoLAQ  met  again  in  June  1950,  under  the  chairmanship  of  Sir  David 
Maxwell-Fyfe, a British conservative politician and former Attorney General. 
On the agenda were both the report of the conference of senior officials and 
the draft Convention, as settled by the officials, which had been referred to the 
Assembly. CoLAQ were critical of the decision taken by the conference simply 
to omit any reference to the property right in their drafts. It was decided that a 
18 TP, vol 4, 18-21
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Drafting  Sub  Committee  should  be  set  up  to  prepare  a  definition.19  The 
following text was produced and, on return to CoLAQ, approved unanimously:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
Such  possessions  cannot  be  subjected  to  arbitrary  confiscation.  The  present 
measures shall not however be considered as infringing, in any way, the right of a 
State to pass necessary legislation to ensure that the said possessions are utilised in 
accordance with the general interest.20
No report on the discussions of the drafting sub committee is available. It is 
impossible  to say what  thought,  if  any,  was given to  the use of individual 
words, such as "possessions" or "ownership," which are terms of art in many 
jurisdictions. It should be remembered, however, that the approach taken to 
the drafting of the Convention as a whole was purposive. The intention was to 
capture the meaning of the protection to be afforded to citizens, and on that 
basis, it is perhaps unlikely that technical terms may have been scrutinised in 
the way that would be expected in the case of regular legislation. From the 
wording used it can be surmised that the previous arguments had been taken 
into account and a compromise agreed upon. The basic right was subjected 
to  qualifications  with  the  aim  of  protecting  individuals  from  arbitrary 
confiscation of property, whilst still enabling states to, for example, nationalise 
industry where that was politically and/or economically desirable. 
After further discussion by CoLAQ, the proposed amendment to include the 
property  right  in  the  text  suggested  by  the  drafting  sub  committee  was 
adopted by 15 votes to 4, with one abstention.21 In the committee's report to 
the Assembly, it was noted that the draft:
Represents  an  attempt  to  define  the  right  as  requested  by  the  Assembly  in 
September  1949,  and  endeavours  to  make  the  distinction  between  arbitrary 
confiscation and social conception of property which allows it to be used by regular 
legislation for the public good.22  
19 TP, vol 5, p26
20 TP, vol 6, p10
21 TP, vol 6, p20
22 TP, vol 6, p62
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In recommending the draft  to the Assembly,  Sir  David Maxwell-Fyfe  again 
attempted a summary of the debate: 
I  think  that  the  arguments  against  the  insertion  [of  property  rights]  may  be 
summarised  as  three.  The  first  is  the  difficulty…of  judicial  interpretation  and 
enforcement of those rights. The second is the fact that…social and economic rights 
are not usually expressed in a Constitution in such a way as to give judicial remedies. 
The third is the broader point that once one enters the third category of rights – that is 
social  and  economic  rights  –  it  is  very  difficult  to  know where  to  halt,  and  it  is 
therefore safer to keep out of that territory altogether.
But on the other hand, it is urged that these rights are the very basis of freedom, and 
there is  a widely held view that  personal and political  freedom is impaired,  if  not 
rendered merely nominal,  unless its enjoyment is made practical  by a reasonable 
guarantee of these rights.23  
On return  to  the  Assembly,  more  detailed  consideration  was  given to  the 
wording of the text and what its implications were likely to be from a practical 
standpoint. In the exchange of views which follows, the arguments put forward 
on  either  side  may have  the  ring  of  familiarity,  not  only  from the  CoLAQ 
discussions, but also from the extensive commentary on P1-1 as introduced in 
the jurisprudence and elsewhere.
 
The first UK delegate to speak in the debate was Mr Roberts:
I certainly think it desirable for everyone to have some property and to be protected in 
respect  of  his personal  belongings,  but  it  is  almost  impossible to define briefly in 
general terms a right to property. 
The word “possessions”, used in the English text, is not really a satisfactory word…[it] 
would not be found in a British Act of Parliament or any other legal document.    
Furthermore, by bringing in property we open up the field for specifying other social 
benefits  and  advantages  –  the  right  to  work,  the  right  to  leisure,  the  right  to  an 
adequate standard of living…we do not wish to lay the draft Convention open to the 
charge that the Assembly considers property the most important of the social rights.24 
23 TP, vol 5, p224
24 TP, vol 6, p88
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These criticisms were answered by M. Pernot of France. As to the imprecision 
of the drafting, he noted:
I think, actually, one may always say of any definition that it lacks clarity. But...side by 
side  with  texts,  there  is  a  thing  called  jurisprudence,  and  we  may  rely  on  the 
European Court of Justice to discriminate, when the time comes, between what would 
be an arbitrary act and what would be a legitimate act.25
As to the argument that property, as a social right, should not be included in 
the Convention:
No proposal has been submitted either to the Committee by one of its members or to 
the Assembly today to include in our Convention the right to leisure or the right to 
work,  while,  on  the  contrary…what  is  likely  to  be  the  state  of  public  opinion  in 
European countries if it is suddenly learned that the Assembly had set aside the right 
to own property, after the Committee had adopted a Motion by a large majority with a 
view to its being included among the recognized rights?26
It is interesting to note that the conduct of the UK during the course of the 
Convention  negotiations  more  generally  was  viewed  at  this  time  in  an 
unfavourable light  by many of  the delegates of  other member states,  with 
regard particularly to the UK's reticence over relinquishing colonial rights. That 
background may have had a bearing on the decision of another of the UK 
delegates, Mr Mitchison, to take a softer line on the property right:   
On the right of property…I have come to the conclusion...that my objections were 
fundamentally those of a lawyer.
I feel that if this legal objection were to be pressed now and I were to put myself in the 
position of raising again the kind of question that was raised here last year, and did 
so on juristic grounds, we might expose what is really a remarkable achievement to 
quite unnecessary criticism. After all, we are only making proposals to the Committee 
of Ministers, and accordingly I propose to smother any juristic difficulties I may feel 
25 TP vol 6, p106
26 TP, vol 6, p108
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and equally to smother any minor questions of the wording of the clause; and instead 
to welcome and accept the [clause] in the spirit in which I believe it was drafted.27 
A more emotive approach was taken by another of the French delegates, M. 
Bastid:
Property is an extension of the man, and man cannot feel safe if he is exposed to 
arbitrary dispossession…I do not know if  there is any right  more ancient or more 
firmly established than the right  to own property.  In all  civilised nations, there are 
rules to protect individuals against arbitrary confiscation. There are also enactments 
which, with certain reservations and in certain circumstances, permit expropriation in 
the public interest. I think that the legislative material which will be at the disposal of a 
commission or a court,  for reference,  is  abundant.  Consequently I  am in  no way 
anxious regarding any hesitation which the commission or the court may have.28 
Following a lengthy debate, a vote was taken on the amendment to include 
the  property  right  in  the  form  of  wording  proposed  by  CoLAQ.  The 
amendment was carried by 97 votes, there being 11 abstentions.29 The new 
draft Convention overall was carried unanimously. 
The views of the Assembly were made known to the Ministers, who convened 
again in November 1950. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe impressed upon them the 
importance of the amendments adopted by the Assembly, indicating them to 
be:
Much more modest than the Assembly would have desired, and represented what the 
Assembly considered to be the bare minimum.30
Regardless of this imprecation on the part of Maxwell-Fyfe, the Ministers were 
not prepared to accept the property right. It was agreed, on the motion of the 
British delegate Ernest Davies, with little reported discussion, that the matter 
should be referred to a Committee of Experts for further consideration, with a 
27 TP vol 6, pp97-98
28 TP, vol 6, p120
29 TP, vol 6, p156
30 TP, vol 7, p226-7.
28
protocol  envisaged at  some later  stage.31 (It  will  be recalled that,  on their 
previous consideration of the draft, the Committee of Experts had not looked 
at  the  property  right  since  no  agreement  had  been  reached  on  it  by  the 
Assembly.) The remainder of the draft was agreed with some minor revisions, 
and formed the basis of the European Convention on Human Rights as we 
know it. The Convention was signed in Rome on 4th November 1950.
Deliberation over the property right continued. The ire of the Assembly had 
been provoked by the Ministers in returning the matter to the Experts, and the 
pressure  was  on  to  reach  some  compromise.  The  Secretariat-General 
observed:
It appears necessary to define as accurately as possible what is meant by the right of 
property,  what is  meant by “arbitrary confiscation” and what exceptions are to be 
permitted  in  the  general  interest  to  the  individual  rights  of  enjoyment  of  one’s 
possessions.
 
The preparation of definitions on these points will presumably need to take account of 
the  national  legislation  in  different  countries  on  such  matters  as  nationalisation, 
requisition in time of war, expropriation for public use, agrarian reform, confiscation in 
criminal law, death duties and reversion to the State on intestacy. 32 
The Committee of Experts met again in February 1951. It had before it the 
draft of the property right adopted by the Assembly, together with an alternate 
version  submitted  by  the  British  government,33 and  a  further  alternative 
proposed by the Belgian government.34 The consensus, as at the previous 
meeting of the experts where the matter was not technically even on the table 
for discussion, was that the property right should be included. However, as 
31 TP, vol 7, p34
32 TP, vol 7, p128
33 Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. This provision, however, 
shall not be considered as infringing in any way the right of a state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary either 
to serve the ends of justice or to secure the payment of monies due whether by way of taxes or otherwise, or to 
ensure the acquisition or use of property in accordance with the general interest – TP, vol 7, p186   
34 Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of 
his possessions except in the public interest, in such cases and by such procedure as may be established by law and 
subject to fair compensation which shall be fixed in advance. The penalty of total confiscation of property shall not be 
permitted.
The present measures shall not however infringe, in any way, the right of a State to pass legislation to control the use 
of property accordance with the general interest or to impose taxes or other contributions – TP, vol 7, p 194
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with  CoLAQ, the exact  wording proved less easy for  the experts to agree 
upon. 
The majority of the experts were of the view that the right to compensation 
should be expressly enshrined in the text. However, the British delegation was 
under strict instruction to withhold support from any version of the text that 
included such an entitlement.  Other  delegates suggested that there be no 
reference  to  “fair”  compensation,  in  order  that  the  amount  awarded  by 
member states to their nationals would not be capable of review at European 
level. 
Ultimately it became apparent that no consensus could be reached, and the 
committee  concluded  it  would  be  premature  to  draft  the  protocol.  It  was 
decided  that  suggested  texts  should  be  proposed  by  the  individual 
delegations to their national governments for approval before returning to the 
Ministers.35 This breakdown carried with it the implication that there was no 
shared ideology on property rights amongst the member states, an implication 
which was unwelcome in the post-war political climate of consensus.
Despite the pressure growing on all  parties to reach a compromise, at the 
subsequent meetings of the experts in April  and then in June of the same 
year, compensation was once again at the centre of the dispute. The British 
government were at the eye of the storm, and despite having secured the 
agreement of the majority of the committee to exclude express use of the 
word “compensation” in the text, still the article could not be finalised.36    
With pressure on the British government to reach a compromise, a further 
amended text was produced by them prior to a hastily convened meeting of 
the  experts  in  July  1951.37 The  text  was  altered  slightly  to  remove  the 
35 TP, vol 7, p200-205
36 The text at this stage read: Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by 
law and by the general principles of international law. 
The present measures [preceding provisions] shall not, however, infringe in any way the right of a State to pass 
legislation  to  control  the  use  of  property  in  accordance  with  the  general  interest  or  to  impose  taxes  or  other 
contributions.  
37 Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of 
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
30
reference  to  courts,  in  order  that  other  public  authority  orders,  such  as 
confiscation by customs authorities, would also be excluded from protection.38 
Finally,  more than two years after  discussions were begun by CoLAQ and 
eight months after the Convention itself had been signed, a form of wording in 
respect of the right to protection of property had been agreed. 
The Convention  is  authentic  in  two  languages.  The English  text  reads as 
follows:
 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject 
to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way infringe the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance 
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties.39  
The French text:
Toute personne physique ou morale a droit au respect de ses biens. Nul ne peut être 
privé de sa propriété que pour cause d’utilité publique et dans les conditions prévues 
par la loi et les principes généraux du droit international. 
Les dispositions precedents ne portent pas atteinte au droit que possèdent les Etats 
de metre en vigueur les lois qu’il jugent necessaries pour réglementer l’usage des 
biens conformément à l’intérêt general ou pour assurer le paiement des impost ou 
d’autres contributions ou des amendes.    
It may be helpful to note that the vocabulary used in the English version does 
not appear to be identical to that in the French. The English text, in the first 
sentence,  protects  peaceful  enjoyment  of  “possessions”,  confirming  in  the 
second sentence that no one shall be deprived of his “possessions” except in 
principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way infringe the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems 
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or 
other contributions or of penalties imposed by courts.
38 TP, vol 7, p 312 et seq.
39 TP, vol 7, p338
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certain circumstances. By contrast, the first sentence of the French text refers 
to respect for “biens,” while the second talks of deprivation of “propriété.” In 
the second paragraph, the English version deals with “the use of property” 
where the French text refers to “l’usage des biens.” The rules on interpretation 
of treaties contained in the Vienna Convention apply to assist in reconciling 
any  potential  difference  in  meaning  between  the  two  authentic  language 
versions of the text.40  
The text was approved by the Ministers days later and sent to the Assembly 
for their comments. In its lengthy commentary on the draft, the Secretariat-
General  noted  that  it  represented  “the  greatest  measure  of  agreement 
possible”  amongst  the  member  states,  whilst  being  a  compromise.41  The 
commentary goes on to explain certain of the alterations. The reference to 
“arbitrary confiscation” had been changed as it was considered too imprecise 
in a legal text.  No express right to compensation was included, although it 
was felt  this was adequately covered by the reference to the principles of 
international law.
Despite  continued  disagreement  over  other  articles  of  the  protocol,  the 
Assembly were prepared to approve the text on the property right in the form 
proposed  by  the  Ministers.  The  First  Protocol  was  signed  in  the  Salon 
d’Horloge in Paris on 20 March 1952. 
Britain was one of the few signatories to ratify the ECHR on the first possible 
day to do so, 8 March 1951. The UK general election in October of the same 
year saw Clement Attlee’s Labour government, with its radical programme of 
nationalisation,  replaced  by  a  Conservative  government  under  Winston 
Churchill.  This change in political direction meant many of the reservations 
argued  so  vehemently  by  the  UK delegation,  particularly  in  regard  to  the 
payment of compensation for compulsory nationalisation, lost their force, and 
the First Protocol was ratified without difficulty on 3rd November 1952. The 
40 See further discussion at p44 below
41 TP, vol 8, p6
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protocol, including the property right, finally came into force on 18th May 1954 
after ten ratifications had been deposited.
1.3 From ratification to the Human Rights Act 1998
From a  domestic  point  of  view,  the  progress  of  the  ECHR then  falls  into 
something  of  a  black  hole.  It  took  almost  five  decades for  the  rights  and 
freedoms encapsulated by the Convention,  including the all-important  First 
Protocol, to become part of UK domestic law, a result finally achieved by the 
Human Rights Act and the Scotland Act, both in 1998. During that time frame, 
the parameters of P1-1 were explored in a series of important judgments by 
the European Court of Human Rights, which will be considered in chapters 
two and three below. Property law in Scotland was also undergoing a major 
programme of reform during the latter part of this period. Why did it take so 
long for the Human Rights Act to come into existence?
A full answer to that question is beyond the scope of this thesis, but a brief 
overview of the key factors may be of some assistance in understanding the 
context in which P1-1 cases have been decided domestically. The key to the 
status of the ECHR throughout this time period was the firmly held belief in 
Britain’s unwritten constitution and its ability to protect human rights without 
the need for incorporation of the Convention. Britain considered itself to have 
a “long and proud”  tradition in  respect  of  civil  liberties and the consensus 
amongst the states involved in drafting the ECHR accorded with that view.42 
Legislation was introduced from time to time to ensure certain areas of the law 
were consonant with the principles of the Convention, and beyond that, the 
internal system of checks and balances on the legislature by the judiciary and 
the universal suffrage enjoyed by the British public in electing that legislature 
were considered to be enough.  
42 In reporting back from the meeting of Ministers in August 1950, where Britain had blocked various suggested 
amendments to the Convention overall, Ernest Davies noted that “many of my continental colleagues found it difficult 
to understand why Britain, which they look upon as the cradle of Parliamentary democracy, should oppose the article 
on political liberty”.
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This view was reinforced by the difficulties incorporation was thought likely to 
cause to  the  constitution  which  had been an effective  guardian of  human 
rights  for  so  long.  The  supremacy  of  Parliament  was  the  paramount 
consideration. Parliament, made up of representatives elected by the country, 
was  seen  to  be  the  key  instrument  of  democracy,  and  there  seemed 
something counterintuitive about compromising the powers of that institution 
in  the  name  of  advancing  human  rights.  The  argument  was  that  if  the 
Convention was expressly incorporated into domestic law, it would have to be 
entrenched,  meaning  it  could  not  be  undone  by  the  decision  of  a  future 
Parliament. Tying the hands of future governments in this way would mean 
removing the “unfettered” power to take decisions that was seen to be so 
important. 
The sovereignty point tied into further concern over the role of the judiciary in 
interpreting  an  entrenched  ECHR.  If  judges  were  able  to  rule  on  the 
compliance of  legislation with  Convention rights,  then the final  say on the 
meaning of Britain’s laws fell  to the bench rather than to the Commons. It 
would be undemocratic for this power to be removed from the elected officials 
in the Houses of Parliament.  Additionally,  it  was unclear how the judiciary 
would be able to  cope with  “open textured”  legislation such as the ECHR 
when they were  accustomed to  working with  the (reputedly)  tightly-drafted 
technical  legislation  which  emanates  from  Westminster  draftsmen.  An 
additional  worry  was whether  the justice system in this country was really 
equipped to deal with the pressures of the potential increased caseload an 
incorporated ECHR might give rise to. Commentators expressed the view that 
the judiciary was already overworked.43 
Despite the lack of incorporation, the Convention increasingly influenced the 
development of domestic civil rights law. In 1966, the government accepted 
the jurisdiction of the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and allowed the 
right of individual petition as a means of access to justice there. This provision 
had formed an optional part of the ECHR since its inception, but had not been 
accepted by the UK at the time of signature or ratification.. 
43 Although perhaps only judicial commentators
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Some applications  were  made  to  Strasbourg  as  a  result.  In  terms  of  the 
property  right,  two  important  cases  challenging  major  legislative  reform 
projects  were  determined by the  ECtHR44 and P1-1 points  were  raised in 
some other applications.45 However, all possible routes of appeal domestically 
had  to  be  exhausted  before  an  application  could  be  made  to  the  former 
European  Commission  on  Human  Rights,46 who  would  then  make  an 
admissibility decision as to whether the case was suitable to be heard by the 
ECtHR.  The  process  was  complicated  and  time  consuming,  with  the 
estimated average length of time taken for a case to come before the bench in 
Strasbourg approaching six years. More pertinently, from the point of view of 
effective  protection  of  human rights,  such  an  application  was  “fearsomely 
expensive,”47 and no legal aid was available.   
The status of jurisprudence emanating from Strasbourg became progressively 
more uncertain.  In  a series of  leading cases in  England and Wales,48 the 
courts  seemed  increasingly  willing  to  deal  with  questions  surrounding  the 
Convention  and  to  refer  to  its  tenets  in  their  decisions.  The  position  in 
Scotland was quite different, with Lord Ross declaring:
So far as Scotland is concerned, I am of the opinion that the court is not entitled to 
have  regard  to  the  Convention  either  as  an  aid  to  construction  or  otherwise…a 
convention is irrelevant to legal proceedings unless and until its provisions have been 
incorporated or given effect to in legislation.49   
Although  this  remark  was  obiter,  it  demonstrates  the  lack  of  clarity 
surrounding the implications of the Convention for the domestic courts.
44 Lithgow v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 329; James v United Kingdom (1984) 6 EHRR CD 475
45 See, for example, Handyside v UK (1976) 1 EHRR 737
46 The Commission was abolished by the 11th protocol to the ECHR. Since its coming into force in 1998, applications 
are made directly to the Court.
47 Dworkin, p 18
48 For example R v Secretary of State for the Home Dept, ex parte Brind [1991] 1 AC 696 (statutory interpretation), 
Observer Ltd and Guardian Newspapers Ltd v United Kingdom (1992) 14 EHRR 153 and 229 ((the Spycatcher cases 
on freedom of expression), R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith [1996] 1 All ER 257 (judicial review)
49 Kaur v Lord Advocate 1981 SLT 322 at 330.
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Pressure  built  both  nationally  and  internationally  for  incorporation  to  be 
effected.  The  claims  that  Britain’s  conventional  constitution  was  able  to 
protect human rights as robustly as the ECHR became unconvincing in the 
face of the evidence stuttering through from the UK applications which did 
eventually reach Strasbourg. As the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine of Lairg, 
noted in his opening speech at the second reading of the Human Rights Bill:
Our legal system has been unable to protect people in the 50 cases in which the 
European Court has found a violation of the Convention by the United Kingdom. That 
is more than any other country except Italy. The trend has been upwards. Over half 
the violations have been found since 1990.50 
By 1990, of the 22 signatories to the ECHR, the UK was the only one not to 
have a written Bill of Rights, and one of a handful not to have incorporated the 
ECHR.51 The European Parliament were by that stage looking on to “second 
generation” economic and social rights (embodied in the European Charter of 
Fundamental and Social  Rights),  and even discussing “third generation” or 
“green” rights.52 From being a frontrunner in the field of civil liberties, Britain 
was beginning to lag behind. 
The keys to incorporation lay, of course, in the hands of the politicians. There, 
too, opinions were beginning to shift. In June 1976, the Labour government 
under James Callaghan published a discussion document on human rights in 
general and the ECHR in particular.53 That paper served to highlight some of 
the issues outlined above, and in the ensuing debate, there were indicators of 
a move towards incorporation.54 In 1977, Lady Thatcher indicated that she 
was in favour of incorporation, although no movement was made to effect 
such a result during her time in office. 
50 OR, House of Lords, 3 November 1997, vol. 582, col.1228
51 IPPR Constitution Paper No 1: A British Bill of Rights, p 9
52 ibid., p 9
53 Legislation on Human Rights with particular reference to the European Convention – A Discussion Document 
(1976)
54 In  1977,  the  Standing  Advisory  Committee  on  Human  Rights  in  Northern  Ireland  recommended  that  the 
Convention be incorporated. In 1978 the House of Lords Select Committee on a Bill of Rights again recommended 
that the Convention should be incorporated.
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The  turning  point  came  in  1993  when  John  Smith,  then  leader  of  the 
opposition  Labour  party,  pledged himself  and his  party  to  the  principle  of 
incorporating the ECHR. A party consultation paper, Bringing Rights Home, 
was published in November 1996, and its findings resulted in a commitment to 
incorporation appearing in the 1997 Labour election manifesto.
Following success in the general election that year,  the Human Rights Bill 
became a flagship piece of legislation for the new Labour government. The 
Bill  was  published in  October  1997 alongside  a  Home Office  white  paper 
entitled  Rights  Brought  Home.  The  white  paper  outlined  the  various 
arguments in favour of the incorporation of the ECHR as considered above, 
concluding:
Our aim is a straightforward one. It is to make more directly accessible the rights 
which the British people already enjoy under the Convention.55 
The  white  paper  outlined  the  rights  protected  by  the  Convention  and 
explained the mechanism of incorporation envisaged by the Bill.  The Bill was 
introduced into  Parliament  shortly  thereafter  and received Royal  Assent  in 
August  1998.  Heated  debates  over  the  Bill  took  place  at  each  of  its 
Parliamentary  stages  –  however,  they  focused  on  the  way  in  which  the 
Convention  was  to  operate  within  domestic  law.  It  does  not  appear  that 
detailed consideration was given to the substantive convention rights at all, 
and indeed, the merits or otherwise of the property right do not appear to have 
been discussed at any point. Perhaps this should be obvious – the legislation 
was marketed simply as an exercise in enabling British citizens to use rights 
of  which  they  already  had  the  benefit,  but  with  the  advantage  of  greater 
accessibility. 
 
The Human Rights Act came into force in October 2000.
1.4 The Effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Scotland Act 1998
55 Para 1.18
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It may be helpful at this stage to give an outline of the various ways in which 
the rights encapsulated in the ECHR are given effect as a matter of domestic 
law,  as  this  provides  the  necessary  grounding  for  the  analysis  of  the 
jurisprudence which will follow in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. It is 
important to note that the position in Scotland varies somewhat from that in 
the other parts of the United Kingdom. 
Convention  rights  form part  of  domestic  law under  the Human Rights  Act 
1998. This legislation provides that the Convention rights – which are listed, 
and include, at s1(1)(b), articles one to three of the First Protocol – are to take 
effect in a variety of ways enumerated in the Act. Briefly put, these are as 
follows:
• Primary and subordinate legislation must be given effect to in a way which 
is compatible with Convention rights. There is no need for there to be an 
ambiguity before reference to the Convention will be required – legislation 
must be interpreted in such a way unless it is impossible to do so.56
• Where a rights-friendly interpretation cannot be made, the Court can make 
a  “declaration  of  incompatibility”.57 The incompatible  legislation  remains 
fully  in  force  despite  such  a  declaration  having  been  issued.  It  is  for 
Parliament to decide how such an incompatibility is to be rectified, if at all. 
The sovereignty of Parliament is therefore maintained, although it might be 
wondered why anyone would wish to undertake what would inevitably be a 
lengthy  litigation  process  simply  to  achieve  this  result.  The  Act  also 
provides a locus for the Crown to be joined to a case where it looks as 
though a declaration of incompatibility is a possibility, presumably to argue 
the government line, if that would be appropriate.58
• In the case of proposed new legislation, a Minister of the Crown in charge 
of a Bill  must make a statement  as to the compatibility  of  the Bill  with 
Convention rights.59 
56 s3
57 s4
58 s5
59 s19
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• An act of a public authority which is not compatible with the Convention 
rights will be unlawful. “Act” here includes omission. Some specification is 
given as to the meaning of “public authority” in the statute,60 although no 
doubt there will  be further jurisprudence to follow on this point. The Act 
also provides that such a public authority act will  not be unlawful  if the 
authority  could  not  have  acted  otherwise  owing  to  the  existence  of 
incompatible primary legislation. The intent here is obviously to prevent the 
provisions regarding declarations of incompatibility being circumvented by 
challenging the subsidiary actions rather than the incompatible statute.
• The court  has the power to award a judicial  remedy such as it  deems 
appropriate in any given case. This includes damages.61
• The  Act  specifies  that  the  Convention  rights  are  intended  to  exist  in 
conjunction with existing human rights, rather than as a replacement for 
the  same.  Specific  provisions  regarding  freedom  of  expression  and 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion are also made.
Additionally, the Act provides that:
A court  or  tribunal  determining a  question which  has arisen in  connection with  a 
Convention right must take into account any— 
(a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court 
of Human Rights, 
(b) opinion of the Commission given in a report adopted under Article 31 of 
the Convention, 
(c) decision of the Commission in connection with Article 26 or 27(2) of the 
Convention, or 
(d) decision  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  taken  under  Article  46  of  the 
Convention, 
whenever made or given, so far as, in the opinion of the court or tribunal, it is relevant 
to the proceedings in which that question has arisen.62
The  wording  of  the  obligation  on  the  courts  to  "take  account  of"  the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence suggests some degree of discretion, although the 
60 s6
61 s8
62 s2(1)
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House of Lords has indicated that a Strasbourg precedent should normally be 
followed unless there is a strong reason to deviate from it.63 
The Scotland Act adopts a different approach in respect of the human rights 
implications for devolved matters. 
• An Act of the Scottish Parliament may not include provisions which are 
incompatible with Convention rights as defined in the HRA. Any Act which 
is incompatible with Convention rights is ultra vires the competence of the 
Scottish Parliament. Essentially,  purported legislation which contravenes 
Convention rights will not be law.64
• A member  of  the  Scottish  Executive  in  charge  of  a  bill  must  make  a 
statement  as  to  whether  it  is  within  the  legislative  competence  of  the 
Parliament, which will  include compliance with Convention rights, before 
the  bill  is  introduced.65 The  Presiding  Officer  must  also  scrutinise  the 
competence  of  the  Bill  at  the  same  stage.66 If  there  is  doubt  over 
compliance, a reference can be made to the Judicial  Committee of the 
Privy Council  (soon to be replaced by the Supreme Court67)  for  a final 
determination.68 In practice, the human rights implications of proposals for 
legislative reform will often be scrutinised prior to the introduction of the Bill 
in Parliament. For example, the Scottish Law Commission now invariably 
include a statement on Convention compliance in any Report proposing 
new legislation. As yet, no Act of the Scottish Parliament has been found 
to be incompetent as a result of conflict with human rights. 
• A  member  of  the  Scottish  Executive  has  no  power  to  make  any 
subordinate  legislation,  or  to  do  any  other  act,  which  would  be 
incompatible with Convention rights.69 A member of the Scottish Executive 
will include Scottish Ministers, junior Scottish Ministers and civil servants. 
63 R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 1 AC 837. An interesting discussion of some 
potential difficulties with this approach where domestic precedent conflicts with Strasbourg judgments can be found 
in Kay v Lambeth Borough Council [2006] 2 AC 465.
64 Scotland Act 1998, s29
65 Scotland Act 1998, ss31(1) and (2)
66 Scotland Act 1998, s19
67 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, sched 9
68 Scotland Act 1998, s33
69 Scotland Act 1998, s57(2)
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The term "act" has been given a wide construction, although there is some 
doubt over whether an omission can fall within this definition.70 
 
Since compliance with Convention rights is a pre-requisite for competence of 
acts  of  the  Scottish  Executive  in  the  form  of  legislation  or  otherwise, 
challenges to such acts must be raised as a devolution issue.71    
One practical impact of the different approach taken to Convention rights in 
the Scotland Act is that the final say on the legitimacy of legislation, when it 
comes  to  matters  of  Convention  compatibility,  will  no  longer  lie  with  the 
legislature or the executive, but rather with the judiciary. In some senses, this 
puts judges in rather an exposed position.
The question  of  title  to  raise  an  action  in  respect  of  non-compliance with 
Convention rights has the same answer both north and south of the border. 
Proceedings  cannot  be  brought  in  the  United  Kingdom  unless  the  party 
seeking to raise the action would be a victim in the meaning of article 34 of 
the ECHR were he to make an application to the ECtHR. 72 
     
1.5 Conclusion
Protection of property had been envisaged as a part of the new European bill 
of rights from the very beginning. However, a combination of ideological and 
political differences amongst the member states had the result that the nature 
of the right was furiously debated at every stage of drafting. These conflict 
lines were so pronounced that no agreement could be reached in time for the 
signature of the Convention itself, with the First Protocol not appearing until a 
further eight months had passed.
A review of  the materials  recording  the  drafting of  the  ECHR gives  some 
useful insight into the way P1-1 was finally put together. The delegates were 
under pressure to reach some form of accord. The points of view held by 
70 See R v HMA 2003 SC (PC) 21
71 See Scotland Act 1998, sched 6
72 Human Rights Act 1998, s7(7) and Scotland Act 1998, s100(1)
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various  member  states  were  in  some  cases  in  direct  opposition  to  one 
another, a situation in which no compromise was really possible, and yet a 
compromise was sought. The property right ultimately represented what might 
reasonably be called an attempt to please all  parties but  which,  in reality, 
pleased none. The ambiguity in the wording of P1-1 was even recognised at 
the  time,  but  the  view  was  taken  by  some  that  jurisprudence  was  the 
appropriate route for clarification.  
That  jurisprudence  has  been  produced  at  a  rapid  pace  by  the  former 
European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights from the 
1950s onwards. The UK courts have also had occasion to deliberate over P1-
1, with increasing frequency since the Convention rights were given effect in 
domestic law through the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Scotland Act 1998. 
The question to be asked is whether this case law has provided the clarity in 
respect of P1-1 which the drafters intended it to, whilst still remaining true to 
the original spirit in which the right was conceived. It is to this question that 
the thesis will now turn.   
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CHAPTER TWO: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
"Speak English!" said the Eaglet. "I don't know the meaning of half those long words, 
and I don't believe you do either!"73
2.1 Introduction
The  discussion  in  the  first  chapter  of  this  thesis  highlights  certain  key 
concepts in the genesis of P1-1 which should inform the subsequent analysis 
of the jurisprudence. It is useful to remember that the property protection was 
always intended to form part of the new European bill  of rights. It seemed 
clear  to  the  authors  of  the  Convention  that  some  elements  of  property 
ownership were political,  and that those interests required to be protected. 
However,  beyond  that  initial  idea,  there  was  little  in  the  way  of  universal 
consensus surrounding the property right.  Differences in political  and legal 
ideology left the ambit of the protection almost impossible to determine. The 
final wording of the right was recognised to be a compromise, containing a 
certain  level  of  ambiguity  which  could  be  resolved  through  judicial 
interpretation. The extent of the right was never certain. The parameters of 
legitimate state interference were not made clear. 
Against that background, it is perhaps not surprising to find that the evolution 
of P1-1 through the jurisprudence has been somewhat faltering. It is certainly 
far from complete. The following chapters of the thesis will attempt to chart 
that  evolutionary  process,  drawing  out  conclusions  as  to  the  current 
understanding of P1-1.
Chapters  two  and  three  will  begin  this  analysis  through  a  detailed 
consideration of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (the 
Court)  and  the  former  European  Commission  of  Human  Rights  (the 
Commission). Chapter two will focus on the wording of the article, seeking to 
systematically define each of the key terms with  a view to setting out the 
parameters  of  the  right.  Chapter  three  will  then  examine  how  the  former 
Commission  and  the  Court  developed  an  approach  to  examining  these 
73 Alice in Wonderland, p25
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parameters  with  a  view  to  establishing  whether  a  violation  of  P1-1  has 
occurred in a given application.   
In this chapter, then, the focus will be on the wording of the article with a view 
to answering the question posed in the chapter title: what does P1-1 mean?
It may be helpful here to give a brief outline of the broad principles adopted in 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence as to interpretation of the Convention. In the first 
place,  the  customary  international  law  rules  on  interpretation  of  treaties 
contained within Part 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 
apply to the ECHR. Article 31 of the Vienna Treaty provides generally that:
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.
In respect of treaties authenticated in more than one language, such as the 
ECHR,  Article  33  provides  that  the  text  is  equally  authoritative  in  each 
language. It also states that:
when a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning …the 
meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of 
the treaty, shall be adopted.
These rules have a clear application in the interpretation of P1-1 since, as 
noted previously,74 the English and French versions of the text of the article do 
not appear to be identical. 
Against the background of the Vienna Convention, the aim of the Court is to 
interpret  the  ECHR  in  a  way  that  will  make  the  protections  it  contains 
meaningful. The intention is to protect rights which are “real and effective.” 
Accordingly,  the  Court  will  not  be  bound  by  purely  formal  or  semantic 
questions as to when a violation may have occurred, but will look directly at 
the action taken by the state and the actual impact on the applicant. This can 
be seen in relation to  questions of  deprivation of  possessions in the P1-1 
74 p32 above
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jurisprudence, where a de facto deprivation of property will still be considered 
an interference with  P1-1 notwithstanding that formal title remains with the 
applicant.75 The emphasis is on effectiveness,  and this principle resonates 
throughout the jurisprudence.
One tool used in the case law to bring about the desired effectiveness is the 
notion  of  autonomous  concepts.  The  Convention  applies  to  an  increasing 
number of states with no unifying law or set of legal principles. Accordingly, in 
determining Convention applications,  the Court  does not  bind itself  by the 
definitions given in national legislation as to particular terms, preferring rather 
to build its own meanings which can be applied in the Convention context. In 
the P1-1 jurisprudence, this is demonstrated most clearly in relation to the 
term “possessions,” which has been very widely interpreted in the Strasbourg 
case law so as to ensure the protection can be as far reaching as it  was 
designed to be.
It is also helpful to bear in mind the Court’s own description of the ECHR as:
a living instrument which…must be interpreted in the light of present day conditions.76 
For rights to be effectively protected, account must be taken of the changing 
norms  and  values  of  the  European  society  with  which  the  Convention  is 
concerned.  Interpretation  of  the Convention should  not  be  fixed,  but  must 
continue to evolve over time.    
Arguably the Strasbourg approach to interpretation of the Convention causes 
particular difficulty in the context of P1-1. Ownership of property and the rights 
which  attend  to  it  is,  traditionally,  the  domain  of  private  lawyers.  The 
autonomous, adaptive terminology of the Convention sits in sharp contrast to 
the  stark  and  formalistic  language  which  is  most  often  seen  in  domestic 
legislation regulating the law of property. In Scotland in particular, the focus 
on defined principle and certainty in application is considered to be one of the 
key strengths of property law. The potential for conflict here is obvious.       
75 See, inter alia, Bramelid and Malmström v Sweden (8588/79) 12 December 1983. 
76 Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 1
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In this chapter, an attempt will be made to bridge the gap between these two 
modes of legal construction. P1-1 contains six terms which are fundamental to 
any understanding of its application. The Court and the former Commission 
have given consideration in an overwhelming number of cases to the exact 
meanings intended to be captured by the wording of P1-1.Through a review of 
this key jurisprudence, this chapter will seek to formulate a concrete definition 
for  the  terms  natural  or  legal  person,  possession,  peaceful  enjoyment,  
deprivation, control and public/general interest.
 
2.2 Every natural or legal person
The  first  article  of  the  Convention  confirms  that  every  juristic  person  is 
intended to enjoy the protection offered by the ECHR. The opening of P1-1 
reinforces this blanket protection, making it clear that bodies corporate are 
capable of  benefiting from property  rights  in the same way as individuals. 
Although bodies corporate are subject to the same rules as natural persons 
when it comes to determining whether an interference has taken place and, if 
so,  whether  it  was  justified,  applications  by  companies  do  raise  some 
particular questions when it comes to determining the identity of the “victim” of 
such an interference.  
2.2.1 Shareholders and "special connection"
From what has been said in the preceding paragraph, it is evident that where 
a company’s property rights have been violated, the company is the victim 
and is entitled to make an application under P1-1 in its own name. However, 
in certain circumstances, shareholders of the company may also have victim 
status.  In  X  v  Austria,77 the  applicant  individual  ran  a  company  which 
produced  superphosphate.  The  state  owned  a  factory  manufacturing  the 
same product, and the applicant complained that his company was subjected 
to a string of interferences from the government, including the withholding of 
promised state funding for economic development, in order that his company 
would go out of business, thereby removing any competition to the state-run 
factory. Although the majority of allegations made by the applicant concerned 
77 (1706/62) 4 October 1966
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interference with the property rights of the company, the Commission was of 
the view that the applicant as an individual was nonetheless a victim in terms 
of article 25 (now article 34) of the Convention.78 Particular regard was had to 
the  fact  the  applicant  held  91%  of  the  shares  in  the  Company.  The 
Commission considered it irrelevant that, under Austrian domestic law, only 
the company would be entitled to make a claim. Similarly, in Kaplan v UK,79 
restrictions  were  imposed  on  a  company  on  the  basis  of  the  applicant 
individual’s  alleged personal  unfitness  to  act  as  a  controller.  Although the 
interference  was  with  the  company’s  rights,  the  applicant  had  a  direct 
personal interest in the subject matter of the complaint.
It appears that a close connection between the company and its shareholders 
will be required before the shareholders will be considered as “victims”. Some 
idea of  these limitations is given in  Yarrow v UK.80 Here,  a wholly owned 
subsidiary company of Yarrow was nationalised, impacting on the value of 
Yarrow’s shares. The company itself, together with three of its shareholders, 
complained that their rights under P1-1 had been violated by the manifest 
inequality of the statutory compensation scheme. The shareholders argued 
that they had locus to make a claim based on X v Austria and Kaplan v UK. 
However, the Commission distinguished the earlier cases. It considered that 
the shareholders had only been indirectly affected by the alleged violation.
In  previous  cases  where  a  shareholding  in  a  company  was  enough  to  give  an 
applicant  “victim”  status,  the  individual  concerned  held  a  substantial  majority 
shareholding in  the company.  In effect  they were  carrying  on their  own business 
through the medium of the company and had a direct personal interest in the subject 
matter of the complaint. The circumstances here are not comparable.81
78 The relevant part of article 25 read: “The Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary-General of 
the Council of Europe from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the 
victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention, provided that the 
High Contracting Party against which the complaint has been lodged has declared that it recognizes the competence 
of the Commission to receive such petitions.” The amended wording in article 34 states that: “The Court may receive 
applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a 
violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto. The 
High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right."
79 (1982) 4 EHRR 64
80 (1983) 5 EHRR 498
81 ibid, at p.185
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That being the case, it was for the company to make a complaint (as it had 
done) rather than the shareholders.
It seems, then, that two factors must be present before a shareholder will be 
considered a victim of an interference with the rights of the company in which 
he or she holds shares. In the first place, the shareholder will have to hold a 
controlling interest in the shares of the company. Secondly, there must be a 
“special  relationship”  between  the  shareholder  and  the  company.   If  both 
these criteria are met, as in X v Austria and Kaplan v UK, it will be competent 
for the shareholder to make an application directly. If, however, one or both of 
these conditions is unfulfilled, as in Yarrow v UK, it will be for the company to 
make an application directly to protect its own rights.
But what if the company is prevented from making its own application? This is 
the issue which arose in  Agrotexim v Greece.82 Here,  the applicants were 
companies  who  held  shares  in  an  associated  company,  a  brewery.  The 
brewery  wished  to  develop  land  on  two  of  its  sites,  but  the  land  was 
earmarked by the Athens council for expropriation, with signs to that effect 
being placed on the sites. The brewery business was failing, and had become 
subject  to  a  special  liquidation  procedure,  in  which  the  liquidators  were 
appointed by the state. The applicant companies argued that the liquidators 
worked for the government and were under no obligation to take account of 
the shareholders’ views. This effectively prevented the brewery from making 
its own application under the Convention.   
In its judgment, the Court clarified that a majority shareholding in itself would 
not  be  enough  to  justify  granting  victim  status  to  shareholders.  Special 
circumstances would have to exist. The Court seemed to agree that, were the 
company prevented from making its own application,  this could amount  to 
such special circumstances. In the event, the Court was not satisfied on the 
evidence that  the shareholders had made any attempt to interact  with  the 
liquidators  or  to  have  them  replaced,  and  accordingly  did  not  find  it 
established that the brewery was incapable of making its own application.
82 (1996) 21 EHRR 250
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The  Court’s  reasoning  here  seems  to  significantly  expand  the  scope  of 
“special circumstances.” The situation is not comparable to X v Austria, where 
the shareholder effectively  was the company, or even to  Kaplan, where the 
identity  of  the  shareholder  was  closely  tied  to  the  interference  in  the 
company’s  rights.  In  Agrotexim,  the  shareholders  held  only  a  secondary 
interest in the company’s  property rights.  The shares were not themselves 
being  expropriated;  the  impact  on  the  shareholders  would  simply  be  a 
reduction of the value of their shares, or a loss of dividend at a later stage. 
However, the expansion is perhaps justified in view of the particular complaint 
made  by  Agrotexim.  The  liquidators  appointed  in  the  case  had  a  direct 
connection  to  the  state.  If  they  had  refused  to  listen  to  the  pleas  of  the 
shareholders for an application under P1-1, then in a sense, the omission of 
the liquidators to act is  an omission by the state which interferes with  the 
shareholders’  rights  under  P1-1.  Arguably  it  is  the  shareholders’  rights 
themselves, rather than the property held by the company,  which is being 
interfered with.   
Where this leaves the issue of “special connection” is unclear. The difficulty 
may be that insufficient jurisprudence exists as yet  from which a definitive 
definition of this term can be extrapolated. In any event,  there is probably 
some sense in arguing that such a definition should be argued on a case-by-
case  basis,  as  cases  concerning  “piercing  the  corporate  veil”  are  often 
considered to do.     
2.2.2 Conclusion
 Bodies corporate benefit  from the protection of  P1-1 in the same way as 
natural  persons.  Shareholders  will  also be  entitled to  make an application 
under P1-1 where there has been an interference with the possessions of a 
company provided that (a) they hold a majority of shares in the company and 
(b) they have a special connection with that company.  What will  qualify as 
such  a  “special  connection”  is  unclear,  and  it  may  be  a  question  most 
correctly answered on a case by case basis.   
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2.3 Possessions
Of all the key terms in P1-1, "possessions" is perhaps the one which demands 
the most flexibility.  It is not possible to give an exhaustive definition of the 
term, and it is arguable that doing so would be undesirable in any event; the 
property  right  should  not  be  so  rigid  as  to  be  unable  to  cope  with  new 
developments  in  technology and law which  allow new types  of  rights  and 
things  to  come  into  existence  at  a  rapid  pace.  At  the  same  time,  if  the 
protection offered by P1-1 is to be real and effective, there must be a degree 
of certainty as to how this term will be understood by the Court.
A huge amount of case law has built up around the meaning of "possessions", 
and it is not always easy to reconcile the opinions expressed by the Court in 
different judgments. The jurisprudence does, however, illustrate that the Court 
will  not  be  bound  by  traditional  private  law  views  of  what  constitutes  a 
"possession." The word has an autonomous meaning for the purposes of P1-
1 and the parameters of the definition are set by the Court in that context. It 
also shows us the key factors taken into account by the Court in determining 
what falls within the definition. Understanding the approach taken by the Court 
should offer some guidance for jurists attempting to anticipate whether a given 
thing will fall within the definition of "possessions" in novel cases.
2.3.1 Freedom of definition
The  Court  has  stated  that  “possessions”  is  to  be  treated  as  having  an 
autonomous meaning for  the purposes of  the Convention.83 The boundary 
lines of the domestic law of individual states will therefore not delineate the 
extent of the protection afforded by P1-1. 
This  point  is  illustrated  by  the  tragic  case  of  Oneryildiz  v  Turkey.84 The 
applicant  lived in  a  makeshift  dwelling bordering on a refuse tip  in  Kazim 
Karabekir,  near Istanbul. As a result of negligence on the part of the local 
83 Beyeler v Italy (2001) 33 EHRR 52
84 (2005) 41 EHRR 20
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authority,  a  build  up of  methane gas caused an explosion  in  the  tip.  The 
applicant's dwelling was engulfed in a landslide of waste and several of his 
close relatives were killed. Although it  was clear that the applicant had no 
ownership over the land on which the dwelling was situated, and indeed the 
dwelling had been erected in contravention of local planning laws, the Court 
recognised that the applicant had a proprietary interest in the place where he 
lived. The local authority had known of the dwelling and acquiesced to its 
presence  for  almost  five  years,  which  the  Court  took  to  be  a  de  facto 
acknowledgment of the applicant's proprietary interest. The dwelling was his 
possession.   
 
A more complex illustration of the dichotomy between domestically-defined 
property rights and “possessions” in the Convention sense is found in Matos 
E Silva LDA v Portugal.85 The dispute centred round land acquired by the 
applicants’ predecessors by way of Royal Concession one hundred years or 
so previously.  The government sought to transform part  of  the land into a 
nature reserve, and argued inter alia that there could be no violation of P1-1 
because there was a dispute at national level as to whether the Concession 
had  transferred  ownership  to  the  applicants  in  the  first  place.  The  Court 
agreed  that  it  could  not  make  a  determination  of  whether  the  right  of 
ownership belonged to the applicants in Portuguese law. However, it noted 
that the applicants had had unchallenged use of the disputed land for almost 
a century and obtained their revenue by working it, and considered that these 
interests might qualify as possessions for  the purpose of P1-1.86 A similar 
view was adopted by the Commission in their admissibility decision in  Holy 
Monasteries v Greece.87 Here, the disputed area of land had been granted to 
several monasteries several hundred years previously, before the separation 
of  the  Greek  Orthodox  Church  and  the  state.  The  titles  had  never  been 
registered in the names of the various monasteries and the government again 
argued that P1-1 could not be relied upon where the existence of the property 
right  was  disputed  in  domestic  law.  The  Commission  noted  that  the 
government decrees purporting to regain ownership of the land in question 
85 (1997) 24 EHRR 573
86 ibid., para 75
87 (1995) 20 EHRR 1
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referred  to  the  “monastic  patrimony”  and  “transfer  of  ownership”  of  the 
estates, and concluded that these rights could be possessions even though 
they  did  not  derive  from duly  registered  legal  titles.88 The  point  does  not 
appear to have been argued further before the Court.89 
The Court may also infer the existence of a possession from the actions of the 
state,  even  where  there  is  a  dispute  under  the  domestic  legislation.  This 
happened in Zwierzynski v Poland,90 where the applicant had an expropriation 
decision against his land set aside in 1992. The Polish government had been 
attempting to evade the effect of that decision through a series of litigations 
continuing for eight years subsequent to the original verdict. The Court, clearly 
unimpressed by the actions of the government, looked at the inconsistency in 
the treatment of the applicant by various authorities in order to find that his 
right of ownership to the land was recognised by the state since the 1992 
judgement.
[T]he Court observes that on June 21, 1994, the Olsztyn district court acknowledged 
[the applicant] as being the owner of the property when the estate of his parents was 
split up, a decision which was confirmed by the Olsztyn district court on July 8, 1998, 
despite the attempts made by the regional police department to challenge this right. It 
also finds that by entering into negotiations with a view to the sale or lease of the 
property after the entry of the applicant in the land register and while the action to 
acquire the property by usucaption91 was pending, the authorities treated him as the 
owner of the property. It notes that the proceedings instituted subsequently did not 
dispute the applicant's status as owner within the meaning of the Convention.
Finally, the Court finds that the applicant regularly pays land taxes and duties on the 
property in dispute.92 
The applicant's right of ownership was therefore found to be established.
88 ibid., para 71
89 Mr J A Frowein annexed an additional speech, concurring with the Commission’s finding that there had been no 
violation of P1-1 but offering alternative reasons why he had reached this conclusion. In his view, the interest in the 
land had been transferred to the Monasteries at a period when they exercised functions belonging to the Greek state. 
P1-1 does not protect the property of public institutions. In his view, public property was the subject of the discussion 
in this case. Accordingly there could be no violation, since P1-1 did not apply.
90 (2004) 38 EHRR 6
91 Similar to the Scots law doctrine of prescription.
92 Paras 64 and 65
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 So, neither the Court nor the Commission will be restrained by the definitions 
of domestic law. What is more, it appears that the Court does not need any 
definition of what is being protected at all for it to qualify as a “possession”. 
The keynote case of Gasus Dosier und Fördertechnik GmbH v Netherlands93 
will be considered in more detail below.94 In summary however, it dealt with a 
machine sold by the applicants to a Dutch company who had agreed to pay 
the price in instalments over time. The credit agreement contained a standard 
retention of title clause, and when the Dutch company became insolvent, a 
dispute  arose  over  whether  the  machine  in  question  belonged  to  the 
applicants as a result of that clause. The Court was of the view that various 
rights and interests could constitute “possessions”. The applicants’ right in this 
case could be categorised as ownership or as some form of security right. In 
the Court’s view, it was “immaterial” which of these was, in fact, the correct 
categorisation, since P1-1 would apply in either case.95  
It  is  not  disputed that  there is a certain  common sense about  the Court’s 
approach here – if a thing is either A or B, and both A and B are possessions, 
it follows that the thing in question must be a possession. However, once a 
possession  is  found  to  exist,  a  P1-1  application  will  have  to  deal  with  a 
number of subsequent issues – has there been interference with the rights 
which flow from the possession? What form does that interference take? Can 
the interference be justified? In Gasus Dosier, the Court provided answers to 
all  these  questions,  which  resolved  the  issue  as  far  as  that  particular 
application was concerned. However, it is impossible to say whether or how 
the reasoning in the case will apply to future applications when it is not clear 
what the possession in the case was. Such uncertainty is clearly undesirable, 
and may lead to litigation in future cases which might have been avoided if the 
ruling in Gasus had been clearer. 
2.3.2 Key factors
Having  established  that  "possessions"  has  a  unique  definition  for  the 
purposes of P1-1, the jurisprudence can be used as a tool to uncover the key 
93 (1995) 20 EHRR 403
94 See p125 et seq.
95 ibid, para 53
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factors the Court will take into account when making a determination of this 
definition. An analysis suggests there are two principal criteria which come 
into play in a variety of ways – economic value and legitimate expectation.
Economic value
Economic value is at the core of any determination of what can be defined a 
possession. The Court and the Commission have issued a series of opinions 
detailing specific examples of what will fall within the definition and what will 
not. Traditional heritable property will naturally be included, as in  Akdivar v 
Turkey,96 where  the  possession  in  question  was  a  house  owned  by  the 
applicant.  Usufruct  over  land  was  also  considered  to  qualify  in  Wittek  v 
Germany.97 In  the  admissibility  decision  in  Bramelid  and  Malmström  v 
Sweden,98 the Commission noted that the company shares concerned in the 
dispute certainly had an economic value and must therefore be possessions 
for the purposes of P1-1. In Nerva v UK,99 the Commission concurred with the 
view of the domestic courts that tips left to waiting staff by customers through 
credit  and debit card payments were possessions, but of the owner of the 
restaurant,  rather  than  the  employees  for  whom  the  tips  had  been  left. 
Gussenbauer  v  Austria100 dealt  with  two complaints  of  a  criminal  defence 
advocate that his obligation to provide services pro bono in certain cases was 
an  interference  with  his  property  rights.  Although  the  applications  were 
declared inadmissible by the Commission for other reasons, it seemed to be 
conceded by the Austrian government, and accepted by the Commission, that 
the applicant’s right to remuneration had been established as a possession. 
The right  to  a tax refund merits  the protection of  P1-1, as in  Intersplav v 
Ukraine.101 Intellectual property is also included in the definition: Smith Kline 
and  French  Laboratories  v  the  Netherlands102 found  that  a  patent  was  a 
possession,103 and  Melnychuk  v  Ukraine104 confirmed  that  P1-1  applied  to 
96 (1996) 23 EHRR 143
97 (2005) 41 EHRR 46
98 (8588/79), 12 December 1983 
99 (42295/98) 24 September 2002 
100 (4897/71), 9 January 2007 
101 (803/02) 9 January 2007 
102 (12633/87) 4 October 1990 
103 In  making  this  finding the  Commission  referred to  the  fact  that  under Dutch  law,  the  owner  of  a patent  is 
considered as its “proprietor”, and rights under the patent are transferable and assignable.
104 (2006) 42 EHRR 39
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copyright.  Even  an  application  for  an  intellectual  property  right  will  be  a 
possession, since such an application carries with it proprietary rights such as 
the  ability  to  licence  or  assign  the  application,  per  Anheuser  Busch  v 
Portugal105 which dealt with an application to trademark "Budweiser". Similar 
reasoning  was  set  out  in  the  "cybersquatting"  case  of  Paeffgen  GmbH v 
Germany106 where the Court found that a registered domain name constituted 
a possession.107  
On the other hand, RC, AWA and Ors v United Kingdom108 confirmed that the 
right to pursue a hobby (in this case, firing handguns) could not constitute a 
possession. X v Federal Republic of Germany109 concerned a German citizen 
convicted  of  drunk  driving,  who  sought  compensation  under  P1-1  for  the 
continuing loss of his driving licence during the period in which he appealed 
against the original confiscation.  The Commission did not consider ownership 
of  a driving licence to be a possession in this context.  In  Durini  v Italy,110 
ownership of the ancestral home of the Durini family had been bequeathed to 
a charitable trust. However, the first born son in each generation was to be 
given a form of liferent right to occupy the home notwithstanding his lack of 
ownership. Female descendants of the family argued that this was a breach of 
their  rights  under  P1-1.  The Commission was  of  the view that  the liferent 
described did not constitute a possession for the purposes of P1-1.  In  M v 
Austria,111 the application concerned the use of common pasture and forestry 
lands (allmende) owned by the city of Bludenz but reserved for the exclusive 
use of the agricultural community in that area. The city wished to alter the 
nature of the use to which the land could be put, which caused several of 
those who benefited from the rights to claim an interference under P1-1. The 
national courts had established that the land was owned by the city, but that it 
was subject to a public law easement in favour of the agricultural community. 
The Commission was of the view that since the shared use of the common 
105 (2007) 45 EHRR 36
106  (25379/04) 18 September 2007
107 The domain names in question were freundin-online.de, ad-acta.de, Eltern-online.de and duck.de.
108 (1998) 26 EHRR CD 10
109 (9177/80) 6 October 1981 
110 (19217/91) 12 January 1994 
111 (9465/81) 4 October 1984 
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was not  an individual  right  separate and independent  from the agricultural 
community’s own rights, it could not constitute a possession.   
The  cases  in  which  the  Court  is  not  prepared  to  find  that  the  interest 
concerned amounts to a possession for the purposes of P1-1 are perhaps the 
most  illustrative.  By  definition  a  hobby  does  not  involve  the  pursuit  of  a 
financial goal, and the applicants’ driving licence in  X v FRG was not being 
used  for  the  purposes  of  employment.  The  liferent  in  Durini could  not,  it 
appears, be transferred or assigned, and therefore had no realisable financial 
worth.112 The same logic applies to the agricultural community’s rights in M v 
Austria. The interests at issue, although no doubt of value to the applicants, 
had no objective economic value, and therefore the protection of P1-1 did not 
extend to them.
The emphasis on the objective economic value which must attach to property 
before it  can be categorised as a possession in the P1-1 sense seems to 
produce certain results which are difficult to accept. It seems the Court has 
aligned the objective value of an interest with the value it would produce on 
transfer. The inverse proposition, that if the interest cannot be transferred, it 
has no objective economic value, seems also to be accepted. In the case of, 
for  example,  a  hobby,  both propositions are true:  a personal  interest  in  a 
leisure pursuit cannot be transferred, and nor can the market place a value on 
its  worth  to  the  individual  pursuing  it.  However,  both  propositions  do  not 
universally apply. In Durini, the liferent could not be transferred. However, that 
does not mean to say it would not be possible for the market to place a value 
on the worth of that interest to the liferenter through consultation of property 
prices  and  actuarial  tables,  much  as,  for  example,  pension  entitlement  is 
routinely  valued  in  divorce  cases.  Given  the  extremely  wide  definition  of 
“possession” generally employed by the Court, this limitation is not easy to 
understand.  
Acquisition of economic value
112 Compare this with the usufruct in Wittek v Germany, discussed above, which was capable of transfer and actually 
had been transferred in the circumstances of the case.
56
If it can be established that the putative possession under discussion has an 
objective economic value, the next question the Court will consider is whether 
that value has been acquired by the applicant at the time of application. In the 
majority  of  cases,  this  question  will  not  be  difficult  to  answer,  but  more 
complex  examples do  arise.  In  Inze  v  Austria,113 P1-1 was  relied upon in 
conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.114 The deceased had left no will, 
and her property, including her farm, was to be split between her two sons. By 
a rule of Austrian law, working farms could not be split apart on intestacy, and 
instead one of the heirs was obliged to take over the running of the farm, 
paying compensation to the others. In this situation, legitimate children were 
to be given preference over illegitimate children. The applicant was the elder 
of the sons, but had been born out of wedlock. He contended that his rights 
under P1-1 had been violated by the rules as to distribution of the estate. The 
government argued that the case did not fall within the ambit of P1-1 because 
it  applied only to  existing possessions,  and did  not  guarantee the right  to 
acquire possessions either on intestacy or through voluntary dispositions. The 
Court disagreed, finding that the complaint did not concern a potential future 
right. Rather, the applicant had acquired by inheritance a right to a share of 
his deceased mother’s estate, including the farm, subject to a distribution of 
the assets in accordance with  domestic law.  P1-1 was therefore engaged. 
Effectively,  the  Court  took  the  view  that  the  right  of  the  applicant  to  his 
inheritance  had  vested  on  the  date  of  his  mother’s  death.  The  economic 
interest had already been acquired. Such an approach to acquisition of an 
interest fits well with systems of succession, such as that in Scots law, where 
issue of the deceased will always be entitled to a specific share in the estate, 
with  the  precise  value  of  that  share  determined  by  other  claims  on  the 
estate.115 Even with alternative systems of succession, the very wide definition 
of possessions adopted in connection with P1-1 seems to allow quite readily 
for an interpretation of acquisition such as that put forward in Inze.  
113 (1987) 10 EHRR 394
114 Article 14 reads: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
115 In  Scotland,  issue are  entitled to  equal  shares in  legitim worth  one half  of  the total  moveable estate  if  the 
deceased is not survived by a spouse or civil partner, or one third of the estate otherwise.
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One area in which the determination of when a property right is acquired has 
proved troublesome is that of welfare benefits. When this issue first arose in X 
v Federal  Republic of Germany,116 the position seemed quite clear.  In this 
case, a former miner sought the increase in the state pension applicable to 
those suffering from silicosis. The Commission stated in broad terms that the 
right  to  a  pension  was  not  one  of  the  fundamental  rights  and  freedoms 
guaranteed by the Convention, and that no circumstances had been shown to 
exist which called for an examination of issues under P1-1 in the particular 
case. Although the decision of the Commission is very shortly put, it must be 
presumed that there was no question of the right to a state pension qualifying 
as a possession for the purposes of P1-1.  
In subsequent cases, however, pension rights have been analysed in more 
detail,  and  with  different  results.  The  discussion  was  re-opened  in  X  v 
Netherlands,117 an application made jointly by several female pensioners to 
the effect that the old age pension system operated in the Netherlands was 
discriminatory to divorced and unmarried women, who were not entitled to a 
pension  until  age  65,  despite  the  fact  they  paid  the  same  pension 
contributions as married women, who were entitled to receipt of a pension 
when their husbands reached 65.  The Commission considered that:
while it is clear that no right to a pension is as such included in the Convention, the 
making of compulsory contributions to a pension fund may, in certain circumstances, 
create a property right in a portion of such fund and that such right may be affected 
by the manner in which the fund is distributed.118
The Commission referred to the principle of solidarity which underpinned the 
Dutch national insurance system. Younger members of the community made 
contributions  for  the  ongoing  support  of  the  aged members;  in  effect,  the 
contributions paid in by the young were paid out to the old. The pensions paid 
reflected  the  wage  index  at  the  time  of  payment rather  than  at  the  time 
contributions  were  being  paid  in  by  those  now  in  receipt  of  a  pension. 
116 (2116/64) 30 March 1996 
117 (4130/69) 20 July 1971 
118 ibid., p224
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Accordingly, there was no direct correlation between contributions paid and 
the pension benefit received. 
Consequently, a person does not have, at any given moment, an identifiable share in 
the fund claimable by him but he has an expectancy of receiving old-age or survivors 
pension benefits subject to the contributions envisaged by the Acts concerned.119
Since the pension scheme in  X v Netherlands was based on the solidarity 
principle, there was no possession to be protected under P1-1 in this case. 
There was no right to payment of a particular type or level, (at least, not prior 
to the commencement of payments, discussed further below) and so changes 
to the pension scheme in this manner could not be contested by contributors 
to the scheme prior  to pensionable age.  The only possession held by the 
applicants was the right to payment of a pension at all, and this right had not 
been engaged by the actions of the state since there was no question that a 
pension of some type would eventually be paid.
This rule was also seen to apply beyond the specific context of social security 
contributions.  G v Austria120 concerned a civil  service pension fund,  where 
pensions were payable by the state on the retirement of its employees. The 
Commission  noted  that  the  pension  scheme  operated  on  the  basis  of 
“support”, where the amount received was dependent on a variety of factors 
including the salary of  the civil  servant  whilst  employed and their  financial 
needs at the time of retirement. Again, since there was no direct correlation 
between the contributions made and the payments received, there could be 
no right of property to a specific share of the pension fund.
That the right to receive a payment from a scheme into which contributions 
have been paid constitutes a possession which can be interfered with was 
clearly recognised in  Müller v Austria.121 The applicant was a locksmith who 
had worked in Austria and Liechtenstein, paying contributions into the state 
pension  schemes  of  both  countries.  The  two  countries  then  concluded  a 
Convention which prohibited such dual contributions. The Convention was to 
119 Ibid., p240
120 (10094/82) 14 May 1984 
121 (5849/72) 1 October 1975 
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have retrospective effect, meaning the pension entitlement of the applicant to 
one of the funds was extinguished, notwithstanding the contributions he had 
already paid.  The Commission considered  X v FRG and  X v Netherlands, 
stating  that  it  intended  to  "extend  the  line  of  reasoning"  there  developed, 
before going on to state that the applicant in this case did have a possession, 
that possession being the right,  as a beneficiary,  to receive any payments 
made  by  the  fund,  regardless  of  their  exact  value.  This  approach  was 
confirmed by a Grand Chamber in  Stec v United Kingdom,122 an application 
concerning “reduced earnings allowance,” an earnings-related benefit paid in 
certain circumstances to persons who had suffered an occupational accident 
or disease. The Court accepted that the applicants held a right to payment of 
the benefit which constituted a possession in terms of P1-1.    
Support  for  this  analysis  is  also  found  in  jurisprudence  suggesting  that  a 
significant  reduction  in  entitlement  to  eventual  benefits  will  constitute  a 
violation of P1-1. Banfield v United Kingdom123 concerned a police officer who 
had been convicted of several counts of rape and sexual assault of detainees 
and  complainers  in  his  care.  In  addition  to  a  custodial  sentence,  he  was 
subject to disciplinary proceedings within the police force which resulted in an 
order  for  dismissal  from  the  force  and  forfeiture  of  75%  of  his  pension 
entitlement. He argued that the forfeiture order violated his rights under P1-1. 
It was accepted by both the government and the Court that such a significant 
reduction amounted to an interference with his right to receive payment of a 
pension, which was considered to be a possession. The interference was, 
however, found to be justified in the circumstances of the case.124 
Not all benefit schemes are based on the principle of solidarity, however. The 
concept  of  benefits  accrued  on  the  alternative  basis  of  “coverage”  was 
explored in the case of Gaygusuz v Austria.125 The applicant in this case was 
a Turkish national who had lived and worked in Austria for 10 years, paying 
122 (2006) 43 EHRR 47
123 (6223/04) 18 October 2005 
124 See also Azinas v Cyprus (2005) 40 EHRR 8, where a disgraced civil servant similarly had his pension declared 
forfeit. The case was declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, although the fact a possession 
existed in the form of the applicant's pension entitlement was not disputed.
125 (17371/90) 16 September 1996 
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contributions into the social security scheme. He became unwell, and sought 
emergency assistance from the state in the form of an advance on a pension. 
He  was  refused  on  the  basis  that  he  was  not  an  Austrian  national  and 
therefore  did  not  fall  into  the  category  of  those  entitled  to  emergency 
assistance.  The  Commission  and  Court  both  noted  that  entitlement  to 
emergency assistance was based on a certain  number of  “credits”  having 
been paid into the social insurance system.  There was a direct link between 
the credits paid and the assistance received – in other words, the benefit was 
founded on the principle of “coverage”. Accordingly,  a property right in the 
benefits  fund  had  been created  in  favour  of  the  applicant,  and  P1-1  was 
engaged.
What does seem clear is that a benefit will constitute a possession once the 
claimant begins to receive payments, and a change in the level of benefit at 
that stage will engage P1-1.126 A useful recent example comes in the case of 
Asmudsson v Iceland,127 where the applicant had been in receipt of a disability 
pensions for almost fifteen years when the eligibility rules were changed. The 
result was that his pension was discontinued entirely. The Court was satisfied 
that his pension entitlement was a possession and in the circumstances a 
violation was found, since the change in the rules placed a disproportionate 
burden on the applicant.    
Legitimate expectation of future acquisition
In some cases, interferences in property rights will operate to prevent a value 
which should rightly have been acquired by a natural or legal person from 
being so accrued. In this situation, P1-1 should clearly be engaged to ensure 
that applicants receive the property which is rightfully their own. However, P1-
1 cannot protect potential possessions which may or may not ever have been 
acquired. To cope with the difference in these two situations, the Court and 
the Commission have used the concept of legitimate expectation. Where an 
applicant had a legitimate expectation of acquiring a possession at some point 
in the future, that possession will be afforded the protection of P1-1. Where 
126 See, for example, Pravednaya v Russia (17371/90) 18 November 2004, Solodyuk v Russia (67099/01) 12 July 
2005  and Stec v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 47
127 (2005) 41 EHRR 42
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the applicant had no grounds to believe the possession would definitely be 
acquired, P1-1 will not apply. 
A clear example of the application of this test can be seen in  Prince Hans-
Adam II  of  Liechtenstein  v  Germany.128 The applicant's  painting had been 
confiscated by Czechoslovakia  for  treason in  1945.  In  1991,  the applicant 
sought  restitution of  the  painting which  had been loaned to  a  museum in 
Cologne.  The  German  court  declined  jurisdiction  on  the  basis  of  the 
Convention  on  the  Settlement  of  Matters  Arising  out  of  the  War  and  the 
Occupation  1954,  which  had  the  effect  that  German  jurisdiction  was  not 
recognised  in  respect  of  property  expropriated  in  the  occupied  territories 
during the Second World War. The applicant argued that the German Court 
had interfered with his rights under P1-1 by refusing to hear the case, but the 
Court did not agree. Ownership of the painting had been lost by the original 
expropriation.  The  applicant  did  not  have  a  legitimate  expectation  of  the 
painting returning to his ownership; whether such a right to restitution existed 
was  the  reason  for  the  domestic  court  action,  and  that  action  was 
unsuccessful. Therefore the applicant had no possession with which the state 
could interfere.
The concept of legitimate expectation has been usefully elaborated in a series 
of cases arising from the issue and withdrawal of licences. The Court and the 
Commission initially wrestled with difficulty in identifying the possession to be 
protected where a licence had been granted and then revoked. Did a licence 
itself  have  an  economic  value?  Batelaan  and  Huiges  v  Netherlands129 
concerned two GPs who had been granted licences to dispense medicines on 
the basis that there were no dispensing chemists within the immediate area. 
Some years afterwards, a chemist business was established and the GPs’ 
licences were accordingly withdrawn. They argued that this had impacted to a 
significant extent on both their professional income and the goodwill of their 
practice. In considering whether a licence could constitute a possession, the 
Commission questioned whether the licence holder had a “reasonable and 
128  (42527/98) 12 July 2001
129 (10438/83) 3 October 1984 
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legitimate expectation” that they would continue to benefit from the licence. If 
the  licence  was  granted  only  subject  to  certain  conditions,  and  those 
conditions were  no longer  fulfilled,  the licencee could have no reasonable 
expectation of ongoing benefit. Accordingly, there was no property right with 
which  the  state  could  interfere.  The  possession  here  appears  to  be  the 
legitimate expectation of ongoing benefit  rather than the licence itself.  The 
position  was  stated  rather  more  clearly  in  Pudas  v  Sweden,130 another 
decision of the Commission handed down two months after that in Batelaan 
and Huiges. Pudas dealt with a licence to operate a taxi service. In this case, 
the  Commission confirmed that  a  licence “as such”  could not  constitute  a 
possession, and that the benefit  derived from the licence in terms of both 
income and goodwill could only be a possession if, again, the holder had a 
reasonable and legitimate expectation that the benefit  would continue. The 
taxi  licence  had  been  granted  subject  to  revocation  if  one  of  several 
conditions came to be fulfilled, and since one of those conditions had been 
fulfilled, the applicant could have no expectation of ongoing benefit.
The test, having been established, was applied in a variety of contexts. In X v 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany,131 notaries  claimed  that  legislation  obliging 
them to halve their fees when carrying out work for schools, churches and 
other non-profit making organisations was an interference with their property 
rights. The Commission considered that a notary’s claim to a fee could only 
become a possession when the particular fee had been earned, taking into 
account  the  services  rendered by the notary and on the  existing  scale  of 
notaries’  fees.  The  mere  expectation  of  notaries  that  the  existing  legal 
regulations  on  fees  would  not  be  changed  in  the  future  could  not  be 
considered as a property right. A similar line of reasoning emerged in Greek 
Federation of  Customs Officers v Greece,132 where Greek Customs Officer 
sought compensation for the 80% reduction in their income as a result of the 
effective abolition of customs barriers between EU member states.  Again, the 
Commission  stated  that  future  income  could  be  considered  a  possession 
where it had already been earned or a legitimate claim to it could be proven to 
130 (1988) 10 EHRR 380
131  (8410/78) 13 December 1979
132 (24581/94) 6 April 1995 
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exist. The applicants in this case were not restricted from continuing to act as 
customs  officers  but  had  no  legitimate  expectation  that  the  level  of  their 
business would continue at a given amount. 
The fact that licences are granted on a conditional basis – and therefore that 
any  anticipation  of  future  income  must  be  precipitated  on  those  same 
conditions – is central  to a determination of  legitimate expectation.  Where 
there are no such conditions, it is likely that the expectation of future income 
will be considered justified. In Van Marle v Netherlands,133 the application was 
made by four men who had been practising as accountants for 24 years. New 
legislation was then introduced to regulate the profession. Each of the men 
applied for a licence to use the title of “accountant”, which had not previously 
been required, but each of their applications was refused. The Court noted 
that, by dint of their own work, the applicants had built up a clientele and a 
business which was dependent upon their profession as accountants. Their 
economic interest in the business was a possession for the purposes of P1-1. 
There was no reason for the applicants to think their use of the designation 
“accountant” would be prevented, and accordingly the legitimate expectation 
test was satisfied.
Equally,  where  a  licence  is  granted  subject  to  revocation  on  the  basis  of 
certain  conditions,  but  none  of  these  conditions  is  fulfilled,  the  legitimate 
expectation  test  will  have  been  met.  An  example  of  this  is  Tre  Traktörer  
Aktiebolag v Sweden.134 The disputed licence here was for a restaurant to 
serve alcohol, and the submission by the applicant was that it was deprived of 
the restaurant business in its entirety if the alcohol licence was revoked, since 
the restaurant could not  be profitable without  it.  It  did not appear that  the 
restaurant  had  infringed  any  of  the  conditions  on  which  the  licence  was 
granted. The court concluded that the applicant could legitimately expect to 
keep the licence and that the revocation was therefore an interference with 
the company’s rights under P1-1.135 
133 (1986) 8 EHRR 483
134 (1991) 13 EHRR 309
135 An interesting dissenting opinion is given in this case by M Martinez, who observed that the licence could not be 
transferred or inherited, used as security or seized on insolvency. Bearing that in mind, he did not see how a licence 
could be characterised as a property right.  
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It seems that any interest of economic value attached to the continuing grant 
of  licence  will  be  considered  a  possession  for  P1-1,  provided  there  is  a 
legitimate expectation of its existence. Future income to be derived from the 
work the licence allows will clearly be protected, as can be seen in the cases 
above. Goodwill in the business will also be protected, as demonstrated by 
Batelaan and Huiges and Van Marle. The position was stated more loosely in 
the  Fredin case,136 where  the  licence  in  question  was  a  permit  from  the 
government to exploit a gravel pit located on the applicants’ land. The permit 
was later revoked as the work of the pit was found to be damaging to the 
environment.  The  Court  considered  that,  in  general  terms,  the  economic 
interests surrounding the exploitation of gravel were possessions in the sense 
of  P1-1.  In  Pine Valley  Developments  v  Ireland,137 the  applicant  company 
bought land in reliance on outline planning permission for development of the 
site.  Full  planning  permission  was,  however,  not  granted as the  land was 
situated  in  a  green  belt.   Under  Irish  law,  a  grant  of  outline  planning 
permission confers a right to develop in principle. The applicants in the case 
therefore had a legitimate expectation, in the view of the Commission, that 
they would be able to develop the land, and the economic interests connected 
with that development should constitute “possessions” for the purposes of P1-
1.    
The legitimate expectation test has also been elaborated in a separate line of 
jurisprudence  dealing  with  the  notion  of  outstanding  civil  court  actions  as 
possessions which merit the protection of P1-1. It is clear that a court decree 
ordering payment of an obligation will fall within the remit of P1-1, effectively 
as a debt.138 However, does an as yet unresolved civil litigation in a national 
court equate to a possession? The discussion of this subject starts with the 
case  of  A,  B  and  AS  Company  v  Germany.139 The  applicant  company 
managed land which was mainly forestry,  and during the period of French 
military occupation following the second world war, was ordered to fell trees 
136 (1991) 13 EHRR 784
137 (1992) 14 EHRR 319
138 See, for recent examples,  Sciortino v Italy (30127/96) 18 October 2001,  Ari and Others v France (65508/01) 3 
April 2007  and Broniowski v Poland (2006) 43 EHRR 1.
139 (7742/76) 4 July 1978 
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and export them as a form of reparation. Once democracy was restored in 
Germany,  the  applicant  applied  to  the  Commission  under  P1-1.  The 
possession it alleged had been interfered with was not the trees themselves 
(which had been taken legitimately as reparations) but rather the purchase 
price received for  them, which  had been put  into  a  fund to  buy food and 
supplies for  the German people.  The Commission noted that a debt could 
constitute a possession, but with no clear proof that a promise of payment 
existed here – either in the form of evidence to that effect or a national court 
judgement confirming the debt – there could be no possession capable of 
protection under P1-1.
From that ruling, it appears that a civil action in itself will not be a possession. 
A debt established by a court decree, however, will be a possession. This ties 
together well with the legitimate expectation test previously discussed – an 
applicant  can have no justified expectation of  payment  of  a  claim until  an 
award is made by the national courts. Dismissal of a claim by the national 
courts therefore cannot be an interference in itself. This line of reasoning is 
elaborated in Agneessens v Belgium.140 The applicant in this case had been in 
possession of Yugoslav banknotes which had been seized by the government 
on suspicion of being counterfeit. The applicant believed the notes were not 
counterfeit, but rather were of a series issued and subsequently withdrawn by 
a  Yugoslav  bank,  who  were  allowing  them  to  be  exchanged  for  valid 
banknotes  up  until  a  certain  date  in  1974.  This  date  passed  without  the 
applicant  successfully  recovering  the  notes,  and  subsequently  he  sought 
compensation instead. The Belgian courts dismissed his action. The Court 
considered that the applicant had given no evidence of ever having held a 
claim to payment.  The action against the state did not create any claim to 
payment of a debt for the applicant, merely the possibility of securing such a 
payment. Consequently, since a liability action cannot be regarded either as a 
possession or as a debt, the decisions by the Belgian courts dismissing his 
action could not have the effect of depriving him of a possession which he 
owned. Similarly, in Kopecky v Slovakia,141 the applicant sought restitution of 
140 (12164/86) 12 October 1988  
141 (2005) 41 EHRR 43
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gold and silver coins confiscated from his father by the former Communist 
regime. In terms of the legislation, restitution was conditional on the applicant 
providing evidence of the location of the coins, which he was unable to do. On 
that  basis,  the  domestic  court  dismissed  the  claim.  The  Court  found  no 
violation of P1-1 to exist, since the original confiscation had taken place prior 
to the adoption of the ECHR in Slovakia, and the dismissed court action could 
not constitute a possession.  
The  position  was  rather  more  complicated  in  Stran  Greek  Refineries  v  
Greece.142 Here, the applicant company had entered into a contract with the 
Greek government, at the time under a military junta, to build an oil refinery. 
They incurred expenses in commencing the project, but when democracy was 
restored in Greece, the elected government did not wish to proceed with it. 
The  company  sought  repayment  of  their  expenses,  and  the  matter  was 
resolved by arbitration, as provided for in the original contract, with a decision 
in favour of Stran. At this stage, following the logic of A, B and AS Company 
and  Agneessens, the debt had been established and Stran were holding a 
possession  warranting  the  protection  of  P1-1.  However,  the  Greek 
government then had the arbitration decision overturned in the national courts 
on the basis that the arbitration court did not have jurisdiction. By the time 
these proceedings had resolved, the company’s right to raise the claim by an 
alternative route had prescribed. On a strict reading of the earlier cases, it 
seemed the company’s  possession  had therefore been lost.  However,  the 
Court approached the case from a different angle:
 
The Court agrees with the government that it is not its task to approve or disapprove 
the substance of that award. It is, however, under a duty to take note of the legal 
position established by that decision in relation to the parties. 
According to its  wording,  the award was final  and binding;  it  did  not  require  any 
further enforcement measure and no ordinary or special appeal lay against it. Under 
the Greek legislation,  arbitration awards have the force of final  decisions and are 
deemed to be enforceable.
142 (1995) 19 EHRR 293
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[…]
[The arbitration  award]  therefore  conferred  on the applicants  a  right  in  the  sums 
awarded. Admittedly that right was revocable, since the award could still be annulled, 
but the ordinary courts had already twice held – at first instance and on appeal – that 
there was no ground for such an annulment. Accordingly, in the Court’s view, that 
right constituted a possession.143
The rule therefore appears to be that a debt need only be established enough 
for the Court to be satisfied that it is a possession. It is difficult to see where 
the limits of this may lie. If the Greek courts had held on first instance that the 
debt existed, but on appeal had decided it did not, would the Court have ruled 
differently? The likelihood is that every case will turn on its merits, and until 
there is further jurisprudence on the issue, it will be impossible to determine 
the parameters within which the Court is working.
Another ruling handed down shortly after Stran Greek Refineries emphasises 
the importance of the domestic law of signatory states when deciding at what 
stage a debt will be considered established in light of ongoing litigation. The 
case in question is Pressos Compania Naviera SA v Belgium.144 In Belgium, 
the piloting of sea going vessels is a public service organised by the State, 
and pilots are provided directly by the state. The pilot does not replace the 
ship master, who remains in command of the vehicle, but rather advises as to 
the best route to take. A Dutch appeal court ruling of 1983 held that the pilot, 
and accordingly the state on his behalf, would be liable for accidents caused 
by the negligence of the pilot.  In August 1988, new legislation was introduced 
which said that the organiser of a pilot service could not be held so liable. The 
applicants in this case were in the process of litigating claims against the state 
for  pilotage  accidents  which  had  occurred  prior  to  August  1988.  They 
contended that the new legislation, which was to be given retrospective effect, 
breached their P1-1 rights. 
143 ibid., para s61-62. 
144 (1996) 21 EHRR 301
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On the basis of the principle enunciated in  Agneessens that a civil action is 
not, in itself, a possession, it would be expected that the applicants in Pressos 
Compania would not be protected by P1-1. However, once again the Court 
took a different approach.
In order to determine whether in this instance there was a “possession”, the Court 
may have regard to the domestic law in force at the time of the alleged interference, 
as there is nothing to suggest that the law ran counter to the object and purpose of 
P1-1.
The rules in question are the rules of tort, under which claims for compensation come 
into existence as soon as the damage occurs.145 
The Court’s view was the outcome of the civil claim in the domestic courts 
would  simply  be  declaratory,  as  the  debt  existed  as  soon  as  the  delict 
occurred. On that basis, the applicants had a possession in the form of a debt 
without the need for a court ruling. 
It is difficult to see how this judgment can do anything other than contradict 
the previous line of case law in this area, although the Court did not suggest 
there was any conflict. It is accepted in most legal systems that payment of 
damages for a delict should run from the time of the delict itself, but that debt 
does not  exist  and cannot  be enforced until  any litigation surrounding the 
same is resolved. Similarly, in a contractual claim, the right to payment exists 
as soon as the contract is  breached, but it  cannot be enforced until  court 
proceedings resolve the dispute in favour of one party. If the initial test of what 
constitutes a possession is an objective economic value, then what economic 
value can a delict which is disputed be said to have until the case is resolved 
in  the courts? The decision is  remarkable.  It  remains to  be seen whether 
further jurisprudence will clarify the Court’s reasoning on civil claims.146
2.3.3 Conclusion
145 ibid., para 31
146 See also Aubert and Others v France (31501/03) 23 May 2007, in which a legislative change to employment law 
which affected pending litigation was considered to be a violation of P1-1.
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The  term  "possession"  has  been  determined  by  the  Court  to  have  an 
autonomous meaning for the purposes of the Convention, with the result that 
our  understanding of  the word  in  a  P1-1 context  has to  be based on the 
Court's  dicta to date. The jurisprudence suggests a range of factors will be 
taken into account when arriving at a determination of whether a possession 
exists.
In the first place, it seems to be necessary that a purported possession carries 
some form of objective economic value. This is clearly the case in respect of a 
house, or shares in a company, or intellectual property rights. 
If  an economic value attaches to the interest under consideration, the next 
question will be whether that interest had been acquired by the applicant at 
the  time  of  the  state  action.  This  question  will  not  always  have  a 
straightforward answer. The complexities of the issue have been explored at 
length in connection with  state  benefits.  It  seems that,  where benefits  are 
based on the solidarity principle, the possession held by potential recipients is 
the  right  to  some  payment  from  that  fund.  Potential  recipients  have  not, 
however, acquired any right to payment at a particular level. Where benefits 
are based on the coverage system, the possession acquired at the point of 
contribution is the more specific right to a payment at a particular level. Once 
payment of the benefit has commenced, the person in receipt of that benefit 
has acquired the right to payment at a specified level regardless of the basis 
of the scheme. In most cases, the possession held in respect of any state 
benefit  will  be  conditional  on  the  fulfilment  of  certain  requirements,  for 
example, reaching state-defined retirement age. 
  
If an economic value attaches to an interest, but it has not been acquired by 
the applicant at the time of the state action, the next question will be whether 
the applicant had a legitimate expectation of future acquisition of that interest. 
This principle is usefully illustrated by the licence cases, which demonstrate 
that there can be no legitimate expectation of ongoing possession where that 
possession  is  conditional  and  the  conditions  have  not  been  fulfilled. 
Complications exist here in relation to the question of when a court action 
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seeking to establish a debt might become a possession. It seems, in some 
contexts, that a litigant may be considered to have a legitimate expectation of 
acquiring  the  court  decree  at  some  point  prior  to  that  decree  being 
pronounced.  The  parameters  of  this  exception,  if  it  is  an  exception,  are 
unclear to say the least. 
Shortly put, then, a possession is an interest which has an objective economic 
value, where that value has been acquired by the applicant at the time of the 
state  action,  or  where  the applicant  had a legitimate expectation of  future 
acquisition of that interest which was interfered with by the state action. 
The use of the case law in defining “possessions” also offers an interesting 
example of the way in which P1-1 has developed in the broader sense. From 
an initial lack of clarity, it can be seen how, over time, the jurisprudence allows 
lines  of  reasoning  to  be  established  from  which  predictions  as  to  the 
applicability of the protection to new interests can be made. Although these 
lines  are  still  blurred  in  places,  progress  has  clearly  been  made  and  the 
discussion continues at a more nuanced level.  
  
2.4 Peaceful Enjoyment
The  next  significant  term  in  Article  1  of  the  First  Protocol  is  “peaceful 
enjoyment”. These words taken together or separately do not convey a clear 
judicial concept or term of art. The logical argument to follow from this would 
appear to be that the words should be given a common sense meaning, but 
jurisprudence is necessary to set boundaries to that understanding.
What seems to be clear from the case law is that the there is no absolute right 
to enjoyment of property in the aesthetic sense – in other words, no right to a 
pleasant environment. This was made clear in the Commission decision in 
Powell v UK.147 Mr Powell lived in a house which, following changes in the 
flight path in 1972, became subject to a Heathrow departure route. Powell 
argued that he had paid a premium on his property for  the pleasant  rural 
147 (1987) 9 EHRR 241
71
environment in which it was situated, but that possibility for outdoor activities 
was now reduced owing to the noise pollution. 
The Commission did not consider this to be an issue under P1-1.
This  provision  is  mainly  concerned with  the arbitrary  confiscation of  property  and 
does not, in principle, guarantee a right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions in a 
pleasant  environment.  It  is  true  that  aircraft  noise  nuisance  of  considerable 
importance both  as to  level  and frequency may seriously  affect  the value of  real 
property or even render it unsaleable and thus amount to a partial taking of property. 
However…there  is  nothing  to  show  that  the  value  of  [Powell’s]  property  was 
substantially  diminished  on  the  ground  of  aircraft  noise  such  as  to  constitute  a 
disproportionate  burden  amounting  to  a  partial  taking  of  property  necessitating 
payment of compensation.148 
The concept  of  ambient  pollution being  sufficiently  severe  to  amount  to  a 
partial deprivation is nicely illustrated by  S v France.149 The applicant in this 
case owned a house on the banks of the Loire.  A rural  area opposite the 
property became the site for the development of a nuclear power station with 
attendant destruction of the site and noise nuisance. The applicant in the case 
was awarded compensation by the domestic courts for the fall in the value of 
her  house  together  with  the  environmental  damage.  The  Commission 
considered  that,  bearing  in  mind  the  compensation  paid,  there  was  no 
violation of  P1-1.  Although it  is  not  explicitly  stated in  the report,  it  would 
appear that the excessive noise pollution did amount to a partial deprivation, 
but  that  this  was  justified  in  the  circumstances  since  proportionate 
compensation had been awarded.
Betten  compares  the  concept  of  peaceful  enjoyment  to  the  right  of  quiet 
enjoyment enjoyed by a lessee, designed to protect against adverse rights 
over  his  land  rather  than  aesthetic  enjoyment  of  his  property.150 Another 
analogy may be to absolute warrandice in  the transfer of  land,  where the 
seller guarantees good title unaffected by encumbrances, as opposed to good 
land as such.151 It seems clear that the Court wish to limit rights under P1-1 
148 ibid., p243
149 (13728/88) May 17 1990 
150 p 170
151 The writer is indebted to Professor R Paisley for this comparison.
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along these lines to prevent too great a crossover with article eight, which 
protects the right to private,  home and family life. It is notable that in both 
Powell and  S v France,  additional complaints under article eight were also 
made.152 
This  analysis  of  “peaceful  enjoyment”  is  supported  by  the  judgment  in 
Loizidou  v  Turkey,153 where  a  Cypriot  national  was  systematically  denied 
access to her property in Northern Cyprus by the occupying Turkish forces. In 
the particular circumstances of the case, the Court was not prepared to find 
that the applicant had suffered a deprivation or a control of the use of her 
property. However, it considered it clear that there had been an interference 
with her peaceful enjoyment, stating that a physical hindrance can amount to 
a violation of the Convention in the same way as a legal impediment.   
2.4.1 Positive obligation?
The  concept  of  peaceful  enjoyment  goes,  however,  further  than  simply 
encapsulating  the  notion  of  adverse  interference  with  enjoyment  of 
possessions. In the P1-1 sense, it  seems the state can also be under an 
obligation  to  take  positive  steps  to  ensure  that  enjoyment  is  allowed  to 
continue.  This  idea  was  first  given  authority  in  Oneryildiz  v  Turkey,154 
discussed above. The applicant here had lost his home as a result of a gas 
explosion in a landfill site which had been foreseeable and could have been 
prevented had the Turkish state put in place the health and safety measures 
they had been advised to implement by expert advisers. The Court stated:
Genuine, effective exercise of the right protected by [P1-1] does not depend merely 
on the State's duty not to interfere, but may require positive measures of protection, 
particularly where there is a direct link between the measures which an applicant may 
legitimately  expect  from  the  authorities  and  his  effective  enjoyment  of  his 
possessions.155 
152 Indeed, in Powell the article 8 case taken on to the ECtHR, although the P1-1 case was not insisted in after the 
Commission decision.
153 (1997) 23 EHRR 513
154 (2005) 41 EHRR 20
155 para 134
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Given the clear causal link in this case between the government's omission to 
act and the applicant's loss of his dwelling in the explosion, the Court had no 
difficulty  in  finding  the  state  had breached its  obligation  to  allow peaceful 
enjoyment to continue. A violation of P1-1 was therefore established. 
It is difficult to imagine that the Court was not understandably swayed by the 
horrific  circumstances  of  the  application  in  Oneryildiz when  making  its 
statement about positive obligations on the part of the state, and although it is 
difficult to question the use of this construction in that case, the limits of the 
idea  are  somewhat  obscure  at  present.  What  is  the  extent  of  the  state's 
obligation to ensure peaceful enjoyment can continue here? 
The  reported  cases  along  this  line  of  jurisprudence  so  far  seem  to  be 
developing it in an almost delictual sense. In Budayeva v Russia,156 the Court 
differentiated between the situation where a danger was created by matters 
entirely  within  the  purview  of  the  state,  as  with  waste  management  in 
Oneryildiz, and the situation where the danger was brought about instead by 
natural  forces.  In  the  latter  scenario,  the  state  would  still  be  subject  to  a 
positive obligation to the extent that measures within its control could prevent 
or lessen the impact of the danger, but the nature of the state’s obligation 
here  was  likely  to  be  more  limited.  Budayeva  dealt  with  a  number  of 
applicants  who  had  lost  their  homes  as  a  result  of  mudslides,  which  the 
applicants claimed the state should have foreseen and warned them about. 
The Court  found that the positive obligation on the state extended only to 
taking  “reasonable  measures”  in  an  attempt  to  mitigate  the  effect  of  the 
mudslides,  which  evidence  showed  would  have  been  ineffective  in  this 
situation. 
In the present case, the damage in its entirety could not be unequivocally 
attributed to State negligence, and the alleged negligence was no more than 
an aggravating factor contributing to the damage caused by natural forces. 157
156 (15339/02) 20 March 2008 
157 para 182
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The  idea  of  “reasonableness”  limiting  the  extent  of  the  state’s  positive 
obligation  was  reiterated  in  a  more  quotidian  example  in  Blumberga  v 
Latvia.158 Here, the applicant's house had been burgled whilst she was held in 
judicial  custody.  In terms of the domestic law, the Latvian authorities were 
under a specific statutory obligation to protect the applicant's premises while 
she was detained.  The applicant  complained that,  in  failing to prevent  the 
burglary, the state had breached this obligation with a resultant impact on her 
rights under P1-1. Again, the Court recognised a positive obligation on the 
state to ensure peaceful enjoyment of possessions in line with the provisions 
of  the  domestic  statute.  Again,  however,  this  obligation  required  only 
“reasonable” steps to be taken by the state: no absolute obligation could exist 
to  prevent  burglary.  The  state  had  taken  reasonable  steps  to  protect  the 
applicant’s home, and so the positive obligation had been fulfilled. No violation 
of P1-1 was found.  
A  similar   approach  leading  to  the  opposite  result  can  be  seen  in 
Novoseletskiy v Ukraine,159 where the police had clear guidelines indicating 
that an investigation into the disappearance of the applicant’s possessions 
whilst he was temporarily absent from the country should have been carried 
out. No such investigation in fact took place. In this case, The Court found that 
the investigation formed part of the “reasonable” steps required of the state in 
fulfilment of their positive obligation under P1-1. Since they had failed to fulfil 
this obligation, a violation of P1-1 had taken place. 
2.4.2 Conclusion
The use of the phrase "peaceful enjoyment" relates to the enjoyment of the 
right of property itself, rather than to enjoyment of a physical piece of land or 
of an object as such. There would not appear to be any right to a pleasant 
environment  as  such,  with  a  right  of  this  kind  perhaps  more  germane  to 
argument in terms of article eight of the ECHR. 
158 (70930/01) 14  October 2008 
159 (2006) 43 EHRR 53
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Protection of this peaceful enjoyment may, in some circumstances, impose a 
positive obligation on the state to prevent that enjoyment being interrupted. 
The recent emergence of this aspect to P1-1 protection in the jurisprudence is 
an interesting example of the manner in which the property right continues to 
evolve. It seems that, with a greater degree of clarity as to the notion of which 
“possessions” should be protected following on the wealth of jurisprudence 
discussed  earlier  in  this  chapter,  the  jurisprudence  is  now  able  to  begin 
exploring where the limits of the right may lie in alternative directions.  
2.5 Deprivation
The  case  law  surrounding  the  concept  of  “deprivation”  is  perhaps  more 
instructive  than the jurisprudence connected with  the other  terms of  P1-1. 
The Commission states in Bramelid and Malmström v Sweden:160
[The article] is intended to refer to formal (or even de facto) expropriation, that is to 
say the action whereby the State lays hands – or authorises a third party to lay hands 
–  on  a  particular  piece  of  property  for  a  purpose  which  is  to  serve  the  public 
interest.161
From this initial statement, it can be seen that the Court and the Commission 
intended to approach the question of what constitutes a deprivation with  a 
keen eye  on the  factual  position.  They will  be  looking  to  see whether,  in 
reality, an applicant has been prevented from exercising their property rights, 
notwithstanding the formal legal position as reflected in, for example, the land 
registers.  In other words, bare title will  not be enough to acquit  a state of 
responsibility – a  de facto deprivation will merit the attention of P1-1 just as 
much  as  a  de  jure action.  Such  an  approach  seems  consistent  with  the 
Convention’s role as a safeguard of “real and effective” rights. 
2.5.1 De jure deprivation
Formal or de jure deprivation is usually easily ascertained. If a formal transfer 
of title has been effected, there can be no question of what exactly the state 
was attempting to do. For example, Lithgow and Others v United Kingdom162 
160 (8588/79) 12 December 1983 
161 ibid., pg 82
162 (1986) 8 EHRR 329
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concerns the nationalisation of the aircraft and shipbuilding industries in the 
UK in the 1970s.  The Court notes in a single sentence that:
The applicants were clearly ‘deprived of their possessions’ within the meaning of the 
second sentence of Article 1163
and proceeds with its judgment on that basis.
Straightforward expropriations of  this type,  which can be seen in cases of 
nationalisation,  or  for  similar  large  scale  social  projects  such  as  the 
development of  new roads or the protection of conservation areas, do not 
form the major part of the jurisprudence on deprivation. This is because, in 
such  situations,  the  loss  caused  by  state  action  is  usually  an  expressly 
acknowledged part of the scheme and financial recompense for that loss will 
form an essential part of the interference. Such cases typically come before 
the Court  owing to a dispute over the equity of  the compensation offered, 
which was precisely the issue to be decided in Lithgow.
However,  there are occasional instances of large scale  de jure deprivation 
where an absence of compensation is precisely the issue. One such unusual 
case  is  Broniowski  v  Poland.164 The  applicant  was  one  of  around  80,000 
Polish nationals who had been repatriated following the redrawing of Poland’s 
eastern border along the line of the Bug River after the Second World War. 
These “Bug River claimants” had an entitlement to claim compensation for the 
properties they had been forced to abandon beyond the line of the river, this 
compensation  coming in  the  form of  discounts  on  the  sale  of  land in  the 
ownership of the State. However, over the years, insufficient state property 
was made available for every claimant to “cash in” their entitlement, and in 
2003, when the Polish state passed legislation discharging all obligations of 
compensation,  nearly  80,000  nationals  had  their  claims  to  compensation 
abolished. The Court had little difficulty in finding this amounted to a large-
scale  deprivation  of  the  rights  to  compensation  owed  to  thousands  of 
163 ibid., para 107
164 (2005) 40 EHRR 21
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repatriated  Poles  and  insisted  the  government  remedy  the  problem 
immediately and effectively.165  
Another complex example came recently in Jahn v Germany.166 The deprived 
here were German “new farmers” who had been given ownership over land 
previously held by the GDR in a package of legislation passed to enable the 
reunification of Germany. Criticism was made of this award, since the land 
had been confiscated from the original owners by the Communist government 
decades earlier. It was considered unfair that the new farmers should receive 
a  windfall  benefit  when  the  original  owners  had  never  received  any 
compensation. In addition, many of the new farmers were not, in fact, farming 
at a time when agricultural land was much needed. Accordingly,  two years 
later, the government passed further legislation attempting to undo the award 
of ownership in certain circumstances and return the land to the state for more 
appropriate  redistribution. Again,  the Court  characterised this as a  de jure 
deprivation, since land was being transferred out of the ownership of the new 
farmers, albeit that the original award of ownership may have been ill thought 
through or made in error.167    
An enforced sale though, for example, insolvency proceedings will  also fall 
into the category of de jure deprivation, as in Kanala v Slovakia.168
2.5.2 De facto deprivation
More  problematic  for  the  Court  and  the  Commission  are  de  facto  cases. 
Exactly how far do an applicant’s rights of property have to be compromised 
before  they  will  effectively  cease  to  exist?  The  first  serious  consideration 
given  to  unravelling  this  problem  came  with  Sporrong  and  Lönnroth  v 
Sweden.169  The two applicants in this case owned properties in Stockholm 
which had been the subject of expropriation permits for 23 years and eight 
years respectively. The permits earmarked the buildings for later expropriation 
by the state as part of a redevelopment planned for the area. For the same 
165 See further discussion of the case at p162 below.
166 (2006) 42 EHRR 49
167 See further discussion of the case at p162 below.
168 (57239/00) 10 July 2007 
169 (1983) 5 EHRR 35
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reasons, the properties were also subject to a prohibition on construction for 
25 years and 12 years respectively. The redevelopment design changed over 
time, and ultimately the properties were not expropriated. The permits were 
cancelled. 
The applicants in Sporrong did not claim to have been formally deprived; the 
titles had remained in the applicants’  names throughout the time period in 
question and, in a purely legal sense, there could be no question that they 
were the owners. However, they contended that the limitations their properties 
had been subject  to  were  excessive,  and that  their  rights  of  property  had 
accordingly been deprived of any substance while the measures in question 
were  in  force.  They had been owners in name only,  but  with  none of the 
attendant powers attaching to ownership.
The Court analysed the dispute from a practical point of view, stating:
In the absence of a formal expropriation, the Court considers that it must look behind 
the appearances and investigate the realities of the situation complained of. Since the 
Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are “practical and effective”, it has to 
be ascertained whether the situation amounted to a de facto expropriation.170 
The  expropriation  permits  left  intact  in  law  the  owners’  right  to  use  and 
dispose of their possessions. However, in practice, they significantly reduced 
the possibility of  exercising these powers.  The applicants’  right of property 
thus became precarious and defeasible. On the other hand, the reduction in 
the applicants’ powers was not absolute. Although the prospect of disposing 
of  the  properties  was  undoubtedly  impacted upon by the  permits  and the 
prohibition on construction, the possibility of sale still existed; the government 
led evidence to the effect that sales of several properties similarly subject to 
the expropriation measures had, in fact, taken place. 
The Court concluded that:
170 ibid., para 63
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although the right in question lost some of its substance, it did not disappear. The 
effects  of  the measures involved  are  not  such that  they can be assimilated to  a 
deprivation of possessions.171
Sporrong provides something  of  a  waterline  for  deciding when a  de facto 
deprivation will have occurred. Where the applicant’s ability to exercise his or 
her  rights  is  compromised  by  the  actions  of  the  state,  it  will  give  rise  to 
questions of deprivation. An impact on the right to dispose of the property will 
be  given  key  importance.172 However,  a  mere  reduction  in  the  applicant’s 
powers will  not be sufficient, even where that reduction is significant. Little 
less than a complete inability to exercise the usual rights of ownership will 
suffice for a finding of de facto deprivation to be made. A similar statement of 
the Court’s views can be seen in the quite different context of Powell v UK,173 
discussed above, where the applicant’s home was on the route of a new the 
flight path to and from Heathrow. The Commission noted:
It is true that aircraft noise nuisance of considerable importance both as to level and 
frequency may seriously affect the value of real property or even render it unsaleable 
and thus amount to a partial taking of property.174
Again, the importance of disposing of the property is emphasised. As with 
Sporrong,  the  Commission  did  not  feel  the  restrictions  suffered  by  the 
applicant in Powell were extensive enough to equate to a deprivation.
Given the rigorous standard set out by the Court in Sporrong, it is perhaps not 
surprising  that  very  few  de  facto deprivations  have  been  held  to  exist.  A 
recent example came in the case of  Papamichalopoulos v Greece.175  Here, 
the applicant’s land had been expropriated for the benefit of the Navy Fund in 
1967 when  Greece was  controlled  by a  dictatorship.  The land was  never 
formally transferred out of the names of the applicants, but it was occupied by 
the Navy and used for naval  officers and their  families as a holiday park. 
171 ibid., para 63
172 Some issues with the use of transfer as a deciding criterion are outlined at p56 above.
173 (1987) 9 EHRR 241
174 ibid., para 5.
175 (1996) 21 EHRR 439. Similar facts arose in Karagiannis and Ors v Greece (51354/99) 16 January 2003, in which 
the Court again found a violation on the part of Greece.
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When  democratic  government  was  restored,  the  expropriation  was 
acknowledged, and although it was not considered possible to return the land 
to the applicant given the changes which had been made to it subsequently 
and the importance of the area to the Navy, provisions were put in place to 
provide the applicant with alternate land in compensation for that which had 
been  lost.  Complications  arose  with  the  transfer  of  the  new  land,  and 
ultimately neither the old land nor the proposed new land was ever  made 
available to the applicant. Again, the Court gave weight to the fact that, in 
spite of retaining legal title to the property, the applicant had lost any ability to 
dispose  of  it.  In  the  circumstances,  the  Court  was  prepared  to  find  a 
deprivation. It is difficult, however, to see how the Court could find otherwise 
when the state itself, in providing for compensation (albeit which was never 
received),  had  tacitly  acknowledged  that  a  deprivation  had  taken  place. 
Nonetheless,  the case does show that  the circumstances exist  in which a 
finding of de facto deprivation can be made. 
2.5.3 Exceptions to the rules
Where a disposal is possible, however, it seems a restriction of any severity 
on  almost  all  other  rights  of  ownership  will  not  amount  to  a  deprivation. 
Mellacher v Austria176 dealt with the type of rent control legislation which is 
familiar to lawyers throughout Europe as a mechanism used by governments 
to  avoid  a  housing  crisis  in  areas  where  affordable  housing  has  become 
scarce. The applicants in the case claimed that new restrictions on the rent 
they were lawfully able to impose on their leased properties were so severe 
that  the  applicants  themselves  were  rendered  mere  administrators  of  the 
properties, receiving remuneration controlled by the national administration. 
One of the applicants had their rental income reduced by 82.4%, another by 
80.2%. The legislation also made it impossible for the applicants to enforce 
contracts which had already been agreed to by the tenants. The Court was 
not prepared to view the unenforceable contracts as the property in question, 
preferring to look at the situation as a whole. Factually speaking, there was 
nothing to prevent  the applicants from disposing of  their  property,  or  from 
using  it  or  leasing  it  in  the  normal  way.  There  was  no  deprivation  in  the 
176 (1990) 12 EHRR 391
81
circumstances. Similarly, in Matos E Silva v Portugal,177 part of the applicants’ 
land had been earmarked by the government  for  the creation of  a  nature 
reserve. No formal expropriation measures were put in place – the applicants 
remained registered owners – but they contended that their ability to use the 
land or enter into dealings with it had been severely restricted as a matter of 
fact.  The Court  found no formal  or  de facto expropriation,  noting  that  the 
applicants’ position was not irreversible, and also that:
Although the right in question had lost some of its substance, it had not disappeared. 
The Court notes, for example, that all reasonable manner of exploiting the property 
had not disappeared seeing that the applicants continued to work the land.178 
 
Additionally, the question of disposal will not, it appears, be the deciding factor 
in a case where a broader policy reason has informed the state’s actions. This 
point  is  demonstrated by a trio  of  cases arising from criminal  seizure and 
forfeiture proceedings. The first of these is perhaps the easiest to understand. 
Air Canada v United Kingdom179 concerned an aircraft  owned by the flight 
operator, which was seized by UK Customs after a quantity of cannabis resin 
was found on board. The plane was ultimately returned subject to conditions, 
chief  among  which  was  the  requirement  to  pay  £50,000  in  caution.  In 
determining the question of whether a deprivation had taken place, the Court 
gave  weight  to  the  fact  that  the  seizure  of  the  aircraft  had  only  been  a 
temporary measure; by the time the proceedings came before the Court, the 
plane had been returned to the possession of the applicant. The Court also 
looked more broadly at the end sought to be achieved by the seizure of the 
aircraft, namely to prevent carriers from bringing prohibited drugs into the UK. 
With those two factors in mind, the Court felt it would be more appropriate to 
classify the actions of the state as a control on the use of property, despite the 
fact that ownership with all its concomitant rights had been removed from the 
applicant. 
177 (1997) 24 EHRR 573
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The important factor in Air Canada is, obviously, time. Although there was a 
total removal of the rights attaching to ownership, it was temporally limited. 
The plane was returned to the applicant. A temporary withdrawal of rights is 
not,  perhaps,  sufficient  to  amount  to  a deprivation in  the P1-1 sense;  the 
Commission’s remarks about the possibility of reversing the position in Matos 
E Silva v Portugal180 tend to support this interpretation of the jurisprudence. 
The opinion in Air Canada can logically be understood if time, in the view of 
the Court, is of the essence in such cases.181 
Such logic is not so easy to extrapolate from the second of the confiscation 
cases, Vasilescu v Romania.182 Here, the removal of rights was not only total, 
but  also  permanent.  Nonetheless,  no  deprivation  was  held  to  have  taken 
place. The application arose from the police seizure of 327 gold coins during 
the course of a raid on the applicant’s husband’s home. Neither the applicant 
nor  her  husband  was  ultimately  charged  with  any  offence,  but  the  police 
(unlawfully) decided to keep the coins anyway. Curiously, it was the lack of 
legal basis for the actions of the police which the Court considered to prevent 
a finding of deprivation, stating:
In view of the lack of any basis in law, as recognised by both the domestic courts and 
the  Government,  the  continuing  retention  of  the  items  in  question  cannot  be 
interpreted as a deprivation of possessions or control of the use of property allowed 
by P1-1.183
No  further  explication  of  this  statement  is  given  in  the  remainder  of  the 
judgment, with the Court ultimately concluding that the applicant had been the 
victim of a “de facto confiscation”. However, it does appear that the case was 
decided on the basis of a breach of the first sentence of P1-1 rather than on 
the basis of a deprivation. In terms of ascertaining a clear definition of the 
term “deprivation”, it is unclear what help this case can be.
 
180 (1997) 24 EHRR 573
181 See also Debelianovi v Bulgaria (61951/00) 29 March 2007, in which an inability to enforce an order for restitution 
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The waters are further muddied by the third confiscation case,  Allgemeine 
Gold-und  Silberscheideanstalt  v  UK (the  AGOSI),184 which  is  perhaps  the 
most complicated on its facts. Here, Krüggerands had been smuggled into the 
UK and seized by Customs and Excise, being declared forfeit in the criminal 
proceedings  which  followed.  The  applicant  company  had  sold  the 
Krüggerands (unknowingly) to the smugglers, subject to a “retention of title” 
clause providing that the applicants were to remain the owners of the coins 
until such time as full payment was made. At the time the coins were seized, 
the applicant company was still awaiting payment and was therefore the legal 
owner of coins which were now entirely beyond their control. The company 
unsuccessfully  sought  return  of  the  coins  domestically  before  making  an 
application under P1-1.
The Court found:
The prohibition on the importation of  gold  coins into the UK clearly  constituted a 
control of the use of property…The seizure and forfeiture of the Kruggerands were 
measures taken for the enforcement of that prohibition. This did, of course, involve a 
deprivation of property, but in the circumstances the deprivation formed a constituent 
element of the procedure for the control of the use in the United Kingdom of gold 
coins such as Kruggerands. It is therefore the second paragraph which is applicable 
in the present case.185 
The  language  used  by  the  Court  merits  some  attention.  There  is  an 
acknowledgement  that  the  applicants  had,  indeed,  suffered  a  deprivation, 
which would seem difficult to deny given the earlier dicta on what constitutes a 
deprivation.  It  would  not  have  been  possible  for  the  company  to  use  or 
dispose  of  the  property,  or  to  exercise  any  of  the  other  rights  normally 
associated with ownership. However, in this situation, the Court believed the 
deprivation to be “a constituent element of the procedure for control of the use 
[of gold coins].” This statement seems counterintuitive, given that deprivation 
would on the whole be seen as the more serious of the potential violations of 
P1-1, and certainly the one which attracts the strongest degree of protection. 
184 (1987) EHRR 1
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How can  deprivation  therefore  be  a  part  of  (the  less  stringently  guarded) 
control? The Court’s reasoning is unsatisfactory, and does not fit well with the 
earlier jurisprudence. What seems to have been informing the decision of the 
court is public policy considerations, namely, the need to enforce measures 
against high value international smuggling operations. P1-1, as discussed in 
later  chapters,  has  provision  for  such  policy  arguments  to  be  taken  into 
account, but the appropriate place to do so in not when deciding whether an 
action constitutes a deprivation or not in the first place. As it is, the AGOSI 
judgment sits uncomfortably with the case law surrounding it.   
The confiscation cases ultimately appear to be a contentious deviation from 
the usual rules on what will constitute a deprivation, and an unclear deviation 
at that. Unfortunately it does not appear that the Court is willing to clarify or 
even acknowledge any confusion here. The more recent case of  Phillips v 
United  Kingdom  continued  the  confusion  by  relying  on  the  previous  case 
law.186 The application arose from an order confiscating what were considered 
to  be  the  proceeds  of  crime  following  the  applicant’s  conviction  for  drug 
trafficking offences. In a short judgement on the P1-1 point, the Court noted:
As previously stated, the confiscation order constituted a “penalty” within the meaning 
of  the Convention.  It  therefore  falls  within  the scope of  the second paragraph of 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which, inter alia, allows the Contracting States to control 
the use of property to secure the payment of penalties.187 
Thus  it  seems  the  Court  is  content  to  rely  on  its  previously  bewildering 
jurisprudence as a basis on which to perpetuate the uncertainty in this area. 
Unfortunately  the  confiscation  cases  are  not  a  sole  category  in  terms  of 
contentious deviations from the general  principles here.  Another  exception 
appears to exist where a change in the law creates a situation which could be 
construed as a deprivation for one particular individual. The first example of 
this,  although the  case is  not  analysed  in  precisely  these terms,  probably 
186 (41087/98) 5 July 2001 
187 Para 51
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came with  Banér v Sweden,188 where a change in Swedish law turned what 
had previously been exclusive fishing rights held by the applicant into a public 
right  available  to  any  citizen  to  fish  with  hand-held  tackle.  The  applicant 
complained  that  he  had  been  deprived  of  his  exclusive  right  to  fish.  The 
Commission noted that the applicant retained legal title to the fishings as well 
as the ability to fish as a matter of fact. That this right was no longer exclusive 
was considered to be a control of its use rather than a deprivation as such.
A clearer example is to be found in  Stran Greek Refineries v Greece,189 in 
which an arbitration award made in favour of the applicants was rendered 
unenforceable by a change in legislation. The applicants again retained title to 
the award in a formal sense; their inability to enforce it was simply a change in 
the way it could be used in the eyes of the Court. There was held to be no 
deprivation.
Again, it can be difficult to reconcile these cases with the dicta which surround 
them.  Altering  a  right  to  the  extent  that  it  loses  the  significant  part  of  its 
original  substance  would  seem  to  be  a  classic  example  of  a  de  facto 
deprivation. The fact that the law making this change might be justified in a 
policy sense is an issue to be addressed at a later stage, not when deciding 
the applicable rule in the first place. 
One  final  point  worthy  of  note,  without  the  complications  of  the  cases 
discussed immediately above, is that where a property right is based on a 
condition which ceases to be fulfilled, the consequent removal of that right 
cannot constitute a deprivation. This can be seen in a variety of licence cases, 
the most useful example of which is Fredin v Sweden.190
2.5.4 Conclusion
On the face of it, identifying a deprivation is a straightforward matter. Where 
rights of ownership have formally been removed, there can be no question 
that a  de jure  deprivation has taken place. Similarly,  where all  rights have 
188 (11763/85) 9 March 1989 
189 (1995) 19 EHRR 293
190 (1991) 13 EHRR 784
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effectively been removed, even whilst formally remaining in place, a de facto 
deprivation will be found. However, the removal of rights here must be such 
as to result in an almost total inability to exercise the usual rights attaching to 
ownership. A key factor here will be whether or not the applicant has retained 
the right to dispose of the possession in question. 
Where a disposal remains possible, however, even severe restrictions on the 
applicant’s powers will be unlikely to amount to a deprivation in the eyes of 
the Court.
In  addition,  the  complex  issues  surrounding  confiscation  and  forfeiture  of 
goods on a criminal law basis do not appear to fit readily into the definition of 
deprivation the Court has otherwise appeared to find acceptable. 
The difficulties in defining this concept are closely connected with the manner 
in which the Court has approached the bigger question of determining P1-1 
applications. These issues will be explored in detail in the third chapter of this 
thesis. 
2.6 Control
The concept of control does not appear to have been given a similar level of 
scrutiny to that of deprivation. In most circumstances, it seems simply to be 
the  fallback  position  when  a  deprivation  cannot  be  established,  or  where 
common sense dictates that the action taken by the state is a control of the 
use of possessions rather than a removal of the same, for example, in the 
context of planning legislation.191
Some useful guidance is to be found in the 1976 decision of Handyside v the 
United Kingdom.192 The context here was essentially criminal. The applicant 
was  an  English  publisher  who  had  been  charged  under  the  Obscene 
Publications  Act  for  publishing  ‘The  Little  Red  Schoolbook’,  an  alternative 
guide to adolescence for schoolchildren with a great deal of information on 
191 See, for example, Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden, where the court states that prohibition on construction is 
clearly a control of the use of property.
192 (1976) 1 EHRR 737
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topics  such  as  sexual  relationships  and  illegal  drugs.  The  case  raised  a 
variety  of  issues  surrounding  freedom of  expression  and  censorship.  The 
relevance for property law, however, came with the seizure and subsequent 
forfeiture and destruction of around 1200 copies of the book, together with the 
printer’s matrix. 
In making its decision, the Court drew a clear distinction between the seizure 
of the books in the first place, and their destruction following a subsequent 
domestic court decision authorising the same.    
The seizure complained of was provisional. It did no more than prevent the applicant, 
for  a  period,  from  enjoying  and  using  as  he  pleased  possessions  of  which  he 
remained the owner and which he would have recovered had the proceedings against 
him resulted in an acquittal.
In  these  circumstances,  the  Court  thinks  that  the  second  sentence  of  the  first 
paragraph  of  Article  1  does  not  come  into  play  in  this  case.193 Admittedly  the 
expression ‘deprived of his possessions’, in the English text, could lead one to think 
otherwise, but the structure of Article 1 shows that that sentence…applies only to 
someone who is ‘deprived of ownership’.
On the other hand the seizure did relate to ‘the use of property’ and thus falls within 
the ambit of the second paragraph.194
The Court is able to be very clear on why the seizure does not amount to a 
deprivation, but very little is said to justify its categorisation as a control. The 
important thing seems to be that the applicant was prevented from using his 
possession as he pleased for the period of time during which it was out of his 
hands.  The  concept  of  prevention  or  restriction  of  use,  rather  than  any 
interference with ownership qua ownership, therefore appears to be central to 
the definition of “control”. 
The  same  concepts  were  encapsulated  in  a  series  of  cases  involving 
regulation  of  landlords’  interests.  Mellacher  v  Austria,195 discussed  above, 
193 In other words, there was no “deprivation” in the P1-1 sense.
194 ibid., para 62.
195 (1990) 12 EHRR 391
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dealt with stringent rent control legislation severely limiting the rental income 
available to the applicant landlords. The court pointed out that the applicants 
retained the right to use the properties in a different way, or to sell them on. 
The legislation therefore amounted to a control of its use and nothing more.  
Several cases arose from the administration of eviction orders introduced in 
Italy with the aim of stemming a housing crisis. It was possible for landlords to 
obtain  orders  evicting  tenants  from their  property  for  a  variety  of  reasons 
including non-payment of rent and the landlords' own need for the premises. 
However,  police assistance in enforcing these eviction orders was granted 
only on a priority basis, with the result that some landlords, constantly pushed 
to the bottom of the priority list, were effectively unable to enforce their rights 
at  all.  In  Scollo  v  Italy,196 the  application  was  initially  considered  by  the 
European  Commission  of  Human  Rights,  who  noted  that  the  applicant 
continued to receive rent and was not prevented from selling his property, 
thus  rendering  the  measures  in  question  a  control  of  use,  rather  than  a 
deprivation. The Court  saw no reason to depart  from the reasoning of  the 
Commission. Similarly, in Immobiliare Saffi v Italy,197 the Court again focussed 
on the fact the applicant was not prevented from letting or selling the property 
to find that the measures in question amounted a to a control of use. It was 
noted in particular that the applicant in this case had eventually recovered 
possession of the premises.  
196 (1996) 22 EHRR 514
197 (1999) 30 EHRR 756
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Two further points can be extrapolated from the case law as to the definition 
of control. First, positive action enforced by the state can also be a control 
in terms of P1-1. In Denev v Sweden,198 the state obtained a court order 
preventing  the  applicant  from  planting  certain  species  of  tree  on  his 
forestry land, and ordering him rather to plant Swedish pine, or else to 
face  a  heavy  fine.  The  Commission  considered  the  actions  of  the 
authorities to constitute a control, justified by the environmental motives 
underlying  it.  Similarly,  in  Urbarska Obec Trencianske Biskupice v 
Slovakia,199 the  applicants  owned  agricultural  land  which  had  been 
controlled by the Communist regime in the former Czechoslovakia, who 
allowed the land to be occupied and worked by people other than the 
owners,  known  as  "gardeners".   In  the  course  of  transition  to  a  free 
market  economy,  legislation  was  passed  compelling  the  owners  to 
continue leasing their land to the gardeners for a fixed rate of rent which 
amounted in the applicant's case to less than 10% of the market value. 
This obligation to lease was considered by the Court to be a control, and 
a violation was ultimately found.   
 Additionally, Langborger v Sweden200 suggests the existence of a de minimis 
rule,  whereby  a  legislative  measure  impacting  on  an  applicant  only  a 
negligible amount will not be considered capable of constituting a violation of 
P1-1.        
2.6.1 Examples of control
Common examples  of  state  action  which  will  be  categorised as  a  control 
include  the  imposition  of  rules  of  taxation201 or  planning  legislation,202 
restrictions  on  rent,203 licensing  laws204 and  the  operation  of  rules  of 
succession.205 
198  (12570/86) 18 January 1989 
199 (2009) 48 EHRR 49
200 (1990) 12 EHRR 416
201 Spacek v Czech Republic (2000) 30 EHRR 1010,  National and Provincial Building Society v United Kingdom 
(1998) 25 EHRR 127
202 Agrotexim v Greece (1996) 21 EHRR 250
203 Mellacher v Austria (1990) 12 EHRR 391
204 Tre Traktorer Aktiebolag v Sweden (1991) 13 EHRR 309
205 Inze v Austria (1987) 10 EHRR 394
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2.6.2 Conclusion
An  action  by  the  state,  which  regulates  the  use  that  can  be  made  of 
possessions, but does not remove the right of ownership, will fall within the 
definition of  control.  The regulation may be positive or negative,  and must 
have more than a  de minimis  impact  on the applicant.  Essentially,  control 
must be less than deprivation.  
   
2.7 Public/General Interest
Of all  the terms contained with  in P1-1, the notions of  public and general 
interest  are  perhaps  the  most  ambiguous  and  difficult  to  define.  Before 
consideration  can  be given  to  the  case law in  more  detail,  two  important 
provisos must be put in place. First, the Court and the Commission tend to 
use the two terms interchangeably;  there is nothing in the jurisprudence to 
suggest that one term encompasses a different or more demanding standard 
than the other.206 The second proviso is that the two terms form a central part 
of the decision-making process which has evolved for determination of P1-1 
application and which will be considered in detail in chapter three below.207 
So what will be considered to be “in the public interest”? Perhaps the most 
illuminating  piece  of  case  law  is  James  v  the  United  Kingdom.208 The 
applicants,  as  trustees,  were  substantial  owners  of  residential  property  in 
London. They had been deprived of their ownership of a number of properties 
through the exercise by the occupants of rights of purchase conferred by the 
Leasehold Reform Act 1967. The reform was introduced to correct what was 
seen as an outmoded system of property tenure, and a compensation scheme 
was  in  place  for  deprived  landowners.  In  making  its  decision,  the  Court 
emphasized that its role was not to adjudicate on whether or not the policy 
underlying  the  state’s  decision  was  correct  or  not.  It  considered  that  the 
government had a democratic mandate to make such decisions on behalf of 
206 This does tend to beg the question of why two different terms were used in the first place. Was it simply a 
question of sloppy drafting? See “The Protection of Property Rights” by George Gretton in Human Rights and Scots 
Law (Boyle, Himsworth, MacQueen, Loux eds.) 
207 See p129 et seq.
208 (1986) 8 EHRR 123
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citizens, and it would be inappropriate for the Court to substitute its judgment 
for that of elected representatives. In such matters, it was necessary for states 
to  be  given  a  wide  margin  of  appreciation.  As  Reed and  Murdoch  put  it, 
“policy-making  of  this  nature  is  not  amenable  to  international  judicial 
scrutiny.”209    
A similar view was expressed in the later decision of Hentrich v France,210 an 
unusual case dealing with rights of pre-emption available to tax authorities in 
France when a property had been sold for a value less than the assessed 
value. The Court emphasized that:
the notion of “public interest”  is  necessarily  extensive and that the States have a 
certain margin of appreciation to frame and organise their fiscal policies and make 
arrangements – such as the right of pre-emption – to ensure that taxes are paid. It 
recognises that the prevention of tax evasion is a legitimate object which is in the 
public interest.211 
James also clarified another point of dispute as regards the interpretation of 
public/general interest. In the French language text of P1-1, it provides that 
there will be no deprivation of possessions other than pour l’utilité publique. 
Relying on this text, the applicants in  James put forward the argument that 
property could only be taken by the state if it were to be used directly by the 
public. This point of view was rejected at the Commission stage.
A requirement  that  no  one  should  be  deprived  of  property  except  “in  the  public 
interest” is not the same as a requirement that no one should be deprived of property 
except when the property is to be put to a public use. 
The Commission is therefore of the opinion that a taking of property may in principle 
be considered to be “in the public interest” where the property is taken in pursuance 
of legitimate public, social or other policies, notwithstanding that the property is not to 
be put in public use.212
209 para 8.14
210 (1994) 18 EHRR 440
211 Ibid., para 39
212 (1984) 6 EHRR CD 475, para 133
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It  is obvious, then, that the discretion afforded to states here is extensive. 
However it is not, apparently, without limits. Where action the state maintains 
is in the public interest is viewed by the Court as manifestly unreasonable, it 
will  not  be  accepted  as  a  justification  for  interference  with  the  applicant’s 
rights under P1-1. James, again:
The Court, finding it natural that the margin of appreciation available to the legislature 
in implementing social and economic policies should be a wide one, will respect the 
legislature’s judgment as to what is "in the public interest"  unless that judgment be 
manifestly without reasonable foundation.213 
The  virtual  non-existence  of  cases  in  which  such  a  finding  of  manifest 
unreasonableness is made, and the reasons for that, are discussed in more 
detail in chapter three.214
2.7.1 Examples of public/general interest
It is impossible to give an exhaustive list of every justification which has been 
accepted by the Court as amounting to the public/general interest throughout 
the decades of jurisprudence. However it can be seen that the list ranges from 
state action designed to facilitate major regime change,215 through to large 
scale  political  operations  such  as  nationalisation  of  industry216 or  agrarian 
reform,217 more  typical  state  works  such  as  new road  projects218 and  the 
construction  of  public  spaces219 on  to  everyday  examples  like  planning 
regulations,220 systems  of  taxation221 and  succession,222 licensing  of  areas 
such as the sale of alcohol223 or guns224 and the enforcement of customs and 
213 Ibid., para 46
214 See p 129 et seq.
215 Jahn v Germany (2006) 42 EHRR 49
216 Lithgow v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 329
217 Almeida Garrett and Ors v Portugal (2002) 34 EHRR 23
218 Papachelas v Greece (2000) 30 EHRR 923
219 Matos E Silva v Portugal (1997) 24 EHRR 20
220 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35
221 Spacek v Czech Republic (2000) 30 EHRR 1010,  National and Provincial Building Society v United Kingdom 
(1998) 25 EHRR 127
222 Inze v Austria (1987) 10 EHRR 394
223 Tre Traktorer Aktiebolag v Sweden (1991) 13 EHRR 309
224 RC, AWA and Ors v United Kingdom (37644/97) 1 July 1998 
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excise regulations,225 all of which seem generally accepted to be necessary 
parts of democratic governance. Interests which may arguably be considered 
more political than practical are also sometimes seen, such as the protection 
of public morality226 or the protection of the environment.227   
2.7.2 Conclusion
The notions of public and general interest are extremely wide concepts that 
are ultimately defined by the states themselves. The Court will  respect the 
views of the state as to what will be for the good of the public unless those 
views  are  manifestly  unreasonable.  The  importance  placed  on  the  public 
interest  does,  however,  have  to  be  balanced  against  the  interests  of  the 
applicant whose rights under P1-1 have been compromised. This control is 
put in place using the test of proportionality, which is considered in more detail 
below.  
2.8 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter of the thesis was to set out systematic definitions of 
each of the key terms in P1-1. It was noted that the wording of the article was 
always recognised to be ambiguous. The subject matter of the protection fall 
squarely  within  the domain of  private  law,  and there would seem to be a 
natural conflict between the emphasis on certainty traditionally found in that 
area of the law and the adaptive, flexible interpretation which befits a "living 
instrument"  such as the ECHR. It  was posited that  defining the key terms 
might be one way in which to help bridge that schism.
Notwithstanding the autonomous concepts used by P1-1 to safeguard real 
and effective rights, it is possible to extrapolate some general principles as to 
how each of the key terms will  be interpreted by the Commission and the 
Court. The approach is chiefly pragmatic, concerned with the reality of a given 
situation.  This  is  demonstrated  throughout  the  chapter,  with  examples 
including the rule that a majority shareholder in some situations will be entitled 
225 Air Canada v United Kingdom (1995) 20 EHRR 150, Vasilescu v Romania 28 EHRR 737
226 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737
227 Fredin v Sweden (1991) 13 EHRR 784, Denev v Sweden 1989 59 DR 127
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to make an application relating to the property rights of the company in which 
he holds shares, and the concept that a de facto deprivation of property will 
be  considered  a  violation  in  the  same  way  as  a  de  jure deprivation. 
Additionally,  the  flexibility  of  the  Convention  as  a  "living  instrument"  is 
reflected in  for  example,  the reluctance of  the Court  to  be prescriptive  as 
regards the concept of  a possession, or the margin of appreciation afforded 
to states to determine what  state action might be in the public or general 
interest. 
These principles have developed slowly over time. It is apparent that some 
terms required definition more urgently than others to enable P1-1 to offer any 
protection  at  all.  The  meaning  of  "possessions"  has  been  debated  more 
frequently  and  consequently  benefited  from a  more  sophisticated  level  of 
interpretation than probably any other term in the article. In the evolutionary 
process,  determining  what  will  constitute  a  possession  was  a  critical  first 
stage. In contrast, some of the other terms have had to wait longer for the 
light of judicial illumination. The recent discussion in the case law as to the 
positive obligation imposed on states by the term "peaceful enjoyment" is an 
interesting demonstration of the way in which the property right continues to 
develop. With some of the basic issues resolved, matters which may initially 
have seemed more peripheral can be given a greater degree of consideration. 
The adaptive approach to the terminology adopted in Strasbourg can operate, 
however, at the expense of certainty. The Court and the Commission do not 
consider  themselves  bound  strictly  by  rules  of  precedent,  and  in  some 
situations this makes it difficult to state with any certainty how a term is likely 
to be interpreted. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the explanation 
given by the Court for how it has decided certain cases is not always as full as 
might be desired. Some of the key terms will remain in a state of uncertainty 
until further jurisprudence is available as with, for example, the case law on 
domestic court  decisions which make an award against the state.  In other 
words, the understanding of the terminology which can be constructed from 
the jurisprudence will continue to evolve. It should be recognised, however, 
that  this  ongoing  uncertainty  can  continue  to  cause  difficulties  in  the 
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application of P1-1 which overall operate to weaken the protection it offers. 
This theme will be explored in more detail in chapter three.
The working definitions which have been extrapolated from the cases during 
the course of this chapter represent the position of the property right at the 
present time. These definitions should operate as a starting point from which 
a  "best  guess"  as  to  the  application  of  P1-1  in  novel  situations  can  be 
estimated. 
Having considered what P1-1 actually says, the next step is to consider how it 
applies. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  HOW HAS IT BEEN APPLIED?  
"If any one of them can explain it," said Alice, "I'll give him sixpence. I don't believe 
there's an atom of meaning in it."228 
3.1 Introduction
The complex political backdrop which informed the drafting of P1-1 resulted in 
a  form  of  wording  which  suffered  from  certain  ambiguities.  Although  this 
uncertainty was recognised by the drafters, the intention seemed to be that 
clarity should properly be obtained through jurisprudence. Has this intention 
been realised?
The analysis of the case law set out in chapter two has allowed definitions of 
each of the key terms in P1-1 to be put forward. However, that analysis also 
suggested that the development of the property protection to date has been 
uneven in places, with many questions yet to be resolved in relation to some 
of these terms, or at least as regards their use in particular contexts. Even 
were there no such equivalence in meaning, definitions of the words cannot in 
themselves explain the full extent of the protection offered by P1-1. It is also 
necessary to consider how those terms have been applied by the Court in 
determining  the  situations  in  which  a  breach  of  the  property  right  has 
occurred.  It  is  only  in  examining  this  process  that  a  fuller  sense  can  be 
achieved of where the boundaries of the protection may lie. This exercise is 
necessary to fully establish whether the intended clarity has been achieved 
through  the  case  law,  and  to  give  an  understanding  of  the  strength  (or 
otherwise) of the guarantee set out in P1-1. 
An examination of the jurisprudence relating to P1-1 reveals essentially a five-
step  process  through  which  it  can  be  established  whether  the  applicant’s 
complaint entails a violation of P1-1. This process involves a determination of 
whether the applicant holds a possession in the meaning of the Convention, 
whether the state action complained of has contravened the basic principles 
of P1-1and whether that contravention is justified in the terms of the article. 
228 Alice in Wonderland, p106 
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The steps of the process are as follows:
1.  The Court must determine whether the property or interest held by the 
applicant falls within the broad definition of "possessions" as discussed 
in chapter two above.229 The first question in the process is accordingly: 
does the applicant hold a possession?
2. Should it be determined that a possession is involved, the Court asks 
whether an interference with P1-1 has taken place by considering the 
“three rules” set out in  Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden. As will be 
elaborated  upon  below,  any  violation  of  P1-1  must  fall  to  be 
categorised as (a) general interference with the peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions, (b) deprivation of possessions or (c) control of the use of 
those possessions. State action which falls within one of these three 
rules  constitutes  a  contravention.  The second question  is  therefore: 
which rule has been breached?
 
3. Once it has been established that such an interference occurred, the 
Court must decide whether it is justified by the qualifications to the right 
of peaceful enjoyment of possessions set out in P1-1. No contravention 
can be fair if does not have a clear legal basis. The third question is 
accordingly:  was the action of the state lawful in the meaning of the 
article?
4. Interferences can only be justified where they were carried out for the 
benefit of the wider society.  The fourth question is therefore: did the 
action of  the state  pursue a legitimate aim in  the public  or  general 
interest? 
5. Finally, any interference must meet the test of proportionality inherent 
in the wording of the article. The fifth question is accordingly: did the 
state action strike a fair balance between the needs of the community 
229 See pp48-69 above
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and  the  burden  placed  on  the  individual  applicant?  This  is  also 
expressed by asking simply, was the interference proportionate?
 
Each of these steps will be considered in turn in this chapter.  
3.2 Does the applicant hold a possession?
The essence of this step has been covered in the discussion of the definition 
of the word “possessions” in chapter two, and it is not necessary to repeat that 
discussion here. Briefly put, the Court must ascertain whether the applicant 
holds  an  interest  with  an  objective  economic  value,  or  has  a  legitimate 
expectation of acquiring such an interest in future.230 
If no such possession is found to exit, then it follows that P1-1 cannot be 
engaged, and the application will be dismissed. 
3.3 Which rule has been engaged?
If it is determined that the applicant holds a possession meriting the protection 
of P1-1, the next step for the Court is to determine where the state action 
giving rise to the application fits within the framework set out in Sporrong and 
Lönnroth v Sweden.231 This case, in which the "three rule" approach to an 
understanding  of  the  protection  offered  by  P1-1  was  first  elaborated,  is 
arguably the most influential piece of P1-1 jurisprudence to date. 
3.3.1 The dicta in Sporrong and Lönnroth
The application arose from a relatively commonplace planning dispute. The 
applicants  owned  two  properties  in  central  Stockholm,  located  in  an  area 
which was then zoned for future redevelopment. With this is mind, the local 
authority granted expropriation permits against the two pieces of land, along 
with prohibitions on building. This measure not only prevented the applicants 
from developing their land, but effectively rendered the properties unsaleable, 
as the prospect of future expropriation at an undefined time was unlikely to be 
230 See page 48-69 above.
231 (1983) 5 EHRR 35
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appealing to buyers on the open market. After the permits had been in place 
for a significant period of time – 23 years and eight years respectively – a 
change in local authority planning strategy had the result that the properties 
were no longer in the redevelopment zone. The permits were redacted. The 
applicants argued that the impact of the permits throughout the period during 
which they were live was de facto deprivation of ownership of the properties 
concerned, since they could be neither developed nor sold. Having received 
no compensation for this alleged deprivation, the applicants contended that 
their rights under P1-1 had been violated. 
In  making  its  determination,  the  Court  took  the  opportunity  to  carry  out 
something of a review of the principles which could be extrapolated from P1-1 
jurisprudence up to that point. Consideration was first given to the overarching 
purpose of the property protection, as elaborated in the  dicta in  Marckx v 
Belgium.232 
By recognising that everyone has the right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, 
Article  1  is  in  substance  guaranteeing  the  right  of  property.  This  is  the  clear 
impression left by the words "possessions" and "use of property" (in French:  biens, 
propriété,  usage des biens);  the  travaux préparatoires,  for  their  part,  confirm this 
unequivocally: the drafters continually spoke of 'right of property' or 'right to property' 
to describe the subject-matter of successive drafts which were the forerunners of the 
present article.233 
This was the context in which the restrictions placed on the applicants' ability 
to use and dispose of their properties had to be considered, and against the 
relatively expansive outline of the protection suggested by Marckx, the Court 
was satisfied that there had been some interference with the right to property. 
The issue then became: did this interference amount to a violation of P1-1? It 
was in answering this question that the Court pronounced the famous  dicta 
which has formed the basic framework for every subsequent decision in which 
a violation of P1-1 is alleged. 
232 (1979) 2 EHRR 350
233 para 63. See also discussion of the travaux préparatoires in Chapter One at pages 19-32.
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The Article comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, which is of a general nature, 
enounces the principle of  peaceful  enjoyment of  property;  it  is  set  out  in the first 
sentence of the first paragraph. The second rule covers deprivation of possessions 
and subjects it to certain conditions; it appears in the second sentence of the same 
paragraph. The third rule recognises that States are entitled, amongst other things, to 
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest, by enforcing such 
laws  as  they  deem  necessary  for  the  purpose;  it  is  contained  in  the  second 
paragraph.234   
The Court does not offer any elaboration or justification for its analysis of the 
article. It is presented in the report as if this approach to the article is self-
evident from the wording of the text itself. There is some grammatical support 
in the sense that each of the three rules is ascribed to a different sentence of 
P1-1.  However,  this  is  not  the  only  interpretation  even  of  the  grammar: 
George Gretton  points  out  that  the  layout  of  the  article,  with  the  first  two 
sentences  forming  one  paragraph  and  the  third  sentence  forming  a  final 
paragraph, might seem to suggest that the first  two sentences set out the 
basic principle with the third paragraph providing the exception to the general 
rule.235 Placing too much emphasis on the grammar, however, is likely to be 
counterproductive given the autonomous nature of the terminology involved 
and the focus in Strasbourg on pragmatism and the protection of real and 
effective rights.   
Some  indication  as  to  the  Court's  reasoning  may  be  offered  in  the 
continuation of its opinion, in which it suggests:
The Court must determine, before considering whether the first  rule was complied 
with, whether the last two are applicable.236 
It seems then that the first rule, interference with peaceful enjoyment, can only 
come into play where the second and third  rules (deprivation and control) 
have been considered and discounted. This is a little difficult to parse. The 
first rule sets out the general principle. The second and third rules appear to 
234 para 61
235 The protection of property rights in Boyle, Himsworth et al (eds), Human Rights and Scots Law  (Hart Publishing, 
2002) 275-292
236 para 61
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be subsets of that general principle; in other words, a deprivation or a control 
is a specific type of interference with P1-1. It is necessary, in the view of the 
Court, to consider and, where appropriate, discount the subsets before it can 
be decided whether  there is  some other  quality  in  the action  of  the state 
which,  although  not  a  deprivation  or  a  control,  might  still  constitute  an 
interference. In one sense, it seems that the first rule becomes something of a 
"catch-all"  provision,  or  a  safety  net  to  catch  applications which  might  fall 
outside the edges of the definitions of "deprivation" or "control". There is a 
level of ambiguity in that approach which  cannot sit easily with systems of 
property law founded squarely on certainty,  as in Scotland . However, it does 
not necessarily sit so uneasily with the language of the article, nor indeed with 
the  motivations  behind  its  inclusion  in  the  Convention.  If  the  property 
protection is to be flexible enough to adapt to changes in the law and society 
in  signatory  states,  a  definitive  definition  of  "interference"  is  likely  to  be 
impossible.
It should also be noted that framing the rules in this way allows the Court an 
important element of flexibility when it comes to the hotly contested issue of 
compensation. As will be discussed further below, an interference categorised 
as a deprivation will almost always give rise to an entitlement to compensation 
for  the  deprived.237 There  is  an  argument  that  the  general  "interference" 
category  allows  the  court  a  way  round  this  problem  of  mandatory 
compensation in cases where it may not consider it appropriate for a payment 
to be made. This argument may, in fact, be given some weight by the manner 
in which Sporrong itself was ultimately decided, and it could be said that there 
is something disingenuous about calling state  action an interference when 
what is really meant is that it is a deprivation not meriting compensation. It 
should  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that  a  violation  categorised  as  an 
interference will still be subject to the same "fair balance" test as a deprivation 
or a control, and the payment or otherwise of compensation will always form a 
part of that balancing exercise. Furthermore, as is discussed above,238 it was 
made explicit  in the  travaux préparatoires that  a property protection which 
237 See page 154 et seq.
238 See page 30.
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included a mandatory right to compensation for its violation would never have 
been included in the Convention in the first place. Again, it may be that the 
flexibility afforded to the Court here is a natural consequence of the way in 
which the Convention was conceived and drafted.     
In any event, whether the three rule approach is the most intuitive way of 
understanding P1-1 or not, there is certainly no question that it is workable, as 
can  be  seen  from  its  use  in  virtually  every  application  subsequent  to 
Sporrong.  In  the case itself,  the Court  applied its new framework with  the 
result, as discussed in chapter two above,239 that the expropriation permits, 
despite placing serious constraints on the ability of the applicants to use their 
land, were not sufficient to amount to a de facto deprivation of land, and did 
not  possess  the  requisite  characteristics  to  qualify  as  a  control.  The 
expropriation permits therefore qualified as a first rule "interference", whereas 
the building prohibitions were more obviously a rule three "control of the use 
of property."
It is worthy of note that the violation of P1-1 found in Sporrong was decided 
upon  by  the  slimmest  of  majorities:  ten  votes  to  nine.  In  the  dissenting 
opinions, discontent was expressed with the way in which the majority of the 
Court had analysed the provisions of P1-1. 
Our understanding of the way in which Article 1 should be interpreted and applied in 
the present case is different.
The  first  sentence  of  Article  1  contains  a  guarantee  of  private  property.  It  is  a 
provision in general terms protecting individuals and also private legal entities against 
interference with peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. However, modern States 
are obliged, in the interest of the community, to regulate the use of private property in 
many respects.  There are always  social  needs and responsibilities  relevant  to its 
ownership and use. The ensuing provisions of Article 1 recognise these needs and 
responsibilities and the corresponding rights of the States. The very essence of city 
planning is to control the use of property, including private property, in the general 
interest. 
239 See page 76-77.
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It is obvious that, for the second paragraph to apply, restrictions on the use of private 
possessions must leave the owner at least a certain degree of freedom, otherwise the 
restrictions  amount  to  deprivation;  in  this  case  no  "use"  is  left.  But  it  cannot  be 
decisive against the applicability of the second paragraph that the final outcome of 
the measures taken may be the expropriation of the properties concerned. Where the 
use  of  the  properties  is  still  possible  although  restricted,  this  provision  remains 
applicable, even if the intention behind the measures is the eventual deprivation of 
ownership. This is confirmed in the present case by the fact that deprivation in reality 
never took place. The use of the property by the owner was never terminated by state 
action. It was temporarily restricted in view of possible expropriations in the future.240
The argument here could suggest a slightly different construction of P1-1 than 
anything discussed so far. A control here would seem to be any interference 
up to the point at which it becomes a deprivation. Control in this sense might 
be  the  lesser  of  two  evils,  but  there  are  still  only  two  evils:  the  first  rule 
"interference" is superfluous. In the event,  it  is  difficult  to say whether  the 
opinion in dissent here intends to argue for a systematic understanding of P1-
1 along the lines suggested, or whether it is restricting itself to the facts of 
Sporrong,  arguing  that  in  the  particular  case the  expropriation  permits 
amounted to a control and so categorisation as an interference, although a 
valid option,  was incorrect in the circumstances.  Whatever  the intention, a 
systematic  argument  along  these  lines  could  be  counter-balanced  by  the 
same considerations of flexibility already discussed above. 
3.3.2 Development of the "three rule" approach
The three rule approach set out in  Sporrong has been relied upon almost 
ubiquitously in subsequent jurisprudence, but a few cases have attempted to 
revise or refine it. One example often cited as having altered the framework is 
James v United Kingdom.241 As set out in some detail in chapter two,242 the 
application arose from a leasehold conversion scheme, in which tenants of 
very  long  leases  had  their  interests  converted  to  ownership,  with 
compensation paid to the former landlords on the basis of a statutory scheme. 
240 Joint dissenting Opinion of Judges Zekia, Cremona, Thór Vilhjálmsson, Lagergren, Sir Vincent Evans, 
Macdonald, Bernhardt and Gersing. 
241 (1986) 8 EHRR 123
242 See page 92-93 above.
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In its opinion, the Court first quoted the  Sporrong three rule  dicta, and then 
stated:   
The three rules are not, however,  'distinct' in the sense of being unconnected. The 
second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the 
right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore be construed in the light 
of the general principle enunciated in the first rule.243
This is useful in so far as it illuminates to a certain extent the reasoning of the 
Court  in  Sporrong in suggesting that,  as discussed above, deprivation and 
control are subsets of the general category of interference. James does also 
go  further  than that  in  emphasising  a  connection  between all  three  rules. 
However, it is not really clear what this connection entails. To say that the 
second and third rules must be considered in light of the general aim of the 
article  is  arguably superfluous:  they are,  after  all,  an essential  part of  the 
article. The Court did not offer any further elaboration of or authority for the 
point, and little is to be found in the numerous subsequent cases which cite 
this dictum. 
A more radical alteration of the framework, although less remarked upon, is to 
be found in Allegemeine Gold-und Silberscheideanstalt v United Kingdom (the 
AGOSI.)244 Also discussed in chapter two,245 the applicant in this case had, in 
good faith, sold Krüggerands which were subsequently illegally smuggled into 
the UK. A condition of the sale had been the retention of the applicant's title 
until such times as full payment for the coins was made, a condition which 
had not been purified. Consequently, when the coins were confiscated and 
subsequently declared forfeit by UK customs, it was the applicant's right of 
ownership which was affected. The application was aimed at the forfeiture 
proceedings, which the applicant contended was unlawful since it, the legal 
owner of the coins, had done nothing wrong. In determining which of the three 
rules  might  be  applicable  in  the  case,  the  Court  gave  a  further,  perhaps 
unexpected, subdivision to the categories.  
243 para 37
244 (1987) 9 EHRR 1
245 See page 81 above.
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The forfeiture of the coins did, of course, involve a deprivation of property, but in the 
circumstances the deprivation formed a constituent element of the procedure for the 
control of the use in the United Kingdom of gold coins such as Krüggerands. It is 
therefore the second paragraph of Article 1 which is applicable in the present case.246
By this  dictum,  it  seems that  deprivation can,  in  certain  situations,  form a 
subset of control. If the construction of the  Sporrong dicta outlined above is 
accepted, control  is  itself  a subset of the general category of interference. 
There is a logical appeal about this reasoning from a semantic point of view; 
depriving someone of their property could be said to be the most extreme 
form of controlling their possessions. However,  it is strange that these two 
categories  which  had  previously  been  presented  as  sitting  alongside  one 
another should in fact be considered as a circle within a circle. Furthermore, 
even if such a presentation of the three rules as forming a set of concentric 
circles is appropriate, it does not explain why the central "deprivation" figure 
should in fact, be subsumed by "control". If that is the case, surely it follows 
that every deprivation or control becomes simply an interference? Why bother 
breaking down the categories at all?
246 para 51.
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It  is  of  some additional  concern that  the Court  describes deprivation as a 
subset of control only "in the circumstances." Does this mean that in other 
circumstances,  deprivation  is  entirely  separate  from  control?  Perhaps, 
however,  this  is  the  key  to  the  AGOSI  dictum.  The  case,  as  one  of  the 
problematic confiscation cases discussed in detail in chapter two,247 may best 
be considered restricted to its own facts, or at least to cases similarly based 
on matters of confiscation and forfeiture. It is difficult to see how it can form 
part of the broader Sporrong framework, and although it is often cited in P1-1 
decisions, little weight seems to have been given to the actual wording of the 
dictum set out above.  
247 See page 81-85 above.
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3.3.3 Conclusion
The second step in any P1-1 application, therefore, is to determine which of 
the three Sporrong rules, (if any) best describes the state action complained 
of by the applicant. Categorisation as a deprivation or a control should first be 
considered and, if inapplicable, the question of whether the action amounts to 
a more general interference with the right to property should be resolved. 
It may not be immediately apparent how the Court came to break down the 
principles of P1-1 in this way from the wording of the article. It is certainly not 
the only construction possible: in the judgment itself, an alternative, two-step 
approach was offered in dissent, to the effect that a control amounted to any 
interference up to the point that it became a deprivation.248 It is important to 
recall, however, that development of the three-rule approach does not start 
and finish with  Sporrong. Initially it may have been a crude tool, but its use 
has been clarified and refined in subsequent cases. The Court has become 
more adept in its use.
Again, it is not suggested that an end-point has been reached in the evolution 
of  this  stage  in  the  decision-making  process.  A  lack  of  clarity  remains  in 
relation to the inter-relation of the three rules, and there is some question as 
to how clearly the different categories are conceptualised by the Court when 
faced with "difficult" cases. However, the three rules do offer some general 
guidance on how novel interferences will be dealt with, and in that sense at 
least, they have a value.
 
If  the state action falls within one of the categories described by the three 
rules, a  prima facie violation of P1-1 has taken place. The Court must then 
decide  whether  the  violation  can  be  justified  by  the  qualifications  to  the 
property right set out in the article itself. The first step in justifying any violation 
is establishing whether it is lawful. 
3.4 Is the interference lawful?
248 Discussed at pp 104-105 above.
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P1-1 is a qualified right. In other words, it  is not an absolute protection in 
every  situation  unlike,  for  example,  the  right  to  freedom from inhuman or 
degrading  treatment  enshrined  in  article  three.  The  property  right  can  be 
compromised, without penalty to the state,  in specific circumstances which 
are set out in the terms of the article itself. Once it has been established that 
an interference in the meaning of one of the three Sporrong rules has taken 
place, it is for the Court to consider whether this interference can be justified. 
The first requirement which must be fulfilled in justification of state action is 
that the interference has been carried out in accordance with the law. This 
requirement is plainly set out in the second sentence of P1-1, which states:
No  one  shall  be  deprived  of  his  possessions  except…subject  to  the  conditions 
provided for by law.
3.4.1 Development of the lawfulness requirement
The Court's understanding of  what  is meant by this term in context  draws 
heavily on jurisprudence beyond that relating to P1-1. A similar form of words 
can be seen elsewhere in the Convention, particularly in the case of other 
"qualified" rights which can be compromised where necessary for the public 
good, such as articles eight and nine. 
The first time this wording was given detailed consideration by the Court was 
in Sunday Times v United Kingdom,249 in which the article 10 right to freedom 
of  expression  was  in  issue.  The  applicant  had  been  prevented  by  court 
injunction from publishing a story about the history of the drug thalidomide. At 
the time, a number of women who had taken the drug whilst pregnant, and 
subsequently  given  birth  to  children  suffering  physical  deformity,  were 
pursuing damages claims against the manufacturer of the drug. The injunction 
had been granted on the grounds that the story the applicant wished to print 
would be unfairly prejudicial in respect of the ongoing court actions such as to 
result in contempt of court.  
Article 10 states that everyone has the right to freedom of expression, but 
provides:
249 (1979-80) 2 EHRR 245
109
The exercise of these freedoms, since it  carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may  be  subject  to  such  formalities,  conditions,  restrictions  or  penalties  as  are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society...
The main thrust of the applicant's argument was that the rules on contempt of 
court  were so arcane as to breach the requirement that any restriction be 
"prescribed by law": in other words, this requirement could not be fulfilled if it 
was uncertain what the law, in fact, was.
The Court  noted that  there was  some ambiguity  over  the  meaning  of  the 
phrase in the authentic texts  of the Convention. In French, the expression 
"prévues par la loi" is used in articles nine, 10 and 11, and in each case is 
equivalent to "prescribed by law" in the English text. However, in article eight 
and article two of Protocol Four, the same French text is equivalent to the 
English "in accordance with the law," and then in P1-1, to "provided for by 
law."  
Thus confronted with versions of a law-making treaty which are equally authentic but 
not exactly the same, the Court must interpret them in a way that reconciles them as 
far as possible and is most appropriate in order to realise the aim and achieve the 
object of the treaty.250
 In tackling this problem, the Court came up with two main prerequisites for 
lawfulness. 
First, the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an 
indication that is  adequate in the circumstances of the legal  rules applicable to a 
given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a "law" unless it is formulated 
with sufficient precision to enable to citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able…
to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences 
which a given action may entail.251  
The  Court  was  clear  that  the  "foreseeability"  requirement  hinged  on 
reasonableness; absolute certainty was impossible. It  was also of the view 
that  legislation  was  not  a  pre-requisite  for  lawfulness;  common  law  rules 
would be equally competent provided that they were sufficiently clear as to 
meet the requirements outlined above. In the particular case, it was decided 
250 para 48
251 para 49
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that the rules on contempt of court  were sufficiently clear – in other words, 
that  the  applicant  could  have  foreseen that  publication  of  the  story would 
result in a finding of contempt. The applicant was aware of the legal rules 
which applied and could regulate his conduct according to those rules. The 
lawfulness requirement was accordingly fulfilled.
The Court had cause to look at the wording again some three years later, in 
Silver v United Kingdom.252 Each of the several applicants in the case was a 
convicted  prisoner  and  the  argument  concerned  censorship  by  the  prison 
authorities of outgoing mail, which it was alleged violated article eight (right to 
respect  for  private  life)  and article  10  (freedom of  expression.)  The Court 
looked at the phrase "in accordance with  the law" in the context  of  article 
eight, and was satisfied that the meaning of the lawfulness provision in article 
10, as set out by Sunday Times, must be the same as that required by article 
eight. In analysing the decision in Sunday Times, the Court extrapolated three 
requirements.
A  first  principle  that  emerges  from  the  Sunday  Times  judgement  is  that  the 
interference in question must have some basis in domestic law…A second principle is 
that  the law must be adequately accessible:  the citizen must be able to have an 
indication that is adequate, in the circumstances, of the legal rules applicable to a 
given case…A third principle is that a norm cannot be regarded as a law unless it is 
formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct…A 
law which confers a discretion must indicate the scope of the discretion.253
It was important in this case that the first two requirements be separated out. 
Legislation regulating censorship of prison correspondence, which was freely 
available to the public, had been supplemented by rules and orders issued to 
prison officers, which were not available to the applicants or to the body of 
prisoners in general. Many of the violations of article eight found in the case 
hinged on this critical  difference.  There was no dispute that the rules and 
orders had a basis in domestic law, but since they were not accessible, their 
use to censor correspondence could not be said to be lawful in the meaning of 
the Convention. The accessibility element was not new as such, in so far as 
its  inclusion  could  be  implied  from  the  Court's  treatment  of  the  issue  in 
252 1983 5 EHRR 347
253 paras 86-88
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Sunday  Times,  and  particularly  from  the  notion  of  foreseeability:  it  is 
impossible for a citizen to foresee the legal consequences of their actions if 
the law is hidden from them. Silver simply made explicit the point that the law 
must be certain both in terms of expression and of accessibility. 
A more pragmatic view of the lawfulness requirement was taken by the Court 
in Malone v United Kingdom,254 two years after the outline provided by Silver. 
Mr Malone was an antiques dealer suspected of handling stolen goods. In the 
course of their investigations, the police obtained a warrant from the Home 
Office  authorising  the  tapping  of  Mr  Malone's  telephone,  in  addition  to 
"metering"  his  outgoing  calls  (a  process  by  which  all  outgoing  telephone 
numbers are recorded.) The applicant argued that his rights under article eight 
had been violated, which was accepted by the Court. The issue became one 
of whether the interference could be justified.
In  breaking  down  the  requirements  of  lawfulness,  the  Court  again  took  a 
slightly  different  approach.   The  first  principle  they  extrapolated  from  the 
previous jurisprudence was  that  "law"  should  be  interpreted  to  cover  both 
written and unwritten rules, which is made clear in Sunday Times. The second 
principle  is  that  the  interference  must  have  some  basis  in  domestic  law. 
Additionally,  the law must be accessible,  and finally,  it  must be sufficiently 
certain  to  allow  a  citizen  to  regulate  his  conduct  –  the  foreseeability 
requirement of Sunday Times. 
The  UK government  argued  that,  in  the  context  of  laws  regarding  secret 
surveillance,  there  was  no  need  for  the  foreseeability  requirement  to  be 
satisfied,  since  the  law was  not  regulating  the  conduct  of  citizens.  In  the 
government's view, the main question in determining whether the lawfulness 
requirement  had  been  fulfilled  was  whether  the  administrative  action  had 
conformed to domestic legal requirements.
The Court was not impressed by this argument. 
The Court would reiterate its opinion that the phrase "in accordance with the law" 
does not merely refer back to domestic law but also relates to the quality of the law, 
254 (1985) 7 EHRR 14
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requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law, which is expressly mentioned in the 
preamble to the Convention. The phrase thus implies – and this follows from the 
object and purpose of article eight– that there must be a measure of legal protection 
in domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights 
safeguarded  by  paragraph  one.  Especially  where  a  power  of  the  executive  is 
exercised  in  secret,  the  risks  of  arbitrariness  are  evident…The  law  must  be 
sufficiently  clear  in  its  terms  to  give  citizens  an  adequate  indication  as  to  the 
circumstances in which and the conditions on which public authorities are empowered 
to resort to this secret and potentially dangerous interference with the right to respect 
for private life and correspondence.255  
The Court thereby set in stone another requirement,  of "non-arbitrariness". 
The issue is not simply one of the foreseeability of the result of the citizen's 
own actions in terms of the law, but also of foreseeability of the actions of the 
state and the extent to which it  is empowered to exercise its discretion in 
respect of a particular domestic legal provision. Domestic provisions should 
be sufficiently clear that state actions are not arbitrary, thereby operating in 
compliance  with  the  rule  of  law.  The  Court  went  on  to  clarify  that  any 
discretion to be operated covertly in a situation such as the one described in 
the case could not be unfettered. 
The law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent 
authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, having regard to the 
legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection 
against arbitrary interference.256 
 The Court then characterised the question to be answered in the case as 
follows:
Whether,  under  domestic  law,  the  essential  elements  of  power  to  intercept 
communications were laid down with reasonable precision in accessible legal rules 
that  sufficiently  indicated  the  scope  and  manner  of  exercise  of  the  discretion 
conferred on the relevant authorities.257  
Ultimately,  the  Court  was  of  the  view that  the rules as  to  when and why 
communications  could  be  intercepted  by  the  State  were  uncertain  and 
ambiguous. In particular, it was not clear what elements of the State's power 
255 para 67
256 para 68
257 para 70
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to intercept were embodied in the written rules and what remained within the 
discretion of the Executive. The discretion was not clearly defined, as the rule 
of law required it should be.  Accordingly, the case fell foul of the lawfulness 
requirement of article eight.
In summary, the rules set out by the Court in the jurisprudence from Sunday 
Times through to Malone could be formulated roughly as follows:
(i) The interference must have a clear basis in domestic law. This 
does  not  require  a  piece  of  legislation.  Both  written  and 
unwritten rules might provide this basis.
(ii) This legal basis must be freely accessible to the public and not, 
for example, contained in guidelines available only to a limited 
class of persons.
(iii) The  legal  basis  must  be  sufficiently  clear  that  it  allows  an 
individual to foresee what the consequences of their actions will 
be, and to regulate their conduct accordingly. In other words, the 
legal basis cannot allow for arbitrary action on the part of the 
state. This is in accordance with the rule of law. If the legal basis 
allows for the exercise of discretion on the part of the state, that 
will not lead to lack of foreseeability, or arbitrariness, provided 
that the limits on that discretion are clearly defined.
3.4.2 Applying the test of lawfulness to P1-1
The rules set out above were adopted in relation to P1-1 with the case of 
James  v  United  Kingdom.258 As  discussed  above,  James arose  from  a 
statutory scheme converting leases lasting longer than a given duration into 
ownership in the hands of the lessees. The previous landlords complained of 
a violation of their P1-1 ownership rights. The detailed reading of the term 
"subject to the conditions provided for by law" in P1-1 was in fact undertaken 
258 1984 6 EHRR CD 475 (Commission decision) and 1986 8 EHRR 123 (Court judgement)
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at the stage of consideration by the former Commission, with the later Court 
report  adding  little  of  substance.  The interpretation  of  the  provision  which 
resulted  does  not,  perhaps,  follow  exactly  the  summary  of  the  previous 
jurisprudence given above. 
The  Commission's  analysis  of  the  lawfulness  requirement  began  with  the 
assertion that, in interpreting this phrase, the Commission was bound by the 
principles  developed  previously  by  the  Court  in  relation  to  lawfulness 
requirements elsewhere in the Convention. However, the Commission felt it 
must  also  "take  account  of  differences  in  the  wording  of  the  different 
provisions."259 This does not appear to sit easily alongside the Sunday Times 
dictum that the different versions of the wording in the authentic text must be 
reconciled  as  far  as  possible,  or  the  view  in  Silver that  the  expressions 
"prescribed by the law/  prévues par la loi" in article 10 must, of necessity, 
share a definition with "in accordance with the law/ prévue par la loi" in article 
eight. On the other hand, in  Silver,  the same alleged violation gave rise to 
challenges  under  both  articles,  which  might  explain  a  need  for  absolute 
identity in the interpretation of the provisions in that instance which does not, 
perhaps,  carry  over  in  more  general  terms.  In  any  event,  such  opening 
remarks  are  arguably  of  less  significance  than  the  details  of  the  specific 
analysis which followed.  
Having set out the context for its definition, the Commission went on to state, 
in the first place:
this  condition  in  P1-1 requires  inter  alia  that  the law should  define  the  power  to 
expropriate with a degree of precision that is reasonable in all the circumstances.260
The use of the word "precision" here is perhaps ambiguous,  but it  seems 
apparent that, at least, this statement is reiteration of the requirement that the 
interference must  have  a  clear  basis  in  domestic  law.  It  could  be  argued 
additionally that the reference to reasonableness imports something of  the 
requirement of foreseeability. The Commission continued:
259 Commission decision, para 141.
260 Ibid.
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 Furthermore,  the  "conditions"  on which  expropriation  takes  place  include,  in  the 
Commission's opinion, such matters as the compensation terms and these, like the 
power to expropriate itself, must also be defined by the law with reasonable precision. 
261
On first reading, it  seems that the Commission may have been placing an 
importance on the use of the word "conditions" in P1-1 which does not sit 
easily alongside the lack of such focus on other individual words used in the 
various  constructions  of  the  lawfulness  requirement  elsewhere  in  the 
Convention. However, on a closer reading, it may be that the Commission is 
really not adding anything new here at all. Essentially what is being said is 
that all the terms of a state action interfering with a Convention right must be 
sufficiently precise. In this particular case, the terms of the state action include 
compensation provisions. However, arguably these so-called "conditions" are 
already covered in the wording of the original principle – the requirement that 
the law be clearly stated – since it is clear from earlier case law that all rules, 
written  and  unwritten,  are  covered  by  this  principle.  If  the  compensation 
scheme is set out not in legislation as such, but in some form of guideline or 
directive, that should still be precise and accessible to the public. If it is not, it 
will fall foul of the lawfulness requirement in the same way that the orders and 
directives  guiding  censorship  of  prisoners'  mail  were  deemed  unlawful  in 
Silver. 
The Commission went  on to look at  the standard to which domestic  legal 
provisions must be held. This harks back to the approach taken in  Malone, 
and  particularly  to  the  requirement  that  the  lawfulness  requirement  in  the 
various  Convention  rights  demands  that  the  domestic  legal  provisions  in 
question accord with the rule of law. The Commission in James speaks of: 
…terms and conditions which are in line with the Convention as a whole and with the 
particular  purpose of  the  restriction on the right  of  property  permitted by the second 
sentence of article 1 in particular.262
Essentially the requirement here is that there should be no arbitrariness in the 
actions of the state. The rule of law must be adhered to, so that what applies 
261 para 141
262 para 143
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to one citizen will apply to all citizens. Even where the state has discretion, the 
parameters of that discretion must be clearly defined.
The Commission went on to examine the provisions of the leasehold reform 
legislation against the test of lawfulness set out above, and ultimately found 
that the UK legislation was in line with the requirements of P1-1 in terms of 
both  the  transfer  of  ownership  to  lessees  and  also  of  the  compensation 
available to landlords. When the case later came before the Court,  it  was 
happy to act largely in accordance with the views of the Commission. The 
applicants  argued  that  a  taking  of  property  where  compensation  did  not 
reasonably relate to the market value of the property at the time of the taking 
must  be  arbitrary  in  the  meaning  of  the  Convention  jurisprudence,  and 
accordingly  that  the  actions  of  the  UK  in  this  instance  fell  foul  of  the 
lawfulness requirement of P1-1. The Court disagreed, considering: 
There  are  no  grounds  for  finding  that  the  enfranchisement  of  the  applicants' 
properties was arbitrary because of the terms of compensation provided for under the 
leasehold reform legislation.263 
Essentially the Court, like the Commission, did not believe that payment of 
less  than  full  market  value  in  compensation  rendered  the  compensation 
scheme "arbitrary." A decision to award compensation at a given level could 
be justified provided it was sufficiently clear what that level would be.
3.4.3 Key elements of the lawfulness requirement
Accordingly  it  appears  that  the  three  factors  set  out  in  the  earlier 
jurisprudence as the determinants of lawfulness – namely a clear basis in 
domestic law, easily accessed by the public, resulting in foreseeable (or non-
arbitrary) consequences – will apply equally in P1-1 applications. Importantly, 
compensation  of  less  than  market  value  will  not  be  considered  arbitrary 
provided the amount of compensation available and the reasons for setting it 
at such a level are clearly indicated. The jurisprudence subsequent to James 
in which issues of lawfulness have arisen tends to support this understanding 
of what is meant by "provided for by law," as shown in the following analysis.
263 Court opinion, para 67
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3.4.4 Clear basis in domestic law
The  lack  of  any  clear  basis  in  domestic  law  is  an  unusual  ground  for  a 
challenge  under  P1-1,  although  it  does  arise  occasionally.  One  short  but 
useful  example  comes  with  Vasilescu  v  Romania.264 Here,  the  applicant's 
house was searched without a warrant by the Romanian militia and 327 gold 
coins were seized in connection with an investigation of her husband. The 
investigation was subsequently discontinued, but the seized items were not 
returned, despite the domestic courts ruling that the applicant remained the 
owner of the coins and that there was no legal justification for the state to 
retain them. Accordingly, a violation was found by the Court. More recently in 
Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  Shipping  Lines  v  Turkey,265 the  applicants  were 
transporting arms to Iran on a Cypriot-owned vessel. The Turkish customs 
officials suspected organised arms smuggling and confiscated the ship and its 
cargo.  The applicant  appealed the decision of  the customs officials  in  the 
Turkish security court. Despite the fact the Turkish Foreign Minister confirmed 
the arms were bound for  Iran,  and the Prime Minister of  Turkey issued a 
statement  saying  that  Turkey  was  not  at  war  with  any country,  the  court 
upheld the reasoning of the customs officials to the effect that Cyprus and 
Turkey were at war and that accordingly the confiscation was justified. In light 
of the evidence from the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister the Court saw 
no legal basis for the control of use. 
In  Vasilescu  and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, there was no real 
argument that any applicable legal  rule existed to allow the actions of  the 
state in the first place. A slightly different issue comes about where the state 
did have a legal basis for their actions initially, but that basis has come to an 
end  for  one  reason  or  another.  This  situation  can  be  seen  in  Iatridis  v 
Greece,266 in which the applicant had leased and operated a cinema for some 
years  before  being  evicted  by  the  State  as  a  result  of  a  dispute  over 
ownership of the land. Amidst the numerous legal complications in the case, 
the applicant obtained a domestic court decision quashing the eviction order, 
against which there lay no right of appeal. The State refused to vacate the 
264 (1999) 28 EHRR 241
265 (2008) 47 EHRR 24 
266 (2000) 30 EHRR 97
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property on the grounds that the applicant had not obtained a "reinstatement 
order" for his return to the property, and cited also the ongoing dispute about 
the ultimate ownership of the piece of land.
The Court was very clear that it was not its role to adjudicate on issues of 
national  law,  which  could  only  be  ruled  upon  by  the  domestic  courts. 
However, in simple terms, the Court noted that the applicant's property rights 
had  been  interfered  with  by  the  eviction  order.  The  eviction  order  was 
therefore the legal  basis for  the interference. The eviction order had been 
quashed. Therefore there was no legal basis for the interference. A logical 
connection was drawn by the Court between lack of legal basis and lack of 
foreseeability  of  outcome.  The  underlying  substantive  guarantee  of  the 
lawfulness requirement was emphasised: 
The rule of law, one of the fundamental principles of democratic society, is inherent in 
all the Articles in the Convention and entails a duty on the part of the State or other 
public authority to comply with judicial orders or decisions against it.267
The  failure  of  the  State  to  comply  with  the  decree  quashing  the  eviction 
therefore resulted in arbitrariness.   
It may also be appropriate to consider under this heading cases in which the 
state  believes  they  do  have  a  legal  basis  for  their  actions,  but  the  Court 
considers  that  basis  to  be  incorrectly  applied  or  illegitimate  given  the 
circumstances of the case. This arose in two recent cases where the alleged 
legal  basis  in  question  was  found  to  be  incompatible  in  itself  with  the 
principles of the Convention. In the first,  Družstevní  Záložna Pria v Czech  
Republic,268 the Court determined that domestic legislation allowing a receiver 
to refuse sight of accounts and other business documents to a company in 
receivership (who sought to lodge an appeal) was incompatible with the right 
to a fair trial under article six. Accordingly, there was no legal basis for the 
interference  with  the  applicant  company's  paperwork  under  P1-1.  In  the 
267 para 58
268 (72034/01) 24 July 2008 
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second, Russian Conservative Party Of Entrepreneurs v Russia,269 the Court 
found that the Russian law on eligibility to stand for election violated article 
three  of  the  First  Protocol,  which  details  the  right  to  free  elections. 
Accordingly, the forfeiture of the applicant’s deposit on the basis of the faulty 
domestic regulations amounted to a violation of P1-1 without any legal basis. 
A final point which has arisen here in a P1-1 context concerns the interaction 
of EC law and its implementation domestically with the rights contained in the 
Convention. In  Bosphorus Hava Yollari  Turzim ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v 
Ireland,270 the applicant  was a Turkish airline company who leased planes 
from Yugoslav  Airlines.  One of  these aircraft  was  impounded by the  Irish 
authorities following its arrival in Dublin. The impoundment occurred on the 
basis of EC Regulation 990/93, which implemented a UN Resolution adopting 
sanctions against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in light of the 
armed  conflict  and  human  rights  violations  taking  place  there.  The  plane 
remained impounded for three of the four years for which the lease had been 
agreed. In its deliberations, a Grand Chamber accepted that a control of use 
had taken place here but was satisfied that the Regulation offered a clear 
legal basis in domestic law for that interference. The Regulation had direct 
effect  in  member  states  and  did  not  require  domestic  implementation 
legislation.  Ireland  had  no  discretion  as  to  whether  the  plane  should  be 
impounded; it was compelled to comply with the EC law.  
3.4.5 Accessibility
Challenges under this head are even rarer and very few reported decisions of 
the  Court  under  P1-1 touch on this  issue.  One recent  example,  however, 
appeared in the case of  Spacek v Czech Republic.271 The applicants here 
complained of an interference caused by a marked increase in their liability to 
income  tax  following  on  their  change  from  single  entry  to  double  entry 
accounting. They argued that the change in tax rules was not contained within 
a publicly available piece of legislation, and accordingly that the lawfulness 
269 (2008) 46 EHRR 39
270 (2006) 42 EHRR 1
271 (2000) 30 EHRR 1010
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requirement was not fulfilled. The Court noted that the rules on tax liability had 
been set out in the government's Financial Bulletin, which did not constitute a 
piece  of  legislation  as  such,  but  was  designed  to  give  official  notice  of 
changes in tax and accountancy regulations to those working in that sector of 
business and was distributed by the Czech state on that basis. The applicants 
had relied on such a bulletin to implement the book-keeping practice they had 
kept previously.  Taking into account the nature of  the applicant's business 
and the  industry  in  which  they  operated,  the  Court  was  satisfied  that  the 
regulations  had  been  sufficiently  accessible  to  fulfil  the  lawfulness 
requirement of P1-1.  
3.4.6 Foreseeability/Lack of arbitrariness
This is the most common ground of complaint as to lack of lawfulness in P1-1 
applications. The usual context of the discussion is in relation to an exercise 
of  discretion  by the  state  which  the  applicant  claims was  incorrect,  either 
because  it  overstepped  the  limits  of  that  discretion  or  because  the  limits 
themselves were never clearly defined. One prominent example of this type of 
complaint  is  Hentrich  v  France.272 The  case  was  centred  on  the  French 
General Tax Code, article 668 of which allowed the Treasury a right of pre-
emption  in  any  sale  for  which  the  price  declared  in  the  contract  was 
considered by the Commissioner of  Revenue to be too low.  The intention 
behind the provision was to prevent cases of sale at a deliberate undervalue 
designed to evade liability to tax. The applicant in the case had bought land in 
Strasbourg in May 1979, only to have an action of pre-emption brought by the 
Commissioner of Revenue in February 1980. 
It  was  a  matter  of  agreement  between  the  parties  in  the  case  that  the 
applicant had been deprived of her property in the meaning of P1-1, and the 
question was whether the deprivation had been carried out in accordance with 
the restrictions set out in the article. Mrs Hentrich argued that the deprivation 
was arbitrary, and therefore unlawful, since no reason had been given by the 
Commissioner as to why he had decided to exercise his right of pre-emption. 
The Court had some sympathy with this argument.
272 (1994) 18 EHRR 440
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While the system of the right of pre-emption does not lend itself to criticism as an 
attribute of the State's sovereignty, the same is not true where the exercise of it is 
discretionary and at the same time the procedure is not fair. 
In  the  instant  case,  the  pre-emption  operated  arbitrarily  and  selectively  and  was 
scarcely foreseeable, and it was not attended by the basic procedural safeguards. In 
particular, Article 668 of the General Tax Code, as interpreted up to that time by the 
Cour de Cassation and as applied to the applicant,  did not sufficiently satisfy the 
requirements of precision and foreseeability implied by the concept of law within the 
meaning of the Convention. 
A  pre-emption  decision  cannot  be  legitimate  in  the  absence  of  adversarial 
proceedings that comply with the principle of equality of arms, enabling argument to 
be presented on the issue of the underestimation of the price and, consequently, on 
the Revenue's position – all elements which were lacking in the case.273 
 As the Court have so often stated in this regard, the existence of discretion is 
not in itself a barrier to the lawfulness requirement. However, the parameters 
of that discretion must be clearly defined. The problem in  Hentrich was that 
they  were  not.  It  was  impossible  to  say  in  a  given  situation  whether  the 
Commissioner of Revenue would exercise his right of pre-emption, and it was 
that lack of foreseeability that proved fatal to the lawfulness requirement in 
this case. 
It  might be noted that in the dissenting judgements of the case, there was 
some criticism of the Court's reasoning, particularly as regards the mention of 
"equality of arms".274 That issue should perhaps more properly be dealt with in 
terms of the right to a fair trial set out in article six of the Convention, and does 
not form a true part of the jurisprudence of P1-1. 
A  more  recent  example  is  Smirnov  v  Russia,275 in  which  the  applicant's 
computer was retained as evidence in a criminal trial for over six years. The 
relevant evidence was allegedly contained on the computer's hard drive. The 
Court noted that the state criminal investigation authorities had the discretion 
to order retention of any object which they considered to be instrumental for 
273 para 42
274 See the Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judges Ryssdal and Baka.
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the investigation, a very wide test with no right of appeal available. The Court 
cast serious doubt on whether a provision this widely drafted could ever be in 
line with the lawfulness requirement of P1-1, although ultimately it was not 
necessary to decide the case on this point. 
The Court has made clear that its role to adjudicate on issues of discretion will 
not extend to questioning the decision of a domestic court  unless there is 
evidence of manifest unreasonableness on the part of that court. This point 
was recently reiterated in Anheuser-Busch Inc v Portugal.276
Confronted with the conflicting arguments of two private parties concerning the right 
to use the name “Budweiser” as a trade mark or appellation of origin, the Supreme 
Court reached its decision on the basis of the material it  considered relevant and 
sufficient  for  the  resolution  of  the  dispute,  after  hearing  representations  from the 
interested parties. The Court finds no basis on which to conclude that the decision of 
the  Supreme  Court  was  affected  by  any  element  of  arbitrariness  or  that  it  was 
otherwise manifestly unreasonable.277
This  case  neatly  also  provides  authority  for  the  idea  that  retrospective 
application of a piece of legislation will  normally fall  foul of this element of 
lawfulness, since it is not foreseeable that legislation will  be applied in this 
way, and retroactivity does not conform to the rule of law. Anheuser Busch 
had argued that the decision of the Czech Supreme Court had the effect of 
retrospectively applying a bilateral treaty as to recognition of trademarks and 
trademark  applications.  The  Court  agreed  that,  had  this  argument  been 
correct,  that  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  would  have  been  arbitrary. 
However, in the event, the Court did not agree that any such retrospective 
application of the domestic law had in fact taken place.278
 A final  and perhaps obvious issue relevant to lack of foreseeability is the 
situation where domestic legal provisions are incorrectly applied by the state. 
This arose in Lithgow v UK.279 The allegation of misapplication of the law was 
made against the UK government by one of the applicants in the case, who 
complained that the statutory compensation scheme from which they were 
276 (2007) 45 EHRR 36. For a summary of the facts, see discussion at 53 above.
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entitled to benefit and which was based on a valuation of company shares at 
a specified period, had not been applied correctly since the shares in question 
were  not  valued  at  the  relevant  time.  The  Court  suggested  that  if  this 
complaint had been accurate, the lawfulness requirement would have been 
contravened. However, in the circumstances, the Court could see no difficulty 
with the valuation. 280
3.4.7 The general principles of international law  
The lawfulness requirement discussed above is not the only legal requirement 
contained in P1-1. A deprivation is not only subject to the conditions provided 
for  by  law,  but  also  "by  the  general  principles  of  international  law."  What 
exactly is meant by this provision has been the subject of much dispute.  
It  may  assist  to  consider,  in  the  first  place,  which  general  principles  of 
international law might apply. The most relevant appear to be those relating to 
expropriation of foreign property.
The rule supported by all leading "Western" governments and many jurists in Europe 
and North America is as follows: the expropriation of alien property is lawful if prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation is provided for.281 
It should be noted, however, that this blanket rule is not accepted by all jurists 
as appropriate in all  cases. It  seems to be accepted, for example, that no 
compensation  is  necessary  where  property  is  seized  by  the  police  in  the 
exercise of their powers or as a penalty for crimes. Additionally, the principle 
of national treatment, which provides that aliens are entitled only to the same 
treatment as nationals, may come into play here to suggest aliens are only 
entitled to compensation where an expropriated national would similarly be 
entitled to claim.  A final point worthy of note is that compensation need not 
necessarily equate to the market value of the property taken in all situations. 
Particularly,  where  a  state  is  taking  steps  towards  nationalisation  of  an 
industry, it is understood that payment of full compensation in all cases would 
render the exercise impossible, and so some lesser degree of compensation 
280 See paras 110 and 153 - 155.
281 Brownlie (7th ed), p533-4.
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would  seem to  be  acceptable  in  order  to  allow the  state  to  achieve  their 
political goals.282 
Some indication as to the meaning of the phrase in the context of P1-1 is 
given in the travaux préparatoires. 
The Swedish delegation pointed out – and requested the fact be mentioned in these 
conclusions – that the general principles of international law referred to under article 
one of the protocol only applied to relations between a state and non-nationals. At the 
request  of  the  German and  Belgian  Delegations,  it  was  agreed  that  the  general 
principles of international law, in their present connotation, entailed the obligation to 
pay compensation to non-nationals in the case of expropriation.283 
 
The inclusion of this reference to the general principles of international law 
seems, then, to have been undertaken with a certain degree of clarity. In the 
first place, it is intended to apply only to deprivations, and not to the other 
forms of interference defined by the  Sporrong three-rule approach to P1-1. 
Secondly,  it  applies  only  to  expropriation  of  non-nationals.  Thirdly,  it 
necessitates the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation in 
respect of such expropriation. On its first consideration of this issue, in the 
case of  Gudmundsson v Iceland,284 the Commission treated the phrase in 
exactly this straightforward manner.
Whereas the general principles of international law, referred to in article one, are the 
principles which have been established in general international law concerning the 
confiscation of the property of foreigners; whereas it follows that measures taken by a 
State with respect to property of its own nationals are not subject to these general 
principles of international law in the absence of a particular treaty clause specifically 
so  providing;  whereas,  moreover,  in  the  present  instance,  the  records  of  the 
preparatory work concerning the drafting and adoption of Article 1 of the Protocol 
confirm that the High Contracting Parties had no intention of extending the application 
of these principles to the case of the taking of the property of nationals.285  
282 It might be noted that generally speaking, however, payment of full and prompt compensation is necessary to 
meet the international law standard, with an exception in the case of natural resources: see generally Brownlie pp 
509 - 520. The P1-1 standard may be less exacting: see the discussion at 3.6.6 below.
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However, an alternative interpretation which threw the preceding authority into 
some doubt came in the keynote case of James v UK.286 The applicants in this 
case accepted that, in previous jurisprudence, the Commission and the Court 
had  been  unambiguously  of  the  view  that  the  general  principles  of 
international  law  should  not  apply  to  the  taking  of  property  of  nationals. 
However, the argument was that this view was incorrect, and that the general 
principles  of  international  law  should  apply  to  the  taking  of  property  of 
foreigners and nationals alike. It was also argued by the applicants that the 
meaning of this phrase was that property could only be taken for purposes of 
public use, and that payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation 
should be made. 
The  Commission  gave  very  detailed  consideration  to  the  arguments  put 
forward  by  the  applicants.  It  noted  that  there  were  a  number  of  ways  of 
interpreting the term as it was laid out in P1-1, and affirmed the approach to 
date:
Everyone is entitled to the protection of international law by virtue of article one, but 
only in respect of acts in relation to which such law applies, namely the acts of States 
other than his own.287     
The Commission accepted that in general the Convention set out to accord 
rights  equally  to  all,  and  that  accordingly  it  should  be  slow  to  favour  an 
interpretation of the protection offered by P1-1 which discriminated dependent 
on the nationality of the parties involved. However, such discrimination could 
be justified in this instance. The taking of property by the state had different 
implications for a national than it would do for an alien; particularly, a state 
might  be  entitled  to  place  a  greater  burden  on  its  own  nationals  since, 
ultimately,  they would likely benefit from the "public interest" served by the 
deprivation  in  a  way  which  a  non-national  would  not.  Additionally,  it  was 
accepted that the Convention incorporated compliance with the rule of law 
amongst  its  tenets.  Why,  then,  should  other  legal  principles  beyond  the 
specific content of the Convention itself not also be incorporated? In the case 
of P1-1, the Convention has specified that both domestic and international law 
286 (1984) 6 EHRR CD 475 (Commission) and (1986) 8 EHRR 123 (Court).
287 para 113
126
should be respected. There is nothing in the incorporation of those principles 
to suggest that they should be extended to persons to whom they would not 
usually apply.
The Commission, then, did not see any reason, on the basis of the wording of 
P1-1, to extend the principles of international law to nationals. It considered 
that  this  viewpoint  was  supported  by  an  examination  of  the  travaux 
préparatoires. It noted, as discussed in chapter one above, that an express 
right to compensation in all cases had been included in the initial drafts of P1-
1, but had subsequently been removed since several signatory states had 
refused to subscribe to a property right which contained such an obligation. 
Indeed,  there had been clarification  that  the reference to  international  law 
here was designed to apply only to aliens.288 A review of these materials led 
the Commission to conclude:
The reference to international law was not intended to apply to nationals. Indeed, [the 
Commission] finds it inconceivable that a Resolution in these terms would have been 
adopted if the intention had been that they should apply to nationals.289
Unsurprisingly, the Commission therefore concluded that the reference to the 
general principles of international law should be construed, as it previously 
had been, as applying to aliens and not to nationals. 
The matter was debated once again by the Court. Again, the Court looked at 
the grammatical construction of P1-1, with the conclusion that:
The Court  finds it  more natural  to take the reference to  the general  principles of 
international law to mean that the principles are incorporated into P1-1, but only as 
regards those acts to which they are normally applicable, that is to say acts of a State 
in relation to non-nationals. Moreover, the words of a treaty should be understood to 
have their ordinary meaning, and to interpret the phrase in question as extending the 
general principles of international law beyond their normal sphere of applicability is 
less consistent with the ordinary meaning of the terms used, notwithstanding their 
context.290
288 see para 119 
289 para 119
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The applicants went  on to argue that an application of  the terms solely to 
aliens would mean the inclusion of the terms in P1-1 was entirely redundant. 
The general principles of international law already applied to expropriation of 
non-nationals – why reiterate that fact in the wording of the article itself? The 
wording  must  have  been  designed  to  add  something  more,  namely  by 
extending the principles to expropriation of nationals. 
Again the Court disagreed. It pointed out that including these principles in P1-
1 allowed non-nationals to assert their rights directly through the Convention, 
rather  than  having  to  use  an  alternative  route  to  enforcement  through 
international  law.   Additionally,  the  inclusion  of  the  wording  ensured  no 
diminution of the rights of aliens; there could be no argument their rights were 
overridden by the new provisions of P1-1. 
Finally, the applicants again argued that application of these principles only to 
aliens  would  mean  discrimination  on  grounds  of  nationality.  The  Court 
reiterated that such discrimination could competently occur where there was 
objective and reasonable justification. Such justification could easily exist in 
this context.
To  begin  with,  non-nationals  are  more  vulnerable  to  domestic  legislation:  unlike 
nationals, they will generally have played no part in the election or designation of its 
authors  nor  have been consulted on its  adoption.  Secondly,  although a taking of 
property must always be effected in the public interest, different considerations may 
apply to nationals and non-nationals and there may be legitimate reason for requiring 
nationals to bear a greater burden in the public interest than non-nationals.291  
The argument here seems to be that if  the state expropriates property for 
some national  good,  a national  will  ultimately gain  some benefit  from that 
good. An alien, however, will not. 
The  Court  also  referred  to  the  travaux  préparatoires,  reaching  the  same 
conclusion as the Commission, namely that the travaux préparatoires offered 
no  support  for  the  interpretation  argued for  by the  applicants.  Finally,  the 
Court was of the view that practice amongst signatory states subsequent to 
291 para 63
128
the introduction of P1-1 tended to support the interpretation of the terminology 
contended for by the Commission.
The Court ultimately concluded that the general principles of international law 
are not applicable to a taking by a state of the property of its own nationals.
It  should  be  noted  that  the  Court's  decision  here  does  not  imply  that 
compensation will never play a part in cases of deprivation of nationals. As 
will  be seen below, compensation has an important  role in the process of 
determining whether an interference is proportionate or not.292 
Whatever may be the substantive merits (or otherwise) of the Court's ruling on 
the non-applicability of the general principles of international law to nationals, 
the rule at least has the benefit of certainty: expropriated aliens are entitled to 
compensation under this head; expropriated nationals are not. However, even 
this clear cut policy line was thrown into some confusion by the case of Gasus 
Dosier v Netherlands.293
Gasus was a German company who had agreed to sell a cement mixer to a 
Dutch company, Atlas. Payment for the mixer was to be made in instalments, 
and a retention of title clause was inserted into the contract of sale, which 
stated that Gasus would remain the owner of the mixer until such times as 
Atlas had paid its debt in full. Atlas made one payment, and was then subject 
to  enforcement  proceedings  at  the  hands  of  the  Dutch  tax  authorities,  to 
whom it was significantly in debt. The Dutch tax authorities seized the mixer 
and sold it, using the proceeds in part satisfaction of Atlas's debt. 
Gasus argued that it, an alien, had been deprived of its property by the Dutch 
state.  It  was clear that in both Dutch and German law,  a retention of  title 
clause maintained the seller as the owner of the property until such times as 
the buyer had purified the conditions of the contract. There was no dispute, 
therefore, that Gasus was the owner of the mixer. However, no compensation 
was forthcoming. 
292 See page 154 et seq.
293 (1995) 20 EHRR 403
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At the Commission stage, it was accepted that the seizure and subsequent 
sale  of  the  mixer  amounted  to  a  deprivation  of  the  applicant's  right  of 
ownership. The deprivation was lawful in the sense of P1-1. The Commission 
accepted  that,  as  an  expropriated  non-national,  Gasus  would  normally  be 
entitled  to  compensation  in  terms  of  the  principles  of  international  law. 
However:
The deprivation of property which occurred cannot be compared to those measures 
of confiscation, nationalisation or expropriation in regard to which international law 
provides special protection to foreign citizens and companies.294 
Under subsequent review by the Court, it was decided that the actions of the 
Dutch state did not amount to a deprivation, but rather "a control of the use of 
property…to  secure  the  payment  of  taxes."  The  general  principles  of 
international  law were  therefore  not  considered,  presumably because they 
apply only to deprivation in terms of the first paragraph of P1-1, and not to 
control in terms of the second paragraph. 
It is difficult to know what to make of this decision. George Gretton has read it 
critically to suggest that the general principles of international law, explicitly 
stated in James not to apply to expropriated nationals, were implicitly stated in 
Gasus not to apply to aliens either.295 After all, Gasus was an alien deprived of 
its  property,  and  no  compensation  was  forthcoming.  However,  given  the 
statement by the Commission that the deprivation in question was not one to 
which  the general  principles of  international  law applied,  there may be an 
alternate argument. The "deprivation in question", namely the deprivation of 
ownership qualified by a retention of title clause, may not be a deprivation to 
which  the  principles  of  international  law  do  or  have  ever  applied.  This 
deprivation falls into one of the categories for which expropriation of aliens 
does  not  give  rise  to  compensation  under  the  general  principles  of 
international law. A second alternate argument is also possible, based on the 
Court's  judgement.  It  could  be  argued  that  that  the  general  principles  of 
international law are entirely irrelevant to the judgement, given that the action 
294 para 63 Commission decision
295 The protection of property rights in Boyle, Himsworth et al (eds), Human Rights and Scots Law  (Hart Publishing, 
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in the case was deemed a  control rather than a deprivation. Admittedly the 
characterisation of the State's actions here as a control is problematic for the 
reasons more fully outlined in chapter above,296 although it can be seen that 
the  Court  have  a  tendency  to  deal  with  expropriation  of  aliens  in  this 
convoluted  manner:  see,  for  example,  the  AGOSI case,  also  discussed 
above.297 
There is no question that the situation is confused. However, given the view of 
both the Commission and the Court in Gasus, it may be better to consider the 
decision here to be restricted to the particular case of retention of title, and to 
say  that  the  general  principles  of  international  law  apply  in  entitling 
expropriated aliens to compensation in the same way that they have always 
been thought to do. This approach also has the benefit of preventing this term 
in P1-1 from being rendered obsolete. In any event, the decision in  Gasus, 
though difficult to reconcile with the terminological breakdown of P1-1 offered 
by the jurisprudence, is perhaps closer to the spirit of the protection than an 
alternative approach would have been.  
3.4.8 Conclusion
The  most  basic  conception  of  a  protection  of  property  suggests  that  any 
interference  with  the  right  must,  at  a  minimum,  be  lawful.  This  idea  is 
encapsulated within the wording of P1-1 itself. In developing an understanding 
of its application in the P1-1 context, the Court built upon the construction of 
the requirement that had been employed in relation to similar terms in other 
articles of the Convention. Using this foundation, the test the jurisprudence 
developed in connection with the property contained three key elements:
(i) A clear basis in domestic law;
(ii) Freely accessible to the public;
(iii) Producing a foreseeable (non-arbitrary) result both in terms of the 
action taken by the state and the consequences for the individual.
296 See page 85 - 88 above.
297 See page 102-4 above.
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It is interesting to note that the development of this step of the P1-1 decision-
making  process was  effectively  accelerated  by  the  need for  lawfulness  in 
other areas of the Convention. Unlike certain other aspects of the property 
right – for example, the three rule approach outlined above – the issues which 
arise here are not peculiar to protection of property, and so the jurisprudence 
was  able  to  build  on  pre-existing  case law in  a  way  which  would  not  be 
possible elsewhere. The result would seem to be a step in the process which 
has been defined with relative clarity and which is clearly in keeping with the 
aims envisaged by the authors of the Convention.
The position here contrasts sharply with the confusion which still  surrounds 
the reference in the text  to the general principles of  international law.  The 
difficulty here can be traced back directly to the dispute between delegates 
drafting the Convention as to whether compensation should be an essential 
requirement in every case where deprivation of possessions had occurred. It 
is possible to draw a tentative conclusion that these general principles should 
only apply to expropriation of non-nationals, although the judgment in Gasus 
tends  to  muddy  the  water  somewhat.  Without  the  jurisprudence  of  other 
articles of the Convention to build on, it can be seen that the evolution of the 
Court's understanding of P1-1 is less speedy, and less certain, resulting in a 
protection which is less effective.   
3.5 Is the interference in the public/general interest?
From  the  first  discussions  about  including  a  property  protection  in  the 
Convention,  it  has been clear that  the right  cannot be absolute.  Signatory 
states may have any number of entirely legitimate reasons for controlling the 
use  which  is  made  of  private  property,  from  obvious  examples  such  as 
taxation  and  planning  to  more  broad-ranging  political  policies  relevant  to 
economic regeneration or climate change. There was never an intention to 
restrict the ability of signatory states to exercise their powers in this regard 
where it is necessary for the national good.298 
298 See pages 19-32.
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This  idea  is  encapsulated  in  two  separate  phrases  in  P1-1.  Firstly,  in 
paragraph one: 
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest […] 
Paragraph two provides that: 
The preceding provisions shall not in any way impair the right of a state to enforce 
such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the 
general interest […]
 As discussed in chapter two above, these two terms – "public interest" and 
"general interest" – seem to have been used interchangeably by the former 
Commission and the Court.299
3.5.1 Development of the requirement of public/general interest
A useful place to begin any discussion on the use of this phraseology is the 
keynote case of Handyside v UK.300 As discussed above, this case concerned 
the  confiscation  and  subsequent  destruction  of  a  number  of  copies  of  a 
publication  called  The  Little  Red  Schoolbook,  which  dispensed  "real  life" 
advice to school-aged children on subjects including sex and drugs. The case 
is  interesting  in  its  examination  of  "public  interest"  since  it  sets  up  a 
juxtaposition  of  the  term's  use  in  two  different  articles  of  the  Convention. 
Article ten, which contains the right to freedom of expression, was the basis of 
one of the challenges in the case. That article allows interference with the 
right in certain circumstances, outlined in the second paragraph of the article:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it  carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may  be  subject  to  such  formalities,  conditions,  restrictions  or  penalties  as  are 
prescribed  by law and are  necessary  in  a  democratic  society,  in  the interests  of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the 
299 See page 91-92 above.
300 (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737
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rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or 
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.  
As can be seen,  the article  itself  specifies a finite  number of  justifications 
which can be relied on by a signatory state in respect of any interference with 
the primary right encapsulated in the article. In this particular case, the UK 
authorities had seized the book under the Obscene Publications Act and had 
relied expressly on the idea of "protection of health or morals" since the initial 
confiscation.  This  was  ultimately  accepted as  sufficient  justification  for  the 
interference with the right to freedom of expression by the Court. 
In contrast, P1-1 has no such defined list. Taking that into account, the Court 
considered that it must:
 
…restrict  itself  to supervising the lawfulness and the purpose of  the restriction in 
question...the aim of the seizure was 'the protection of morals' as understood by the 
competent British authorities in the exercise of their power of appreciation. And the 
concept  of  'protection  of  morals',  used  in  Article  10  (2)  of  the  Convention,  is 
encompassed in the much wider notion of the 'general interest' within the meaning of 
the second paragraph of Article 1 of the Protocol.301 
The Court  seemed satisfied that if  a justification had been given that was 
specifically  listed  as  relevant  under  article  ten,  then  that  must  also  be 
sufficient justification for an interference with P1-1. The Court does not go any 
further in defining what the limits of the public interest requirement might be 
beyond the contents of the article ten list. 
For further guidance on that point, we must turn once again to James v UK.302 
It is here that we see for the first time in connection with P1-1 the "margin of 
appreciation" which plays such a notable role in other areas of Convention 
protection. In considering whether the leasehold reform scheme met with the 
"public interest" test, the Court commence by noting:
301 para 62
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Because  of  their  direct  knowledge  of  their  society  and  its  needs,  the  national 
authorities are in principle better placed than the international  judge to appreciate 
what  is  'in  the public  interest'.  Under the system of  protection established by the 
Convention, it is thus for the national authorities to make the initial assessment both 
of the existence of a problem of public concern warranting measures of deprivation of 
property and the remedial action to be taken. 303
As in other areas where the margin of appreciation plays a part, the Court 
considers its role here to be essentially supervisory. State governments have 
been elected by the citizens on the basis of their politics and policies. It is not 
for  the  Court  to  substitute  its  opinion  for  that  of  a  democratically  elected 
parliament. The Court goes on to say:
The notion of public interest is necessarily extensive. In particular, as the Commission 
noted,  the  decision  to  enact  laws  expropriating  property  will  commonly  involve 
consideration  of  political,  economic  and social  issues  on  which  opinions  within  a 
democratic society may reasonably differ widely. The Court, finding it natural that the 
margin  of  appreciation  available  to  the  legislature  in  implementing  social  and 
economic policies should be a wide one, will respect the legislature's judgement as to 
what is "in the public interest" unless that judgement be manifestly without reasonable 
foundation. In other words, although the Court cannot substitute its own assessment 
for that of the national authorities, it is bound to review the contested measures under 
Article 1 of Protocol No.1 and, in so doing, to make an enquiry into the facts with 
reference to which the national authority acted.304
The level at which the Court will  intervene, then, seems to be the stage at 
which the action of the State is "manifestly without reasonable foundation." 
Evidently this sets the standard of proof at an extremely high level, particularly 
when  considered alongside  the  fact  that  the  Court  is  seemingly  willing  to 
accept any explanation of the public interest involved at face value. So, for 
example,  in  James,  the  Court  found  that  the  state's  justification  for  the 
scheme of  leasehold  reform  was  the  aim  of  rectifying  the  social  injustice 
caused by this outmoded system of property tenure which allowed landlords 
the sole benefit of the efforts and expenditure of their tenants. The Court did 
not  investigate  whether  this  was,  in  fact,  a  social  injustice,  despite 
303 para 46
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protestations  on  the  part  of  the  applicants,  but  rather  concluded  that  the 
argument presented by the UK government was stateable, and on that basis 
could not be said to be without  reasonable foundation. The public interest 
requirement was accordingly fulfilled. 
The  same  concept  was  applied  to  the  "general  interest"  in  Mellacher  v 
Austria.305 The challenge here was raised by landlords in respect of new rent 
control legislation, which the Austrian government again argued was intended 
to  redress  a  social  injustice,  although the  applicants  argued that  no  such 
injustice  existed.  The  Court  again  noted  that,  particularly  in  matters  of 
property legislation, the range of political, economic and social factors to be 
taken into account was likely to be extensive, and that housing in particular 
was likely to be of central concern. It went on to state:
In order to implement [housing] policies, the legislature must have a wide margin of 
appreciation  both  with  regard  to  the  existence  of  a  problem  of  public  concern 
warranting measures of  control  and as to the choice of  the detailed rules for the 
implementation of such measures. The Court will respect the legislature's judgement 
as to what is  in  the general  interest  unless that  judgement be manifestly  without 
reasonable foundation.306
The Court is highlighting the discretion here of the government both to identify 
the existence of a problem and also to decide on an appropriate course of 
action to deal with it. The Court again concluded:
The  explanations  given  for  the  legislation  in  question  are  not  such  as  could  be 
characterised as being manifestly unreasonable.307  
3.5.2 The political dimension of the interest test
The Court's  absolute unwillingness to be drawn into any evaluation of  the 
public interest justifications put forward on the part of the state does leave 
serious question marks over the purpose of having this requirement in P1-1 in 
the first place. There is certainly an argument that states are engaged in a 
305 (1990) 12 EHRR 391
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"box-ticking  exercise"  here.  Provided  the  state  can  provide  some  sort  of 
reason for their actions that does not appear entirely spurious, the Court will 
be satisfied, even where the alleged public need is argued not to exist. 
The  obvious  difficulty,  however,  with  the  Court  taking  more  of  an 
interventionist approach as regards P1-1 decision-making is that decisions as 
to  the  existence  or  otherwise  of  public  interest  are,  almost  of  necessity, 
political. The application of the doctrine of margin of appreciation here is not a 
straightforward abdication of responsibility by the Court. In many ways, it is an 
important element of protection of the separation of powers. Simply put, the 
electorate of a signatory state did not vote to be governed by the European 
Court of Human Rights. 
Consider,  for  example,  the  complex  politics  of  a  case  like  Stran  Greek 
Refineries v Greece.308 Here, the applicants had concluded a contract with the 
Greek state during a time in which it was governed by military junta. Once 
democratically elected government was resumed, they sought to undo some 
of the actions of the junta which they believed to have damaging economic 
consequences for the country, and the contract with the applicants was one 
such action. The contract contained an arbitration clause, and both parties 
attended arbitration in accordance with it, with an award finally being made in 
favour of the applicants to compensate them particularly for expenses they 
had already accrued in connection with the contract. However, the arbitration 
award was subsequently quashed by the Court of Cassation on the grounds 
that it was unconstitutional.
The argument put forward by the government in terms of the public interest 
aim of their actions was very strong. Undoing the applicant's contract was one 
of  a series of  measures designed not  just  to  undo the economic damage 
caused by the junta, but also to:
308 (1995) 19 EHRR 293
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Cleanse public life of the disrepute attaching to the military regime and to proclaim 
the power and the will of the Greek people to defend the democratic institutions.309 
Essentially the government sought to argue that undoing contracts such as 
the applicants' had the aim of removing the legitimacy which might otherwise 
be seen to attach to the brutal actions of the military junta. 
The applicants did not accept this contention, submitting that it would not be 
fair  to  label  every  contract  made  with  a  dictatorship  invalid  once  that 
dictatorship fell from power. 
The argument that was made by the Greek state here involved fundamental 
political questions that went to the heart of governance of the country during a 
time of serious instability. It is extremely difficult to see how it could be the role 
of the Court to step in here and undermine what the government contended to 
be a fundamental step on the road to legitimacy of the state. The opposite 
view put forward by the applicants in the case is essentially an alternative 
political interpretation. It is surely the political view of the elected government 
which must prevail in such a situation. Of course, it may have been helpful if 
the court had expressed its view on the public interest question here in those 
kinds of terms. In fact it hardly commented on the arguments, but focussed 
rather on the overall question of fair balance. 
3.5.3 Objective application of the test?
If it is accepted that political questions of public interest are not appropriate for 
the consideration of the Court, are there other areas where a more objective 
intervention may be both possible and justified? One situation in which there 
may seem to be greater  scope for  Court  involvement  is  where  the action 
taken by the state does not,  in fact,  appear to promote the public interest 
which the state contends was its purpose. If  the hypothetical state were to 
declare an aim of increasing housing provision for a homeless population, but 
had taken the action of expropriating property which members of the cabinet 
subsequently used as a holiday home, the action could not be said to fit with 
309 para 70
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the stated aim.  Again, though, the jurisprudence suggests that the Court will 
take  an  entirely  "hands-off"  approach  in  the  face  of  such  arguments.  A 
demonstration of  the same is  given in  the  very different  circumstances of 
Pressos Compania Naviera v Belgium310 and Holy Monasteries v Greece.311
Pressos concerned retrospective legislation which deprived applicants of the 
right  to  enforce  court  decrees  for  damages  which  had  previously  been 
awarded.  Amongst  the  various  complaints  made by the  applicants,  it  was 
argued particularly that the retroactive effect of the legislation could not be 
justified by any of the public interest arguments put forward by the Belgian 
government. These interests were protection of the state's financial interests, 
the  need  to  re-establish  legal  certainty  in  the  field  of  tort  and  the 
harmonisation of Belgian law with that of the Netherlands in the same area. 
On the face of it,  it  is  certainly difficult  to  see what  purpose retrospective 
application could serve in relation to the public interest arguments outlined. 
Additionally,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  all  the  provisions  of  the 
Convention are intended to conform to the rule of  law,  and retrospectively 
applied legislation would not normally fall within that category.
However,  it  is  impossible  to  explore  the  matter  much  further,  since  all 
argument was swept aside at the level of both the former Commission and the 
Court.  The Court generically noted that that wide margin of appreciation is 
available to national authorities both as regards the identification of a need 
and the methods used to resolve it, and that the Court should not interfere 
unless the actions of the legislature:
Be manifestly without  reasonable foundation,  which is clearly  not  the case in this 
instance.312
There is no more detailed analysis of which of the public interest arguments 
related to the retroactivity of the application. It appears that, provided the state 
310 (1996) 21 EHRR 301
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offers  some sort  of  argument  explaining  the  reasons  behind  their  chosen 
course of action, the Court will be satisfied.
   
A  perhaps even more borderline  case was  Holy  Monasteries v  Greece,313 
where the Greek state enacted legislation which transferred a large part of the 
patrimonies of each of eight monastic estates to the state. The public interest 
argument presented in respect of this was to end illegal sales of the relevant 
land, encroachment upon it, and abandonment, and instead to redistribute the 
land to  some of  the  most  needy into  society  who  could  help  to  build  the 
agriculture  industry.  The applicants  argued that  the  land  was  not,  in  fact, 
being transferred to destitute farmers and therefore serving a social purpose, 
but rather to agricultural co-operatives who stood to make a lot of money. The 
Court's view was as follows:
The optional nature of the transfer of the use of land to farmers or agricultural co-
operatives  and  the  inclusion  of  public  bodies  among  the  beneficiaries  of  such 
transfers  might  inspire some doubt  as to the reasons for the measures,  but  they 
cannot suffice to deprive the overall objective of [the legislation.]314
  
The wording here is telling. Even though the Court appears to concede that it 
is  dubious  that  the  state  are  using  the  land  for  the  purpose  they  have 
presented, nonetheless the Court does not feel it is appropriate for the Court 
to interfere. 
3.5.4 Absence of public/general interest
The jurisprudence shows us, then, that public and general interest are used 
interchangeably, and that their scope is a matter which falls within the margin 
of appreciation of state governments. The Court will not adjudicate on whether 
the reasons put forward by the state are, as a matter of fact, in the interests of 
the country, since this is deemed to be a political question. The Court will not 
investigate whether a need identified by the state as justifying an interference 
does actually exist as a matter of fact. The Court will not even assess whether 
313 (1995) 20 EHRR 1
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the public interest founded upon by the state is being served in any way by 
the state action.
What, then, is the purpose of this requirement suppose to be? Does it serve 
any meaningful function whatsoever?
At its very barest, it can be seen that the requirement compels states to offer 
some reason  for  their  action  where  it  constitutes  an  intervention  with  the 
property right. In Zwierzynski v Poland,315 the applicant complained of a series 
of court actions pursued by the state with the clear aim of delaying the return 
to him of land which had been expropriated almost 50 years previously. The 
state’s defence to the application did not deal with the interference as such, 
arguing rather  that  the applicant  had no possession capable of  protection 
under  P1-1.316 This  argument  was  rejected  by the  Court,  who  went  on  to 
categorise the interference as a deprivation of possessions, before stating:
The Court finds no justification for the situation in which the public authorities have 
placed the applicant. The Court is unable to discern in this particular case any serious 
“reason of public interest” to justify deprivation of property.317  
3.5.5 Criticism of the Court's approach to the interest test
Accordingly it seems clear that some public interest argument must be made 
by the state. Is that all that is required, a bare statement of interest served? 
This would not appear to offer any meaningful protection. The property right 
was  designed to  prevent  totalitarian  regimes from removing  property  from 
political opponents as a means of silencing their voices. To take an extreme 
example, imagine a white supremacist party came to power in a signatory 
state,  perhaps  through  dubious  means  or  as  the  result  of  a  state  of 
emergency.  That party could pass a law removing all  property from ethnic 
minorities, arguing that it would be in the best interests of society as a whole 
for white people to own the land, since white people were better equipped to 
exploit the land, which would in turn allow the economy to thrive. Based on 
315 (2004) 38 EHRR 6
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the  jurisprudential  analysis  offered  above,  a  P1-1  application  would  not 
succeed on Zwierzynski grounds, since a public interest argument has been 
made. The Court would not question the political motivation underscoring the 
white supremacist action, since that is a matter falling within the state's margin 
of appreciation. The Court also would not investigate whether as a matter of 
fact white people were better equipped to exploit the land, or whether this was 
likely to benefit  society as a whole.  Could an action which is so clearly a 
method of racially motivated attack be considered to comply with the human 
rights standards set by P1-1, at least as far as this step of the process is 
concerned?
It would be hoped that this is the type of situation in which the action of the 
state  would  be  found  "manifestly  without  reasonable  foundation,"  in  the 
wording suggested in  James. The use of that terminology suggests there is 
some  minimum,  objective  moral  standard  to  which  the  notion  of  "public 
interest" will be held, and a clear act of persecution such as the one given in 
the hypothetical  example would not meet that minimum standard. The fact 
that no such case has yet come to light in the Strasbourg jurisprudence could 
be construed as a positive outcome of the fact that such acts of violence have 
not been carried out by states signatory to the Convention.
The difficulty here is clearly in finding a balance between political autonomy 
and minimum human rights standards. P1-1 is essentially an economic right. 
In  the  economic  context,  there  is  no  universal  consensus  around  one 
particular set of values such as may be found in other areas governed by the 
Convention.  There  is  no  agreement  amongst  politicians,  economists, 
academics  and  so  on  as  to  the  appropriate  manner  in  which  to  regulate 
planning, or operate systems of land reform, or allow for economic growth. 
The types of issues likely to arise under P1-1 are almost by definition political 
in nature, and in that context, it is not only justifiable, but  desirable that the 
margin of appreciation should be sufficiently widely drawn as to allow elected 
governments to pursue their own political agendas.
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Clearly there is still work to be done in determining the correct limits of this 
requirement  in  respect  of  P1-1.  It  does  not  seem  entirely  obvious,  for 
example, why the Court could not conduct more analysis as to whether the 
action of the state could, on any argument, be said to meet the public interest 
argument put forward in justification of that action. It is to be hoped that the 
rigour of  the public interest  requirement  is enhanced to  an extent  that the 
requirement  does  not  become  meaningless,  whilst  the  need  for  political 
autonomy amongst member states continues to be respected. 
3.5.6 Taxes and other penalties
One other justification for State control of possessions is set out in the second 
paragraph of P1-1. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance 
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties.
The way in which this section is phrased, as is so often the case with P1-1, 
leaves it open to perhaps more than one interpretation. It could be said that 
the general  right  to  protection of  possessions can be interfered with,  first, 
where  the  state  wishes  to  enforce  control  laws  in  the  general  interest. 
Secondly,  it  can  be  interfered  with  where  the  state  wishes  to  secure  the 
payment of taxes or other penalties. This would seem to suggest that, where 
payment  of  taxes,  other  contributions  or  penalties  is  the  reason  for  the 
interference, no general interest requirement has to be met. With tax, there is 
perhaps an argument that the "general interest" is inherent in any system of 
taxation, at least in the sense in which the phrase "general interest" has been 
interpreted by the Court (in other words, any interest the state says it has, 
whether it is in the general good or not.) Accordingly, it seems germane to 
examine the meaning of this phrase together with the other element of the 
public  interest  test.  Is  collection  of  taxes  an  alternative  third  step  in  the 
decision-making  process  which  removes  the  need  for  state  action  to  be 
carried out in the public interest? 
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This section of P1-1 is perhaps the least judicially considered of them all, but 
the  few authorities  that  do  exist  suggest  that  the  provision  has  not  been 
interpreted in the way outlined in the preceding paragraph. Useful elaboration 
was provided by the decision of the former Commission in  Gasus Dosier v 
Netherlands,318 the facts of which are discussed in some detail above.319 The 
Commission were of the view that a tax confiscation still required to be in the 
public interest and could be characterised as a deprivation. It is interesting to 
note that the one of the opinions in dissent in the Commission stated:
Leaving aside the sheer economical interest of filling the treasury, which cannot be 
meant by that provision, I can think of no "public interest" which could be used to 
justify such an expropriation as there exists no link whatsoever between the claims of 
the Dutch tax authorities and the applicant company's possessions.320    
The majority of the Commission appeared to accept, however, that "filling the 
treasury" was in the public interest if the state said it was.
The Court took a different approach, determining that since the interference 
had come about as a result of the tax authorities' exercise of their statutory 
powers, the appropriate head under which to consider the case was "securing 
the payment of taxes." It is not entirely clear where this "head" is supposed to 
fit  within the  Sporrong  three-rule approach. Is it a subset of "control"? It  is 
never made clear. The Court emphasises that it is considering a "procedural" 
tax law, meaning one which details how taxes may be collected, rather than a 
substantive law setting out what tax will be due. As usual, the Court highlights 
the wide margin of appreciation open to member states in the exercise of their 
discretion, particularly:
…with regard to the question whether – and if so, to what extent – the tax authorities 
should be put in a better position to enforce tax debts than ordinary creditors are to 
318 (1995) 20 EHRR 403
319 See page 125-7 above.
320 Dissenting opinion of Mr S Treschel joined by MM C.L Rozakis and J-C Geus.
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enforce commercial debts. The Court will respect the legislature's assessment in such 
matters unless it is devoid of reasonable foundation.321
The collection of tax debt is considered:
…clearly in the general interest.322
A discussion of proportionality followed in the usual way with the result, as 
outlined above, that no violation was found to have taken place.
One case which focussed primarily on issues of taxation was  National and 
Provincial Building Society v UK.323 There were a number of applicants in this 
case, each of whom was a building society, complaining about new legislation 
regarding the tax levied on savings accounts.  Each applicant had paid the 
Inland Revenue a lump sum annually to represent the tax levied on savings 
held by their customers. The annual period over which the tax was assessed 
related to the accounting period of each of the building societies in question, 
and the various accounting periods began and ended on different months of 
the year. The government then introduced new legislation in terms of which 
the tax would be assessed over a period of one fiscal year, from April to April. 
After the legislation was in force, it became apparent that the changeover in 
rules  left  some "gap  periods"  -  for  example,  where  an  accounting  period 
ended in January, there would be a period of three months where no tax was 
assessed until the fiscal year began in April. The government retrospectively 
introduced transitional provisions to deal with this. The applicants paid the tax 
assessed under  these transitional  provisions whilst  arguing that  they were 
unlawful, and following a domestic judicial review process applied to the Court 
arguing  inter  alia that  this  payment  of  tax as  a  result  of  retrospective  tax 
legislation was a violation of P1-1. 
The former Commission and the Court took slightly different views, but both 
reached the same conclusion, namely that there had been no violation. 
321 para 60
322 para 61
323 (1998) 25 EHRR 127
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The Commission, for its part, viewed the situation as falling within the third 
rule, which
Explicitly  reserves the right  of  Contracting States to pass such laws as they may 
deem necessary to secure the payment of taxes.324
It  was  satisfied  that  the  use  of  the  legislation  to  give  effect  to  the  initial 
legislative intention was sufficient to satisfy the interest requirement and were 
quite clear that the idea of retrospective legislation was not in itself enough to 
suggest that a fair balance had not been struck where it concerned taxation 
(even though it  conceded that in  Pressos Compania Naviera,  retrospective 
legislation introduced with the intent of denuding the power of a court decree 
had constituted a violation.) The justification for this special treatment of tax 
legislation seemed to be founded on the fact that the UK government had 
some history of introducing retrospective tax law, combined with the fact that 
the applicants would have received a windfall benefit in tax avoidance over 
the gap period but for the retroactivity. The legislation corrected the lack of fair 
balance that the windfall benefit would otherwise have created. 
The Court was of the view that it would be:
…the most natural approach to examine their complaints from the angle of a control 
of the use of property in the general interest to secure the payment of tax, which falls 
within the second paragraph of [P1-1].325  
The Court found:
…an obvious and compelling public interest  to ensure that  private entities do not 
enjoy the benefit of a windfall in a changeover to a new tax payment regime and do 
not deny the Exchequer revenue simply on account of inadvertent defects in enabling 
tax legislation. 326  
324 para 69
325 para 79
326 para 81
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The strength of this public interest and the need to prevent a windfall benefit 
was sufficiently strong to strike a fair balance between the needs of society 
and the burden placed on the applicants.
Both the former Commission and the Court spoke of the public interest served 
by tax legislation in fairly strong terms here, but it may not be the case that 
this is a rule of general application. In National and Provincial, the complaint 
was made by large financial institutions effectively trying to evade paying a 
few months worth of tax which they had always known they should be paying 
in the first place as a result of a change from one complex, technical area of 
law to another. To have found in favour of the applicants here might have 
upheld the letter of P1-1, but it would seem hardly to be in line with the spirit 
of the provision. 
It seems, then, that the reference to "taxes and other penalties" should not be 
considered as an alternative to the public interest test. State action cannot be 
either in  the  public  interest  or taken  in  order  to  collect  taxes  and  other 
penalties. The case law discussed above suggests that, in fact, collection of 
taxes is an aspect of control of use which must satisfy the interest test in the 
normal way. It appears unlikely that collection of taxes would ever fail this test, 
however.
 
3.5.7 Conclusion
The third step in the decision-making process is perhaps the one which most 
closely expresses the conflict inherent in the existence of a right to protection 
of  property,  and  the  one  which  raises  the  most  questions  as  to  the  true 
strength of such a right. The need for interference by the state to pursue a 
legitimate aim in the public or general interest is clearly stated in the text of 
P1-1. Building to some extent on the guidance given in other articles of the 
Convention as to what might constitute, such an interest, the Court developed 
a test  which offered member states a very wide margin of  appreciation in 
determination  of  whether  and  where  this  type  of  interest  might  exist.  In 
keeping with the respect for political autonomy which it is recognised must be 
retained by member  states,  the  Court  has  shown  a  marked reluctance to 
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intervene  where  it  is  argued  by  an  applicant  that  this  test  has  not  been 
satisfied,  and  it  seems  that  only  a  complete  failure  to  advance  any 
public/general interest on the part of the state will result in an adverse finding 
in respect of this step of the decision-making process. 
The width of the margin of appreciation extended by the Court to signatory 
states here is open to question. In the first place, it is difficult to understand 
why  this  discretion  is  considered  to  extend  to  virtually  all  questions 
surrounding public interest, particularly as to whether that interest is actually 
promoted by the action taken by the state supposedly in furtherance of it. In 
situations where such objective questions are raised, it is arguable that the 
Court should play a genuinely adjudicative role. The political interests pursued 
by signatory states do, eventually, come up against the hard limit of manifest 
unreasonableness.  Although it  is  reassuring that  the  Court  recognises the 
existence of such a limit, a degree of dubiety exists over whether or when 
state action will fail to meet up to this test.
As with the previous steps in the decision-making process, it is apparent that 
the Court's understanding of this element of the property protection has taken 
some time to develop, and it is recognised that this step is the area in which 
the central conflict in P1-1 must be most closely negotiated. The examination 
of the case law here suggests that perhaps this evolution has, to date, tended 
more towards the interests of the state to the extent that it is unclear whether 
the aims of the property protection, as imagined by the Convention's authors, 
can genuinely be realised by application of the interest test in its current form. 
3.6 Is the interference proportionate to the aim sought to be achieved?
The final step the Court will take in determining whether an interference with 
P1-1 can be justified is applying the test of proportionality. Is the interference 
proportionate  to  the  aim  sought  to  be  achieved?  The  essence  of 
proportionality is that one person should not be asked to bear an individual 
and excessive burden for the sake of the greater good of broader society. 
3.6.1 Development of the proportionality test
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Sporrong  and  Lönnroth  v  Sweden327 is  again  a  useful  place  to  begin  the 
discussion of proportionality in a P1-1 context. In reviewing the compliance of 
the expropriation permits with P1-1 in that case, the Court set out the general 
rule:
The Court must determine whether a fair balance was struck between the demands 
of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the 
individual's fundamental rights. The search for this balance is inherent in the whole of 
the Convention and is also reflected in the structure of Article 1.328
By way of precedent, the Court cited the  Belgian Linguistic Case (No. 2).329 
This  authority  dealt  not  with  P1-1,  but  rather  with  the  right  to  respect  for 
private and family life  under  article  eight  and the right  to  education under 
article  two of the First  Protocol.330 The applicants were  parents of  Belgian 
schoolchildren  who  believed  that  the  legislation  governing  the  "official" 
languages allowed  to  be used for  teaching in  schools  violated their  rights 
under these articles of the Convention. The difficulty was that French was not 
recognised as an "official" language in certain parts of Belgium (although it 
was so recognised in others.) A school teaching in an "unofficial" language 
would  not  receive  the  government  funding  provided  to  other  schools.  In 
exploring the extent  of  the right  to education and considering in particular 
whether a right to education in a given language was enshrined in P1-2, the 
Court made the following observation:
The right to education guaranteed by the first sentence of Article 2 of the Protocol by 
its very nature calls for regulation by the State, regulation which may vary in time and 
place according to the needs and resources of the community and of individuals. It 
goes without saying that such regulation must never injure the substance of the right 
to education nor conflict with other rights enshrined in the Convention. 
The  Court  considers  that  the  general  aim set  for  themselves  by  the  Contracting 
Parties through the medium of the European Convention on Human Rights was to 
327 (1983) 5 EHRR 35
328 para 69
329 (1968) 1 EHRR 252.
330 Hereinafter referred to as P1-2
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provide effective protection of fundamental human rights, and this, without doubt, not 
only because of the historical context in which the Convention was concluded, but 
also  of  the  social  and  technical  developments  in  our  age  which  offer  to  States 
considerable possibilities for regulating the exercise of these rights. The Convention 
therefore implies a just balance between the protection of the general interest of the 
community  and  the  respect  due  to  fundamental  human  rights  while  attaching 
particular importance to the latter.331
The Court  implies here,  as elsewhere,  that  the  notion  of  proportionality  is 
inherent in the Convention itself.  
So how does the Court ascertain whether the test of proportionality has been 
satisfied? Essentially,  this is a balancing exercise, where the needs of the 
community served by the interference are on one side of the scales, and the 
burden to be undertaken by the person (or persons) concerned lies on the 
other.  The Court  tends to  look  at  a  number  of  factors  in  order  to  decide 
whether the balance lies where it should do. More than any of the previous 
three steps, the question of proportionality tends to turn very much on the 
facts of the particular application at hand, and the Court will  sometimes go 
through  all  the  pros  and  cons  of  the  situation  in  considerable  detail.  332 
Thought  will  be given to  alternative mechanisms by which the state  could 
have achieved the same aim333 and to the processes used in similar situations 
in  alternative  jurisdictions.334 The  conduct  of  the  parties  may be  relevant, 
particularly  where  the  interference  by  the  state  has  been  triggered  by 
suspicion of fraud.335 Any number of other issues may come into play, and it is 
impossible to give an exhaustive list. However, some common factors can be 
established,  namely:  the  nature  and  importance  of  the  aim  sought  to  be 
achieved  by  the  interference;  the  right  to  any  process  of  appeal  in  the 
domestic  jurisdiction;  the  nature  and extent  of  information available  to  the 
applicant relevant to state action prior to the action being taken; attempted 
mitigation of any loss on the part of the applicant, and; the availability and 
331 para 5.
332For one of any number of examples, see Immobiliare Saffi v Italy (2000) 30 EHRR 756 
333 Hentrich v France (1994) 18 EHRR 440
334 Hentrich v France, ibid; AGOSI v UK (1987) 9 EHRR 1
335 Hentrich v France, ibid; AGOSI v UK, ibid.
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extent of any compensation in respect of the interference. Each of these shall 
be considered in turn. 
3.6.2 Aim pursued by the interference
The purpose of  the interference, as argued by the state,  will  inevitably be 
taken into  account  in determination of  the proportionality  question.  If  state 
action has been taken with the view to addressing a pressing social need, 
then this will tip the scales of proportionality much further in favour of the state 
than if something of less critical importance is being attempted. This makes 
sense: if the needs of the community are both urgent and fundamental, then 
one individual might reasonably be expected to undertake more of a burden to 
meet those needs without it being considered "excessive". The test is relative. 
One useful example of this principle can be found in the case of Mellacher v 
Austria.336 This  dispute  arose  from  the  introduction  of  new  Austrian  rent 
control legislation which capped rent increases at a certain level. Landlords 
complained that this effectively deprived them of the property rights they held 
in existing tenancy agreements which could no longer be enforced as the new 
law rendered them invalid. The stated aim of the legislation at the time of its 
introduction had been to redress the disparity between rent chargeable on 
equivalent  properties.  The  government  were  concerned  that  levels  of 
homelessness  were  on  the  rise  whilst,  at  the  same  time,  an  increasing 
number  of  rental  properties  were  lying  vacant.  Housing  matters  were 
considered key to the health  of  the economy overall,  and the government 
sought to close the rift before it widened any further. 
A key complaint made by the applicants was the limits on rent levels applied 
across the board without  reference to the location of  the properties or the 
amount that had been paid to buy the properties in the first place. This would 
result in some landlords suffering a much greater financial loss than others, 
with  no correlation between this increased level  of  loss and the degree of 
need  of  the  recipient.  The  Court  was  of  the  view that  this  indiscriminate 
approach to restriction of rent levels was the only practical way to deal with 
336 (1990) 12 EHRR 391
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the problem outlined by the government, since considering each property on a 
case-by-case basis would be impractical and inefficient. The applicants also 
argued that the rents were now set at an arbitrary level which in some cases 
did not cover the landlords' expenses, but the Court did not find this to be 
proved. 
In making its decision, the Court noted that the rent reductions in the case of 
two of the particular applicants were "striking", but concluded:
It does not follow that these reductions constitute a disproportionate burden. The fact 
that the original  rents were agreed upon and corresponded to the then prevailing 
market conditions does not mean that the legislature could not reasonably decide as 
a  matter  of  policy  that  they  were  unacceptable  from the  point  of  view  of  social 
justice.337    
Mellacher gives some indication of the arguably substantial burden that an 
individual may be expected to bear where the related aim is perceived to be of 
sufficient importance by the Court. 
Another example is  Spadea and Scalabrino v Italy.338 The applicants were 
again landlords, and their complaint related to the unenforceability of eviction 
orders they had obtained against the tenants in their properties, which had 
been suspended four times prior to the application. The justification for this 
action put forward by the Italian government was that there was a shortage of 
low-income housing available in the districts in which the applicants owned 
properties. Had the eviction orders not been suspended, there would have 
been a sharp increase in homelessness in these areas, which the government 
were concerned would lead, amongst other things, to social tension and might 
threaten public order. 
In determining the issue of proportionality, the Court looked in some detail at 
the facts of the applications in question. It emphasised that Italy had put in 
place a series of measures designed to alleviate housing shortages, including 
337 para 56
338 (1996) 21 EHRR 482
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freezing rents and extending leases in a variety of situations, but had been 
unable to  avoid  the "last  resort"  of  suspending eviction orders.  The Court 
noted, as regards the applicants, that the tenants had not broken the terms of 
their lease agreement for example by failing to pay rent: the leases had simply 
reached the end of their term. The tenants had sought reallocation from Milan 
City Council but had not been offered anywhere else to live, and they were 
elderly ladies. The applicants, having been unable to remove the tenants from 
their property, were forced to buy another flat. Indeed, they did not recover 
possession  of  the  rented  property  until  one  of  the  tenants  died,  following 
which the other agreed to move out.
 
The Court  concluded that,  given the aim pursued, the actions of  the state 
were  not  disproportionate.  There  is  no  question that  the  risk of  increased 
levels of homelessness with attached disruption to public order was afforded 
significant weight by the Court in its deliberations here, but it is important to 
note that the needs of the applicants were also weighed in the balance. It was 
noted specifically that applicants had the means with which to buy additional 
property.  It  would seem logical  to  suggest  that,  had the non-availability  of 
eviction  orders  rendered  the  applicants  themselves  homeless,  the  Court 
would have reached a different conclusion.339 
3.6.3 Domestic right to be heard
Another important element in the fair balance equation will be the extent to 
which the applicant has had the opportunity to have his case heard at the 
domestic  level.  Discussion  of  this  issue  tends  to  cross  over  with  the 
requirements  of  lawfulness  discussed  above,  and  often  also  with  the 
applicant's right to a fair trial under article six of the Convention. This does not 
lessen the importance of the point for determination of proportionality under 
P1-1. Where the issues on both sides of the alleged interference have already 
been aired at some length through a process of domestic appeals, this tends 
339 The same difficulties in respect of sufficient, habitable housing have arisen in many Eastern European countries 
and a pattern of applications from landlords subject to excessive rent controls or the inability to resume occupation of 
their property can be discerned. See, for example, Radovici and ors v Romania (68479/01, 71351/01 and 71352/01) 
2 November 2006,;  Hutten-Czapska v Poland (2006) 42 EHRR 15 and Schirmer v Poland (2005) 40 EHRR 47. In 
Blecic v Croatia (2005) 41 EHRR 13, the applicant was a tenant whose lease had been terminated by the state after 
she left the country for an extended period during a time of severe housing shortages. No violation was found here.
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to suggest that the state is at least trying to find a fair balance. On the other 
hand,  the  Court  is  generally  unimpressed  if  an  individual  has  had  no 
opportunity to put his side of the story across after the initial state decision 
has been taken. 
The  issue  is  neatly  illustrated  by  dicta  in  AGOSI  v  UK,  which  dealt  with 
confiscation by the customs authorities of gold Kruggerands smuggled into 
the UK, more details of which are set out above.340 The discussion as to the 
proportionality of the interference opened as follows:
The Court must consider whether the applicable procedures in the present case were 
such as to  enable,  amongst  other  things,  reasonable  account  to be taken of  the 
degree  of  fault  or  care  of  the  applicant  company or,  at  least,  of  the  relationship 
between  the  company's  conduct  and  the  breach  of  the  law  which  undoubtedly 
occurred;  and  also  whether  the  procedures  in  question  afforded  the  applicant 
company a reasonable opportunity of putting its case to the responsible authorities. In 
ascertaining whether these conditions were satisfied, a comprehensive review must 
be taken of the applicable procedures.341 
In the particular case, the applicants had the opportunity to avail themselves 
of the extensive process of judicial review in the English courts, which allowed 
full discussion of various points raised by the applicants in their favour. The 
proportionality test was ultimately found to be satisfied here.
The  appeal  issue  proved  critical  in  Hentrich  v  France.  As  discussed 
previously, the application dealt with the power of the French tax authorities to 
exercise a right of  pre-emption in respect of  property transfers which they 
considered to be at  an undervalue and suspected might be attempted tax 
evasion  or  fraud.342 The  discretion  available  to  the  tax  authorities  was 
extensive and the process was not at all  transparent.  In this situation, the 
Court considered the opportunity for the applicant to seek judicial review of 
the decision to be critical. 
340 (1987) 9 EHRR 1, discussed at page 102-4 above
341 para 55
342 (1994) 18 EHRR 440, discussed at page 117-8 above.
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In  order  to  assess  the  proportionality  of  the  interference,  the  Court  looks  at  the 
degree of protection from arbitrariness that is afforded by the [French] proceedings in 
this case.343
The  Court  looked  in  some detail  at  the  various  stages  of  the  adversarial 
process  of  tax  review  which  was  available  to  the  applicant  domestically, 
noting  particularly  that  the  state  had  not  been  obliged  to  provide  any 
statement of reasons for the decision they had made, and also at the length of 
time  taken  to  complete  the  proceedings  which  seemed  to  be  subject  to 
substantial  delays. Ultimately the Court was not satisfied that the applicant 
had had a real opportunity to make her case as to why the decision should be 
reversed, finding that:  
Mrs Hentrich "bore an individual and excessive burden" which could have been rendered 
legitimate only if  she had had the possibility  – which was refused her – of effectively 
challenging the measure taken against her.344
  
Where there is an admitted defect in fair hearing under article six, it seems 
likely  that  this  would  make any finding  of  proportionality  in  terms of  P1-1 
impossible.  This  issue was addressed in  Matos E Silva v Portugal.345 The 
facts of the application were not dissimilar to those of Sporrong and Lönnroth. 
The applicant owned land which became subject to an expropriation permit 
when the Portuguese government made plans to create a nature reserve in 
the area. After 13 years, the permit was still in place, but the land had yet to 
be expropriated. Whilst subject to the permit, the land could not be developed, 
and practically speaking it was impossible to sell. During the 13 year period, 
the  applicant  made  repeated  attempts  to  use  the  domestic  process  of 
planning appeals, but was constantly thwarted by delays and adjournments 
on the part of the state with the result that no full hearing of the case ever took 
place before the permits were finally recalled. In the event, Portugal admitted 
a  violation  of  article  six.  The  Court  took  this  into  account  during  their 
consideration of the issues under P1-1, eventually finding a second violation 
for lack of proportionality under that article.  
343 para 45
344 para 49
345 (1997) 24 EHRR 573
155
3.6.4 Information available to the applicant prior to the interference
Closely  tied  to  the  element  of  the  lawfulness  requiring  that  domestic  law 
provides a foreseeable result in order that citizens know how to best regulate 
their conduct,346 the Court will take careful notice of the information available 
to the applicant as to the likelihood and nature of any interference before it 
occurs. Shortly put, if an applicant had no notice that they were likely to suffer 
an  interference,  then  it  is  unlikely  the  interference  will  be  considered 
proportionate. 
A  useful  discussion  of  this  factor  can  be  seen  in  Fredin  v  Sweden.347 A 
licensing  case,  the  applicants  owned  and operated  a  gravel  pit  until  their 
licence  to  do  so  was  unexpectedly  revoked  by  the  County  Administration 
Board. The aim of the revocation was environmental; a cease in exploitation 
of the pit would allow the natural environment in the area to return to normal, 
in addition to which, there was already a sufficient supply of gravel in the area. 
The  applicants  made  various  complaints  under  P1-1.  The  first  –  that  the 
revocation was at such short notice they had no reason to expect it  – the 
Court  found  unconvincing.  The  revocation  was  based  on  legislation 
introduced in 1973, which gave power to local administrative bodies to revoke 
licences no sooner than July 1983 (thereby allowing a ten year transitional 
period.) The applicants did not buy the pit until 1980, and therefore must have 
been aware of  the potential  for  revocation. Shortly after  the purchase, the 
applicants had been granted permission by the County Administrative Board 
to  build  a  quay.  It  was  argued  that  this  permission  and  the  huge  capital 
expenditure which the Board knew would result amounted to some manner of 
promise or guarantee that the licence would not be revoked. However,  the 
permission for the quay expressly reserved the question of licensing in the 
post-transitional period, and again the Court was not prepared to place any 
reliance on the applicants’ argument. The Court also noted that the applicants 
346 See discussion at 121-124 above.
347 (1991) 13 EHRR 784
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had been given a three year closing-down period, which was extended by 11 
months on their application. 
In  all,  the  Court  felt  that  the  applicants  had been given entirely  adequate 
information at the time the licence was originally granted, and ultimately the 
proportionality  test  was  satisfied  here.  The relevance of  the  availability  of 
information to the question of proportionality was clearly demonstrated. 
Another example is found in the Grand Chamber decision in JA Pye (Oxford) 
Land Ltd v United Kingdom,348 discussed in more detail in chapter five.349 This 
application  concerned  the  English  law  of  adverse  possession,  which  had 
operated  in  the  case  to  allow  former  tenants  of  the  applicant  to  gain 
ownership of what had been the applicant's land, simply through remaining in 
possession of the property for twelve years subsequent to the expiry of the 
lease.  In its decision, the Grand Chamber noted that  the rules of  adverse 
possession were well established, and that the applicants should have been 
aware  of  the  risk  to  their  rights,  a  risk  which  could  easily  have  been 
neutralised had the applicants simply asked the tenants to leave the premises 
or resume payment of rent. Again, this element of foreknowledge contributed 
to the overall finding of proportionality in respect of the interference.   
3.6.5 Mitigation of loss
Proportionality is  a question of  balance. The conduct of  the applicant may 
therefore be as important as the conduct of the state, and there may be some 
expectation on the applicant to mitigate his losses where it is possible and 
reasonable for him to do so. In  Phocas v France,350 the Court was asked to 
look at a long-running planning dispute. The applicant owned land in an area 
subject to a development plan. He had made several applications for planning 
permission on his  property,  each of  which had been repeatedly adjourned 
since there was a possibility that the land would be expropriated. 
348 (2008) 46 EHRR 45
349 See page 272-76
350 (2001) 32 EHRR 11
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Over the course of almost 20 years, the land was neither expropriated nor 
was  planning  permission  granted.  In  terms  of  the  domestic  legislation,  a 
landowner in this situation had the opportunity to apply to have his property 
declared abandoned, and to receive compensation equivalent to the value of 
that  property  as  a result.  Mr  Phocas had commenced proceedings in  this 
regard, but had not pursued them. In the view of the Court, the fact that a 
domestic  remedy existed  which  had  not  been  pursued  was  critical  to  the 
question of fair balance. The applicant was under a responsibility to use the 
remedies available to him. His failure to do so was one factor relied on by the 
Court in their finding that the interference in this case was proportionate.  
3.6.6 Compensation
Often the most critical factor the Court will take into account when ruling on 
proportionality is the availability or otherwise of any monetary compensation in 
respect  of  the  interference.  The  key  authority  in  this  regard  is  Lithgow  v 
United Kingdom,351 which arose from the nationalisation of  the aircraft  and 
shipbuilding  industries  in  the  UK.  The  complex  compensation  scheme 
proposed  in  the  legislation  here  afforded  the  Court  an  opportunity  to 
systematically consider the role compensation payments ought to play in a 
P1-1 application. As discussed above the Court looked in some detail at the 
meaning of the expression "subject to the general principles of international 
law,"  ultimately  deciding  that  it  did  not  have  the  effect  of  requiring 
compensation  be  paid  for  every  interference  under  P1-1.352 However,  the 
Court did consider that some provision for compensation was necessary if a 
real protection was to exist:
The Court observes that under the legal systems of the Contracting States, the taking 
of  property  in  the  public  interest  without  payment  of  compensation  is  treated  as 
justifiable only in exceptional circumstances not relevant for present purposes. As far 
as Article 1 is concerned, the protection of the right of property it affords would be 
largely illusory and ineffective in the absence of any equivalent principle.353
351 (1986) 8 EHRR 329
352 See pages 124-32 above.
353 para 120
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In  considering  the  role  of  compensation  specifically  with  regard  to 
proportionality, the Court observed:
Clearly compensation terms are material to the assessment whether a fair balance 
has been struck between the various interests at stake and, notably, whether or not a 
disproportionate burden has been imposed on the person who has been deprived of 
his possessions.354 
The Court also made a ruling as to the appropriate level of compensation:
The taking of property without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value 
would  normally  constitute  a  disproportionate  interference  which  could  not  be 
considered justifiable under Article 1. Article 1 does not, however, guarantee a right to 
full compensation in all circumstances, since legitimate objectives of 'public interest,' 
such as pursued in measures of economic reform or measures designed to achieve 
greater social justice, may call for less than reimbursement of the full market value. 355
The  Court  went  on  to  review  in  detail  the  specifics  of  the  compensation 
scheme  introduced  in  the  nationalisation  legislation,  which  the  applicants 
alleged was inappropriate.  The Court prefaced their review by stating:
It would, in the Court's view, be artificial in this respect to divorce the decision as to 
the compensation terms from the actual  decision to  nationalise,  since the factors 
influencing  the  latter  will  of  necessity  also  influence  the  former.  Accordingly,  the 
Court's power of review in the present case is limited to ascertaining whether the 
decisions regarding compensation fell outside the United Kingdom's wide margin of 
appreciation; it will respect the legislature's judgment in this connection unless that 
judgment was manifestly without reasonable foundation.356 
Ultimately, the Court found that the compensation provisions applicable in the 
case where proportionate. 
Based on the observations of the Court in Lithgow, the first clear rule in terms 
of  proportionality  is  that  a  deprivation  of  property  must  be  balanced by a 
354 para 120
355 para 121
356 para 122
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compensation payment, other than in exceptional circumstances. It would, of 
course,  be unusual  for  a  state  government  to  carry out  a familiar  form of 
expropriation such as a compulsory purchase or a nationalisation exercise 
without compensation being an integral part of the scheme, but some unusual 
situations do arise. A useful example is Holy Monasteries v Greece,357 where 
a change in  the law resulted in the patrimonies of  eight  monastic  estates 
vesting  in  the  state  without  the  opportunity  of  appeal  or  payment  of  any 
compensation. The situation arose in the context of a dispute as to whether 
the Monasteries had ownership of the relevant properties in the first place. 
Having discounted that argument, the Court had no difficulty in ruling that the 
lack of compensation upset the fair balance required to be struck between the 
needs of the applicants and the public interest, and found a violation of P1-1 
had taken place. More recently,  the applicants in  Strain v Romania358 had 
owned a house which the state had nationalised in 1950 and converted into 
four flats. In 1993, the applicants brought an action for recovery of possession 
of the building. While that litigation was ongoing, the state accepted an offer to 
purchase one of the flats from the tenant in occupation at the time. The Court 
could  see  no  justification  for  the  non-payment  of  compensation  in  what 
ultimately  appeared  to  be  a  relatively  clear-cut  case,  and  a  violation  was 
found to exist.359 
Despite the clear statement in  Lithgow that exceptional circumstances may 
allow  deprivation  without  payment  of  compensation  to  be  a  proportionate 
interference, it seemed for many years as though such circumstances did not, 
in fact, exist. In Holy Monasteries, the former Commission had expressed the 
view  that,  since  the  monasteries  had  initially  been  given  the  property  in 
question in order to facilitate the administration of tasks such as social care 
and education which were now performed by the state, it was justified for the 
state to take ownership of the properties without payment of compensation. 
As discussed in the previous paragraph, the Court was not of the same view. 
357 (1995) 20 EHRR 1
358 (2008) 46 EHRR 1
359 See also Yagtzilar v Greece 41727/98 6 December 2001
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Even major political shake-ups or regime change seemed not to be sufficiently 
exceptional.  One  example  is  Papamichalopoulos  v  Greece,  in  which  the 
applicant’s land was transferred to the Navy Fund by the Greek state, at the 
time under the control of a military junta. When democratic government was 
restored,  the  expropriation  was  acknowledged,  and provisions  were  put  in 
place to provide the applicants with alternate land in compensation. The case 
came before the Court as a result of complications and delays in providing 
that  land,  the  result  of  which  was  that  the  Court  ordered  financial 
compensation  to  be  paid  in  its  place.  There  was  no  suggestion  that 
compensation  should  be  disregarded  entirely  given  the  circumstances  in 
which the deprivation had occurred. 
Similarly,  when  the  Greek  monarchy  was  abolished  and  the  country 
reconstituted as a republic in 1973, properties formerly belonging to the royal 
family  were  transferred  to  the  ownership  of  the  state  as  part  of  the  new 
constitutional framework. The former King of Greece and two other members 
of the former royal family complained that the property transfer had violated 
their rights under P1-1. The Court considered the circumstances surrounding 
the changes and, while they noted that compensation of the full value of the 
properties transferred might not be necessary to ensure a fair balance, they 
were firmly of the view that compensation of some description would have to 
be paid in line with the previous case law on deprivation.360 
A  more  recent  and  much  wider-reaching  example  of  this  approach  is 
Broniowski  v  Poland361 which  concerned  the  difficulties  created  by  the 
redrawing of Poland’s eastern border along the line of the Bug River after the 
Second World War. Repatriated Polish nationals who had been living in the 
territories beyond the River were entitled to claim compensation in kind for the 
properties they had lost, by buying land from the state and having the value of 
the abandoned property offset against the cost.  However,  insufficient state 
property  was  made available,  and in  2003,  when  the Polish  state  passed 
legislation  discharging  all  obligations  of  compensation,  nearly  80,000 
nationals  had  their  claims  to  compensation  abolished.  The  Court  did  not 
360 The Former King of Greece v Greece (2003) 36 EHRR CD 43
361 (2005) 40 EHRR 21
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consider even these extreme circumstances sufficiently exceptional to justify 
an absence of compensation, but rather ordered that the state put in place 
measures  at  a  national  level  to  secure  the  effective  and  expeditious 
realisation of the entitlement in respect of the remaining Bug River claimants. 
Remarkably, however, the "exceptional circumstance" doctrine was invoked to 
allow an absence of compensation in an application arising from land reform 
occurring  as  part  of  the  reunification  of  Germany.  During  the  period  of 
Communist rule in East Germany, certain areas of agricultural land had been 
taken into state ownership and allocated in small parcels to certain farmers 
who were allowed to work it. In the process of reunification, a law was passed, 
saying  that  all  farmers  currently  in  occupation  of  parcels  of  land  would 
become the outright owners of that land on the reunification date. However, 
owing to the shambolic administration of the regime under Communist rule, 
this produced what were perceived to be some unfair results, particularly in 
cases where "farmers" had ceased to use the land for agricultural purposes 
but had not given up occupation of the land as they should have done under 
the Communist  system.  To redress this  perceived imbalance,  the German 
state passed a second law stating that land which was not being used for 
agricultural  purposes at the time of reunification would be assigned to the 
state  for  redistribution.  The  non-farming  "farmers"  complained  that  this 
violated their  P1-1 rights,  since  they had become outright  owners  of  their 
parcels of land on the date of reunification, and were then deprived of that 
ownership  with  the  introduction  of  the  second  law,  with  no  payment  of 
compensation. This was the case of Jahn v Germany.362
In its decision, the Court looked in some detail at the history of the disputed 
areas of land and gave considerable weight to the pressures faced by the 
governments of the former East and West Germany in trying to put together 
the complex measures required to reunify the country. It concluded:
In the unique context of German reunification, the lack of any compensation does not 
upset the fair balance which has to be struck between the protection of property and 
the requirements of the general interest.363
362 (2006) 42 EHRR 49
363 para 117
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Bearing in mind the previous jurisprudence such as Papamichalopoulos and 
particularly  Broniowski, it is difficult to see exactly why the circumstances of 
Jahn should be considered so much more exceptional. The previous case law 
of the Court would seem to suggest that regime change in itself is not enough 
to merit a finding of exceptional circumstances, but which factors will tip the 
balance? In the current global climate, it is possible to imagine a number of 
threats – the war  on terror,  for  example,  or  the perceived need to secure 
national boundaries from illegal immigrants – which governments might seek 
to  use as  a basis  for  expropriation without  compensation.  Might  these be 
considered  exceptional  circumstances?  There  is  very  little  to  work  with  in 
determining  the  direction  in  which  the  court  might  choose to  develop  this 
doctrine, and the potential for a political influence to come into play in doing 
so is obvious. To leave the Court with such a wide power of discretion over 
such  a  fundamental  element  of  P1-1  must  be  considered  to  lessen  the 
protection of the property right at its most basic level. 
Further jurisprudence is required before any definitive statement can be made 
on how damaging the decision in  Jahn might be. Early indications suggest, 
however,  that  the  Court  will  not  be  quick  to  invoke  the  exceptional 
circumstances doctrine again. Pincová and Pinc v the Czech Republic364 dealt 
similarly with applicants who had obtained "nationalised" property from the 
state during the Communist regime, and then been deprived of it by legislation 
restoring  the  property  to  its  original  owners  after  the  regime  fell.  In  its 
discussion of proportionality, the Court:
…accepts that the general objective of the restitution laws, namely to attenuate the 
consequences of certain infringements of property rights caused by the communist 
regime,  is  a legitimate aim and a  means of  safeguarding the lawfulness of  legal 
transactions and protecting the country's socio-economic development. However, it 
considers it necessary to ensure that the attenuation of those old injuries does not 
create  disproportionate  new  wrongs.  To  that  end,  the  legislation  should  make  it 
possible  to  take  into  account  the  particular  circumstances  of  each  case,  so  that 
persons  who acquired  their  possessions  in  good  faith  are  not  made to  bear  the 
364(36548/97) 5 November 2002 
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burden of responsibility which is rightfully that of the State which once confiscated 
those possessions.365
The Court went on to set out three factors to be considered in each of the 
individual cases which made up the application in order to determine whether 
a  fair  balance  had  been  struck,  namely  (a)  whether  the  applicants  had 
acquired  their  properties  from the  state  as  the  result  of  abuse  of  power, 
substantive unlawfulness or minor omissions which were attributable solely to 
the administrative authorities; (b) the hardship suffered by the complainants 
as  a  result  of  losing  their  property,  especially  if  it  were  the  only  property 
available to them; and (c) the amount of the compensation paid compared to 
the value of the property. This thoughtful, measured approach was followed in 
similar  circumstances  in  Velikovi  v  Bulgaria.366 In  both  cases,  the 
proportionality  arguments were  set  out  in full  and in neither case was the 
blanket  rule  on  exceptional  circumstances  considered  to  be  appropriate. 
Although it is too early to say whether the decision in Jahn may turn out to be 
something of an isolated incident, these cases do mark a promising start to 
the development of the jurisprudence.  
 As set out in Lithgow, compensation, when it is provided for, does not have to 
be equivalent to the full market value of the property to which it relates. The 
signatory states will be allowed some margin of appreciation here to enable 
them to decide how best resources should be applied in order to achieve the 
aim sought. As it was expressed in James:
Legitimate objectives of 'public interest', such as pursued in measures of economic reform 
or  measures  designed  to  achieve  greater  social  justice,  may  call  for  less  than 
reimbursement  of  the  full  market  value.  Furthermore,  the  Court's  power  of  review is 
limited to ascertaining whether the choice of compensation terms falls outside the State's 
wide margin of appreciation in this domain.367  
The  value  of  the  property  should,  however,  be  fairly  assessed,  even  if 
compensation  is  not  to  be  awarded  at  that  level.  This  was  demonstrated 
365 para 58
366 (2009) 48 EHRR 27
367 (1986) 8 EHRR 123 para 54
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recently  in  Kozacioglu  v  Turkey,368 where  the  historic  importance  of  an 
expropriated building was ignored during the course of its valuation for the 
purposes of calculating the compensation payable.369 
The state  is  entitled  to  take  into  account  material  benefits  derived  by the 
applicants when computing the appropriate compensation for an interference, 
confirmed by Katikaridis v Greece:370
The  Court  recognises  that  when  compensation  due  to  the  owners  of  properties 
expropriated for roadworks to be carried out is being assessed, it is legitimate to take 
into account the benefit derived from the works by adjoining owners.371
In this case, the applicants owned property along the site of a major road, and 
part of their land was expropriated as part of a project to widen the road in 
certain places. The compensation scheme included a discount on the amount 
of compensation to be paid to owners of land adjacent to the road, since it 
was considered that they would benefit from the redevelopment of the road. 
The opposite side of this coin may be the situation where expropriation of a 
parcel of land impacts negatively on the value of the (non-expropriated) land 
surrounding it, creating an overall loss greater than simply the value of the 
expropriated land. In  Bistrovic v Croatia,372 the Court confirmed a prejudicial 
effect of this kind must also be taken into account when compensation levels 
are being assessed by the state.
Delay  in  payment  of  compensation  will  also  impact  negatively  on 
proportionality. The Court gave clear confirmation of the position here in the 
recent case of  Almeida Garrett and Ors v Portugal,373 where the applicants 
had  been  deprived  of  property  as  part  of  a  far-reaching  programme  of 
agrarian reform. An entitlement to compensation was set out in the reform 
368 (2334/03) 31 July 2007
369 See also Urbárska Obec Trenčianske Biskupice v Slovakia  (2009) 48 EHRR 49, in which the market value of the 
expropriated land was ignored entirely.
370 (2001) 32 EHRR 6
371 para 49
372 (25774/05) 20 May 2007 
373 (2002) 34 EHRR 23
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legislation,  but  24  years  after  the  event,  full  compensation  had  yet  to  be 
received. The Court made a clear statement of its policy:
The States have a wide margin of appreciation to determine what is in the public 
interest,  especially  where compensation for a nationalisation is  concerned,  as the 
national  legislature  has  a  wide  discretion  in  implementing  social  and  economic 
policies.  However,  that  margin  of  appreciation is not  unlimited and its exercise is 
subject to review by the Convention institutions.
…However, the Court notes that 24 years have now elapsed without the applicants 
being  paid  the  final  compensation  to  which  the  domestic  legislation  nonetheless 
states that they are entitled. It reiterates that the adequacy of compensation would be 
diminished if it were to be paid without reference to various circumstances liable to 
reduce its value, such as unreasonable delay.
The delay is indisputably attributable to the State and neither the complexity of the 
authorities' activities in that sphere nor the number of people entitled to compensation 
can justify a delay as long as that which has occurred here.374
A final  point  worth  noting here is  that  it  is  not  only compensation paid or 
payable by the state that will be relevant in terms of proportionality. If it is the 
case that the applicant has received a financial payment of some kind from, 
for example, a third party who has benefited from the loss to the applicant as 
a  result  of  state  action,  that  financial  payment  will  also  be  taken  into 
consideration by the Court. Examples of where this could be relevant can be 
seen in  two  cases  arising  from the  Communist  land  reform in  the  former 
Czechoslovakia  in  1967,  where  the  state  confiscated  huge  areas  of  land 
without payment of compensation. Whilst some of this property was retained 
by the state, parcels were sold on to third parties who were required to make 
payment  of  “compensation”,  which  would  rarely  be  seen  by  the  original 
owners.   When democracy  was  restored,  legislation  was  passed  to  allow 
restoration  of  the  land  to  the  original  owners.  However,  the  Court  was 
concerned that the new law was weighted too heavily in favour of those who 
had been expropriated, without regard for the rights of those who bought from 
the state. 
374 paras 52-54
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In Zvolsky and Zvolska v the Czech Republic,375 the Court took a broad look at 
the legislation, noting that the possibility of setting aside a property transfer 
carried out during the Communist  regime without  ascertaining whether  the 
original  owners  had  voluntarily  transferred  the  land,  and  without  taking 
account of compensation paid by third parties such as the applicants in the 
case, did not strike a fair balance between the protection of the third party’s 
rights and the general interest served by remedying the wrongs perpetrated 
by the Communist  state.  In  Pincová and Pinc v the Czech Republic,376 an 
application was made by a family who had purchased property from the state, 
paying  full  market  value  in  “compensation”.  In  1991,  the  original  owner 
sought,  and  was  granted,  restitution.  The  applicants  were  awarded 
compensation, but only of the amount originally paid in 1967. Although the 
Court was clear that it was not its place to assess appropriate compensation, 
it considered it self evident that what was market value for the land in 1967 
could not possibly be market value for the land now. Moreover, the applicants 
had  spent  money  maintaining  the  land  in  the  intervening  years.  The 
compensation paid was therefore manifestly inequitable, and a violation of P1-
1 was found.
3.6.7 Conclusion 
The test of proportionality is critical to the operation of any effective protection 
of property rights. The desire to safeguard the political aspects of property 
ownership requires to be balanced against the need for states to regulate the 
economic aspects of that ownership in order to secure a functioning society. 
Proportionality is the exercise which allows these competing interests to be 
measured and, if correctly carried out, an appropriate balance struck.
Proportionality is most often the critical question in P1-1 applications. Since 
states will most often provide a legal basis for their interference and since the 
test  of  public  interest  is  so  rarely  enforced  in  any  meaningful  way,  the 
question  of  balance  becomes  critical.  Perhaps  for  this  reason,  the 
375 (46129/99) 12 November 2002 
376 (36548/97) 5 November 2002 
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jurisprudence  on  this  step  of  the  process  is  more  voluminous  and  more 
instructive than elsewhere. 
Although questions of proportionality will  turn on the individual facts of any 
given application, general themes can be extrapolated from the case law to 
date which give an indication of the factors which are likely to be important for 
the Court under this head. The relevance of the aim of the interference, the 
ability  of  the  applicant  to  have  his  arguments  heard  domestically  and, 
critically, of compensation, particularly in cases of deprivation of possessions, 
has been stated repeatedly. This level of transparency in the application of the 
right has an important part to play in ensuring the protection is effective. 
This is not to say, however, that the development of this step in the process is 
without difficulties. In particular, the recent suggestion that compensation will 
not be required for deprivation of possessions in "exceptional circumstances" 
creates the type of opacity in the Court's approach which tends to weaken the 
strength  of  the  protection  over  all.  It  is  noteworthy  that,  so  far,  the  Court 
seems reluctant to make use of this new doctrine. It may be that the Court 
recognises the difficulty with this type of ambiguous innovation itself.      
3.7 Conclusion
It was posited at the beginning of this chapter that definitions of the key terms 
of P1-1 could only go so far to explain the extent of the protection it offers. 
What would also be necessary is an understanding of how these terms, and 
the article as whole, have been understood and applied by the Commission 
and the Court. It can be seen that, over time, an identifiable process has been 
developed through which P1-1 applications will be determined. This process 
has taken time to evolve. As with the discussion of definitions in chapter two, 
it can be seen that, perhaps through necessity, some aspects of this process 
have received more judicial consideration than others. In some places, the 
Court has been able to build on the foundations of case law relating to other 
articles of the Convention to accelerate understanding of the requirements of 
P1-1. In other places, a degree of ambiguity remains, if not as to the existence 
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of  a  step  in  the  process,  then  as  to  its  application.  What  has  been 
demonstrated without doubt, however, is that a decision-making process does 
exist.  
The  first  step  in  this  process  entails  determination  of  the  existence  of  a 
possession in the meaning of the Strasbourg jurisprudence, as discussed in 
chapter two.377 The second step requires categorisation of  the state action 
complained of into  one of  the three  Sporrong and Lönnroth rules:  general 
interference  with  the  peaceful  enjoyment  of  possessions,  deprivation  of 
ownership  or  control  of  use.  This  three-rule  division may not  be the most 
obvious breakdown of the protection offered by P1-1, and even within  the 
Sporrong judgment  it  can  be  seen  that  an  alternative  approach  was  very 
nearly adopted by the Court. However, the point of critical importance here is 
the three-rule approach did not cease to evolve as soon as it was created. 
The  test  has  been  slowly  refined  in  subsequent  cases.  It  is  used  almost 
ubiquitously in P1-1 applications and offers some degree of insight as to what 
the Court consider to be the important elements of state action.
That is not to say, however, that the approach is without its difficulties even 
yet. There is still  some scope for confusion as to how the three categories 
relate  to  each other.  Problems arise  particularly  with  problematic  subjects 
such as confiscation and retention of title, where the existing jurisprudence 
may serve more to obfuscate than to illuminate. 
Nevertheless,  the combination of  this  step of  the decision-making process 
with the increasing clarity of definition of the key terms discussed in chapter 
two will allow an accurate prediction to be made of the Court's view of the 
nature of state action in the majority of cases. This exercise will  in fact be 
attempted with novel issues in chapter five of this thesis. The importance of 
this  clarity  must  be  given  due  account  in  determining  the  strength  of  the 
protection offered by P1-1.  
377 pp48-69 above
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The third step in the decision-making process deals with the lawfulness of 
state action. Measures taken by the state must have a clear basis in domestic 
law,  which  is  accessible  to  the  public,  and which  produces a  foreseeable 
result in conformity with the rule of law. 
The question of lawfulness is the area where the P1-1 jurisprudence is most 
substantially  founded  upon  case  law  relating  to  other  articles  of  the 
Convention. It  is perhaps also the step of the process which is easiest for 
private lawyers to grasp: it demands the legal certainty which is such a feature 
of  property  law  domestically.  The  case  law  demonstrates  how  this 
requirement works well to neutralise arbitrary state action in situations where 
political  power has been too heavily wielded or discretion is unfettered. In 
terms of achieving the aims of the property article, this requirement is a very 
necessary element.  
The fourth step in the decision-making process is, however, less successful. 
The requirement that the measures implemented by the state be pursued in 
the public or general interest seems to amount, in reality, to little more than a 
requirement  that  such an interest  be mentioned by the state.  It  has been 
demonstrated that the Court requires  some justification to be offered under 
this head before an interference can be justified. It has also been said that 
where the interest contended for is "manifestly unreasonable," it will  not be 
accepted. However, beyond that hard limit, which has yet to be exceeded in 
the reported applications, it appears that "anything goes."
It is recognised that this step is in closest contact with the conflict inherent in 
the nature of property protection. The state has many legitimate reasons to 
interfere  with  property  rights.  The  political  reasoning  which  justifies  such 
interference must be the purview of a democratically elected government. It is 
not for the Court to substitute its will for that of the electorate. Fulfilment of 
that aim requires a substantial margin of appreciation on the part of signatory 
states which should not quickly be eroded by the Strasbourg institutions.
However, the protection of property demands that the Court performs some 
function in this context. There would seem to be more scope for intervention 
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by  the  Court  than  is  currently  undertaken  without  compromise  of  the 
necessary margin of  appreciation. For example, it  is difficult  to understand 
why  the  Court  will  not  take  a  firm  stand  in  situations  where  the  interest 
claimed by the state does not appear to marry up with  the action actually 
taken.  Perhaps  some  further  development  along  these  lines  might  be 
desirable here to increase the overall strength and purpose of P1-1.
The  final  step  in  the  process  demands  that  a  fair  balance  be  achieved 
between the burden placed on the party whose rights have been violated and 
the needs of society which are served by the interference. In many ways, it is 
the question of proportionality which anchors the remainder of the decision-
making  process,  and  it  is  often  the  step  most  realistically  required  to 
safeguard the balance between justifiable and unjustifiable state action. 
Any number of factors may be relevant to the proportionality of a particular 
action  by  the  state,  but  consideration  here  is  usually  closely  tied  to  the 
findings of the Court in connection with steps one and three of the decision-
making process. The initial determination of the category of interference will 
give some indication of how heavily the scales have tipped towards the state 
through the action which has been taken. This can be seen particularly in 
relation to deprivation of ownership, where compensation will almost always 
be required to balance the equation and justify the interference. In a case of 
control  of  use,  compensation  will  not  be  a  requirement,  but  the  gradual 
development  of  jurisprudence  to  date  demonstrates  that  court  will  often 
expect other types of protection to be put in place, such as the opportunity to 
have the arguments aired before a domestic tribunal. The value of the aim 
sought  to  be  achieved  will  also  be  evaluated  under  this  head,  with 
consideration given to the extremity or otherwise of  the interference which 
might be considered justified.  
The development of the proportionality test is a good demonstration of the 
manner in which the property protection has evolved over time. In many ways 
it is not surprising that there is such a huge amount of jurisprudence available 
in connection with this step of the process: the degree of flexibility required of 
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P1-1 as a result of its inherent conflict means that proportionality will often be 
called into question. Despite the necessary subjectivity in the test, however, it 
is useful to see that common themes can be drawn out, with the suggestion of 
limits of protection that these themes suggest. As with the other steps in the 
process,  however,  that  evolution  is  ongoing,  as  unfortunate  complications 
such as the "exceptional circumstances" doctrine serve to demonstrate.
Overall, the analysis of the Strasbourg jurisprudence suggests that, despite its 
ambiguous beginnings, the property protection has slowly evolved into a right 
with  more  definite  guidelines  and  limits.  The  progress  to  date  has  been 
imperfect. However,  a clear decision-making process has been established 
which serves to protect property interests albeit  imperfectly,  and allows for 
some degree of certainty in how future applications will be dealt with.   
The next part of this thesis will  attempt to situate these findings within the 
United Kingdom context through an analysis of the domestic case law. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  APPLICATION IN THE DOMESTIC COURTS  
"It would be so nice if something made sense for a change."378
4.1 Introduction
It has been possible for UK citizens to apply to the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) in respect of P1-1 since 1966. The property right has only 
been  part  of  domestic  legislation,  however,  since  the  introduction  of  the 
Human Rights Act  1998 and,  north  of  the border,  the Scotland Act  1998. 
Despite this relatively short time frame, the Scottish and English courts have 
had the opportunity to consider cases brought under P1-1 on a surprisingly 
large number of occasions in a range of different contexts. 
In this chapter of the thesis, authorities from both Scotland and England will 
be  considered.  Although  the  rules  of  property  law  can  vary  significantly 
between  the  two  jurisdictions,  both  are  subject  to  the  same human rights 
legislation.379 There is no doubt that the approach taken by a judge to a novel 
problem in one jurisdiction will  be viewed as persuasive by a judge in the 
other. 
As discussed in the opening chapter, judgments of the ECtHR and decisions 
of the former Commission do not create a strict precedent for the courts in the 
UK. The domestic legislation provides that the courts are under an obligation 
to  "take account  of"  the Strasbourg jurisprudence.  However,  the House of 
Lords has indicated that a Strasbourg precedent should normally be followed 
unless there is a strong reason to deviate  from it.380 Accordingly,  it  is  this 
approach to the Strasbourg case law that is assumed in the analysis of the 
domestic jurisprudence carried out in this chapter. 
Following the structure of the thesis so far, this chapter will look firstly at the 
way in which the key terms of P1-1 have been understood by the domestic 
378 Alice in Wonderland, p
379 The Scotland Act impacts on the outcome where a violation of P1-1 is held to exist, but substantive questions of 
whether a right is engaged or has been breached are governed by the Human Rights Act in both jurisdictions.
380 R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 1 AC 837. An interesting discussion of some 
potential difficulties with this approach where domestic precedent conflicts with Strasbourg judgments can be found 
in Kay v Lambeth Borough Council [2006] 2 AC 465.
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courts. Does this accord with the definitions of the terminology extrapolated 
from the Strasbourg jurisprudence, described in chapter two? The approach 
the domestic courts have taken to determination of a case brought under P1-1 
will then be analysed, using the five-step process developed by Strasbourg 
and outlined in chapter three as a point of comparison.   
4.2 Definitions and the domestic courts
In chapter two of this thesis, a review of the Strasbourg jurisprudence was 
undertaken with a view to extrapolating definitions of the key terms of P1-1. It 
may  not  be  correct  to  describe  the  terminology  of  the  property  right  as 
containing terms of art. What can be said with certainty is that the definitions 
ascribed to key words and phrases by the Strasbourg court may not sit easily 
alongside the traditional understanding of such terms in domestic private law. 
This may create difficulties for the conscientious domestic court seeking to 
take the Strasbourg jurisprudence into account.
In this first section of the chapter, the Strasbourg definitions of they key terms 
will  be  briefly  reconsidered  before  a  comparison  is  made  with  Scots  and 
English domestic jurisprudence in the same area.   
4.2.1 Every natural or legal person
Bodies  corporate  benefit  from the  protection  of  P1-1  in  the  same way as 
natural  persons.  Shareholders  will  also be  entitled to  make an application 
under P1-1 where there has been an interference with the possessions of a 
company provided that (a) they hold a majority of shares in the company and 
(b) they have a special connection with that company. 
There are some similarities in the approach adopted by the ECtHR in this 
context  to  the  situations  in  which  domestic  courts  have  traditionally  been 
prepared  to  “lift  the  veil  of  incorporation”,  disregarding  the  separate  legal 
personality of a company in order to look at the actions and interests of the 
company members. The modern statement of the law in this area was set out 
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in  Adams  v  Cape  Industries  Plc,381 which  suggests  lifting  the  veil  is  only 
possible where necessary as a question of interpretation of  an ambiguous 
statutory  provision  or,  more  pertinently,  where  special  circumstances exist 
indicating that the company is “a mere façade concealing the true facts.”382An 
example  of  such  a  situation  is  found  in  Jones  v  Lipman,383 in  which  the 
defendant, having contracted for the sale of land with the plaintiff, changed his 
mind. Lipman formed a company and contracted with that company for the 
sale of the same land, which was duly registered in the company’s name, 
thereby frustrating the plaintiff’s right to enforce the original contract. Since it 
was clear the company had been formed purely to allow the defendant to 
carry out an act of fraud, the Court had no difficulty in lifting the veil, finding 
the company to be a façade and making an order for specific performance in 
respect of the original contractual obligation.  
The domestic  conception of  the  company as “a  mere façade”  may import 
more of a moral overtone than is contained within the “special connection” 
sought by the Strasbourg jurisprudence. However, there is some identity of 
ideas here, in the sense that those behind the veil must be more than mere 
shareholders or directors of the company before the court will disregard the 
incorporation. 
Although various bodies corporate have pursued litigation in respect of P1-1 
both north and south of the border,384 there has yet to be discussion in the 
domestic courts of shareholders making an application in respect of company 
possessions. It remains to be seen whether the domestic approach to “lifting 
the  veil”  will  carry  across  into  complex  and  somewhat  ill-defined  area  of 
Strasbourg jurisprudence. 
4.2.2 Possessions
381 [1990] Ch 433
382 This form of wording, first used by Lord Keith in Woolfson v Strathclyde Regional Council [1978] SLT 159 at p161, 
was reiterated as a useful way to delineate this category of cases in Adams. 
383 [1962] 1 All ER 442
384 See, amongst many others, Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank 
[2004] 1 AC 546; Catscratch Limited v City of Glasgow Licensing Board (No 2) 2002 SLT 503; International 
Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] QB 728 
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This term has an autonomous meaning for the purposes of P1-1. Strasbourg 
jurisprudence  suggests  that  an  interest  must  have  an  objective  economic 
value before it will be considered a possession. That value must either have 
been acquired by the applicant at the time of the alleged interference, or else 
the applicant must have a legitimate expectation of its acquisition in future.385  
4.2.2.1 Freedom of definition
The UK Courts appear to have accepted that the word "possessions" as used 
in P1-1 bears little relation to the term of art which forms a part of domestic 
property law. This has not necessarily made it easy to determine when an 
interest will merit the protection of P1-1, however. An excellent example of the 
difficulties which can arise here came with the keynote decision of  Wilson v 
First County Trust (No 2.)386 The facts of the case were deceptively mundane. 
Penelope Wilson borrowed £5,000 from a pawnbroker, First Country Trust, for 
a  period  of  six  months.  The  pawned  property  was  her  car,  a  BMW  318 
convertible.  She did not repay the loan within  the agreed time frame. The 
pawnbroker  sought  repayment,  indicating  that  if  no  payment  was  made 
timeously, the car would be sold as provided for in the contract. Mrs Wilson's 
response  was  that  the  agreement  was  unenforceable  because  it  did  not 
contain all the prescribed terms. She sought an order for the return of her car. 
The  argument  concerned  a  £250  "document  fee"  (administration  fee)  the 
claimant  had  been  required  to  pay,  which  was  then  added  to  the  overall 
amount of the loan. Did this mean the loan amount, given in the contract as 
£5,250, was incorrectly stated, thus rendering the contract unenforceable in 
terms of the legislation?
The Court of Appeal agreed that this was exactly the position. The contract 
was  unenforceable.  It  held,  however,  that  this  result  amounted  to  an 
interference  with  First  County's  P1-1  rights,  and  a  declaration  of 
incompatibility was made. This declaration was appealed by the Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry to the House of Lords. 
385 See page 48 above.
386 [2004] 1 AC 816
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Each of  the  five  judges  gave  detailed  speeches  in  which  the  question  of 
whether a possession could be said to exist was an important consideration. 
There was consensus that contractual rights were an interest which attracted 
the  protection  of  P1-1,  in  itself  an  uncontroversial  conclusion  given  the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence. The issue of whether such rights could be said to 
exist  in  the  circumstances of  the  case was,  however,  more  divisive.  Lord 
Hope of Craighead and Lord Scott of Foscote took the view that, since the 
contract was invalidly formed, no rights could ever have existed under it, and 
therefore  there  was  no  possession  capable  of  protection.  As  Lord  Hope 
expressed it:
[P1-1] does not confer a right of property as such nor does it guarantee the content of 
any rights in property…It is a matter for domestic law to define the nature and extent 
of any rights which a party acquires from time to time as a result of the transactions 
which he or she enters into.
…[First  County Trust]  never  had an absolute and unqualified right  to enforce this 
agreement or to enforce the rights arising from the delivery of the motor car. [P1-1] 
cannot  be  used  to  confer  absolute  and  unqualified  rights  on  FCT  which,  having 
regard to the terms of the statute by which agreements of this kind are regulated, it 
never had at any time under the improperly executed agreement which it  entered 
into.387  
This line of reasoning is perhaps uncomfortable from a Strasbourg point of 
view. There is no question in the ECtHR jurisprudence of P1-1 "conferring" 
rights  onto  an individual.  The question  is  whether  First  County Trust  held 
some type of right, whether or not absolute and unqualified, which would merit 
protection under P1-1. 
Lord Nicholls  of  Birkenhead and Lord Hobhouse of  Woodborough took an 
alternative  view.  Their  conclusion was that  a  right  of  property held  by the 
defendant  had  arisen  under  the  contract.  That  right,  however,  had  been 
rendered unenforceable by the application of the Consumer Credit legislation. 
Lord Nicholls notes:
387 paras 106-108
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Clearly the expiry of a limited interest such as a license in accordance with its terms 
does not engage P1-1. That is not this case. Here the transaction between the parties 
provided for repayment of the loan and for the car to be held as security. What is in 
issue is the "lawfulness" of overriding legislation. The proposition advanced by the 
Secretary  of  State  would  mean  that  however  arbitrary  or  discriminatory  such 
legislation might be, if  it  was in existence when the transaction took place a court 
enforcing human rights values would be impotent. A convention right guaranteeing a 
right of property would have nothing to say. That is not an attractive conclusion.388 
This  argument  is  more  convincing  in  Strasbourg  terms.  Lord  Nicholls 
essentially conceptualises the contractual right as coming into existence at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract. That right is then affected by the 
legislation in a way that causes it  to become unenforceable.  It  is  the very 
impact  of  the  legislation  which,  in  Strasbourg  terms,  would  constitute  an 
interference with  a  possession and have to  be justified.  The fact  that  this 
interference has the result that the right is no longer in the possession of FCT 
is exactly the situation that P1-1 is designed to protect against.  
Part  of  the difficulty in  Wilson was that it  was arguably unclear whether a 
possession  could  be  said  to  exist  under  domestic  law,  even  without 
consideration of the P1-1 jurisprudence. The courts have shown, however, 
that they are prepared to find the existence of possession for P1-1 purposes 
where such a possession would not have existed under domestic law. 
This  was  demonstrated  in  Strathclyde  Joint  Police  Board  v  Elderslie  
Estates.389 The pursuer in this case owned land under a feu contract which 
was subject to a title condition prohibiting the use of the former police house 
on the premises for anything other than police purposes. The Police Board 
wished to sell the house as a private residence. It had raised the issue of a 
waiver of the condition with the defender, the feudal superior, who had asked 
for a substantial sum in exchange, a sum which the Police Board was not 
willing to pay. Instead, it made an application to the Lands Tribunal to have 
388 Para 41
389 2002 SLT (Lands Tr) 2
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the condition varied or discharged in terms of the Conveyancing and Feudal 
Reform  (Scotland)  Act  1970,  which  also  allowed  the  tribunal  to  award 
compensation  for  a  variation  or  discharge  when  and  at  whatever  level  it 
considered appropriate. The defender argued that a failure on the part of the 
tribunal to award compensation in a case such as this would amount to a 
violation of its rights under P1-1.    
The  tribunal  made  what  was  clearly  a  good  faith  attempt  to  interpret  the 
legislation  and  resolve  the  particular  issue  in  the  case  in  as  Convention-
compliant  a  manner  as  possible.  Detailed  consideration  was  given  to  the 
nature of  the  possession  with  which  the tribunal  had been empowered to 
interfere by the 1970 Act:  was the possession the right  of  the superior  to 
control the use the vassal made of the land? Or was it alternatively the right of 
the  superior  to  extract  money  in  exchange  for  a  minute  of  waiver  of  the 
offending condition, bearing in mind the importance placed by the Strasbourg 
court  on  looking  at  the  reality  of  a  situation  rather  than  focusing  on  the 
formalistic elements? 
The Tribunal noted:
We accept that it is appropriate, in seeking to identify possessions, to look behind 
appearances  and ascertain  the  reality  of  the  situation…We are  satisfied  that  the 
primary  right  of  the  respondents  [Elderslie]  is  accurately  described  as  a  right  to 
control the use of the dominium utile. The power given to the tribunal could well be 
described as a control of the use made of that right.  However,  as the method of 
control produces a permanent change effectively removing the right, we accept that 
there  is  clearly  a  sense in  which  he is  deprived  of  a  possession.  But  it  may be 
misleading to refer to that  as a "right  to extract money." It  is in no sense a right 
enforceable by way of legal process. No money is due to the respondents.  They 
have no right to payment. There is accordingly no right to extract payment.390   
Having identified the possession in question as the defender's right to control 
the pursuer's use of the property,  and clarified that the defender had been 
deprived  of  this  possession  by  the  decision  of  the  tribunal  to  waive  the 
390 p7 
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condition, the tribunal went on to consider whether such a deprivation could 
be justified in terms of the exceptions to P1-1. They noted that in many cases 
(including, impliedly, the one in question) the superior's right to control could 
not be enforced since the superior lacked interest to enforce. This formed part 
of  the  discussion  in  respect  of  proportionality.  However,  the  question  of 
interest is arguably more fundamental. Can a right incapable of enforcement 
really be regarded as a possession? It  exists  nominally,  but in reality it  is 
useless. The tribunal would not accept that a right to payment of a waiver fee 
was a possession since it was no right capable of enforcement in law. Is the 
situation with the right of control of use really any different?
Perhaps a more accurate analysis of the situation in the case would be not 
that the defenders had been deprived of a possession in circumstances which 
did not necessitate compensation in order to strike a fair balance, but rather 
that there was no possession here in the first place, and so no deprivation had 
taken place at all. 
Another  complicated  discussion  over  the  determination  of  "possessions" 
arose in the case of Rowland v Environment Agency.391 An understanding of 
the issue here requires the facts to be set out in some detail. Mrs Rowland 
was the owner of property including a non-tidal stretch of the River Thames 
known as Hedsor Water. She had succeeded to the property on the death of 
her husband in 1998, he having purchased the estate in 1974. At the time of 
the purchase, Mr Rowland had believed Hedsor Water to be a private stretch 
of the river. This belief was based in part on signs to that effect erected along 
this  part  of  the river  by the navigation authorities.  In  2001,  the navigation 
authority, now in the body of the Environment Agency, formed the view that, in 
fact, public rights of navigation over Hedsor Water subsisted, and indicated to 
the claimant that all signs indicating otherwise required to be removed. Mrs 
Rowland  argued,  inter  alia, that  the  actions  and  statements  of  the 
representatives of the defendant at the time of her husband's purchase and 
subsequently had created a legitimate expectation that she would continue to 
391 [2005] Ch. 1
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enjoy the stretch of river as private water. Resiling from this position therefore 
constituted a violation of P1-1. 
One of the difficult aspects of the case was that, even if such an expectation 
of continuing use could be considered to exist, it was  ultra vires the powers 
afforded to the Environment Agency. No statutory power existed which would 
allow the Agency to extinguish a public right of navigation in Hedsor Water. 
The result of this situation in English law was that no remedy could exist for 
Mrs  Rowland,  since  her  expectation  had  no  lawful  basis.  She  argued, 
however,  that  same  result  was  not  true  of  P1-1.  Her  case  was  that  a 
legitimate expectation constituted a possession, and the fact that it could not 
be fulfilled lawfully would be relevant not to the creation of this possession, 
but rather to questions of the aim of any interference with the possession and 
proportionality. Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal were satisfied that 
this interpretation of the Strasbourg jurisprudence was correct. Peter Gibson 
LJ, giving the leading judgement in the Court of Appeal, noted the relevance 
of Pine Valley v Ireland392 and Stretch v UK393 in confirming that:
An expectation may amount to a possession for the purposes of P1-1 even though it 
arises from an act unlawful under the domestic law…I would therefore hold that Mrs 
Rowland's expectation was a possession entitled to protection under P1-1 unless the 
interference with that possession was justified and proportionate.394 
The decision of the Court of Appeal here is a good example of the fact that 
"possession"  has an autonomous meaning  for  the purposes of  P1-1.  This 
meaning will not be subject to the constraints of domestic law. Mrs Rowland's 
expectation would not have been a possession in the meaning of the English 
law nor afforded any remedy, but the wider scope of the definition under P1-1 
allowed a possession to be held to exist.
4.2.2.2 Economic Interest
392 14 EHRR 319. See discussion at  page 65 
393 38 EHRR 196
394 paras 91 and 92.
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Despite the complexities of the cases discussed above, in fact the majority of 
domestic case law has dealt with more straightforward subject matter, at least 
in terms of what may be defined a possession. The test of economic interest 
used by  the  ECtHR fits  well  with  domestic  decisions.  Traditional  heritable 
property such as a house,395 a garden,396 farmland,397 a country estate398 and a 
pub399 have  all  been  accepted  as  possessions.  As  in  the  Strasbourg 
jurisprudence,  licences  for  the  sale  of  alcohol,400 driving  a  taxi,401 HGV 
driving402 and  medical  practice403 have  also  fallen  within  the  definition. 
Livestock, including sheep and cattle,404 and fish stocks405 have been litigated 
upon under P1-1. In a line of cases surrounding customs legislation, motor 
vehicles including cars,406 lorries407 and even a hovercraft408 were accepted as 
meriting the protection of the property right. The right to enjoy the benefit of a 
shareholding was also considered a possession.409     
4.2.2.3 Acquisition and legitimate expectation of future acquisition
The concept that an interest must be acquired before it will be considered a 
possession has also been used without difficulty domestically. 
The issue in Catscratch Limited v City of Glasgow Licensing Board (No 2)410 
was an application for an extension to the regular opening hours of a public 
house which had been refused by the defenders. The applicant argued that its 
rights under P1-1 has been breached, in this instance on the basis that the 
extension had been granted in previous years, therefore refusing to grant it 
again amounted to an interference.
395 Malekshad v Howard de Walden Estates Ltd [2002] QB 364
396 Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2004] 2 AC 42   
397 Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2004] 1 AC 546
398 Adams v Scottish Ministers 2004 SC 665; R (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney-General [2008] 1 AC 719
399 Catscratch Limited v City of Glasgow Licensing Board (No 2) 2002 SLT 503
400 Di Ciacca v Scottish Ministers 2003 SLT 1031; Adams v South Lanarkshire Council 2003 SLT 145 
401 Baird v Glasgow City Council [2003] SLLP 27
402 Crompton v Department of Transport North West Area 2003 WL 117004
403 Whitefield v General Medical Council [2003] HRLR 9
404 Westerhall Farms v Scottish Ministers Unreported, Court of Session, 25 April 2001
405 Booker Aquaculture Ltd v Secretary of State for Scotland 2000 SC 9
406 Lindsay v Customs and Excise Commissioners [2002] 1 WLR 1766
407 International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] QB 728
408 R (Hoverspeed) v Customs and Excise Commissioners [2002] 3 WLR 1219
409 R (on the application of Professional Contractors Group Ltd) v Inland Revenue Commissioners [2001] HRLR 42
410 2002 SLT 503
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The Court noted that a licence could constitute a possession following the 
Strasbourg authorities. 
A fortiori a failure to obtain permission to occupy one's property in the manner desired 
can equally be an interference with the property right on the basis of both Chapman411 
and  Pine Valley.412 The difficulty in the present case is that senior counsel for the 
respondent submitted that if the licence in question is of limited duration and capable 
of revocation or removal it is not properly to be regarded as a right of property…In my 
opinion, the important point in Gudmundsson,413 was that when the applicant started 
his  employment  as  a  taxi  driver,  there  was no  licensing provision.  Thus  when it 
arrived it was an invasion of his existing right to be a taxi driver without control. The 
converse would appear to be that failure to obtain a taxi licence at the start of the 
work  proposal  period  that  was  necessary  to  achieve  that  aim  would  not  be  an 
interference with the property right, because of the nature of the licence being sought 
and in particular its limited character, but more importantly, in my opinion, it is not a 
right until at least a grant is made. A refusal of an application thus invokes no right.414 
The applicant neither had the licence itself, nor any legitimate expectation that 
one  would  be  granted.  The  interest  had  not  been  acquired,  and  so  no 
possession could be said to exist. 
A  contrary  finding  was  made  in  the  succession  context  In  re  Land,415 
discussed  in  more  detail  below.416 The  claimant  in  this  case  had  been 
convicted of his mother's manslaughter through gross negligence. He was the 
sole beneficiary named in her will. The English law of forfeiture, a public policy 
rule designed to prevent  wrongdoers acquiring a benefit  through their own 
wrongdoing,  precluded the  claimant  from taking  his  legacy under  the  will, 
however. Although the case did not involve a direct human rights challenge, 
turning rather on a point of statutory interpretation, the Court considered P1-1 
in the performance of its obligation to construe legislation in a Convention-
compliant manner wherever possible. Judge Norris QC stated simply:
411 Chapman v UK (2001) 33 EHRR 18,
412 Pine Valley v Ireland (1992) 14 EHRR 319, discussed at 63 above
413 Gudmundsson v Iceland (1996) 21 EHRR 89
414 para 27
415 [2007] 1 WLR 1009
416 p222-3
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The right to inherit property under a will is, in my judgment, a "possession" within the 
protocol.417
No  explanation  is  offered  for  the  finding,  and  no  reference  is  made  to 
Strasbourg authority. However, this view of a right to inheritance accords with 
the approach taken by the ECtHR in Inze v Austria.418 It is submitted that the 
"possession"  in  this  context  is  best  understood  as  a  type  of  debt.  The 
possession held by a beneficiary is a claim against the deceased's estate for 
payment of a legacy.  Prior to the death of the testator, no possession can 
exist since any claim is, at best, conditional: it is within the testator's power to 
change her will at any time. On death, however, the claim "crystallises" and 
the right that vests in the beneficiary constitutes a "possession" in the P1-1 
meaning of that word.
The complex  issue of  welfare  benefits  has also  been explored with  some 
difficulty  in  the  domestic  jurisprudence.  In  Campbell  v  South 
Northamptonshire  District  Council  and  the  Secretary  of  State  for  the  
Department  for Work and Pensions,419 the claimants were members of the 
Jesus Fellowship Church. They lived communally in properties owned by the 
Church, subject to a variety of religious rules on lifestyle and child-rearing, 
and paid a charge to the Church for board and lodging. The charge could be 
altered  by  the  Church,  with  retrospective  effect,  without  any  need  for 
consultation or agreement. The applicants had been claiming housing benefit 
in respect of their boarding charges for an undisclosed period of time prior to 
the amendment in 1998 of the regulations on eligibility to receive the benefit. 
The result of the amendment was that the applicants were no longer eligible, 
since their living situation was not a "commercial arrangement" in the meaning 
of  the  legislation.  The  applicants  argued  that  this  change  amounted  to  a 
violation of P1-1, effectively on the basis that, since they had previously been 
in receipt  of the benefit,  they had a legitimate expectation that they would 
continue to receive it.  The argument advanced before the Court of Appeal 
417 para 20
418 (1987) 10 EHRR 394, discussed at p57 above.
419 [2004] 3 All ER 387
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went further in suggesting essentially that any welfare benefit amounted to a 
possession for the purposes of P1-1, based on the ECtHR jurisprudence.420
Jacob LJ was not prepared to entertain this argument, noting that if it were 
accepted, its consequences would be far reaching. 
At first blush, this is a startling proposition. The appellants never "owned" a right to 
[Housing  Benefit  (HB)]  in  any  meaningful  sense.  HB  is  a  non-contributory  state 
benefit given to certain persons who have housing needs and who satisfy the relevant 
criteria. If it is right, then so far as I can see, any form of State benefit would count as 
a "possession." So, once a State has allowed payment of a benefit, it can never be 
withdrawn or even, I suppose, reduced.421
Having carefully reviewed the Strasbourg jurisprudence, the Court concluded 
that it did not lay down a general rule in relation to welfare benefits.422 No 
possession was considered to exist in the case, and so no violation of P1-1 
was possible. 
This  case  appeared  to  be  in  direct  conflict  with  the  European  case  law. 
Although the position  of  welfare  benefits  had taken some time to  emerge 
clearly from the cases, by the time the decision in  Campbell  was made, the 
position  seemed  fairly  settled.  Certainly  following  the  subsequent  Grand 
Chamber judgment in  Stec v United Kingdom,423 there could be no question 
that  entitlement  to  payment  of  a  welfare  benefit  constituted  a possession. 
Even had that not been the situation, the reasoning in Campbell is not easy to 
follow.  The right to a benefit does not include payment at a particular level, 
and so  Jacob LJ's  concern that  a  benefit  could  never  be  reduced seems 
unfounded. 
The subject was revisited more recently in R (RJM) v Secretary of State for  
Work and Pensions,424 in connection with the exclusion of homeless persons 
420 For further discussion, see pages 57-61
421 para 31
422 para 35
423 (2006) 43 EHRR 47
424 [2009] 1 AC 311
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from the right to payment of a disability premium on income support. In the 
leading  speech,  Lord  Neuberger  of  Abbotsbury  quoted  at  length  from the 
opinion in Stec, noting its clear finding that welfare benefits fell with the scope 
of P1-1. He concluded:
As disability premium is part of the UK’s social welfare system, RJM does have a 
sufficient “possession” to bring his claim within P1-1.425
The decision  in  Campbell  was not  subject  to  revision,  presumably on  the 
basis that Stec represented a subsequent change in the Strasbourg position. 
It  seems,  however,  that  domestic  law  on  benefits  will  be  in  line  with  the 
ECtHR jurisprudence from this stage onwards.426  
The idea of legitimate expectation of  future acquisition of  benefit  was also 
explored in  one of the most controversial areas of domestic dispute, arising 
out of the separate bans on foxhunting imposed by the Scottish Parliament (in 
the  form of  the Protection of  Wild  Mammals  (Scotland)  Act  2002)  and by 
Westminster (with the Hunting Act 2004.) Both pieces of legislation operated 
to prohibit  mounted foxhunting with  dogs, together with  the use of land or 
dogs for that purpose. Challenges were raised north and south of the border 
in respect of a number of different articles of the ECHR, including the right to 
private and family life under article eight, freedom of association under article 
11 and freedom from discrimination under  article 14.  The P1-1 arguments 
covered a range of alleged violations. Primarily, landowners argued that they 
were no longer able to use their possessions in the form of land, horses or 
hounds to hunt foxes. The ban also impacted the foxhunting "industry" more 
generally with the result that jobs were lost, hounds had to be destroyed and 
rental income for land on which hunts had previously taken place could no 
longer be obtained. 
425 para 34
426 In regards to the P1-1 position, at least. The arguments relating to interpretation of article 6 may not yet be 
resolved. 
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In the leading Scottish case, Adams v Scottish Ministers,427 the issue of what 
constituted a possession was dealt with relatively shortly.  The land, horses 
and  hounds  were  obviously  possessions,  but  a  question  arose  over  the 
livelihood of one of the petitioners, who described himself as a self-employed 
manager of foxhounds for the Duke of Buccleuch's hunt. Accommodation for 
this  applicant  and  his  wife  was  tied  to  his  employment  on  the  hunt.  The 
Second  Division  accepted  the  Lord  Ordinary's  analogy  with  Strasbourg 
licence cases. 
The first  petitioner's economic interest in making his livelihood as a self-employed 
manager of foxhounds is a possession within the meaning of [P1-1]. That interest is 
comparable  with  an  interest  in  operating  a  licensed  restaurant  (Tre  Traktörer 
Aktiebolag v Sweden) or in carrying on a medical practice (Karni v Sweden) or in 
practising  a  profession  (Van  Marle  v  Netherlands),  each  of  which  has  been 
recognised as a possession.428     
Bearing  in  mind  the  definition  set  out  above  in  relation  to  legitimate 
expectation of acquisition of economic interest, this decision seems entirely in 
accordance with the Strasbourg case law. 
The relevant case in England and Wales, R (Countryside Alliance and others)  
v Attorney General and another,429 grappled with similar issues. Lord Bingham 
of Cornhill seemed satisfied that on the basis of the Strasbourg jurisprudence, 
the  following  could  all  be  considered  instances  of  interference  with 
possessions:
…landowners who cannot hunt over their own land or permit others to do so, those 
who cannot use their  horses and hounds to hunt,  the farrier who cannot use his 
equipment to shoe horses to be used for hunting, owners of businesses which have 
lost their marketable goodwill, a shareholder whose shares have lost their value and 
so on.430 
427 2004 SC 665
428 para 97
429 [2008] 1 AC 719
430 para 20.
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He goes on to observe the distinction between goodwill and future unearned 
income (which, as noted, may not be a possession), but does not distinguish 
any particular element of the various claims in the case as not constituting a 
possession  on  that  basis.  Perhaps  it  seemed  unimportant  given  that  the 
violations were to be considered justified in any event, although it does make 
it unclear why he raised the point in the first place. 
4.2.3 Peaceful enjoyment
The use of the phrase "peaceful enjoyment" relates to the enjoyment of the 
right of property itself, rather than to enjoyment of a physical piece of land or 
of an object as such. There is no right to a pleasant environment. Protection 
of this peaceful enjoyment may, in some circumstances, impose a positive 
obligation on the state to prevent that enjoyment being interrupted, although 
the limits of this have yet to be clearly defined. 
There has yet to be much in the way of domestic jurisprudence in relation to 
this  aspect  of  P1-1.  Certainly  there  does  not  appear  to  have  been  any 
litigation  raised  concerning  the  loss  of  a  pleasant  environment.  It  will  be 
recalled  that  in  extreme  circumstances,  excessive  detriment  to  pleasant 
environment can be enough to amount to a deprivation.431 The same principle 
has been applied by the English courts in Dennis v Ministry of Defence.432 The 
pursuer here was the owner and occupier of Walton Hall in Cambridgeshire, 
which  was  situated  alongside  an  RAF airbase  and  subjected  to  frequent, 
excessive noise pollution from Harrier Jump Jets. The Court found the noise 
from the jets to be "highly intrusive, frightening, persistent and unpredictable" 
to the extent that it constituted an "interference" with the property rights of the 
owner.
Along  similar  lines,  in  Marcic  v  Thames  Water  Utilities  Ltd,433 the  plaintiff 
owned a sizeable family home with large gardens at the front and back. His 
garden had been repeatedly flooded with sewer water over a period of more 
than ten years as a result of the fact the sewerage system, which was the 
431 See Powell v UK (1987) 9 EHRR 241, S v France (13728/88) May 17 1990 and the discussion at 71-75 above.
432 [2003] Env LR 34
433 [2004] 2 AC 42
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responsibility of the defendants, was overloaded at points in proximity to the 
plaintiff’s premises. Although the defendants were aware of the problem and 
although it was possible to remedy the difficulty, no works had been carried 
out or were planned at the time of the hearing owing to budgetary constraints. 
The plaintiff contended that the flooding amounted to an interference with his 
right  to  peaceful  enjoyment  of  his  property,  which  was  not  disputed  by 
Thames.  The  nature  of  this  interference  was  found  by  the  trial  judge  to 
amount to a partial deprivation:
Although I have not heard expert evidence of any diminution in value of his property, 
there is expert evidence of damage to the property and the evidence of Mr. Marcic, 
who considers it to be unsaleable. The value of Mr. Marcic's property must have been 
seriously and adversely affected by the nuisance. That effect has constituted a partial 
expropriation: in S v. France434 the Commission observed that where the value of real 
property was seriously affected by noise nuisance, that nuisance would amount to a 
partial expropriation.435  
One interesting interpretation in the domestic case law which has yet to be 
aired in Strasbourg is whether the concept of “enjoyment” carries with it both 
positive  and  negative  aspects.  This  point  arose  in  Aston  Cantlow  and 
Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank and Another.436 
The issue at stake was the cost of repairs to the chancel437 of St John the 
Baptist Church in Aston Cantlow, which the plaintiffs contended were due to 
be paid by the defendants as the proprietor of Glebe Farm, a former rectorial 
property which imposed on its owner a variety of burdens as lay rector. The 
judge  at  first  instance  had  found  this  liability  on  the  defendants  to  be 
established by virtue of the Chancel Repair Act 1932. The defendants argued 
inter  alia  that  this  obligation  was  essentially  an  indiscriminate  and  unduly 
burdensome form of taxation which amounted to a breach of their rights under 
P1-1.
434 See discussion at 72-73 above.
435 2001 WL 542174, para 69. Although the case was subsequently appealed as far as the House of Lords, this 
finding of the trial judge was not disputed.
436 [2004] 1 AC 546
437 The area at the end of the church traditionally housing the choir.
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The House of Lords was not satisfied that the burden on the defendants here 
arose  from  anything  other  than  the  private  law.  There  was  no  outside 
interference by a public body causing the liability; it was part and parcel of the 
defendants'  ownership  and had always  been so.  Lord  Hope of  Craighead 
noted:
I recognise that Mr and Mrs Wallbank may well need to draw on their personal funds 
to discharge the liability. But they are not being deprived of their possessions or being 
controlled in the use of their property, as those expressions must be understood in 
the light of the general principle of peaceful enjoyment set out in the first sentence of 
[P1-1.] The liability is simply an incident of the ownership of the land which gives rise 
to it. The peaceful enjoyment of land involves the discharge of burdens attached to it 
as well as the enjoyment of its rights and privileges.438 
This is an interesting corollary to the concept elaborated by the European 
Court of Human Rights to the effect that peaceful enjoyment can involve a 
positive obligation being imposed on the state, which has yet to be discussed 
domestically. This development in the Strasbourg case law is, of course, fairly 
recent. It would be fortuitous if the parameters here were more clearly defined 
at  the  Strasbourg  level  before  the  domestic  courts  were  obliged  to  make 
sense of them in a UK context. 
4.2.4 Deprivation
Where rights  of  ownership  have  formally  been removed,  there  can be no 
question that a de jure deprivation has taken place. Similarly, where all rights 
have effectively been removed, even whilst formally remaining in place, a de 
facto deprivation will be found. However, the restriction here must be such as 
to result in an almost total inability to exercise the usual powers attaching to 
ownership. A key factor here will be whether or not the applicant has retained 
the right to dispose of the possession in question. Where a disposal remains 
possible, even severe restrictions on the applicant’s powers will be unlikely to 
amount to a deprivation in the eyes of the Court.
438 Para 72
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In  addition,  the  complex  issues  surrounding  confiscation  and  forfeiture  of 
goods on a criminal law basis do not appear to fit readily into this definition of 
deprivation.
The  domestic  jurisprudence  on  deprivations  is,  at  best,  confusing,  and  at 
worst entirely contradictory. Although the concept of  de jure deprivation may 
be subject to a certain amount of ambiguity in the Strasbourg case law,  de 
facto deprivation is easier to identify.
Such deprivations are sometimes recognised by the UK courts. One example 
is  R (Clays Lane Housing Co-operative Ltd.) v The Housing Corporation.439 
The defendant in this case is the statutory regulatory body for social landlords, 
who had directed the plaintiff  to transfer its  housing stock to the Peabody 
Trust  following  findings  of  serious  mismanagement  within  the  plaintiff's 
administration.  This  compulsory  transfer  was  agreed  by  the  parties  to 
constitute  a  deprivation,  a  definition  which  the  Court  of  Appeal  had  no 
difficulty accepting. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine why they would not have 
accepted it: the plaintiff's rights of ownership were being removed as a matter 
of both law and fact. 
This clear-cut test has not been so simply applied in an agricultural context, 
however. The difficulties began with  Booker Aquaculture Ltd v Secretary of  
State  for  Scotland.440 This  case concerned the  Diseases of  Fish  (Control) 
Regulations  1994  which  set  out  a  scheme for  the  destruction  of  fish  and 
sanitisation of fish farming facilities in which certain listed piscine diseases 
had  been  identified.  The  Regulations,  which  had  been  introduced  in 
implementation of an EC Directive, made no provision for compensation in 
respect of destroyed fish stock. The pursuer in the case had been subject to 
the scheme and its request for compensation had been rejected. 
It would seem difficult to argue that the pursuer had not been deprived of its 
possessions here: the fish were literally destroyed. However, the Court was 
not prepared to accept that there was any case to be made under P1-1 here, 
439 [2005] 1 WLR 2229
440 2000 SC 9
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holding rather that the matter as a whole turned on EC law.441 No deprivation 
was acknowledged to have taken place. 
Matters only became more confusing with the outbreak of foot-and-mouth in 
2001.  Foot-and-mouth  is  a  highly  contagious  viral  disease  which  affects 
cloven-hoofed  animals  including  cattle  and  sheep.  The  outbreak  of  the 
disease in the UK in spring 2001 was identified by the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food as being a particularly virulent strain which could spread 
through  animal,  human,  mechanical  or  airborne  transfer  between 
neighbouring  farms.  Veterinary  advice  suggested  that  rapid  culling  of  all 
animals not only on affected farms, but also on neighbouring farms, would be 
necessary to prevent the spread of the disease.  This was the situation in 
Westerhall  Farms v  Scottish  Ministers.442 The petitioner  owned a  hill  farm 
bounded at its highest point by an infected farm. When foot-and-mouth was 
identified in the neighbouring concern, a notice was served on the petitioner 
indicating that its livestock would be slaughtered. The petitioner argued that 
the  blanket  rule  on  culls  of  animals  in  neighbouring  farms  was 
disproportionate. 
Again, the pursuer in the case was to suffer actual destruction of his property. 
Yet Lord Carloway did not find that P1-1 was engaged. 
Although it is proposed that the petitioners’ peaceful enjoyment of their livestock be 
interfered with, it was not suggested that this was otherwise than purportedly in the 
public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law. These conditions 
involve  the  payment  of  compensation  amounting  to  the  value  of  the  beasts 
slaughtered and this type of approach seems to be permitted under the Convention 
where the public interest demands the interference.443 
Looking later at proportionality, he noted:
Here, there is on the one hand the prospect of substantial, potentially catastrophic, 
economic harm being caused to the farming industry if swift and effective action is not 
441 See further discussion of this case below.
442 Unreported, Court of Session, 25 April 2001
443 Para 27
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taken to prevent the spread of the disease. Such steps as are advised may result in a 
limited  amount  of  farming  livestock  being  slaughtered.  However,  the  legislation 
empowering  the  executive  to  order  the  slaughter  of  animals  also  compels  the 
executive to pay compensation amounting to the value of the animals killed.  This 
process does not seem to amount to a potential breach of the article.444
Although there is little to argue with in the conclusion reached by the Court 
here, it is perhaps indicative of the general lack of understanding exhibited by 
the Court  of  Session towards the Convention that the judge considers the 
article  not  to  have  been  engaged.  Using  the  approach  of  the  Strasbourg 
jurisprudence here, it would seem quite clear that culling the beasts would 
amount to a deprivation of property:  in other words, the article would most 
certainly have been engaged. The deprivation may well have been justified 
given the aim pursued and the compensation offered, but it is unfortunate that 
the Court's reasoning does not appear to accord with the essentials of the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence. 
More confusingly, however, the same judge appears to have taken a different 
tack  in  a  similar  decision  days  later.  In  Christopher  Shepherd  v  Scottish 
Ministers,445 a slaughter notice was issued against the petitioner’s farm on the 
basis that he had visited his brother’s farm three days before foot-and-mouth 
was identified there. Although there were no signs of infection amongst the 
petitioner’s sheep, there was a particular concern that the disease should not 
spread  into  the  previously  infection-free  area  of  Sutherland  where  the 
petitioner’s farm was located.
 
In the opening paragraph of his decision, Lord Carloway notes:
There is no doubt that the respondent’s proposals involve an interference with the 
petitioner’s  possessions  albeit  purportedly  in  the  public  interest  and  subject  to 
conditions provided for by law.
444 Para 27
445 Unreported, 1 May 2007
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The  case  again  turns  on  proportionality,  and  again  there  may be  little  to 
disagree with in the eventual decision of the Court. However, the approach 
taken in these cases suggests a fundamental lack of understanding of the 
Strasbourg approach to interpretation of P1-1. 
Unfortunately  this  apparent  lack of  grasp on the Strasbourg way of  doing 
things has not prevented the domestic courts becoming mired in the same 
confusion over confiscation and forfeiture cases as their sister institutions in 
France. 
It will be recalled that, despite a seeming conflict with the usual rules as to 
what  will  constitute  a deprivation,  the ECtHR has repeatedly characterised 
confiscation and forfeiture as a control of use. Lindsay v Customs and Excise 
Commissioners446refreshingly bucks this trend.  Lindsay was effectively a test 
case for the many individuals who had fallen foul  of  the heavier penalties 
introduced by Customs and Excise to deal with members of the British public 
taking the car ferry over to France, buying quantities of alcohol and cigarettes 
subject to the much lower rates of French tax and then bringing them back to 
the UK, sometimes in illegal quantities for resale. In July 2000, Customs and 
Excise instituted a new policy by which any car or light goods vehicle used to 
smuggle excise goods would be seized, even for a first offence, and usually 
confiscated unless there was sufficient proof that such a forfeiture would be 
disproportionate. 
The particular plaintiff  in the case had been caught attempting to smuggle 
around £2,000 worth of tobacco products into the UK without paying duty. He 
was instructed to forfeit not only the goods, but also his car. 
The leading speech in the case was given by Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers 
MR.  He  started  on  the  basis  that  the  commissioners'  policy  led  to  the 
deprivation of possessions, an interesting conclusion in itself given that the 
446 [2002] 1 WLR 1766
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general  trend  in  the  Strasbourg  jurisprudence  towards  characterising 
confiscation as a control rather than a deprivation.447 He goes on to say:
[Under P1-1] such deprivation will only be justified if it is in the public interest. More 
specifically, the deprivation can be justified if it is “to secure the payment of taxes or 
other contributions or penalties.”448
Securing a payment of taxes or other penalties is, however,  defined in the 
Strasbourg case law as a control of use.449
Were the domestic courts, then, to categorise confiscation as a deprivation, 
which would seem the most logical approach? Sadly it appears this deviation 
from the Strasbourg line of jurisprudence was to arise only in the context of 
Lindsay. A  selection  of  cases  emerging  from  the  provisions  surrounding 
confiscation of the proceeds of crime suggests that courts north and south of 
the border are more generally inclined to define confiscation as a control. The 
key piece of legislation in this area is the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which 
allows for criminal income to be confiscated. Where a person is convicted of 
certain offences, particularly involving drug trafficking or money laundering or 
where there is a defined pattern of recidivism, he will be considered to have a 
“criminal lifestyle” in the wording of the statute. The impact of this finding is 
that every piece of property obtained by the accused during the six years prior 
to his conviction will be presumed to be the result of criminal activity, unless 
the accused can show evidence to the contrary. A confiscation order can be 
made for the full amount of this “benefit” received by the criminal, regardless 
of whether he is still in possession of the property or not by the time the order 
is made.
The P1-1 implications of this legislation were first considered in Scotland in 
McSalley v HMA.450 Lady Cosgrove emphasised that a confiscation order was 
an order for payment of money. It did not compel a transfer of ownership from 
447 See discussion at pages 81-85 above.
448 Para 52
449 See discussion at pages1141-145 above.
450 2000 JC 485
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the criminal to the state. Accordingly the action of the state here should be 
considered a control of use rather than a deprivation. However, this reasoning 
may be somewhat disingenuous. The level at which a confiscation order is set 
by the Court is calculated based on the available assets of the criminal. If the 
order  is  not  paid  timeously,  the  Court  can  appoint  a  management 
administrator (in Scotland) or a management receiver (in England and Wales) 
who will take control of the assets and arrange for them to be sold off, much 
like a trustee in bankruptcy proceedings. The idea that a confiscation order 
does not compel a transfer of ownership is true on paper, but in reality the 
order is calculated with that very action in mind.
There may be something of a middle road solution here that has been put 
forward  in  the  more  recent  English  authority  of  R v  Goodenough.451 The 
suggestion was made in this case that, at the time the confiscation order is 
made, it amounts to nothing more than a control. However, the action taken 
by the state in appointing a management administrator/receiver goes further 
and essentially amounts to a deprivation. R v Goodenough was not decided 
on this basis, so the comments here are obiter. Given the body of Strasbourg 
authority to the effect that a confiscation is a control, it seems perhaps unlikely 
that  this  distinction  would  ever  be  accepted  in  domestic  jurisprudence 
However,  it  is  interesting  nonetheless  to  see  the  difficulties  with  the 
Strasbourg approach being acknowledged at least to some extent.       
4.2.5 Control
An  action  by  the  state,  which  regulates  the  use  that  can  be  made  of 
possessions, but does not remove the right of ownership, will fall within the 
definition of  control.  The regulation may be positive or negative,  and must 
have more than a  de minimis  impact  on the applicant.  Essentially,  control 
must be less than deprivation.  
As  with  the  European  jurisprudence,  the  concept  of  control  has  been 
subjected  to  considerably  less  scrutiny  than  that  of  deprivation.  One 
celebrated Scottish case in which the principle of control is demonstrated is 
451 [2005] Crim. L.R. 71
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Karl Construction Ltd v Palisade Properties.452 Scots law allows for a form of 
diligence known as inhibition, which, when in operation, prevents the owners 
of  a  property  from  selling  or  otherwise  disposing  of  it.  Inhibition  of  the 
defender's  property  was  automatically  allowed  in  the  Scottish  civil  court 
system  whenever  a  conclusion  for  payment  of  money formed part  of  the 
summons. There was no requirement that special circumstances existed – for 
example, that the defender be on the verge of bankruptcy - to justify the grant 
of inhibition on the dependence. In this particular case, the pursuer sued for 
payment  of  damages  in  respect  of  construction  work  completed  under  a 
contract between the defender and an agent of the pursuer. In its summons, 
the  pursuer  included  the  standard  conclusion  for  diligence  on  the 
dependence. The defender argued that the blanket grant of inhibition in these 
circumstances without any need to show that it  was justified a given case 
amounted to a breach of its rights under P1-1.
Lord  Drummond  Young  considered  the  Strasbourg  case  law,  particularly 
Sporrong and Lonnröth v Sweden453 and Marckx v Belgium,454 and noted that 
inhibition on the dependence constituted a restriction on the right to dispose of 
property. The ability to transfer title is one of the key elements of ownership, 
and accordingly  any  obstacle  to  the  exercise  of  that  right  is  fundamental. 
However, there can be no question of deprivation as such – the owner retains 
title, and is free to use and enjoy his property in all other ways. This limited 
restraint  on  the  powers  attaching  to  ownership  is  a  classic  example  of  a 
control of use of possessions, and Lord Drummond Young characterised it as 
such.  
Some  less  controversial  examples  of  controls  on  the  use  of  possessions 
found in the domestic case law include planning restrictions,455 licensing the 
sale of alcohol456 and imposing tax on business profits.457 In Adams v Scottish 
Ministers, the ban on hunting with horses and hounds was categorised as a 
452 2002 SLT 312
453 (1982) 5 EHRR 50, see discussion at pages 99-105 above.
454 (1979) 2 EHRR 355, see discussion at 100 above
455 Di Ciacca v Scottish Ministers 2003 SLT 1031 
456 Adams v South Lanarkshire Council 2003 SLT 145
457 R (on the application of Professional Contractors Group Ltd) v Inland Revenue Commissioners [2001] HRLR 42
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control  of use of the land over which hunts had previously taken place, in 
addition to a control of the use of horses and hounds.458 
4.2.6 Public/General Interest
The notions of public and general interest are extremely wide concepts that 
are ultimately defined by the states themselves. The Court will  respect the 
views of the state as to what will be for the good of the public unless those 
views are manifestly unreasonable. 
The domestic jurisprudence has hardly touched upon this definition, which is 
perhaps unsurprising given the width of the original parameters. Examples of 
the public interest served by state action have covered a fairly wide range, 
however. In  Strathclyde Joint Police Board v Elderslie Estates,459 discussed 
above, it  was  determined  that  the  legislative  power  given  to  the  Lands 
Tribunal  to  waive  title  conditions  served  a  public  interest  in  preventing  a 
superior effectively holding a vassal to ransom for waiver fees in a situation 
where the superior had title in respect of the land condition but no interest to 
enforce the same. 
The power of one party to extract money from the other in circumstances which were 
unlikely to have been contemplated by the parties at the outset has been perceived 
as producing an unfair imbalance of property rights. The aim [of the legislation] has 
been to correct that imbalance.460
International Transport Roth GmbH and Others v Secretary of State for the  
Home Department461 concerned regulations  by which  heavy good vehicles 
could be confiscated if it was discovered that asylum seekers had smuggled 
themselves  aboard  in  an  attempt  to  cross  the  British  border.  The  public 
interest served by the regulations was noted as the need to combat the "grave 
social evil"462 of illegal entry to the UK. In McSalley v HMA,463 Lady Cosgrove 
458 2004 SC 665. Similar findings were made in the analogous English case R (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney-
General [2008] 1 AC 719
459 2002 SLT (Lands Tr) 2
460 p12
461 [2003] QB 728
462 As Simon Brown LJ describes it in para 1.
463 2000 JC 485
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noted that the legislation allowing for the confiscation of the proceeds of crime 
was put in place with the aim of: 
protecting the public from the evils and dangers of illegal drugs whose effects are 
pervasive and which cause untold human misery.464 
Perhaps more prosaically, destruction of property in the form of cattle and fish 
stocks  have  been  deemed  necessary  to  halt  the  spread  of  infectious 
diseases.465 Prevention of cruelty to animals was the justification offered by 
both Holyrood and Westminster for the ban on foxhunting in the subsequent 
P1-1  challenges.466 The  legitimacy  of  state  controls  such  as  planning 
regulations467 and licensing of various kinds468 have also been accepted, as 
they had been in Strasbourg.  
4.3 Determining an application under P1-1
In chapter three of this thesis, analysis of the jurisprudence demonstrated that 
the European Court of Human Rights carried out a five step process when 
determining  the  outcome of  an  application  under  P1-1.  That  process  was 
summarised as follows:
1. The Court must determine whether the property or interest held by the 
applicant falls within the broad definition of "possessions" as discussed 
in chapter two above.469 The first question in the process is accordingly: 
does the applicant hold a possession?
2. Should it be determined that a possession is involved, the Court asks 
whether an interference with P1-1 has taken place by considering the 
464 P495
465 Westerhall Farms v Scottish Ministers Unreported, Court of Session, 25 April 2001; Booker Aquaculture Ltd v 
Secretary of State for Scotland 2000 SC 9
466 Adams v Scottish Ministers 2004 SC 665; R (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney-General [2008] 1 AC 719
467 Di Ciacca v Scottish Ministers 2003 SLT 1031;
468 Catscratch Limited v City of Glasgow Licensing Board (No 2) 2002 SLT 503 and Adams v South Lanarkshire 
Council 2003 SLT 145 (both alcohol licensing); Crompton v Department of Transport North West Area 2003 WL 
117004 (licence to drive an HGV); Whitefield v General Medical Council [2003] HRLR 9 (medical licence.)
469 See pp50-6971 above
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“three  rules”  set  out  in  Sporrong  and  Lönnroth  v  Sweden.  Any 
intervention  with  P1-1  must  fall  to  be  categorised  as  (a)  general 
interference  with  the  peaceful  enjoyment  of  possessions,  (b) 
deprivation  of  possessions  or  (c)  control  of  the  use  of  those 
possessions. State action which falls within one of these three rules 
constitutes an interference. The second question is therefore: does the 
state action fall within one of these three categories?
 
3. Once  an interference  has been  established,  the  Court  must  decide 
whether  it  is  justified  by  the  qualifications  to  the  right  of  peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions set out in P1-1. No interference can be fair if 
does not have a clear legal basis. The third question is accordingly: 
was the action of the state lawful in the meaning of the article?
4. Interferences can only be justified where they were carried out for the 
benefit of the wider society.  The fourth question is therefore: did the 
action of  the state  pursue a legitimate aim in  the public  or  general 
interest? 
5. Finally, any interference must meet the test of proportionality inherent 
in the wording of the article. The fifth question is accordingly: did the 
state action strike a fair balance between the needs of the community 
and  the  burden  placed  on  the  individual  applicant?  This  is  also 
expressed by asking simply, was the interference proportionate?
How have the domestic courts adapted to this decision-making process? To 
say  that  success  has  been  mixed  seems  perhaps  inevitable.  Given  the 
uncertainties surrounding the ECtHR's own approach to applications under 
P1-1,  it  would  hardly  be  possible  to  expect  the  domestic  courts  to  have 
somehow followed Strasbourg step-by-step. Additionally, it must be borne in 
mind that the domestic courts are not bound by Strasbourg “precedent” as 
such, being under an obligation only to “take account of” the European case 
law.470 Nevertheless,  it  is  discouraging  to  discover  that,  in  some cases,  it 
470 Human Rights Act 1998, s2(1). See discussion at 38-40 above.
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would appear that every element of the Strasbourg jurisprudence had been 
ignored almost entirely.    
One example of this is the decision in Booker Aquaculture Ltd v Secretary of  
State for  Scotland.471 As discussed above, the case concerned regulations 
which allowed for destruction of fish stocks in order to prevent the spread of 
piscine disease. There was no provision in the regulations for compensation 
where  a  destruction  order  was  made.  The pursuer  in  the  case  had been 
subject to the scheme, and had made a request for financial  recompense. 
This request was rejected; there was no basis on which to grant it. The case 
called  for  an  answer  to  the  question  of  whether  this  lack  of  provision  for 
compensation meant the regulations were in breach of the right to property.
There  was  no  dispute  between  the  parties  that  domestic  law  had  to  be 
implemented in accordance with the principles of community law. There was 
also no dispute that the right to protection of property formed one of those 
principles. In the particular case it was considered that the notice requiring 
slaughter of certain fish amounted to a deprivation of property. (Alternatively, 
certain fish were allowed to be sold for commercial purposes under specific 
conditions, which was properly categorised as a control of use.) The public 
interest  served by the regulations in  preventing the spread of  virulent  fish 
diseases was accepted by all parties. However, the pursuer argued that the 
failure of the regulations to make provision for compensation amounted to a 
breach of P1-1 based on the Strasbourg case law.
The  Lord  President  (Rodger),  having  reviewed  the  authorities,  concluded 
correctly:
I am satisfied that the right to property is recognised as a fundamental right under 
Community  law  and  that  the  availability  of  compensation  is  relevant  to  any 
consideration of whether the right has been respected. Moreover the right pervades 
the Community legal order and…will  fall to be taken into account by any member 
state when implementing the obligations placed on it by a directive.472   
471 2000 SC 9
472 p 19
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He goes  on  to  consider,  however,  whether  community  law applies  to  the 
determination of compensation in this case, concluding ultimately that:
In my view, these observations [by the European Court of Justice in Flip CV and O 
Verdegem NV v Belgian State473] suggest that in the absence of any provision in a 
particular  Community  act  requiring the payment  of  compensation,  the question of 
compensation for owners whose pigs had been slaughtered under national measures 
taken to fulfil  a Community obligation remained a matter within the competence of 
each member state.474   
Applying that conclusion to the present case, the Court found the question of 
whether  compensation  should  be  awarded  was  a  matter  purely  for  the 
national  law.  The  right  of  property  enshrined  in  the  general  principles  of 
community law was the sole basis of the pursuer's claim; since only national 
law was applicable in respect of  the compensation question, the pursuer's 
claim was therefore bound to fail. 
The  Court  referred  the  matter  to  the  ECJ  for  clarification  on  whether 
community law applied in this situation. No opinion was offered on whether, if 
community law did apply, the property right had been violated by the failure to 
provide compensation. The Court believed rather that the ECJ would set out 
the relevant principles to be considered in their judgement should it consider 
that community law was, indeed, applicable here.
This case is odd and dissatisfying due to the insistence that human rights only 
have an application in the UK where the issue is one of community law. It may 
be  that  the  pursuer  was  somewhat  hoist  by  its  own  petard,  however,  in 
pleading the case on a community law basis.  Presumably it  would always 
have  been  open  to  Booker  to  make an application  directly  to  the  ECtHR 
questioning  the  compliance  of  the  slaughter  order  with  P1-1  given  the 
absence of provision for compensation. It seems unfortunate and contrary to 
justice, though, that it should have been necessary to take this step: after all, 
473 [1995] ECR I-913
474 p 25
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the domestic court had already reviewed the relevant ECtHR authorities, and 
it  had been some decades since the First  Protocol  had been ratified. The 
regulations under dispute in this case were introduced prior to the Human 
Rights Act. If the case were to be considered nowadays, the Court would be 
under an obligation to review their P1-1 compatibility based on that statute, so 
perhaps  this  particular  oddity  is  unlikely  to  be  repeated.  It  still  serves, 
however,  as  an  example  of  the  difficulties  the  domestic  courts  have 
sometimes  had  with  grasping  the  general  tenor  of  the  Strasbourg 
jurisprudence on P1-1. 
4.3.1: Does the applicant hold a possession?
As before, the essence of this step has been described in detail during the 
discussion above475 of the definition of “possessions” by the domestic courts. 
If no such possession is found to exist, the application can go no further. 
4.3.2 Which rule has been engaged?
As discussed in chapter three, the three-rule approach to P1-1 first elaborated 
in Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden is not without its difficulties. However, it 
is unquestionably the framework around which all P1-1 decisions have been 
made  in  Strasbourg  for  almost  30  years  now.  It  has  been  seen  in  the 
preceding  chapter  that  whether  a  state  action  is  categorised  as  an 
interference, a deprivation or a control of use will impact on the remainder of 
the  five-step  decision-making  process,  and  particularly  will  impact  on  the 
question of proportionality.  Given the numerous ambiguities which surround 
the definition and application of the P1-1 terminology, it would seem desirable 
that the certainties that do exist be adhered to by the domestic courts now 
that the article has been incorporated into UK legislation. In the majority of 
domestic  case  law,  the  courts  begin  by  deciding  which  Sporrong rule  is 
applicable. However, this adherence is not universal. Unfortunately it does not 
appear that the deviations from the rules are due to principled objections to 
the difficulties with it, but rather due to a lack of understanding of the rules in 
the first place. 
475 See pp50-70 above
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An example of  this confusion can be seen in  International  Transport  Roth 
GmbH and Others  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home Department.476 The 
regulations  under  fire  in  the  case  concerned  illegal  aliens  attempting  to 
smuggle themselves into the UK by hiding in the back of  goods lorries.  A 
penalty  scheme was  created  by which  the  owner,  hirer  and driver  of  any 
vehicle found to contain a “clandestine entrant” could be subject to significant 
fines.  The vehicle  could be detained if  there was a “serious risk” that  the 
penalty  would  not  be  paid  in  the  opinion  of  the  issuing  officer  and  if  no 
alternative security was given. There would be a defence to the penalty if the 
driver had no actual or constructive knowledge of the clandestine entrant and 
also operated a system designed to prevent such entrants from making use of 
the vehicle.
There were a number of different things going on in this case which make the 
P1-1 elements of the decision somewhat difficult to identify and parse. Asylum 
seekers are obviously something of a political hot potato. In addition to the 
P1-1 point, there was a case made in terms of article six of the ECHR which 
required discussion of whether the penalty scheme should be categorised as 
civil or criminal in addition to determination of whether the right to a fair trial 
had been breached. The Court was also very occupied by the definition of 
proportionality  as set  out  in  the  English public  law cases of  De Freitas  v 
Permanent  Secretary  of  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Fisheries,  Lands  and 
Housing477 and R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department.478
Perhaps  it  was  the  overall  complexity  of  the  case  which  resulted  in  the 
analysis  of  the  P1-1  elements  being  something  less  than  satisfactory  in 
comparison with the usual Strasbourg jurisprudence.  Essentially the whole 
discussion of P1-1 revolved around some notion of proportionality. There was 
no mention of the three Sporrong rules, nor discussion of which category state 
action in this case might fall  into. Despite this, both the trial judge and the 
Court of Appeal had found the regulations to breach P1-1. 
476 [2003] QB 728
477 [1999] 1 AC 69,
478 [2001] 2 AC 532
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We have  seen  in  the  Strasbourg  jurisprudence  that  categorisation  of  the 
breach of P1-1 is an essential pre-requisite to determining whether or not a 
fair  balance has been struck.  In  particular  we  have seen that,  in  case of 
deprivation of property, compensation must almost always be paid before a 
fair balance can be said to be achieved. The situation in this case is not even 
one in  which  the  categorisation  is  obvious:  as  discussed at  length  in  the 
preceding chapters, there is a substantial degree of confusion in the ECtHR 
case law on confiscation cases between whether forfeit of an item amounts to 
a deprivation or merely a control. 
The majority of the judges in the Court of Appeal did not concern themselves 
with these issues. Only Laws LJ in dissent clarified that he considered the 
matter to be one of control of use rather than deprivation of property, although 
this was not without difficulties. 
I accept the submission that what is at issue here is the control of the use of property, 
as regards which it is clear that the signatory states enjoy a wide margin of discretion. 
Given the approach of the Strasbourg court in Air Canada, and in light of the overall 
nature of the scheme, there is in my judgment no transgression of the margin.479 
The margin of appreciation to which he refers is relevant to the methods by 
which a legitimate aim can be pursued, not to control  of use as a general 
category. It is unfortunate when it has been demonstrated repeatedly by the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence that these categories are significant and impact on 
the decision-making process as a whole that the domestic courts do not feel 
the need to take them into account. 
The confusion over the three Sporrong rules is also demonstrated by the two 
cases arising from the foot-and-mouth epidemic in 2001, as discussed above. 
In Westerhall Farms v Scottish Ministers,480 Lord Carloway did not find P1-1 to 
be engaged:
479 para 110
480 Unreported, Court of Session, 25 April 2001
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This process does not seem to amount to a potential breach of the article.481
On the  other  hand,  in  Christopher  Shepherd  v  Scottish  Ministers,482 Lord 
Carloway referred to identical state action to amount to an interference.483 It is 
difficult to imagine how this can be meant in the technical  Sporrong sense. 
Following the Strasbourg jurisprudence here, what might have been expected 
(in both cases) was a finding of deprivation of property amounting to a breach 
of the article, although this may well subsequently have been justified with 
reference  to  the  remaining  steps  of  the  decision-making  process.  If  Lord 
Carloway did mean to suggest that the state action in Shepherd should be 
categorised  as  a  Sporrong interference,  this  should  no  doubt  have  been 
explained  since  it  is  less  than  evident  from  the  facts.  Further,  it  seems 
impossible to understand why this technical categorisation should have been 
decided upon in one case but  not  the other when the nature of  the state 
intervention is virtually identical in each. What appears more likely is that the 
whole notion of the three-rule approach has been ignored entirely. 
A  final  example  of  uncertainty  arising  in  this  area  either  from  lack  of 
understanding  or  lack  of  interest  is  MW  and  H  Ward  Estates  Limited  v 
Monmouthshire County Council.484 The council in this case wished to enter 
onto the plaintiff's land to construct a drainage channel designed to alleviate a 
severe flooding problem. The claimant argued that this action on the part of 
the council  would amount  to a disproportionate interference with  his rights 
under P1-1. 
Unlike the Westerhall Farms and Christopher Shepherd cases, the Court here 
did  not  ignore  the  question  of  the  Sporrong categories  entirely.  Rather,  it 
seems  that  the  discussion  over  which  category  was  applicable  became 
confused. The claimant contended that, should the work be undertaken by the 
council,  it  would  amount  to  a  deprivation  of  property.  The  respondent 
challenged this contention, and indeed the Court was not convinced on the 
481 Para 27
482 Unreported, Court of Session, 1 May 2001
483 See discussion of this case at p194
484 2002 WL 31413995
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argument, but opted to proceed on that basis in any event. It is hard to see, 
bearing in mind the Strasbourg jurisprudence on the meaning of the various 
terms, how the Council's action could sensibly be said to amount to anything 
other than a control of use. Nevertheless, at least what appeared to be a clear 
basis for the decision was put in place.  
The basis, however, was not founded upon in the way that might be expected. 
Laws LJ went on to find that the fact compensation was to be paid meant 
there was no violation of  P1-1. However,  he considered the compensation 
provisions not in terms of proportionality, but rather from the point of view of 
whether an interference could be said to have taken place at all. His view was 
that, given the compensation, there was no violation. This finding is difficult to 
parse to say the least. Having already decided that the state action amounted 
to a deprivation, why go back and reconsider the question of whether any 
interference has taken place at all? It may be that what was intended here 
was a finding that the deprivation of possessions was justified as lawful, in the 
public interest and ultimately proportionate as a result of the compensation 
payment. It is unfortunate that, if this is what was meant, it is not what was 
said. 
Overall it might be said that the approach domestically to the first step of the 
decision-making process is confused in places. However, it does not appear 
that this confusion has as yet amounted to a result in any particular case that 
might have been different had the Strasbourg approach been fully applied. It 
is to be hoped, however, that a clearer grasp of the Sporrong categorisations 
and the role they play is obtained before more difficult cases arise. 
4.3.3 Is the interference lawful?
The question of lawfulness is one which rarely arises in the domestic case 
law.  It  can  be  seen  from  the  jurisprudence  of  the  ECtHR  that  the  most 
common  context  for  applications  under  this  head  is  one  of  political 
uncertainty, where regimes are in the process of change whether voluntarily 
or as a matter of force. In a sense, the lawfulness requirement is the one 
which most clearly encapsulates the original spirit of the property right: the 
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idea that a state should not be able to deprive a citizen of his possessions on 
a whim or as a means to weakening political opponents. It is to the credit of 
both Westminster  and Holyrood that  this  is  not  a  situation  with  which  the 
courts here have had to contend. 
Lawfulness  arguments are not  entirely unknown,  however.  One interesting 
case where a discussion of lawfulness arose amidst a variety of other P1-1 
arguments was R (on the application of Professional Contractors Group Ltd) v  
Inland  Revenue  Commissioners.485 The  application  here  came  out  of  the 
introduction  of  a  piece  of  composite  tax  legislation  known  as  IR35.  The 
legislation  was  aimed  at  "service  companies."  A  person  who  wished  to 
provide professional services of whatever kind could set up such a company 
with herself as the only member and herself also as the only employee. The 
company would contract  out  her  services in return for  remuneration which 
would be paid by the client to the company. Some of this income could be 
taken as a salary by the individual-as-employee, and some could be taken 
later as a dividend by the individual-as-shareholder. The Inland Revenue had 
taken the view that these companies were often operated for tax avoidance 
purposes,  and  IR35  introduced  new  rules  providing  that  where  the 
professional  was  effectively  acting  as  an  employee  of  the  client, 
notwithstanding  the  interposition  of  the  service  company,  the  professional 
would be obliged to pay tax and National Insurance contributions on the same 
basis as any other employed person.
The applicant,  representing  a number  of  individuals  who  operated  service 
companies,  made  various  arguments  under  P1-1  to  the  effect  that  its 
members  had  been  deprived  of  possessions  in  an  unlawful  and 
disproportionate manner. The lawfulness argument turned on the contended 
uncertainty  in  determining  when  an  individual  might  be  considered  to  be 
"employed" by the client using the Inland Revenue guidance on the subject. 
The parameters of legal certainty as defined by the Strasbourg case law were 
outlined, before detailed consideration was given to the IR guidance on the 
subject.  This  largely  attempts  to  encapsulate  the  common  law  on  the 
485 [2001] HRLR 42
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differences  between  a  contract  of  employment  and  a  contract  to  provide 
services.  
Burton J eventually concluded:
Notwithstanding certain areas of potential dispute [outlined in the IR guidance], I do 
not consider that it offends against the concept of certainty for the common law of 
employment to apply to a service contractor; and I find no difficulty with the concept of 
what the claimants have described as the "entirely hypothetical relationship between 
the service contractor, when no such relationship exists." …I do not consider that [the 
service contractor's]  subjection to the same law as if  he were a sole trader or an 
individual is objectionable, or submits him to unacceptable uncertainty, any more than 
I conclude that it is contrary to Human Rights to apply such law in an ordinary case to 
an individual.486 
  
The case is reminiscent of  Sunday Times v United Kingdom487 in the sense 
that it is the general principles of an existing area of law which are in dispute 
(contempt of court in Sunday Times, employment law in the instant case.) In 
both cases, the common law rules were alleged to be so uncertain that they 
did not fulfil the foreseeability requirement of lawfulness, which demands that 
the application of the law should be sufficiently clear as to allow a person to 
regulate their conduct in accordance with it. As in  Sunday Times, the Court 
was of the view that this requirement was fulfilled, and accordingly the case 
on this point was unsuccessful.
One other example of a case which, it is submitted, turns on a question of 
lawfulness  although  it  is  not  explicitly  identified  as  such  in  the  report  is 
Crompton v Department of Transport North West Area.488 The possession in 
question here was an HGV licence which had been revoked as a result of the 
driver no longer being "in good repute", one of the conditions for holding a 
licence in terms of the relevant legislation. The loss of good repute had come 
about  as  the  result  of  an  incident  at  an  unconnected  Transport  Tribunal 
hearing concerning the applicant's brother in which the applicant had verbally 
486 para 49
487 (1979-80) 2 EHRR 245. See discussion at  pages109-11 above.
488 2003 WL 117004
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abused a journalist,  called a traffic examiner a "big fat fucking trollop" and 
advised the Traffic Commissioner that he knew his car registration number 
and that he should therefore "sleep with one eye open." (It might be noted that 
the applicant subsequently apologised to all parties.)
It  was agreed that  the licence was a possession and that revocation of  a 
licence could amount to a deprivation in the sense of P1-1. At first instance, 
the Transport Tribunal had determined that the intention of the legislation in 
including the condition of "good repute" was to ensure a license holder was, in 
fact,  fit  to hold such a licence.  In the view of the Tribunal,  the applicant's 
behaviour had demonstrated him to be unfit to hold the licence.
The  Court  of  Appeal  was  unhappy  with  this  conclusion.  No  matter  how 
reprehensible  the  applicant's  actions  may have  been,  the  Court  could  not 
accept that  they had impinged on the applicant's  ability  or  fitness to  drive 
heavy goods vehicles. In the view of the Court, that could be the only element 
of the applicant's reputation which was relevant for the purposes of the licence 
condition. The Tribunal's decision was accordingly overturned. 
Essentially the argument here surrounded a misapplication of the law by the 
Tribunal at first instance. Once again, this difficulty goes to a failure to meet 
the foreseeability requirement. The law on licence conditions here had been 
incorrectly applied leading to a result which could not have been foreseen by 
the applicant. Accordingly, his argument under P1-1 was successful.  
  
4.3.4 Is the interference in the public/general interest?
As discoursed upon at  length  in  chapter  three,  the requirement  that  state 
interference with possessions be carried out in the public or general interest is 
a requirement in which the state is given an exceptionally wide of margin of 
appreciation. Given the apparently absolute unwillingness of the Strasbourg 
court to make a finding that state action is not in the public interest, at least in 
a case where the state has made some sort of argument that a public interest 
exists, it is perhaps not surprising to find that this requirement has not caused 
much difficulty for Holyrood or Westminster domestically either. 
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The  parameters  of  the  margin  of  appreciation  were  set  out  helpfully  and 
comprehensively  by  Lord  Drummond  Young  in  Karl  Construction  Ltd  v 
Palisade Properties,489 the case which led to the reform of the law in Scotland 
on inhibition on the dependence, discussed further below.  
The margin of appreciation and the equivalent principle in national law are in large 
measure based on the idea that the aims of the articles of the Convention can 
usually be achieved in a number of different ways. It is accordingly open to the 
national authorities of the individual  states to decide which method of achieving 
those aims is to be used… Within a single national system of law, it will frequently 
be the legislature or the executive that is in the best position to determine how the 
margin of appreciation accorded to the national authorities should be exercised. In 
cases where the legislature has chosen to act, it is obvious that the courts must 
exercise great restraint in interfering with the decisions made by it; the legislature is 
the democratically elected organ of government. The same is true to some extent 
of  decisions  of  the  executive,  although  for  somewhat  different  reasons.  The 
function of the executive is to govern in an effective manner, and the courts must 
allow it to do so; in particular, they should be slow to take over functions involving 
the exercise of administrative discretion, or to foreclose major budgetary decisions. 
Similarly,  where  a  principle  or  procedure of  the  common law has been  clearly 
established, I am of opinion that a court should exercise restraint in holding that 
that principle or practice contravenes the Convention. That is in accordance with 
the basic principle that the national authorities are given a margin of appreciation 
because they are in the best position to know how to respond to local conditions; 
the common law can be regarded as just such a response. Consequently, in every 
case  where  a  common  law  principle  or  practice  is  challenged  under  the 
Convention, the court must consider whether the principle or practice in question 
can be regarded as a legitimate way of  achieving the aims of  the Convention, 
having regard to the national equivalent of the margin of appreciation.490 
Interestingly in this case, the state's margin of appreciation was considered to 
have been exceeded, although not on the basis of a lack of public interest, 
rather  through  a  lack  of  proportionality.  However,  what  is  useful  in  Lord 
Drummond Young's summary is that it sets out quite how widely drawn the 
discretion afforded to the state will be here. As with the Strasbourg case law, 
489 2002 SLT 312
490 para 69-70
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this  will  ensure  the  flexibility  needed  to  meet  the  intended  aims  of  P1-1. 
However,  it  may be argued to rob the right of some of its force, since the 
requirement of  public/general interest may become little  more than a hoop 
through which the state is required to jump on paper. 
A  wide  range  of  public/general  interests  have  already  been  accepted 
domestically as sufficient, as outlined above. It remains to be seen whether 
any  unexpected  developments  might  take  place  in  this  element  of  the 
jurisprudence. 
4.3.5 Is the interference proportionate to the aim sought to be achieved?
A fair balance must be struck between the aim of any state interference with 
P1-1 and the burden to be borne by the individual affected by the interference. 
This  final  step  in  the  decision-making  process is  the  one most  frequently 
discussed  and  perhaps  most  fully  understood  by  the  domestic  courts. 
Questions of proportionality must, by definition, be decided on a case-by-case 
basis, since each interference takes place in its own individual circumstances. 
Nonetheless, as discussed in chapter three, some common elements have 
arisen in a number of ECtHR cases. The aim of the state action will always be 
of critical  importance. Other concerns which appear repeatedly include the 
availability of domestic appeal processes to the applicant, the impact of the 
applicant's  own behaviour  on the situation as a whole and, of  course,  the 
availability and level of any compensation for the interference. 
Analysis  of  the  domestic  case  law  also  suggests  the  existence  of  some 
common factors in the reasoning of the UK courts, although these are not 
necessarily  the  same  issues  which  have  arisen  in  Strasbourg.   One 
interesting point which has come up repeatedly in the domestic jurisprudence 
is the idea of flexibility in terms of how the state acts. This has been best 
illustrated by a trio of  cases dealing with  a variety of  customs regulations 
which provided for forfeiture of goods as a penalty for certain transgressions. 
The first of the three, a complex case in which the English Court of Appeal 
opened a useful discussion about proportionality, is  Lindsay v Customs and 
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Excise Commissioners.491 As discussed above, this concerned day-trippers to 
France  who  would  purchase  alcohol  and  cigarettes  at  the  significantly 
reduced  rates  of  French  tax  and  return  with  them to  the  UK.  There  was 
concern  that  many  people  were  exceeding  the  limits  imposed  on  the 
quantities which could be brought back into the country as a means of tax 
evasion. In July 2000, the commissioners instituted a new policy by which any 
car or light goods vehicle used to smuggle excise goods would be seized, 
even for a first offence, and usually confiscated unless there was sufficient 
proof that such forfeiture would be disproportionate. 
The particular plaintiff  in the case had been caught attempting to smuggle 
around £2,000 worth of tobacco products into the UK without paying duty. He 
indicated that some of the goods were for personal use and some had been 
bought  for  members of  his family with  money they had given him for  this 
purpose. He was instructed to forfeit not only the goods, but also his car, a 
new Ford Focus which he had bought only a few months previously and which 
had a showroom price of £12,000. The issue in the case was whether the 
forfeiture of the car in such circumstances was disproportionate.  Specifically, 
it was asked whether the guidance which had been given to customs officers 
– to the effect that all smugglers should have to forfeit their car except where 
it  would  be  "inhumane",  for  example,  in  the  case of  a  first  time technical 
offence where a minimal  amount of  tobacco had been brought back for  a 
relative  – was too great  a fetter  on their  discretion to  allow a true test  of 
proportionality in every case. 
Lord  Phillips  of  Worth  Matravers  MR  proceeded  on  the  basis  that  the 
commissioner’s policy led to the deprivation of possessions.492 The crux of the 
matter  for  the  court  seemed  to  be  that  there  was  not  enough  discretion 
afforded to customs officers by the general policy to allow a proportionate 
result in every case. Particularly, the court believed that a distinction had to be 
drawn between genuine commercial smugglers who were importing goods to 
sell for profit and individuals who were bringing back extra goods to give to 
491 [2002] 1 WLR 1766
492 This is an interesting approach in itself, given the usual Strasbourg position on confiscation and forfeiture. See 
discussion at pages 81-85 above.
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family and friends. The aim of the policy did not justify such a harsh penalty in 
the case of this latter group, of which Mr Lindsay was, on his evidence, a 
member.
Where the importation is not for the purpose of making a profit, I consider that the 
principle  of  proportionality  requires  that  each  case  should  be  considered  on  its 
particular facts, which will  include the scale of the importation, whether it is a first 
offence, whether there was an attempt at concealment or dissimulation, the value of 
the vehicle and the degree of hardship that will be caused by forfeiture. There is a 
wider range of lesser sanctions that will  enable them to impose a sanction that is 
proportionate where a forfeiture of the vehicle is not justified.493 
Given the wide range of possible circumstances in which a person might be 
caught by customs and excise officers, then, it was considered that the policy 
was not sufficiently flexible to take into account all the relevant factors. This 
decision  positively  embraces  the  position  taken  by  the  ECtHR  on 
proportionality,  in  which  individual  context  is  key.  It  can  be  seen  that  the 
factors concerning the Court here – the behaviour of the individual and the 
chance for his case to be properly considered, as in an appeal process – are 
familiar from the Strasbourg jurisprudence. The reasoning set out by the Court 
seems very much in keeping with the line the ECtHR would likely take in a 
similar situation.  
The second case,  arising from the same customs and excise policy,  is  R 
(Hoverspeed)  v  Customs and Excise Commissioners.494 The plaintiffs  here 
included  three  individuals  who  borrowed  the  car  of  a  fourth  and,  more 
elaborately,  used the hovercraft  of  a fifth  to travel  to France and Belgium 
seeking tobacco products and alcohol. On return to the UK, the party were 
searched by customs officials and found to be carrying goods in excess of 
customs limits. Only one of the individuals was found to be importing goods 
for  "commercial"  use.  However,  on  the  basis  of  this  finding,  the  customs 
officers confiscated all the goods and the fourth plaintiff's car. 
493 para 64
494 [2002] 3 WLR 1219
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The Court was invited to declare that the commissioners' policy regarding the 
seizure of goods and vehicles was contrary to P1-1. The argument concerned 
both  the  commissioners'  powers  to  stop  and  search  travellers  and  their 
vehicles and the eventual forfeiture provisions, which had been discussed in 
Lindsay.  In the consideration of proportionality, the Court interestingly made 
note of the fact that the ECtHR was not, in general, enthusiastic about too 
wide a discretion being afforded to public bodies since it tended obfuscate the 
decision-making process and render the consequences of action difficult to 
foresee. The Court  was satisfied that  the limits on the powers  of  customs 
officers  to  stop  and  search  vehicles,495 taken  together  with  the  temporary 
nature of confiscation of goods and vehicles, which could be returned to the 
individual if appropriate after evidence and arguments had been aired in court, 
were sufficient to render the policy on stop and search proportionate in the 
meaning of P1-1. 
However:
It is their present policy on restoration which concerns us. They do not purport to treat 
all absentee owners equally, and they do not purport to give a proportionate response 
in every case. If goods worth £1,000 are seized, the genuine smuggler's car worth 
£2,000 will also be seized, and both will be forfeited. If goods worth £500 are seized 
from a "not for profit" smuggler, the absentee owner's car worth £15,000 will also be 
seized, and both will also be forfeited. And the policy discriminates in favour of the 
absentee owner who is a hiring company and against the absentee owner who is a 
private  individual,  although  both  could  have  imposed  conditions  on  the  terms on 
which they were willing to hire or lend their goods.496 
 
Again, it was the blanket nature of the policy which caused concerns about 
whether the requirement of proportionality had been met. More flexibility was 
required. 
The  third  in  this  trio  of  cases  is  the  previously  mentioned  International  
Transport  Roth  GmbH  and  Others  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home 
495 Essentially they required to have reasonable grounds for suspicion before they were entitled to search an 
individual or vehicle. 
496 para 189
215
Department,  arising from legislation designed to combat "people smuggling" 
into the UK by,  inter alia,  allowing for forfeiture of vehicles in which illegal 
aliens were found.497 As outlined above, this case was complex both in terms 
of its facts and of the legal questions it raised, with arguments made in terms 
of article six and the English public law of proportionality as well as under P1-
1. 
The trial judge had found the scheme to breach P1-1 since the provisions for 
restoration were too restrictive: a detained vehicle would only be returned in 
cases where there was both a stateable case on which to defend the penalty 
notice and also a compelling need for the vehicle to be retuned. In the Court 
of Appeal it was once again argued that P1-1 had been breached by the scale 
and inflexibility of the penalty.
The  social  and political  importance of  the  people  smuggling  problem was 
given appropriate weight by the Court in considering the aim of the state in 
intervening with  the property rights  of  the plaintiff.  Simon Brown LJ noted, 
however,  that  achieving  this  aim  was  only  one  part  of  the  proportionality 
equation:
Even acknowledging,  as  I  do,  the great  importance  of  the  social  goal  which  the 
scheme seeks to promote, there are nevertheless limits to how far the state is entitled 
to  go  in  imposing  obligations  of  vigilance  on  drivers  (and  vicarious  liability  on 
employers and hirers) to achieve it and in penalising any breach.  Obviously, were the 
penalty heavier still and the discouragement of carelessness correspondingly greater, 
the scheme would be yet more effective and the policy objective fulfilled to an even 
higher degree. There comes a point, however, when what is achieved is achieved 
only at the cost of basic fairness. The price in Convention terms is just too high.498 
Again, the lack of flexibility in the provisions was considered to be the key 
issue, and Simon Brown LJ's speech explains the issue neatly and succinctly. 
497 [2003] QB 728
498 para 53
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It  is  worth  noting  that  not  all  the  speeches  in  this  case  are  similarly  "on 
message" with the Strasbourg jurisprudence, however.  Jonathan Parker LJ 
stated:
There  is  no  dispute  as  to  the  "legitimate  aim"  [of  the  forfeiture  provisions.]  The 
question is whether the detention regime is disproportionate in the de Freitas sense. I 
have already concluded that it is, and no remedial interpretation is able to save it. 
Accordingly, in my judgement, the scheme falls foul of [P1-1.]499
Parker LJ had already concluded that the scheme was disproportionate in the 
English public law sense in respect of article six of the ECHR. An article six 
argument had been made concerning an alleged shift in the burden of proof 
from the authorities onto the driver to prove that he had no knowledge of a 
clandestine  entrant  in  his  lorry.  Parker  LJ  had decided  this  aspect  of  the 
regulations breached the plaintiff's  right  to  a fair  trial  in  a  disproportionate 
manner. It surely cannot be correct, however, to consider proportionality in the 
particular light of one provision of the ECHR, and then to say that the same 
result  applies  to  all  other  relevant  articles.  A  violation  of  an  article  of  the 
ECHR involves a particular type of harm with particular consequences, with 
the intention of securing a particular aim. The fact that one article has been 
violated may in itself be relevant to the proportionality determination in respect 
of another; the extent to which the applicant has the right to argue his case 
before the domestic courts has been identified as a relevant consideration in 
deciding whether a fair balance has been struck in terms of P1-1.500 However, 
the  same  factors  that  render  a  violation  of,  as  here,  article  six, 
disproportionate are not, of necessity, the same factors that carry weight in 
respect  of  P1-1.  The justification  for  reversing  the  burden of  proof  in  this 
situation is not the same as the justification for detaining the vehicle involved 
in  the incident  except  in  the broadest  sense.  The impact  on the driver  of 
reversing the burden of proof is very different than the impact on the driver of 
losing the use of his vehicle for weeks or months. If compensation had been 
paid,  that  would  be  relevant  for  P1-1  but  it  is  unlikely  to  be  relevant  to 
questions of a fair trial. The factors on either side of the proportionality scale 
499 para 193
500 See discussion at pp 150-152 above
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vary depending on the violation in question. To say that the interference with 
article six is justified cannot be the basis on which it is concluded that the 
interference  with  P1-1  is  also  justified.  It  is  submitted  that  Parker  LJ's 
approach here simply cannot be correct.501
Where the state  does have a certain amount  of  discretion within  which to 
operate,  the Court  will  be concerned to see that they have done so in an 
appropriate manner. This will tend to include some indication that the various 
routes  which  are  open  to  the  public  authority  have  been  given  due 
consideration. For example, in the case of MWH and H Ward Estates Limited  
v Monmouthshire County Council502mentioned above, the council needed to 
construct a drainage channel to deal with a repeated problem of flooding in 
the area. A plan to insert the channel under the applicant's land had been 
decided  upon  following  a  lengthy  consultation  which  formed  part  of  the 
planning application for a new residential development on neighbouring land. 
The claimant argued that this action on the part of the council would amount 
to a disproportionate interference with his rights under P1-1. In considering 
proportionality, the Court reviewed the various routes the council may have 
gone down to achieve the result they sought (such as a compulsory purchase 
order.) With the work in question involving little more than a day's entry onto 
the  applicant's  land,  and  evidence  of  full  consideration  being  given  to  all 
potential options at the planning stage, the Court agreed with the trial judge 
that the proportionality test was satisfied. 
Consideration of all the options, however, does not mean to say that the least 
intrusive action by the state will be the only proportionate action that could be 
taken. There is not, in this sense, a principle of minimum intervention where 
proportionality is concerned. This point was eloquently made by the Court of 
Appeal  in  R  (Clays  Lane  Housing  Co-operative  Ltd.)  v  The  Housing 
Corporation.503 The defendant in this case is the statutory regulatory body for 
501 Unfortunately this confusion is not unique in situations where more than one article of the ECHR is engaged. For 
example, in  McIntosh v Lord Advocate [2003] 1 AC 1078, the Court  deals with the proportionality of an alleged 
breach of art 6 caused by the confiscation of proceeds of crime legislation, before concluding that the P1-1 breach 
must be proportionate if the art 6 breach is proportionate.
502 2002 WL 31413995
503 [2005] 1 WLR 2229
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social landlords, who had directed the plaintiff to transfer their housing stock 
to the Peabody Trust following findings of serious mismanagement within the 
plaintiff's administration. The plaintiff did not dispute that a transfer of stock 
was necessary and appropriate, but it wished the transfer to be made to its 
choice  of  successor,  Tenants  First  Housing  Co-operative,  with  whom  the 
plaintiff had already agreed the terms of a voluntary transfer. It argued that by 
imposing a compulsory transfer when a voluntary transfer was possible and, 
indeed,  the  preference  of  the  plaintiff,  the  defendant  had  acted 
disproportionately in violation of P1-1.
The parties  had agreed that  the  case constituted  a  deprivation,  as  would 
appear fairly straightforward given full legal title was to be removed from the 
plaintiff and transferred elsewhere. An argument was made by the plaintiff's 
counsel that the use of the word "necessary" in P1-1 should be interpreted to 
mean that an interference could only be justified by a strict necessity test, in 
other  words,  the  state  should  only  take  action  if  there  was  absolutely  no 
alternative.  The Court  of  Appeal  rejected this  submission,  however,  noting 
that the Strasbourg case law made clear that this word could have different 
meanings in different contexts within the Convention, and James v UK504 had 
made  it  explicit  that,  in  P1-1,  the  correct  test  was  what  was  reasonably 
necessary to achieve the legitimate aim sought to be achieved by the state 
whilst managing to strike a fair balance between the relevant interests.
How this would apply would depend on the context of the state action. In the 
instant case, there was not an option for the defendant to do nothing; having 
ascertained  the  extent  of  the  mismanagement  by  the  plaintiff,  it  was 
necessary for the housing stock to be transferred somewhere. The action the 
defendant  was  required  to  take  was  to  make  a  choice  between  two 
alternatives. In that context, Maurice Kay LJ concluded:
…that  the  appropriate  test  of  proportionality  requires  a  balancing  exercise  and a 
decision which is justified on the basis of a compelling case in the public interest and 
as being reasonably necessary but not obligatorily the least intrusive of Convention 
504 (1984) 8 EHRR 123
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rights. That accords with Strasbourg and domestic authority. It is also consistent with 
sensible and practical decision making in the public interest in this context. If "strict 
necessity"  were  to  compel  the  "least  intrusive"  alternative,  decisions  which  were 
distinctly second best or worse when tested against the performance of a regulator's 
statutory  functions  would  become mandatory.  A  decision  which  was  fraught  with 
adverse  consequences  would  have  to  prevail  because  it  was,  perhaps  quite 
marginally, the least intrusive. Whilst one can readily see why that should be so in 
some Convention contexts, it would be a recipe for poor public administration in the 
context of cases such as…the present one.505 
 
The  whole  tenor  of  this  finding  appears  very  much  in  keeping  with  the 
approach of Strasbourg towards enforcement of P1-1 rights. The margin of 
appreciation afforded to states is wide; flexibility is important; many interests 
have to be balanced up. It  is  difficult  to argue with  the idea that a test  of 
necessity should be less strictly applied in economic questions than in, for 
example, cases of deprivation of the right to liberty.
Although there is no principle of minimum intervention as such, the impact on 
the applicant will nevertheless be important to the question of proportionality. 
This point is neatly illustrated in Baird v Glasgow City Council,506 in which the 
pursuer was a taxi driver who had had his licence suspended for six months 
following an allegation that he had acted in a racist and threatening manner 
towards  another  driver  on  the  road.  The  sheriff  noted  that  depriving  the 
pursuer of his licence, even for a temporary period, would prevent him from 
working entirely during that period and might have a longer term impact on his 
business. The severity of  this result  was,  in the view of the sheriff,  out of 
proportion with the aim of securing the appropriate behaviour of taxi drivers.
The impact on the applicant also carried weight in the succession case In re 
Land.507 As set out above, the claimant had been convicted of his mother's 
manslaughter through gross negligence; he was the sole beneficiary under 
her will, but the English law of forfeiture applied to preclude him from taking 
the legacy since to do so would mean acquiring a benefit through his own 
505 para 25
506 [2003] SLLP 27
507 [2007] 1 WLR 1009, discussed at p183 above.
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wrongdoing.  This  left  the  claimant  in  a  position  of  financial  hardship.  The 
question  in  the  case  was  whether  he  could  seek  relief  in  terms  of  the 
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, which allows the 
Court to regulate distribution of an estate where reasonable financial provision 
has not been made under a will for a dependant of the deceased. Pre-existing 
obiter dicta of the Court of Appeal suggested  that a person in the claimant's 
situation could not make an application under the 1975 Act, since reasonable 
financial provision had been made for him in the will. The fact that he could 
not benefit from that provision as a result of the forfeiture rule was not relevant 
to the statute. 
The matter was essentially one of statutory interpretation, and the Court noted 
its obligation to construe legislative provisions in accordance with the ECHR 
so far as possible.508 The claimant's right to inherit was a possession in the 
meaning of P1-1; a restrictive reading of the legislation would result in him 
being deprived of that possession. The Court accepted that such a deprivation 
would be in the public interest in the sense that forfeiture rule exists in the first 
place to fulfil a public policy. However, in the Court's view:
[the  legislation]  must  be  read…in  a  way  that  enables  the  court  to  deprive  the 
wrongdoer of benefit from the estate when it is in the public interest so to do, but to 
confer a discretion to mitigate the harshness of the absolute rule where it is not in the 
public interest to deprive the wrongdoer of all benefit from the estate.509
Although the Court talks in this passage of "public interest," it is submitted that 
the argument here is really about proportionality. Where the wrongdoer would 
find  himself  in  a  state  of  extreme  financial  hardship  as  a  result  of  the 
deprivation,  it  would place a disproportionate burden upon him. The Court 
considers the legislation must be interpreted to allow discretion in order to 
avoid such a result as it would constitute a breach of P1-1. The impact on the 
individual  applicant  in  the  circumstances  of  the  case  must  be  taken  into 
account.  
508 This obligation is set out in s3 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
509 Para 20.
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Another  factor  which  may  assist  in  determining  the  proportionality  of  an 
interference is  the comparative viewpoint.  This  is  an approach which  has, 
perhaps surprisingly, been little considered in the Strasbourg jurisprudence. A 
useful example is given in Karl Construction Ltd v Palisade Properties.510 As 
discussed  above,  this  case  concerned  the  rules  on  inhibition  on  the 
dependence  which,  at  the  time,  was  allowed  as  a  matter  of  right  to  any 
pursuer of a summons containing a conclusion for payment of money. 
Lord Drummond Young took the opportunity to carry out a fairly systematic 
review of the law and procedure of inhibition on the dependence, noting the 
ease with which it could be obtained, the very limited grounds for recall and 
the  potentially  very  significant  impact  of  the  diligence  on  the  pursuer.  In 
respect  of  proportionality,  he  considered  the  range  of  criticisms  of  the 
automatic  grant  of  inhibition  on  the  dependence  made  by  commentators, 
noting that in almost every case comparative provisions in other jurisdictions 
required  special  circumstances to  be  made out  before  a  restraint  on  sale 
would be imposed. He also noted the potentially severe repercussions on the 
defender before concluding:
…the automatic right to an inhibition conferred by Scots law, with very limited right to 
compensation for use of the diligence without objective justification, does not strike a 
fair balance between the interest of the pursuer in having assets available to satisfy 
his claim and the right of the defender, recognised in P1-1, to dispose of his property 
as he wants. The requirement of proportionality is accordingly not satisfied.511
Ultimately,  it  was  held  that  the  automatic  grant  of  inhibition  on  the 
dependence was in breach of P1-1. The law in this area was subsequently 
reformed  along  the  lines  suggested  by  Lord  Drummond  Young  in  his 
judgment, to the effect that the diligence would only be granted where it was 
justified in the particular  case.512 This reform was extended to  apply to all 
510 2002 SLT 312
511 para 66
512 ss15A-N Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987, inserted by s169 Bankruptcy and Diligence (Scotland) Act 2007, although 
there is some doubt as to how successfully this protection operates in practice: see “Diligence on the dependence – 
a return to the old regime?” 2009 SLT 71
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forms of diligence on the dependence by  Advocate-General for Scotland v 
Taylor.513   
Finally,  as  in  any  discussion  of  proportionality  in  relation  to  P1-1,  some 
consideration must be given to the importance of compensation. As in the 
ECtHR jurisprudence, where financial recompense is made for a loss to an 
individual sustained in violation of his P1-1 rights, this will play a part in the 
proportionality equation. One short example is given in the case of Westerhall  
Farms v Scottish Ministers,514 discussed above, where the pursuers'  sheep 
were  ordered  to  slaughter  owing  to  the  risk  of  foot  and  mouth  disease 
spreading  from  the  infected  neighbouring  farm  premises.   Looking  at  the 
proportionality of the measures, Lord Carloway noted:
Here, there is on the one hand the prospect of substantial, potentially catastrophic, 
economic harm being caused to the farming industry if swift and effective action is not 
taken to prevent the spread of the disease. Such steps as are advised may result in a 
limited  amount  of  farming  livestock  being  slaughtered.  However,  the  legislation 
empowering  the  executive  to  order  the  slaughter  of  animals  also  compels  the 
executive to pay compensation amounting to the value of the animals killed.  This 
process does not seem to amount to a potential breach of the article.515
It will be recalled that the Strasbourg authorities set out a principle by which 
compensation had to be paid in respect of a deprivation of property, except in 
exceptional circumstances. Those circumstances seem to have existed only 
once, in the form of the reunification of Germany in 1991, and the extent to 
which even these circumstances could be said to be "exceptional" is one of 
some debate.516 
This issue of exceptional circumstances has been touched upon somewhat 
unhelpfully by the English courts in R v Secretary of State ex parte Eastside 
Cheese Co.517 In this case, a ban on commercial  dealings with  a batch of 
cheese which was likely, ultimately, to lead to destruction of that cheese was 
513 2004 SC 339
514 Unreported, Court of Session, 25 April 2001
515 Para 27. See also Christopher Shepherd v Scottish Ministers, unreported, 1 May 2007
516 See page163 above. 
517 [1993] CMLR 123
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considered by the Court  to amount to a control  of use. In considering the 
question  of  proportionality  in  this  case,  the  Court  correctly  observed  that 
payment of compensation was necessary in deprivation cases. It went on to 
state that: 
Such a rule is readily understandable where the State is itself assuming ownership of 
property belonging to another, or where property is being transferred from one citizen 
to another. It appears to us to have much less force where, in a case such as the 
present,  the object of the measure is to restrain the use of property in the public 
interest.518
 
There can be little to argue with  in the Court's reasoning up to this point. 
Indeed, there seems no reason why the argument could not have ended here. 
However, the Court goes on to observe:
If, however, the general rule stated by the court concerning compensation has any 
application to a situation such as faced by the Secretary of State, we would have little 
hesitation in holding that the circumstances were sufficiently exceptional to displace 
it.519
It  is a little unfortunate that the Court felt the need to make this statement 
when  it  was  entirely  unnecessary for  their  decision.  Given the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence on the subject in which various instances of dramatic political 
upheaval  and  regime  change  have  not  amounted  to  circumstances 
exceptional enough to render payment of compensation for a deprivation to 
be  unnecessary,  it  seems  somehow  unlikely  that  the  risk  of  an  albeit 
dangerous  strain  of  bacteria  infecting  cheese  stocks  would  be  sufficiently 
unusual  to  displace  the  normal  compensation  doctrine.  The  words 
"exceptional circumstances" may well have been used somewhat loosely in 
this context, but their use nevertheless suggests a grasp on the part of the 
domestic courts of some important and complex elements of the ECtHR case 
law.  
518 para 57
519 para 57
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One final and shorter point on compensation made by the domestic courts 
relates to the appropriate level at which compensation should be paid. This 
arises  in  Dennis  v  Ministry  of  Defence.520 It  has  been  made  clear  in  the 
Strasbourg  jurisprudence  that  compensation  for  a  deprivation  will  not 
necessarily be considered disproportionate simply because it does not reflect 
the  market  value  of  the  property  lost.  The  problem in  Dennis was  not  a 
deprivation,  but  rather  an  interference  with  the  peaceful  enjoyment  of 
possessions  as  a  result  of  noise  pollution  from  Harrier  Jump  Jets,  as 
discussed above.  The severe  extent  of  the  interference lead the  Court  to 
conclude that payment of compensation would be necessary to meet the test 
of  proportionality.  The  Court  confirmed  that  the  appropriate  level  of 
compensation  should  be  assessed  on  the  same  principles  as  delictual 
damages for common law nuisance. This seems sensible and appropriate in 
the domestic context.  
Overall, the question of proportionality appears to be one of the aspects of 
P1-1 which is most clearly understood by the domestic courts, with the variety 
of  novel  issues dealt  with  domestically seeming to  be in keeping with  the 
reasoning  of  the  Strasbourg  court.  Some issues  remain  in  relation  to  the 
relationship  between  different  articles  of  the  Convention  and  their  related 
requirements  of  proportionality,  and  the  complex  matter  of  "exceptional 
circumstances"  may  create  problems  domestically  as  it  has  done  in 
Strasbourg. 
4.4 Conclusion
The analysis of the Strasbourg jurisprudence in the second and third chapters 
of this thesis suggested a property right which had evolved gradually and with 
some difficulty in light of the ambiguity with characterised the protection from 
its conception. Although the domestic courts have had the opportunity to build 
to  a  large  extent  on  the  understanding  of  the  right  already  developed  in 
Strasbourg, it still remains necessary for the conflict at the heart of the right to 
be negotiated. That fact taken together with the range of areas of uncertainty 
520 [2003] Env LR 34
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which have yet to be resolved (or in some cases, have recently been created) 
by the Strasbourg jurisprudence, it is only to be expected that the path of the 
right in the domestic courts would not run entirely smoothly.    
For the most part, it would seem reasonable to say that the domestic courts 
have approached the question of interpretation and application of the right in 
good faith. Even subsequent to the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 
1998 and the Scotland Act 1998, the judiciary in the UK were not bound by 
Strasbourg  precedent  as  such,  being  under  an  obligation  rather  to  take 
account of the Strasbourg case law. Nonetheless, it has been shown that in a 
majority  of  cases,  the  domestic  courts  have  attempted  to  use  the  same 
principles of effective application which inform the Strasbourg understanding 
of the “autonomous concepts” which make up Convention law. This can be 
seen in the wide approach to the definition of possessions adopted both north 
and south of the border. The Court of Appeal even took the opportunity to ask 
some interesting questions about the extent of  “peaceful  enjoyment”  which 
have yet to be given a proper airing in Strasbourg in Aston Cantlow.521
There  have  inevitably  been  some  mis-steps  along  the  way,  although  the 
approach taken by the House of Lord in R(RJM)522 following shortly after the 
difficult case of  Campbell523 tends to confirm that the domestic judiciary are 
doing what  they can to  follow their  Strasbourg  counterparts.  Unfortunately 
some  of  the  difficulties  which  have  arisen  in  the  ECtHR  jurisprudence, 
particularly in the context of confiscation and forfeiture cases, seem set to be 
duplicated here, although it may not be fair to place the responsibility for these 
complexities at the doors of the Scottish and English courts.  
The use by the  domestic  courts  of  the  five  step  decision-making  process 
which has emerged gradually from the Strasbourg jurisprudence may perhaps 
not be viewed in such a positive light. Although it is possible to have some 
sympathy with the fact the ECtHR approach to resolution of P1-1 cases has 
taken some time to evolve and contains various uncertainties of its own, it is 
521 [2004] 1 AC 546
522 [2004] 3 All ER 387
523 [2009] 1 AC 311
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worth  bearing  in  mind  that  the  significant  majority  of  cases  decided 
domestically and discussed in this chapter have been dealt with within the 
past decade. It should have been open to the domestic courts to build upon 
the substantial work already carried out in Strasbourg to ensure an effective 
protection was in place, notwithstanding the difficulties inherent in the right 
itself. 
Although  the  domestic  jurisprudence  rarely  fails  to  at  least  mention  the 
Sporrong  and  Lonnröth “three  rules,”  there  seems  to  be  a  lack  of 
understanding as to how the categories are delineated which does not result 
directly  from confusion  in  the  European  understanding  of  the  doctrine.  In 
Strasbourg, the three-rule approach is used almost universally. As discussed 
in chapter three, the approach is not without its difficulties, but it has come to 
offer a useful starting point for the discussion of P1-1 rights within a variety of 
contexts, and at the least, it is certainly a workable doctrine. 
The lack of enthusiasm for the three-rule approach may be linked to an over-
generous interpretation by the domestic courts of the proportionality doctrine. 
Although it has been seen in the Strasbourg jurisprudence that the question of 
fair balance is decided very much on a case by case basis, it remains the 
case that the right in question must be balanced against the state action with 
which it interferes. There is a tendency in the domestic jurisprudence to apply 
some  general  concept  of  proportionality  to  state  action  as  a  whole  as 
compared with the aims it  seeks to achieve as a whole, without any more 
detailed  consideration  of  the  rights  and  possible  violations  involved.  It  is 
submitted, consequent to the discussion in chapter three, that this is not how 
the doctrine of proportionality is meant to operate within the P1-1 context. An 
overly  generous  application  of  this  doctrine  can  only  lead  to  a  lesser 
protection both in the immediate sense of seeming to justify what should be a 
disproportionate  interference,  and in  the  broader  sense of  creating  further 
ambiguity in a right that needs exactly the opposite.
One positive development in the domestic jurisprudence, however, seems to 
be a tendency on the part of the courts to question more closely the issue of 
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the public interest which is said to be served by the action of the state. Such 
scrutiny can bee seen particularly in the customs cases including International 
Transport Roth524 and Lindsay.525 The domestic courts continue to recognise 
the margin of appreciation afforded to the state here, but there seems to be a 
greater willingness to determine exactly where the limit  of  that may lie.  In 
many ways,  the  domestic  courts  are  a  more  appropriate  context  for  such 
discussions to take place. It is correct to say that the UK electorate did not 
vote to be governed by the European Court of Human Rights; nor did they 
vote to be governed by the domestic judiciary, but it remains a fact that the 
domestic judiciary have a much clearer understanding of the values of the 
British  society  and  the  impact  of  implementation  of  political  policies  here. 
There would seem to be scope for  a more interventionist  approach to  be 
taken by the domestic courts under this head.
Overall it may be fair to say that the evolution of the property right to date in 
the domestic jurisprudence is encouraging, with a tentative acceptance by the 
national  judiciary of  the Strasbourg approach in many places leading to a 
protection  that  is  practical  and  effective.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the 
jurisprudence in the next decade will continue to allow the right to evolve as it 
has been doing at the European level. In the fifth chapter, some consideration 
will be given to novel situations in which that jurisprudence may arise.       
 
524 [2003] QB 728
525 [2002] 1 WLR 1766
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CHAPTER FIVE: P1-1 IN THE PRESENT DAY 
"What is the use of repeating all that stuff," the Mock Turtle interrupted, "if you don't 
explain it as you go on?"526
5.1 Introduction
Over the 50 years since the ECHR was first ratified by the United Kingdom, 
human rights have become increasingly central to virtually every area of law. 
The proliferation of jurisprudence from the ECtHR, celebrating its 50th birthday 
this year, and the domestic courts has assisted in augmenting comprehension 
of human rights both amongst members of the legal profession and citizens of 
signatory states. It  may not be correct to say that human rights are better 
respected than they ever were, but they are certainly better known. 
There is a trend at present towards taking stock of what has been achieved 
over the past five decades and planning for the future of human rights. In the 
UK, in June 2009, the Equality and Human Rights Commission published the 
report of their inquiry into the position of the domestic human rights framework 
at  present  and  how  it  should  be  developed  in  the  coming  years.527 The 
European  Parliament,  in  its  most  recent  annual  report  on  human  rights, 
emphasised that economic, social and cultural rights must play as much of a 
role as civil and political rights in the future.528 A conference on the short and 
long-term future of  the  European Court  of  Human Rights  is  to  be  held  in 
Interlaken at the beginning of 2010, during Switzerland's Chairmanship of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.529 There is no doubt that 
human rights will continue to evolve at a rapid pace.
What does this mean for P1-1? In this chapter, an analysis will be carried out 
of  the  role  which  may be played  by  the  property  protection  in  four  areas 
currently  of  significant  importance  either  globally  or  domestically.  First, 
526 Alice in Wonderland, p93
527 Human Rights Inquiry: Report of the Equality and Human Rights Commission (June 2009)
528 "Annual Report on human rights in the world 2008 and the European Union's policy on the matter," 
(INI/2008/2336) (10 June 2009)
529 "Memorandum of the president of the European Court of Human Rights to the states with a view to preparing the 
Interlaken conference," 3 July 2009
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consideration will  be given to the UK legislative response to the worldwide 
problems  of  the  recent  (and  ongoing)  economic  crisis.  Secondly,  an 
examination will be made of the legislation on which the UK's fight to combat 
terrorist  activity  in  the  area  of  finance  is  based.  Thirdly,  a  review will  be 
undertaken  of  the  Scottish  Parliamentary  strategy  for  dealing  with  climate 
change, before finally an analysis of the P1-1 implications of the proposed 
wide-ranging  reform  to  the  Scottish  system  of  land  registration  will  be 
undertaken.   
5.2 Economic crisis
The collapse of the US sub-prime mortgage market in the summer of 2007 led 
to an international economic crisis, popularly referred to as the "credit crunch." 
The  genesis  of  the  crisis  was  the  huge  availability  of  credit  to  Western 
consumers, who had been living beyond their means for many years prior to 
2007. As house prices rose in accordance with spending, the criteria by which 
banks assessed the risk inherent in making a home loan grew increasingly 
less stringent.  Poor quality loans were sold off  in packages with less risky 
debts in a process known as securitisation.  When the US housing market 
crashed, it became apparent to holders of these securities that the packages 
were worth a lot less than they had believed. This loss of confidence caused 
banks to cease lending to each other and to rein back credit  extended to 
consumers.530
One of the most high-profile victims in the UK of this series of events was 
Northern Rock. This bank financed its lending through a type of securitisation 
process.  With  the  crisis  causing  a  virtual  freeze  on  inter-bank  lending, 
Northern Rock was no longer able to raise money in its usual way. Although it 
held more assets than it did liabilities, the inability to raise liquid funds meant 
that Northern Rock was not able to pay its debts as they fell due.531 In other 
words, Northern Rock became "cash flow insolvent" in the terminology of the 
530 This hugely simplified explanation of the crisis is based on a number of sources including numerous articles at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/financial-crisis,  http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/credit-crunch,  and 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/business/2007/creditcrunch/default.stm. 
531 "£3bn lent to Northern Rock," Financial Times, 22 September 2007; "Northern Rock gets bank bail out," BBC 
News 13 September 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6994099.stm 
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insolvency  legislation.532 This  state  of  affairs  became known  to  the  public 
through the media and lead to a run on the Bank.533 Since Northern Rock 
could not meet its debts and since the impact of the collapse of a high street 
bank  on  the  domestic  economy  could  be  catastrophic,  the  Government 
intervened,  first  to  underwrite  Northern  Rock's  liabilities,  and  later  to 
nationalise the bank on what is intended to be a temporary basis.534 
Northern Rock was not the only institution in need of  assistance from the 
Government. Bradford and Bingley Building Society was split into two parts, 
with  the  mortgage  book  nationalised  in  September  2008.535 Lloyds  TSB, 
HBOS  and  the  Royal  Bank  of  Scotland  received  funding  as  part  of  the 
Governmental "bail out" scheme later in 2008.536 
 
The state intervention in financial institutions which has taken place since the 
economic  crisis  blew  up  in  the  summer  of  2007  raises  some  interesting 
questions in terms of P1-1. The institutions concerned are all public limited 
companies  which  have  floated  on  the  stock  market.  The  rights  of  share 
holders,  which are accepted by the Strasbourg court  to be possessions,537 
have therefore been affected by the bail  out. Rights to vote and veto may 
have been overridden in the name of state-determined capital restructuring. 
More  dramatically,  total  deprivation  of  possessions may have  taken  place 
where shares have been compulsorily transferred into the hands of the state 
as  part  of  the  nationalisation  process.  Through a review of  the  legislation 
introduced to deal with the banking crisis and consideration of the case law to 
date, it will be determined whether the banking bail out has or is likely to lead 
to a violation of P1-1.  
532 See principally Insolvency Act 1986, s123(1)(e) 
533 The story was first broken by Robert Peston on his BBC blog here: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/robertpeston/2007/09/rock_or_crock.html
534 "Timeline: Northern Rock banking crisis," BBC News, 5 August 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7007076.stm
535 Statement by Bradford and Bingley, 29 September 2008, 
http://www.bbg.co.uk/bbg/ir/news/releases/groupnews/pressrelease/?id=4765430
536 "UK Banks receive £37bn bail-out," BBC News, 13 October 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7666570.stm 
537 Bramelid and Malmström v Sweden (8588/79) 12 December 1983
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5.2.1 The legislation: the Banking Act 2009
New legislation was required to deal with the crisis situation in which many of 
the major banks and building societies in the UK had found themselves in mid 
and late 2007. The Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 was fast-tracked 
through the legislative process in a matter of days before coming into force on 
21 February 2008 to allow for the nationalisation of Northern Rock. It expired 
a year to the day later, when it was superseded by the Banking Act 2009. The 
2009 Act built upon the skeleton of the earlier legislation by making provision 
for bank nationalisation, as well as setting out a new scheme for processing 
bank insolvency.
The centrepiece of the 2009 Act, and the area which gives rise to various 
questions in respect of  P1-1, is  the permanent Special  Resolution Regime 
(SRR) set  out  in Part  1.538 Where a bank has encountered,  or  is  likely to 
encounter, financial difficulties, the SRR addresses the situation by allowing 
one  of  three  “stabilisation  options”  in  addition  to  new  procedures  for 
insolvency and administration.539 The three stabilisation options are transfer to 
a  private  sector  purchaser,540 transfer  to  a  bridge  bank541 and  temporary 
transfer to public ownership.542 The tripartite authorities – the Treasury,  the 
Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority – are each given a role 
in implementing these options.543    
S4 of the Act sets out five special resolution objectives as follows:
(i) to  protect  and enhance the stability  of  the financial  system of  the United 
Kingdom;544
(ii) to  protect  and  enhance  public  confidence  in  the  stability  of  the  financial 
system of the United Kingdom;545 
(iii) to protect depositors;546
538 Ss1-89
539 S1(1)
540 Ss1(3)(a) and 11
541 Ss1(3)(b) and 12
542 Ss1(3)(c) and 13
543 S1(5)
544 S4(4)
545 S4(5)
546 S4(6)
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(iv) to protect public funds;547
(v) to avoid interfering with property rights in contravention of a Convention right 
(within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998.)548
It is worth bearing in mind that in the explanatory notes to the Banking Bill, the 
government specifically drew attention the terms of P1-1 here, pointing out 
that the right was not absolute but could be interfered with:
…particularly  when  acting  for  economic  and  public  policy  reasons,  where  that 
interference  is  lawful,  proportionate  and  justified  in  the  public  interest…the 
Government therefore considers that any interference with the Convention rights will 
be for a legitimate aim.549 
In order to implement the stabilisation options, the Act also provides for share 
transfer  instruments  (to  transfer  to  a  private  sector  purchaser),550 property 
transfer orders (to transfer to a bridge bank)551 and share transfer orders (to 
transfer to temporary public ownership.)552 In each case, the transfer order or 
instrument may refer to specific shares or classes of shares, or to specific 
property. Additional powers are also provided for to enable the transfer orders 
to be implemented properly, including a power to convert securities into other 
forms553 and to  remove existing directors and/or  appoint  new ones.554 The 
administration procedure set out in Part 3555 allows the Bank of England to 
appoint an administrator to deal with the bank's assets and affairs where it 
has been temporarily transferred into public ownership.  
Where a transfer of some kind is carried out on the basis of these provisions, 
the Act allows for three different orders in respect of compensation.556 There is 
no  substantive  provision  in  the  legislation  itself.  Rather,  the  Treasury  is 
empowered to lay out an appropriate scheme in each individual case. It can 
547 S4(7)
548 S4(8)
549 Banking Bill, Explanatory Notes, para 540
550 S11
551 S12
552 S13
553 s19
554 s20
555 ss136-168
556See generally ss49-62
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do so by making a compensation scheme order, which allows for payment of 
financial  recompense  for  loss  sustained  as  a  result  of  a  transfer,557 a 
resolution fund order, which allows for transferors to receive the proceeds of 
sale of the assets transferred,558 or a third party compensation order where 
persons  other  than  the  transferor  sustain  loss.559 There  is  provision  for 
assessment  of  appropriate  levels  of  compensation  to  be  made  by  an 
independent  valuer,560 although  the  Treasury  may  set  out  “valuation 
principles” on which the assessment must be based.561
The overall scheme set out in the 2009 legislation raises two major issues in 
respect  of  P1-1.  The first  relates  to  the rights  of  shareholders whilst  they 
continue  to  hold  shares.  The  second  relates  to  compensation  provisions 
where  shares  or  property  are  transferred  in  implementation  of  one  of  the 
stabilisation options. 
5.2.2 Interference with shareholder's rights
As discussed  in  chapter  two  above,  the  Strasbourg  court  recognises  that 
shares  carry  an  economic  value  and  therefore  can  be  construed  as 
possessions within the meaning of P1-1.562 Shares in a public limited company 
such as  Northern  Rock carry  with  them a  variety  of  rights  relating  to  the 
operation and governance of the company. In the normal course of events, a 
shareholder would have the right to vote on such matters as the election of 
new directors to the board, the sale of company assets and any proposed 
alteration  to  the  company  articles.  In  particular,  articles  25  to  29  of  the 
European  Council's  Second  Company  Law  Directive563 provide  that  any 
proposed  increase  or  decrease  of  the  company  share  capital  must  be 
approved by the general meeting. 
557 S49(2)
558 S49(3)
559 S49(4)
560 S54
561 S57
562 See pages 54-56 above.
563 Directive 77/91/EEC
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Changes to the administration or capital structure of a company without the 
approval of shareholders where appropriate has already been found by the 
ECtHR  to  amount  to  an  interference  with  possessions.  In  Sovtransavto 
Holding v Ukraine,564 the applicant had originally been a 49% shareholder in a 
company which was reduced to 20.9% as the result of a state-agency ordered 
increase in the share capital.  Although the Court  was unclear whether  the 
domestic  law  allowed  such  action  to  take  place,  it  was  satisfied  that  the 
manner in which the original state interference and the subsequent domestic 
review procedure had been conducted was sufficiently opaque as to make a 
finding of violation of P1-1 appropriate in the case. 
The potential  difficulty in respect  of  the 2009 Act is that  it  enables similar 
types of state interference with the governance of a bank to take place in the 
name  of  facilitating  the  stabilisation  options.  Directors  can  be  appointed, 
securities  can  be  restructured  and  ultimately  an  administrator  can  be 
appointed to manage the bank's affairs without shareholder approval being 
required. Is this likely to amount to a violation of P1-1 on similar grounds to 
those explored in Sovtransavto?
Any action taken under these provisions of the 2009 Act seems most likely to 
be  characterised  by  the  Court  as  a  control  of  the  use  of  possessions. 
Shareholders  are  being  prevented  from  exercising  one  of  the  rights 
associated with their ownership, but they are not deprived of their ownership 
entirely.565 The control  will  be  presumably  be  considered lawful,  since  the 
nature and extent of the possible interference is clearly set out in legislation. It 
would also seem difficult to argue that the control does not pursue a legitimate 
aim  in  the  public  interest,  since  the  objectives  of  the  Act  in  respect  of 
stabilisation of financial markets and protection of the economy are clearly set 
out  in  the  legislation  itself.  The  main  issue  is  most  likely  to  be  that  of 
proportionality. 
564 (2004) 38 EHRR 44
565 Unless, of course, they are, via share transfer order. The P1-1 implications of that deprivation are considered in 
the section on compensation immediately below.
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As will be recalled from discussion in chapter three, a control of use does not 
require payment of compensation for a finding of proportionality to be made. 
Beyond that, it is difficult to say what the balance of proportionality will  be. 
Recent events have demonstrated that protection of the economy is vital for 
the overall public good, and the significance of that aim of the legislation is 
likely to weigh heavily in the proportionality equation. There would seem also 
to be a need for the state to be able to act both quickly and decisively in such 
situations in order to restore faith in the market and prevent panic amongst 
depositors and investors which could destabilise the economy further. On the 
other hand, it is difficult  to know precisely what impact the exercise of the 
legislative  provisions  under  discussion  here  might  have  on  an  individual 
shareholder,  particularly  in  a  case  where  shares  will  not  ultimately  be 
transferred out of his hands. Based on Sovtransvato, the manner in which the 
powers are exercised by the state are also likely to play a part in determining 
the question of proportionality. 
Ultimately it is not possible to say whether the exercise of these provisions will 
entail a violation of P1-1 until a specific example of their exercise is available. 
What does seem clear is that such a violation has the potential to occur here, 
a risk which the state will presumably wish to bear in mind. 
5.2.3 Problems with compensation
Where a transfer of shares or property is implemented under the provisions of 
the Act, there can be no question that a deprivation of possessions has taken 
place. Such a deprivation will presumably be considered both lawful and in 
the public interest on the basis of the analysis set out above in relation to 
capital  restructuring.  The  question  of  proportionality,  however,  is  likely  to 
depend to a substantial extent on the provision made for compensation. 
It  will  be recalled, from the discussion in chapter three, that deprivation of 
property  without  payment  of  compensation  can  only  be  justifiable  in 
exceptional circumstances.566 To date, a finding of exceptional circumstances 
566 See Lithgow v United Kingdom  (1986) 8 EHRR 329 and the discussion at pages 158 - 168 above.
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has been made only once, in relation to the reunification of Germany,567 and it 
may be safe to assume that such a finding would not be made in respect of 
the provisions of the 2009 Act. The ECtHR has indicated that compensation 
should normally be reasonably related to  the value of  the property  lost,568 
whilst clarifying that this does not mean full market value must be paid for the 
proportionality test to be satisfied in every case. The state is permitted to take 
into account broader factors when deciding on the appropriate level, such as 
the reason for the deprivation and any benefit which may be obtained by the 
deprived party from the public interest served by their loss.569 Ultimately, and 
most importantly for  the 2009 Act,  the precise terms of any compensation 
scheme are, in the view of the Strasbourg court, a matter which falls within the 
margin of appreciation afforded to the state. Accordingly, the ECtHR will only 
intervene where the terms of that scheme are manifestly without reasonable 
foundation.570 
These principles of compensation have already led to litigation in respect of 
the  Northern  Rock  nationalisation.  A  conglomeration  of  both  institutional 
shareholders and smaller investors, including employees of the Bank, brought 
an action in which they argued that the compensation scheme established in 
respect of their shares amounted to a violation of their rights under P1-1. This 
ongoing  dispute  is  called  R  (SRM  Global  Master  Fund  and  Ors)  v  HM 
Treasury.571
The Northern Rock Plc Transfer Order came into force on 22 February 2008 
and transferred all shares in the company to a nominee of the Treasury with 
immediate  effect.  The  compensation  scheme  for  shareholders  thus 
expropriated was set out in the Northern Rock Plc Compensation Scheme 
Order 2008. It provided, in the first place, that:
567 Jahn v Germany (2006) 42 EHRR 49, discussed at pages 163-4 above
568 Lithgow v United Kingdom, ibid. 
569 Katikaridis v Greece (2001) 32 EHRR 6
570 Discussion of all the above can be found at pages 158 – 168
571 [2009] EWHC 227 (Admin) (High Court); [2009] EWCA Civ 788 (Court of Appeal)
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The amount of compensation payable to a person shall be an amount equal to the 
value  immediately  before  the  transfer  time  of  all  shares  in  Northern  Rock  held 
immediately before the transfer time by that person.572
That value was to be determined by an independent valuer.  However,  his 
assessment  had  to  be  based  on  the  "valuation  assumptions"  set  out  in 
paragraph 6 of the schedule, namely that:
…Northern Rock–
(a) is unable to continue as a going concern; and
(b) is in administration
These assumptions formed the crux of the debate. The shareholders believed 
that, in application of the assumptions, the value of the shares immediately 
before transfer was highly likely to be nil. Accordingly, they argued that they 
were being deprived of their possessions without payment of compensation in 
violation of P1-1. This was said to be disproportionate since, as a matter of 
fact, immediately before the transfer, Northern Rock was not in administration. 
It was operating on the basis of the assistance of the Treasury and the Bank 
of England and had a legitimate expectation that this support would continue 
to be extended, particularly since security had been given for the Bank of 
England loans. The shareholders also noted that the Treasury stood to make 
a profit from the eventual resale of Northern Rock once the liquidity crisis was 
over,  and this,  it  was argued,  added to  the lack of  proportionality  brought 
about by the absence of compensation.     
At first instance, the Court found the plaintiffs' argument to be fundamentally 
misconceived. The case was not one of deprivation without  compensation. 
Clearly compensation had been provided for. The question was whether the 
basis on which that compensation was assessed – which the court accepted 
may well  result  in a nil  valuation – was justified. Following the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, the Court noted that the terms of the scheme were a matter 
within the margin of appreciation of the state, which could only be questioned 
by the Court if they were manifestly without reasonable foundation. Given that 
572 Schedule, para 3(2)
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Northern Rock would have become cash-flow insolvent without the assistance 
of the state, and given that Northern Rock and the plantiffs had no right to 
expect that such support would continue to be offered, the Court could make 
no finding that the valuation assumptions exceeded the margin of appreciation 
afforded to the state.    
We  do  not  think  that  the  implicit  determination  of  the  legislature  that  the 
Compensation Scheme does not impose an "individual and excessive burden" on the 
shareholders was outside even the narrowest margin of appreciation. To the contrary, 
there is a good argument that the excessive burden would, in the Claimant's case, be 
borne not by the shareholders but by the taxpayer who, having provided financial 
support to Northern Rock, would then have to pay to the shareholders the value of 
their shares enhanced by that support.573
After  this  decision  was  handed  down  in  February  2009,  the  shareholders 
appealed unsuccessfully. The Court of Appeal affirmed the approach taken at 
first instance to the terms of the compensation scheme, which it agreed were 
within the margin of appreciation afforded to the state. It was noted that the 
nationalisation was effected as a strategic exercise of government policy in 
the interests  of  preserving the economy,  and was not  designed to  benefit 
shareholders. At the time, Northern Rock was unable to obtain support from 
anywhere else, and the Court found this to be the situation reflected in the 
valuation  assumptions.  The  Court  also  noted  that  the  assessment  of 
compensation need not necessarily be nil – Northern Rock still held assets, 
such as its mortgage book, which the valuer would no doubt take into account 
as he saw fit. 
The purpose of the assumptions was to put the shareholders in the position they 
would have occupied (vis-à-vis the value of the shares) had no [state] support been 
provided.  That  objective  was  achieved.  Once  the  whole  context  in  which  [the 
compensation  scheme]  was  evolved  is  understood,  it  can  by  no  means  be 
characterised as manifestly without reasonable foundation.574 
573 para 168
574 para 77
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On the whole it  seems likely that the conceptualisation of  the case by the 
English courts is one that would find favour in Strasbourg. It is impossible to 
escape the fact that the whole sequence of events which unfolded around 
Northern  Rock  subsequent  to  the  liquidity  crisis  was  highly  political.  The 
decision to provide support to the bank in the first place was, in itself, a state 
interference.  The nationalisation  could  be  considered an extension  of  that 
interference. The fact that the Strasbourg Court will only take issue with the 
terms of a compensation scheme where it is manifestly without reasonable 
foundation, considered together with  the traditionally extreme reluctance of 
the Court to find that a state has exceeded its margin of appreciation where 
some political or policy argument is put forward, all tend to suggest that the 
outcome of an application to the ECtHR would be the same as the results of 
the litigation so far.
There are, however, two complications, both of which relate to the identity of 
the shareholders involved. The first is touched on by the High Court towards 
the end of its decision, where it states:
We have some sympathy for the position of the former long-term shareholders of 
Northern Rock,  who doubtless believed that  they had an investment in a reliable 
bank.575  
Not  every  shareholder  affected  by  the  nationalisation  was  in  the  same 
position. It is clear that the conglomeration of parties who raised the litigation 
included both large institutional investors, some of whom had purchased the 
majority of  the shares  after  it  had become known that nationalisation was 
likely,  and  also  individual  personal  shareholders  including  employees  and 
former employees of the company. Proportionality is a question of balance. 
Although it may well be right that the Court could not question the terms of the 
compensation scheme in itself on the grounds of proportionality, in looking at 
the  bigger  picture  of  the  deprivation,  the  impact  on  different  shareholders 
could obviously be quite significant.  A large institutional  investor  may only 
suffer a loss of profits, whereas a retiree depending on his dividend as part of 
575 para 170
240
his income may be in a significantly worse position. The burden on one may 
not be considered individual and excessive, whereas the same may not be 
true  of  the  burden  on  another.  At  present  compensation  has  not  been 
assessed and so the ultimate impact of the share transfer cannot be known. It 
should also be borne in mind, of course, that any investor speculating on the 
stock market is responsible for the risk of that, and the collapse of the market 
which led to the extreme diminution of the value of Northern Rock's shares 
was not the result of state interference. However, this may be an issue which 
requires to be revisited at a later stage, when the value of compensation is 
known.
The second complication relates to the nationality of the various shareholders. 
It is quite correct to say that compensation for expropriated nationals is only 
part  of  the  bigger  picture  of  proportionality,  and  that  the  terms  of  a 
compensation scheme may only  be questioned where  they are manifestly 
without reasonable foundation. However, the position for expropriated aliens 
is not the same. As discussed in chapter three, the reference in P1-1 to the 
general principles of international law has been understood, through a series 
of cases, to apply only to expropriations of non-nationals, and carries with it 
the guarantee that  such expropriation should result  in payment of  prompt, 
adequate  and  effective  compensation.576 "Adequate"  in  this  context  is 
generally accepted to mean "market value." The relevant time at which the 
value should be assessed for  the shares in  question is  at  or  immediately 
before  the  date  on  which  the  expropriation  occurred  or  the  decision  to 
expropriate  became  known,  without  reference  to  the  effects  of  the 
expropriating measure.577
 
It has been argued that the terms of the compensation scheme for Northern 
Rock do not meet these requirements of international law. N. Jansen Calamita 
contends that:
Notwithstanding  the  financial  difficulties  experienced  by  Northern  Rock  in  late 
576 See discussion at pages 124-131 above. 
577 See World Bank Guidelines Art IV 3
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2007/early 2008, there is considerable evidence in the public record indicating that at 
the time immediately prior to the nationalization…none of the ‘ assumptions’  required 
by the [Compensation Scheme Order] was true. Northern Rock in fact was not in 
administration. By the Government's own account, Northern Rock was solvent and a 
going concern. Financial assistance from the Treasury and the Bank of England had 
not been withdrawn. And there was no suggestion one way or the other how the 
Treasury  or  the  Bank  of  England  would  act  in  the  future  with  respect  to  further 
financial assistance to Northern Rock. In essence, the CSO requires a rewriting of 
history.  As  a  result,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  a  valuation  based  upon  the  CSO 
assumptions  can  be  characterized  as  independent  of  the  effects  of  the  UK's 
expropriating measures.578 
With respect, however, this approach may be closer to the letter than to the 
spirit of the law. It is true, of course, to say that the valuation is not free from 
the effects of the expropriation; it is a statutory instrument resulting from that 
expropriation which defines the assumptions on which the valuation is to be 
based. However, presumably the government would argue that the purpose of 
those assumptions is to do exactly as international law demands. If the state 
had  not  stepped  in,  Northern  Rock  would  have  inevitably  fallen  into 
administration. The valuation should therefore be made on this basis, not on 
the basis of the expropriation which saved the bank. 
Whether either of these points of views is correct is not known. What is clear, 
however,  is  that  the  implications  of  the  different  treatment  required  for 
nationals  and  non-nationals  have  not  been  considered  at  all  by  the 
jurisprudence  to  date.  It  is  an  issue  which  it  would  appear  needs  to  be 
addressed. It seems, however, that the Northern Rock shareholders may be 
prepared to appeal the case further to the ECtHR.579 It may be that answers 
are provided to the issues raised here at that stage.
5.2.4 Debtor protection
One  additional  impact  of  the  economic  crisis  in  Scotland  has  been  the 
proposal of the Home Owner and Debtor Protection (Scotland) Bill, introduced 
578 "British bank nationalizations: an international law perspective," 2009 ICLQ 119, p140
579 "Northern Rock shareholder battle could end up in House of Lords," Guardian, 28 July 2009
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into  Parliament  on  1st  October  2009.  The  Bill  is  the  result  of 
recommendations put forward by the Repossession Group, a sub-committee 
of the Debt Action Forum, set up by the Scottish Government in January 2009 
to  consider  appropriate  protection  measures  for  debtors  in  the  current 
financial  climate.  As  its  name  suggests,  the  sub-committee  was  tasked 
particularly with  examining the issue of lender repossession in  light  of  the 
substantial increase in residential repossessions subsequent to the collapse 
of the banks.580 
The  Bill  proposes  amendment  of  the  Conveyancing  and  Feudal  Reform 
(Scotland)  Act  1970  to  restrict  the  ability  of  creditors  to  enforce  standard 
securities  over  residential  properties  where  debtors  default  on  loan 
repayments.  In  particular,  if  the  Bill  passes  into  law,  it  will  no  longer  be 
possible  for  standard  security  holders  to  repossess  residential  property 
without first obtaining a warrant from the court.581 Prior to making a warrant 
application, the creditor will be under an obligation to make reasonable efforts 
to arrange a repayment scheme with the debtor, in addition to providing them 
with  details  of  where  to  seek  advice  and  assistance  on  their  financial 
problems.582 The Court,  in determining a warrant  application, is directed to 
consider:
(a) the nature of and reasons for the default,
(b) the ability of the debtor to fulfil within a reasonable time the obligations under the 
standard security in respect of which the debtor is in default,
(c) any action taken by the creditor to assist the debtor to fulfil those obligations,
(d)  where  appropriate,  participation  by  the  debtor  in  a  debt  payment  programme 
approved under Part 1 of the Debt Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Act 2002, 
and
(e) the ability of the debtor and any other person residing at the security subjects to 
secure reasonable alternative accommodation.583
The P1-1 implications in respect of the creditor’s rights are obvious. Debt is 
580 For further discussion, see the SP Bill 32 Policy Memorandum.
581 S1(1) and (2), amending s20 and 23 of the 1970 Act
582 S4(1) and (2), insertion ss 24A and 5B into the 1970 Act
583 S3(7)
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considered a possession in terms of the Strasbourg jurisprudence,584 and the 
restriction of the creditor’s remedies to enforce repayment of that debt would 
no doubt amount to a control of the use of that possession. 
Although the property right will be engaged, however, it seems unlikely that a 
violation would be found should the Bill become law. The new restrictions on 
creditors would have a clear basis in legislation, and there is little doubt that 
the protection of debtors in light of the tumultuous global financial situation 
and a desire to limit the incidence of homelessness would be considered a 
legitimate aim in the public interest. The real question would be whether the 
protection  represents  a  disproportionate  interference with  creditors’  human 
rights.  Although  there  is  no  immediate  comparison  in  the  domestic 
jurisprudence, the Strasbourg case law does offer some useful guidance as to 
the likely attitude of the Court. 
As a general rule, the ECtHR is sympathetic to the position of individuals who 
are at risk of losing their home. In particular, the Court appears reluctant to 
prioritise financial interests of one party over the need of another for a place to 
live. This attitude has been demonstrated in a number of applications dealing 
with rent controls or restrictions on the landlord’s power to evict where these 
measures  have  been  put  in  place  to  alleviate  the  risk  to  tenants  of 
homelessness.585 In Spadea and Scalabrino v Italy,586 the landlords had gone 
as far as obtaining eviction orders through the courts, but were unable to put 
the orders into effect due to a lack of cooperation from the police. The police 
had been issued with guidelines directing them to de-prioritise work of this 
kind. In Mellacher v Austria,587 rent control legislation had reduced the rental 
income of some applicants by more than 80%. In each of these cases, the 
interference was found to be proportionate.
In proportionality terms, the proposed Scottish legislation could be argued to 
584 A, B and AS Company v Germany (7742/76) 4 July 1978
585 See Immobiliare Saffi v Italy (2000) 30 EHRR 756, Scollo v Italy and the discussion at pages 158-168 above.
586 (1996) 21 EHRR 482
587 (1990) 12 EHRR 391
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weigh less heavily on creditors than the restrictions on landlords outlined in 
the  Strasbourg  cases.  Creditors  who  hold  standard  securities  will  almost 
inevitably be financial institutions whose interest in the repossession is purely 
economic. The hardship here is less direct than for some applicant landlords 
in the tenancy applications discussed above, who sought to resume physical 
occupation of the premises concerned. The determination of creditors’ rights 
will be made through the courts, which will be looked upon favourably in the 
proportionality equation.588 At a minimum, the involvement of the courts should 
lead to greater protection of the creditors’ rights than in Spadea, where court 
decrees were effectively rendered impotent by administrative guidelines on 
policing.  Perhaps  most  critically,  it  does  seem from the  Bill  that  eventual 
repossession, although more difficult to obtain than it may be at present, is not 
de facto impossible, as it appeared to be in some of the Italian cases. 
No definitive statement can be made in respect of the P1-1 compliance of the 
proposed debtor protection provisions at present. Amendments may be made 
to the Bill during its passage through Parliament, and the manner in which any 
resulting legislation is ultimately applied may also give rise to proportionality 
concerns. On the basis of the material currently available, however, it seems 
unlikely that any violation of P1-1 would be found.
5.3 The war on terror and anti-terrorist financing
Terrorist organisations require a financial  infrastructure to carry out acts of 
violence. Dismantling that infrastructure is therefore one aspect of the global 
governmental efforts to combat terror. There are generally considered to be 
two main elements to this task. The first  is  to identify and prevent  money 
laundering operations worldwide. The second is to confiscate assets held by 
or  on  behalf  of  terrorist  networks.  It  is  this  second  element  which  raises 
interesting questions in respect of P1-1.  
5.3.1 Domestic legislation
588 See the discussion at pages 154 - 156 above.
245
Seizure of assets in connection with terrorism was first seen in the United 
Kingdom  as  part  of  the  Prevention  of  Terrorism  Act  1989,  a  piece  of 
legislation drafted primarily in response to the activities of the IRA. However, it 
was not until the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York on September 
11th 2001 that asset freezing became an international priority in respect of the 
newly conceptualised "war on terror." The USA led the agenda with extensive 
powers of seizure set out in the much publicised Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act 2001 (or the USA PATRIOT Act 2001.) At the same time the 
mandate of the Financial  Action Task Force (FATF),  an independent inter-
governmental  body  which  had  previously  focused  on  developing  and 
promoting policy to protect the global financial system from money laundering, 
was extended to included anti-terrorist financing measures.589 In October of 
that year, Gordon Brown, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, stated that:
Those who finance terror are as guilty as those who commit it. So our response to the 
funding of terrorist acts must be every bit as clear, as unequivocal and as united as 
our response to the terrorist acts themselves.590  
He announced an action plan on terrorist financing which ultimately led to the 
Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA). 
ATCSA builds on the Terrorism Act 2000 to set out a variety of methods by 
which  funding  of  terrorism  can  be  intercepted  or  dismantled.  Section  1 
provides for forfeiture of "terrorist cash," defined as cash intended for use for 
the  purposes  of  terrorism,  cash  which  forms  part  of  the  resources  of  a 
proscribed organisation and cash which is or represents property obtained 
through terrorism. Sections 4 and 5 confer on the Treasury the power to make 
a freezing order, which prohibits the person on whom the order is served from 
making  financial  assets  and  economic  benefits  of  any  kind  available  to 
specified  persons.  Failure  to  comply  with  the  order  is  a  criminal  offence. 
589 www.fatf-gafi.org
590 "Action against financing of terrorism – statement of Chancellor of the Exchequer," 16 October 2001
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Schedule 2 enhances the powers of seizure and forfeiture of terrorist cash 
and property set out in Part 3 of the 2000 Act.   
The anti-terrorist financing legislation has recently been further augmented by 
the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. Section 62 and Schedule 7 of that Act set 
out a scheme by which the Treasury may "give a direction" imposing certain 
requirements  on  any  credit  or  financial  institution  operating  in  the  United 
Kingdom.  Such a direction can only be given where certain conditions are 
fulfilled, primarily where the FATF has advised a risk of terrorist financing or 
the Treasury "reasonably believe" there is a risk of terrorist financing being 
carried out in a specific country, by that country's government or by persons in 
the county. A direction can include a variety of requirements. Most pertinent 
for the purposes of P1-1 is the requirement to limit or cease business set out 
in articles 9 and 13 of the schedule, which prohibits entering into or continuing 
specific  transactions, all  transactions of  a specified type or all  transactions 
with particular persons. Again, non-compliance with the terms of a direction 
will result in penalties, in this case both civil and criminal. 
The scope of the powers contained within these three pieces of legislation is 
wide to say the least. Is there potential for a violation of P1-1 to occur in their 
exercise?
5.3.2 P1-1 implications
In the first place, it seems clear that action by the government here is likely to 
engage P1-1. State action to freeze cash or assets, or to restrain certain types 
of business transaction, would presumably be considered a control of the use 
of possessions. This is the view taken by the ECtHR and the domestic courts 
in respect of similar provisions for the seizure of smuggled goods identified at 
a border check, for example.591 The subsequent forfeiture of terrorist cash or 
other property should, as a matter of common sense, be categorised as a 
deprivation of possessions, since ownership of the goods is transferred from 
591 Vasilescu v Romania (1999) 28 EHRR 241
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the  original  holder  to  the  state  as  the  result  (usually)  of  a  court  order. 
However, a useful point of comparison here is likely to be the treatment of 
forfeiture  provisions  in  respect  of  the  proceeds  of  crime.  As  discussed  in 
chapters three and four above, both the ECtHR592 and the domestic courts593 
have viewed forfeiture orders in relation to proceeds of crime following on 
drug  trafficking  convictions  as  a  control  of  the  use  of  possessions, 
notwithstanding the loss of ownership they entail. Although it is impossible to 
say  with  any  certainty  how  an  anti-terrorist  forfeiture  would  be  viewed,  it 
seems  that  the  trend  of  the  jurisprudence  is  towards  categorisation  as  a 
control of use.  
Whether the state action under the terrorist financing legislation is considered 
a control or a deprivation, P1-1 will be engaged. Consideration must then be 
given to whether  the breach is lawful  and pursues a legitimate aim in the 
public interest. On the face of it, there would seem to be little difficulty here. 
Any action of the state will be based on the terms of the legislation, which 
would normally be sufficient to meet the lawfulness requirement.  It  is  also 
difficult  to  imagine  that  there  would  be  any  argument  to  the  effect  that 
dismantling  the  financial  infrastructure  of  terrorist  organisations  is  not  a 
legitimate aim in the public interest. 
However, one high-profile use that has been made of the legislation to date 
does beg some questions about whether the analysis of its P1-1 implications 
is quite that straightforward.
5.3.3 The Lansbanki case
On 7th October 2008, the Icelandic financial  institution Landsbanki was put 
into  receivership  by the Icelandic  Financial  Supervisory  Authority.  A press 
release  from  the  Authority  stated  that  all  domestic  deposits  were 
guaranteed,594 however,  the  Icelandic  government  indicated  that  foreign 
creditors would receive only a small percentage of their deposits following the 
592 Philips v UK (41087/98) 5 July 2001
593 McSalley v HMA 2000 JC 485
594 "Based on new legislation, the Icelandic Financial Supervision Authority (FME) proceeds to take control of 
Landsbanki to ensure continued commercial bank operations in Iceland," 7 October 2008, www.fme.is/?
PageID=581andNewsID=331 [accessed 17 August 2009]
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receivership  procedure.595 Landsbanki,  through  its  subsidiary  Icesave,  had 
around 20,000 accounts in the United Kingdom, including several held by UK 
local  authorities,  police  authorities  and  other  public  bodies  with  combined 
deposits of close to £800 million.596 Concerned that UK depositors would not 
be protected and, particularly given the public money involved, that this could 
have a dangerous impact on the economy, the UK government passed the 
Landsbanki Freezing Order 2008. The order was made under s4 of ATCSA, 
specifically on s4(2)(a) which provides that the Treasury may make a freezing 
order where it reasonably believes that:
Action to the detriment of the United Kingdom's economy (or part of it) has been or is 
likely to be taken by a person or persons.597 
The freezing order prohibited funds being made available to Landsbanki, the 
Central  Bank  of  Iceland,  the  Icelandic  Financial  Services  Authority,  the 
Landsbanki  receivership  committee  and the  government  of  Iceland.598 The 
essential effect of the order in this situation was to prevent Landsbanki assets 
being "repatriated"  to  Iceland.  However,  an exception from the Order  was 
granted by the Treasury which allowed Icesave to trade with its UK customer 
base.
Is such action really what the anti-terrorist finance legislation was designed to 
do? Genevieve Lennon and Clive Walker note that:
The Government adopted an almost flippant response to inquiries about the legal 
basis of the order, disclosing that “it happened to be in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act.”599
At  this  stage,  it  is  worth  recalling  the  explanation  of  the  lawfulness 
requirement given by the Strasbourg court in the series of cases outlined in 
chapter three. For an interference to be "subject to the conditions provided for 
by law," it must have a clear basis in domestic law, easily accessed by the 
public, which results in foreseeable consequences. In other words, the state 
595 "Excerpts: Iceland's Oddson," Wall Street Journal, 17 October 2008
596 "Icelandic government seizes control of Landsbanki," Guardian, 7 October 2008
597 s4(2)(a)
598 Landsbanki Freezing Order 2008, arts 2-4
599 "Hot money in a cold climate," 2009 PL 37
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action must not be arbitrary. A person should be able to read the legislation 
and  regulate  their  conduct  accordingly.  Similarly,  it  should  be  possible  to 
reasonably foresee how the state will act on the basis of that legislation.600 
It is possible to make an argument that there was no reasonable foreseeability 
in this particular case. The provisions of ATCSA were designed to counter 
terrorist financing, operating in tandem with more stringent money laundering 
regulation.  There  is  no  suggestion  that  the  circumstances  surrounding 
Landsbanki were in any way connected to terrorist activity.  Could the bank 
reasonably have foreseen, based on the legislation, that the UK government 
would impose a freezing order on its assets?
The difficulty with this argument is likely to be that the wording of the statute is 
certainly sufficiently wide to allow for the outcome that in fact occurred. If the 
context (and title) of the legislation is ignored, and the focus is placed solely 
on the wording of the specific provision, it can be seen that the government 
had the power to make the order to prevent action which would be detrimental 
to the UK economy. That danger certainly seems to have been very present in 
this case. The background to the legislation also seems to suggest that it was 
never intended to be restricted to use strictly for anti-terrorist purposes. When 
the ATCS Bill was at the debate stage in the House of Lords, the width of the 
provision was questioned by Lord Goodhart, who had moved an amendment 
which would have changed the relevant paragraph of s4 to read:
Action involving terrorism to the detriment of the United Kingdom's economy (or part 
of it) has been or is likely to be taken by a person or persons601
In support of the amendment, he gave a hypothetical example of a potential 
outcome of the legislation as it stood at the time.
A Japanese company is considering whether to build a new car manufacturing plant 
in the United Kingdom or in Switzerland. The Swiss Government offer the company a 
financial inducement to build its plant in Switzerland – something in the nature of, say, 
a tax holiday. 
600 See Sunday Times v UK (1979-80) 2 EHRR 245, Malone v UK (1985) 7 EHRR 14 and the discussion generally in 
chapter three at pages 109 - 132
601 Emphasis added. Hansard, HL Vol 629, col 347 (28 November 2001)
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That is plainly action to the detriment of the United Kingdom economy. The result is 
that, at least in theory, the Treasury could make a freezing order stopping anyone in 
the  United  Kingdom,  or  United  Kingdom nationals  resident  abroad,  from  making 
payments to the Swiss Government. Some people might say that that was quite right, 
but I am sure that it was not the intention.602
In the discussion which followed, it became plain that the government had not 
intended that this aspect of the legislation be restricted to use for anti-terrorist 
purposes. It was noted that the intention to "provide for the freezing of assets" 
in the long title  of  the bill  was entirely separate from the reference to the 
intention to "make further provisions about terrorism and security."  Various 
circumstances were suggested in which a threat to the economy may arise 
independent  of  terrorism  and  it  was  argued  that  emergency  legislation 
remained appropriate for dealing with such a wide ranging issue since not all 
emergencies  are  the  result  of  terrorism.  The  amendment  was  ultimately 
withdrawn.603 No further discussion appears to have taken place on this point 
in the House of Commons, although it is perhaps worth noting the description 
given of this Part of the Act by the Home Secretary:
Parts I and II complement the Proceeds of Crime Bill in stopping organised terrorism 
and crime being perpetrated through money laundering by organised finance – We 
are seeking the ability to freeze assets, to take unified action with other countries and 
to introduce restraining orders. I also referred to the terrorism finance unit.604 
Ultimately the issue might best be described as one of the letter of the law in 
opposition to the spirit of the law. Although the action against Landsbanki was 
in accordance with the wording of the legislation, it was not the type of action 
which  the  legislation  was  perceived  to  have  been  designed  for.  In  other 
words, although the state action here did pursue a legitimate aim in the public 
interest, it was  not a foreseeable aim in the context of the legislation which 
enabled the action. 
Notwithstanding this argument, it is difficult to imagine that the ECtHR would 
be likely to find a violation on this basis. It is clear that where the provisions of 
602 Hansard, HL Vol 629, col 348 (28 November 2001)
603 For the discussion, see generally Hansard, HL Vol 629, col 347 - 358 (28 November 2001)
604 Hansard, HC Vol 375, col 34 (19 November 2001)
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the  domestic  law  have  been  misapplied,  state  action  will  be  considered 
unlawful. However, the question here is not one of misapplication. The way in 
which the government used the ATCSA provisions is perhaps best described 
as a matter of policy. The exceptionally wide margin of appreciation granted to 
state governments by the Strasbourg court in such matters cannot be ignored, 
and it  seems unlikely that the ECtHR would choose a matter as politically 
complex as this to take a more proactive approach. It seems that Landsbanki 
may make an application to the ECtHR in respect of the Order, however, so 
perhaps a more definitive answer to this conundrum may be given at a later 
date.605    
The final hurdle that any state action in terms of the anti-terrorist financing 
legislation would have to overcome is that of proportionality. Without a specific 
set  of  circumstances  to  consider,  it  is  impossible  to  say  whether  the  fair 
balance test would be satisfied. However, some general observations can be 
made. By analogy with the views taken on confiscation of the proceeds of 
crime,606 the aim of countering terrorism is likely to be given significant weight 
both  domestically  and  in  Strasbourg,  which  will  allow  for  an  accordingly 
heavier burden to be placed on individuals. In relation to compensation, both 
freezing orders and subsequent forfeitures are likely to be treated as a control 
of use,607 meaning payment of compensation is not a necessary step towards 
a finding of proportionality. Even if state action here was to be characterised 
as  a  deprivation,  it  is  possible  to  envisage  the  government  arguing  that 
compensation  should  not  be  necessary  nonetheless.   Alistair  Darling,  the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, explained the decision to freeze Landsbanki's 
assets to the House of Commons as follows:
Despite the fact that this is a branch of an Icelandic bank, I have in the exceptional 
circumstances that we see today guaranteed that no depositor loses any money as a 
result of the closure of Icesave and I am taking steps today to freeze the assets of 
Landsbanki in the UK until the position in Iceland becomes clearer.608
605 "Iceland may take UK to European Court over freezing of bank assets," Guardian, 6 January 2009
606 See discussion at page 196 above.
607 See discussion at p249-50 above.
608 Hansard, HC Vol 480, col 280 (8 October 2008)
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It  will  be  recalled  that  no  payment  of  compensation  is  required  for  a 
deprivation  in  exceptional  circumstances,  according  to  the  Strasbourg 
jurisprudence.609 It is presumably coincidence that the Chancellor happened 
to use precisely this formulation of words in this instance, but nevertheless 
this is a doctrine which it seems likely could be invoked in connection with the 
global economic crisis. Whether it would be accepted by the ECtHR remains 
unclear. 
Another  issue  which  may  arise  in  connection  with  compensation  is  the 
difference in treatment which P1-1 seems to demand between nationals and 
non-nationals,  as discussed in  relation  to  the economic  crisis  above.  This 
seems particularly pertinent in circumstances such as those of Landsbanki, 
where  action  taken  to  benefit  UK  nationals  will  quite  clearly  work  to  the 
detriment  not  only  of  the company,  but  also  to  Icelandic  nationals.  Again, 
however, we are unlikely to see much debate on this topic in the courts since, 
if  all  measures  are  to  be  categorised  a  control  of  use,  the  payment  of 
compensation will not be mandatory.
Ultimately it seems unlikely that any of the far-reaching provisions set out in 
terms of the anti-terrorist financing legislation will run up against difficulties in 
terms of P1-1.  
5.4 Climate Change
On  4th August  2009,  the  Climate  Change  (Scotland)  Act  received  Royal 
Assent.610 Working in conjunction with the UK-wide Climate Change Act 2008, 
the  Scottish  legislation  has  the  principal  function  of  setting  a  target  for 
reduction of  Scottish emissions of  carbon dioxide,  methane,  nitrous oxide, 
hydrofluorocarbons,  perfluorocarbons  and  sulphur  hexafluoride,  collectively 
known as  "greenhouse gases,"611 over  the  course  of  the  next  forty  years. 
Section 1 of  the Act provides that the Scottish Ministers must ensure that 
Scottish emissions in the year 2050 are at least 80% lower than at present. 
609 See Jahn v Germany (2006) 42 EHRR 49 and the discussion at pages 163-4 above
610 http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/bills/17-ClimateChange/index.htm, accessed 17 August 2009
611 s9(1)
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The remainder of the Act sets out a variety of mechanisms and powers by 
which Scottish Ministers can attempt to achieve this 2050 target. Parts 2 to 4 
contain provisions for the potential establishment of an independent advisory 
body known as the Scottish Committee on Climate Change who would be 
tasked  with  monitoring  and  reporting  on  progress  towards  the  target  and 
might have powers to impose interim reduction targets on public bodies. Part 
5 comprises a range of additional, more specific provisions designed to tackle 
the  emissions  problem.  It  is  these  specific  provisions  which  are  more 
interesting from a P1-1 perspective. 
The potential  effects  of  the Climate Change Act  can be grouped into  two 
rough categories. The first is provisions which may entail a deprivation or a 
control of use of land in the usual way.  The second is a more speculative 
question about the potential positive obligation imposed on the state by the 
Act to ensure that emissions targets are met, or else to be held responsible 
for any climate change related damage to property which may occur.
5.4.1 Control of use
The way in which land is used forms a part of the overall picture of emissions. 
Described in the simplest terms, land, and certain plants which grow on it, 
may  either  absorb  greenhouse  gases  or  emit  them.  This  is  particularly 
relevant in Scotland since so much of the country is unpopulated. As noted by 
the Scottish Government in their consultation document on proposals for the 
Climate Change Act:
The way we use agricultural,  afforested and other undeveloped land has a major 
impact  on net  greenhouse gas emissions.  Scotland has huge amounts of  carbon 
locked  up  in  peatlands,  organo-mineral  soils  and  vegetation,  including  forests. 
Maintaining  the  overall  level  of  these  carbon  stocks  is  an  important  priority, 
particularly as climate change itself might make them more vulnerable to oxidation, 
thereby adding to emissions. Land use changes like deforestation and conversion of 
grassland to arable all result in CO2 emissions. Livestock and use of fertilisers are 
sources of methane and nitrous oxides. On the other hand, woodland creation and 
conversion of  arable grassland create carbon sinks,  with CO2 being locked up in 
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biomass and soils. Given Scotland's significant land resource, emissions reduction 
from, and carbon sequestration through, land use will remain a key part of our climate 
change strategy.612
Against that background, s45D of the Act creates an obligation on Ministers to 
produce  a  land  use  strategy  by  the  end  of  March  2011  detailing  their 
proposals  for  meeting  sustainable  land  use  objectives.  It  is  obviously 
impossible to know exactly what this will entail at present. However, it is worth 
noting that 12% of Scotland's total greenhouse gas emissions are the result of 
land, particularly grassland, being converted to use for cultivation of crops.613 
Land converted to forestland operates, however, as a carbon sink, and the 
Forestry Commission, in their Climate Change Action Plan 2009-2011, set out 
a goal of increasing the area of forestry in Scotland to 25% by 2050, requiring 
around 10,000 hectares of new planting to occur each year.614 Muirburn – the 
practice of burning gorse or heather to encourage new vegetation growth – is 
also an emissions concern, since moorland often lies on top of carbon-rich 
peat soil, and extensive burning can cause greenhouse gases to be released 
into the atmosphere.615 S46 of the Act empowers Ministers to further restrict 
the dates on which muirburn can take place with a view to minimising the 
environmental  impact,  and  further  restrictions  on  the  precise  methods 
employed to carry out this practice have been discussed.
The Act also sets out a range of specific environmental targets beyond the 
control of land use. S48 creates an obligation on Ministers to promote energy 
efficiency,  which  includes  improving  the  energy  efficiency  of  living 
accommodation with specific reference to alteration of planning and building 
regulations to ensure that new buildings avoid emissions. S48A creates an 
obligation  on  Ministers  to  promote  the  use  of  renewable  sources  of  heat 
(meaning sources other than fossil fuels and nuclear power.)616  s50 and 50A 
set  out  a  new  duty  to  assess  the  energy  performance  of  non-domestic 
buildings and living accommodation by which Scottish Ministers must:
612 para 4.57
613 Thomson et al, para 1.2.2
614 p 15
615 SPICe Briefing on Climate Change (Scotland) Bill, p39
616 s48(8)
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Require owners of such buildings to take steps…to –
(i) improve the energy performance of such buildings;
(ii) reduce such emissions.617
The Act provides that these assessment regulations should include measures 
of  enforcement  to  ensure  owners  meet  the  requirements,618 and  also 
introduce offences in relation to failure to comply with the requirements of the 
regulations.619 
   
It seems reasonable to assume, then, that meeting the goals set out in the 
Climate Change Act is likely to involve some level of interference with the 
rights of landowners under P1-1. The state action may be negative in form: for 
example, legislation may prevent land which is currently grassland being used 
for the cultivation of crops. The alterations which have already taken place to 
muirburning regulations would seem to fall within this category. Alternatively, it 
may be  that  the  interventions  of  the  state  are  actually  positive  in  nature. 
Landowners in certain areas may be obliged to plant or allow for afforestation 
of their land, or a part of it. Building developers may be required to design or 
renovate new houses using specified materials or with provision for energy to 
be  provided  from particular  sources.  Even  domestic  homeowners  may be 
subject to obligations in respect of, for example, insulation, with the possibility 
of criminal sanctions if the requirements are not met. 
Whether such interventions will amount to a deprivation or a control is likely to 
be question of degree. It can be seen in both the Strasbourg and domestic 
jurisprudence that the right to dispose of property is often used as the litmus 
test: where that right is retained, state intervention can amount to no more 
than a control.620 However, it is possible to imagine a situation where the use 
of land is so tightly controlled that  it  may be effectively impossible for  the 
landowner to use it for profit (eg by cultivating crops) or, realistically, to sell it, 
precisely because the land has been rendered unprofitable by environmental 
617 s50(1)(b) and s50A(1)(b)
618 s50(2)(l) and s50A(2)(l) 
619 s50(2)(m) and s50A(2)(m)
620 See the discussion at pages 79-81 and 190-196 above
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regulation. It is also worth bearing in mind that the courts have been prepared 
to make a finding of partial deprivation in scenarios where a specific area of 
an applicant's land has been rendered unusable.621 A finding of this type may 
be  likely  where  an  area  has  been  earmarked  for  increased  forestry,  for 
example. The requirement to promote renewable energy sources carries with 
it the question of whether power plants using fossil fuels or nuclear power will 
eventually be decommissioned. Direct regulation preventing the use of power 
plants  would seem to be an interference with  property  rights,  although by 
analogy with the rights of owners of horses and hounds who are no longer 
able to hunt,622 it seems likely that this would be characterised as a control of 
use – the plant and the land on which is stands will still belong to the owner 
after all, it simply cannot be used for energy generation. 
Assuming that P1-1 will indeed be engaged, will the interventions be justified? 
Against  the  background  of  the  Climate  Change  Act  and  the  evolution  of 
environmental  legislation to date,  it  seems reasonable to assume that any 
intervention would meet the test of lawfulness and would, in fact, most likely 
be set out plainly in legislation.
The question of whether such measures could be said to serve the public or 
general  interest  is  potentially  complex.  The  science  surrounding  climate 
change is still an area of substantial dispute and the impact of the types of 
measures it seems to be suggested that Scottish Ministers may put in place is 
not the subject of universal agreement amongst the scientific community.  It 
can be imagined that a challenge to the contended societal need for these 
measures could be mounted based on expert evidence from scientists and 
environmentalists.  However,  would  such  a  case  have  any  likelihood  of 
success?  The  exceptional  reluctance  of  the  Courts  both  in  Strasbourg  at 
home to make a finding of lack of public/general interest in respect of any 
state action where some sort of justification is put forward has been remarked 
upon at length earlier in this thesis. Certainly an environmental motive has 
been accepted as sufficient by the ECtHR previously,  in at least one case 
621 Powell v UK (1987) 9 EHRR 241; Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2004] 2 AC 42
622 Adams v Scottish Ministers 2004 SC 665; R (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney-General [2008] 1 AC 719, 
discussed at pages 187-9 above.
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involving measures not entirely dissimilar to those under discussion here.623 
Although the scientific  basis of  climate change may be disputed, it  seems 
impossible  that  a  party  could  successfully  argue  that  it  was  manifestly 
unreasonable for Scottish Ministers to take action based on the "pro" climate 
change evidence. Ultimately, and somewhat predictably, it seems likely that 
the actions of Scottish Ministers here would be considered to fall within the 
margin of appreciation afforded to the government to determine what is within 
the public/general interest. 
The  real  question,  as  is  so  often  the  case,  is  likely  to  be  whether  the 
proportionality  test  is  satisfied.  This  is  an  area  in  which  the  extent  of 
restrictions placed on a landowner will  be paramount. Although there is an 
argument that the landowner will receive some benefit from the environmental 
restrictions in  the  broad sense that  we  will  all  benefit  from a reduction  in 
emissions, it is apparent that such benefit may seem nebulous compared to 
the  immediate  loss  of,  for  example,  land  which  had  been  intended  for 
agricultural development. 
Where restrictions are severe or where state action amounts to a deprivation, 
the legislative scheme will no doubt have to contain provision for reasonable 
compensation or a finding of lack of proportionality is likely.  It  is difficult to 
imagine any way in which this might be avoided, unless it could be argued 
that the environmental threat caused by emissions had become so urgent that 
the "exceptional circumstances" doctrine should be brought into play.624 That 
doctrine is, at present, so ambiguous that an attempt to imagine whether this 
is likely is more or less speculation. Some climate change analysts already 
argue, for example, that the damage caused to the planet by emissions is 
virtually irreparable, meaning that state action must be taken immediately to 
prevent  inevitable  disaster.  If  that  argument  were  to  be  accepted  by  the 
courts,  those  circumstances  would  seem  fairly  exceptional.  On  the  other 
hand,  given  the  extremely  limited  case  examples  of  exceptional 
circumstances to date, and the apparent trend of the Strasbourg court away 
623 Fredin v Sweden (1991) 13 EHRR 784, Denev v Sweden 1989 59 DR 127
624 See discussion at 158-9 above.
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from that finding,625 it  is  perhaps most realistic  to assume that exceptional 
circumstances will not apply here, and compensation will require to be paid. In 
situations  where  positive  action  is  required  on  the  part  of  owners  –  for 
example, if  a home owner should be required to replace a system of gas 
heating  with  an  alternative  from  a  renewable  source  of  energy  –  the 
proportionality requirements will  be different, and it  seems likely that some 
sort of grant contribution towards alterations may be necessary to meet the 
test.
5.4.2 Positive obligation on the state
One relatively recent development in the case law of the Strasbourg court is 
the idea that P1-1 may, in some situations, create a positive obligation on the 
state to ensure that an applicant's peaceful enjoyment of their possessions is 
able to continue. As discussed above, this was first elaborated in Oneryildiz v 
Turkey,626 in which a build up of methane in the landfill where the applicant's 
dwelling was situated caused an explosion in which the applicant's dwelling 
was destroyed and several members of his family died. Evidence was to the 
effect that the state was aware that the explosion was likely to occur if the 
methane  build  up  was  not  alleviated,  and  yet  did  nothing  to  resolve  the 
problem. A breach of P1-1 was therefore held to exist. This duty, however, did 
not extend to the situation in which a natural disaster caused destruction of 
property, even where that disaster might have been anticipated in the sense 
that it was seasonal or to be expected in certain weather conditions, such as 
the mudslides in Budayeva v Russia.627 
The parameters of this relatively new development in P1-1 jurisprudence are 
at  present  ill-defined.  Additionally,  the  matter  has  yet  to  receive  any 
consideration  by  the  domestic  courts.  However,  on  the  limited  authority 
currently  available,  it  is  possible  to  see  where  an  argument  in  respect  of 
climate change may be made out.
625 See discussion at page 160 above.
626 (2005) 41 EHRR 20. See discussion at page 71 above.
627 (15339/02) 20 March 2008 
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Although the scientific basis for climate change is disputed, it  is  clear that 
Scottish Ministers accept the existence of a link between emissions and the 
global rise in temperature, amongst other environmental impacts.628 The UK 
Climate Impacts  Programme predicts  that,  without  a sufficient  reduction in 
emissions, Scotland will suffer increasingly extreme weather with more severe 
storms,  an increased risk of  flooding and sea level  rises of  up to  600mm 
which  would  threaten coastal  regions.629 The temperature will  also  rise  by 
2.5% in the winter and 3.5% in the summer, with a resultant effect on the 
plants  and wildlife  of  the  Scottish biosphere.  Certain  areas of  the country 
could be rendered uninhabitable. 
An argument could be made that the government have accepted responsibility 
for  these  potential  outcomes  of  climate  change.  In  other  words,  the 
government  have  been  advised  of  a  risk  by  experts  and  are  taking  the 
recommended  steps  to  neutralise  the  risk  with  the  new  climate  change 
legislation.  If  the  government  fails  to  meet  the  2050  emissions  reduction 
target, would it be possible for individuals who have suffered loss of property, 
perhaps through flooding, to make an application in terms of P1-1?  Could 
such a duty extend more generally to anyone who has suffered a reduction in 
the quality of the air they breathe and the environment in which they live? 
What seems clear from the sparse case law to date is that there must be a 
direct  connection between the state omission and the subsequent loss. At 
present,  the scientific background is still  perhaps not clear enough for this 
argument to be properly made out. Additionally, it could be said that the power 
to neutralise the threat of climate change is not entirely in the government's 
hands. In Oneryildiz, there was one specific problem which one specific act by 
the government could have resolved. With climate change, the government 
must  try  to  educate  and  coerce  the  population  as  a  whole  into  making 
changes  in  the  way  they  live  in  the  hope  of  reducing  emissions.  The 
connection between the risk and the potential consequences is perhaps more 
628 See, for example, "What is climate change?" at 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Environment/climatechange/what-is [accessed 17 August 2009]
629 See the various scenarios outlined at http://www.ukcip.org.uk/index.php?
option=com_contentandtask=viewandid=156andItemid=554 [accessed 17 August 2009] 
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akin to  the situation in  Budayeva,  where  a risk was known about  but  the 
power  of  the  state  to  prevent  it  coming  about  was  limited.  As  scientific 
knowledge  increases,  however,  that  balance  may  change.  It  may  be 
interesting  to  monitor  the  situation  here  alongside  developments  in  the 
Strasbourg and domestic jurisprudence in the area. It could be the case that a 
stronger  possibility  of  P1-1  challenge  along  these  lines  develops  in  due 
course.     
5.5 Land Registration
Following  the  introduction  of  the  Land  Registration  (Scotland)  Act  1979, 
Scotland has moved, county by county, onto a system of registration of title in 
respect of ownership of land. The basics of the scheme are relatively easy to 
explain. When an interest in land is created or transferred, the person holding 
the interest applies to the Keeper of the Registers of Scotland to have that 
interest registered.630 The effect of registration is to vest in the registered title 
holder  a  real  right  in  and  to  the  interest  concerned.631 Since  the  register 
creates the real rights, it cannot be "wrong", as such – if a person is registered 
as owning a property, he  does own that property. However, sometimes this 
may not be an accurate reflection of the deeds which induced the registration. 
For example, a disposition may have been forged, and so no transfer of the 
title could be said to have taken place on the basis of ordinary property law. In 
situations such as this, the Register may be considered "inaccurate." In some 
situations, most importantly where the inaccuracy has been caused by fraud 
or carelessness on the part of the registered title holder, the Register may be 
rectified  to  correct  this  inaccuracy.632 Every  interest  on  the  Register  is, 
however, backed by a state guarantee, meaning that where a person suffers 
loss as a result of a rectification of the Register, they will usually receive an 
indemnity payment in respect of that loss. Similarly, if it is not possible for the 
Register  to  be rectified,  perhaps because the mistake was not  caused by 
fraud or carelessness on the part of the registered title holder, any person 
630 1979 Act, ss2 and 4
631 1979 Act, s3
632 1979 Act, s9
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suffering loss as a result of this omission to rectify will also receive payment of 
state indemnity.633 
This account of the system of land registration, although very simplified, gives 
a platform on which to discuss the potential P1-1 implications of the scheme.
On one view of things, these implications could be substantial. The Scottish 
regime is understood to be a "positive" system of land registration.634 What 
this means is that real rights in land which are created or transferred as a 
result of registration actually flow from the register itself. (This is distinct from 
a negative system of land registration, in which rights come from the deeds 
underlying the creation or transfer of those rights.635) This positive system of 
land  registration  may have  P1-1  repercussions  in  terms  of  registration  of 
interests, rectification of the register and administrative errors by the Keeper.
5.5.1 Registration
In  one  sense,  any  transfer  of  a  property  interest  is  likely  to  involve  an 
interference with possessions.636 If A sells something to B, A will be deprived 
of his real right at the point when B takes the legal steps required to complete 
B's  right  of  ownership,  for  example,  by  taking  possession  of  corporeal 
moveable property following on a contract of sale. In a transaction of this kind 
between two legal persons, there can be no P1-1 implication, simply because 
the state is not involved. 
With transfer of heritable property, in Scotland, the final legal step required to 
complete the right is registration of title. If A sells his house to B, A will lose 
his right of ownership and B will obtain the title to the house at the point of 
registration.  The  potential  difficulty  here,  from  a  P1-1  perspective,  is  that 
633 1979 Act, s12
634 This is not entirely clear from the legislation, but the jurisprudence seems to have interpreted the Act to that effect. 
See the discussion at para 5.6, Scot Law Com DP No 124.
635 The previous Scottish system, in which deeds were recorded in the Register of Sasines, is an example of such a 
system.
636 This is, of course, opposed to creation of an entirely new interest in property, which sometimes occurs.
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registration is  not  an automatic process.  This is where the state  becomes 
involved. 
When B is in possession of the disposition and other documents required to 
effect a transfer of A's house to her in terms of ordinary property law, she 
must make an application to the Keeper to have that interest registered. The 
legislation provides, in s4(1), that:
Subject to subsection (2) below, an application for registration shall be accepted by 
the Keeper if it is accompanied by such documents and other evidence as he may 
require.
Subsection (2) sets out a list of circumstances in which an application will not 
be  accepted,  for  example  where  the  land  concerned  is  not  sufficiently 
described to enable the Keeper to identify it by reference to the Ordnance 
Map, or where the relevant fee for registration has not been paid. The wording 
of the legislation suggests, then, that Keeper will refuse an application if one 
of the situations described in subsection (2) has arisen, and may also refuse 
an application in any other situation where he has not been provided with the 
documents and other evidence such as he might require. 
The Keeper has a discretion here. He may accept the application and register 
the title if he has been presented with the evidence required, or he may refuse 
to do so. If he registers the interest, a real right will be conferred on the new 
holder of the interest, and the real right held by the previous holder will be 
extinguished.  It  is  this  act  of  the  Keeper  in  registering  the  interest  which 
extinguishes the real right held by A and transfers it to B. In other words, an 
action by the state (represented by the Keeper) has led to A being deprived of 
his interest in land.
The nature of this discretion was recently discussed by the Lands Tribunal in 
PMP Plus  Ltd v  Keeper  of  the  Registers  of  Scotland.637 In  this  case,  the 
Keeper  had registered the  appellant's  title  to  an undeveloped plot  of  land 
within a residential development, but had excluded indemnity on the basis that 
637 2009 SLT (Lands Tr) 2
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it was not clear, from an examination of the titles of the surrounding residential 
units, or arguably as a matter of the underlying law, whether that undeveloped 
plot  should be included within  the common parts of the development.  The 
Keeper did not express a opinion one way or the other as to the validity of the 
title, but rather expressed uncertainty and excluded indemnity on that basis. 
The  Lands  Tribunal  took  the  opportunity  to  consider  the  nature  of  the 
Keeper's discretion here, noting:
…in exercise of his statutory duty, when presented with an application to register, the 
Keeper is not merely acting administratively but has a duty to investigate the title. He 
must actively investigate the relevant circumstances to enable him to reach a sound 
decision. If  he is considering excluding indemnity,  he is very likely considering an 
actual or a potential competition between owners or claimants. However, it is clear 
that he does not have a full adjudicative function. Where the issue is one of law, he 
can usually be expected to reach a decision; proceed on the basis of such decision; 
and leave it open to a dissatisfied party to seek to have the matter finally determined 
on appeal.  Where the doubtful  issue is one of  fact,  he may well  be faced with a 
situation  which  he  simply  cannot  resolve.  In  rare  cases,  that  might  arise  also  in 
relation to  legal  issues (as in  this  case,  where  he was presented with  conflicting 
opinions by two of the country's most respected academics in this area of law)…He 
obviously has to decide what to do in relation to the application before him.638
As can be seen from this passage, there is no doubt that the Keeper operates 
in a decision-making capacity as to registration. His discretion may not be 
unlimited, but  it  nevertheless requires an investigation of  the title  before a 
decision can be made as to whether it is registered, and whether indemnity is 
excluded. He is taking positive action, as a representative of the state, which 
results  in  a  loss  of  the  right  for  the  previous  holder  to  the  benefit  of  the 
transferee.
If that analysis of the process of registration is correct, it suggests that every 
registration  based  on  transfer  of  an  interest  engages  P1-1.  Can  this 
interference by the state be justified, however? Logic suggests that it must be, 
although the justification is not as straightforward as might be hoped.
638 Para 43
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The first complication is in determining which of the three Sporrong rules the 
state  action falls  into  in  this  situation.  On the face of  it,  the action of  the 
Keeper  might  appear  to  be  a  straightforward  deprivation  of  property.  The 
Keeper's act of registering a title extinguishes the transferor's right. 
The Strasbourg court, however, do not necessarily agree with this analysis of 
the  situation.  It  appears,  in  its  view,  that  even  in  a  positive  system  of 
registration of title, registration is no more than a control of use. In  JA Pye 
(Oxford) Land Ltd v United Kingdom,639 the ECtHR had cause to look at the 
question of registration of title in the context of the English law of adverse 
possession. This legal doctrine bars any claim to ownership of land by the 
registered title holder where the land has been occupied as of right for at least 
12 years by another person. In the case, the doctrine operated to prevent the 
applicant asserting any claim to ownership, despite being registered as the 
owner, when a couple, Mr and Mrs Graham, who had occupied the land for 
the necessary period applied to register title in their name. The Grahams had 
taken  occupation  originally  on  the  basis  of  a  lease  from  the  applicant. 
However, on the expiration of the lease, no further contract was agreed. The 
couple continued to occupy the land in full knowledge of the applicant without 
any attempt by it to have them removed or even to claim rent payments. The 
Grahams were allowed to register their title.
When the  case  was  first  heard  by  a  Chamber  of  the  European  Court  of 
Human Rights, a slim majority of four votes to three categorised the action of 
the state as a deprivation, based on the fact that the applicant had lost its 
ownership as a result of the registration. However, when the application came 
before a Grand Chamber, it disagreed with this conclusion. By ten votes to 
seven, it categorised the action of the state in registering the Grahams' as a 
control of use. The state, it said, had merely altered the register to reflect the 
position of the underlying law.
There is no doubt that the English system of registration of title is a positive 
system. Ownership flows from the register. In making its decision, however, 
639 (2008) 46 EHRR 45
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the Grand Chamber looked behind the register, at the underlying law on the 
basis  of  which  applications  for  registration  are  made.  In  the  view  of  the 
ECtHR,  the  action  of  the  state  in  responding  to  that  underlying  law  by 
reflecting  the  position  in  the  relevant  Land  Register  entries  amounted  to 
nothing more than a control of use. 
This approach seems questionable. The provisions as to registration in the 
equivalent English legislation are similar to those in Scotland. The Keeper has 
discretion to refuse registration in various circumstances.640 His actions are 
not simply a mechanical application of the underlying law. Even if they were, 
as the Grand Chamber seems to imply, it is not clear why that would make 
registration a control of use. It would seem rather to suggest that registration 
is not an action of the state at all. If registration is merely a reflection of the 
underlying law, it is the underlying law which deprived JA Pye of its title to 
land. The state did not act to control JA Pye's use of it land; the state did not 
"act"  at  all.  This  understanding  is,  of  course,  at  odds  with  the  true  legal 
position, namely that right flow from the register and the Keeper has discretion 
over  whether  registration  occurs.  It  seems  impossible  to  reach  an 
understanding of the opinion of the Grand Chamber here which accords with 
the facts.  
Notwithstanding any criticism of the ECtHR's decision here, it  seems likely 
that the domestic courts would follow its lead in categorising registration as a 
control  of  use.  Can this control  be justified in  P1-1 terms? The answer  is 
probably yes. The legal basis for the state action is set out in legislation, and 
although the Keeper has discretion, its parameters are clearly defined.641 The 
public interest served by a system of registration of title is obvious. The issue 
of proportionality is likely to be easily resolved on the basis that the person 
losing a real right had engaged in a transfer with the intention of that result. 
Additionally,  in the overwhelming majority of cases, the transferor will  have 
been adequately compensated for her loss through the proceeds of a sale or, 
for  example, the repayment of  a loan resulting in discharge of a standard 
640 Land Registration Act 2002, ss9-10 (first registrations), s27 and schedule 2 (dispositions of registered land), s42 
(restrictions.) 
641 Clear guidelines are available in the Registration of Title Practice Book, available online at 
www.ros.gov.uk/rotbook/
266
security. In Strasbourg terms, compensation need not be the market value of 
the property,  with  the result  that  sale  at  undervalue or  even a transfer  of 
ownership for "love, favour and affection" would not necessarily seem to result 
in a lack of proportionality here. Most likely, the act of registering an interest in 
the Land Register would not result in a violation of P1-1.
It should be noted that, in any event, this point is likely soon to become moot. 
The  Scottish  Law  Commission  is  in  the  process  of  scrutinising  the  Land 
Register with a view to substantial  reform both on a principle and practice 
level. To date, three discussion papers have been published642 and a report 
with finalised proposals for reform together with a draft bill should be issued 
shortly.643 The  first  of  the  discussion  papers,  which  dealt  with  the  broad 
principles underlying the registration scheme, recommended a change from a 
positive to a negative system of land registration, albeit still backed up with a 
state guarantee of title.644 This would seem to resolve many of the issues 
outlined above, and make registration the simple reflection of the underlying 
law which the Strasbourg court seemingly already considers it to be.       
5.5.2 Rectification
It  is worth briefly noting that rectification of the Land Register gives rise to 
similar questions. As outlined above the Register can be rectified when it is 
"inaccurate" in the sense that the position shown on the Register is not the 
same as the position under the rules of ordinary property law. The Keeper has 
discretion  to  rectify  the  Register  under  s9,  although  it  cannot  usually  be 
exercised where it would prejudice a proprietor in possession. 
As with registration, action by the Keeper here could be construed as a state 
act interfering with the property rights of affected title holders: rectification may 
result in ownership being lost where a different name is entered in the title 
section. Whether this interference would be categorised as a deprivation or a 
control  of  use  is  difficult  to  predict  for  the  reasons  explained  above  in 
642 Void and Voidable Titles, Scot Law Com DP No 125 (2004); Registration, Rectification and Indemnity, Scot Law 
Com DP No 128 (2005); Miscellaneous Issues, Scot Law Com DP No 130 (2005)
643 http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/html/cplandreg.php, accessed 6 August 2009
644 See generally Part 5 and particularly Proposal 9 of DP No 125.
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connection to registration. However, as with registration, the state act has a 
clear legal basis. It  serves a legitimate aim in the public interest. It  is also 
likely to be proportionate, since rectification of the register usually results in 
payment of indemnity to any person who suffers loss as a result. 
Additionally,  as  with  registration,  in  most  cases the P1-1 repercussions of 
rectification  would  cease  to  exist  following  implementation  of  the  SLC 
proposal to switch to a negative system of registration. 
5.5.3 Administrative error
One further issue on which the SLC propose reform is the consequences of 
administrative error on the part of the Keeper. It is an inevitable result of the 
involvement of human beings in the registration process that,  on occasion, 
mistakes will be made. This may result in inaccuracy of the Register. Where it 
is  the  title  holder  who  has made  the  mistake,  the  Keeper  can  rectify  the 
inaccuracy  caused  by  the  title  holder's  carelessness  without  payment  of 
indemnity.  The fact the Keeper may also have made some contribution to the 
error will not affect his power to rectify where the mistake was substantially 
due to carelessness on the part of the title holder, as discussed recently in 
McCoach  v  Keeper  of  the  Registers  of  Scotland.645 However,  there  are 
circumstances in which the Keeper's office itself may be responsible for the 
error,  independent  of  anyone  else.  The  proposal  of  the  SLC  is  that 
rectification of the register to correct a purely administrative error of this type, 
as with carelessness on the part of the applicant, should not result in payment 
of indemnity. 
An administrative  mistake may result  in  a  person being  registered  as  the 
proprietor of  a larger area of land than he was entitled to in terms of the 
underlying deeds. This occurred in Safeway Stores Plc v Tesco Stores Plc.646 
Two  supermarkets  owned  neighbouring  pieces  of  land,  with  a  shared 
boundary in the form of a river. Safeway's title had been registered on the 
Land Register prior to Tesco's title. At the time of registering Safeway's title, 
645 Unreported, 19 December 2008, Lands Tribunal
646 2001 SLT (Lands Tr) 23; 2004 SLT 701
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an administrative error resulting from digital conversion of the map lead to the 
boundary  line  between  the  properties  being  drawn  close  to  the  bank  on 
Tesco's side of the river, rather than in the middle of the river, which is where 
it  was shown to be on the underlying disposition. Effectively Safeway had 
become the owner of an area of the river which it did not, in fact, own as a 
result of the administrative error. On registration of Tesco's title, the error was 
discovered, and following the conclusion by both the Lands Tribunal and the 
Inner  House that  Safeway could  not  be  said  to  be  in  "possession"  of  the 
disputed area of river in the meaning of the 1979 Act, Safeway's title on the 
Register was rectified to redraw the boundary in the correct place. Safeway 
received an indemnity payment in respect of the area of river they had "lost" 
through the rectification. If Safeway had been in possession of the disputed 
area,  rectification  would  not  have  been  possible,  and  Tesco  would  have 
received an indemnity payment for the loss of the river bed resulting from the 
administrative error. 
In the first Discussion Paper, the SLC consider this case as an example of the 
problematic nature of universal  indemnity payments.  Safeway must always 
have been aware of the fact that the disputed area of river did not belong to it. 
When  it  received  the  title  sheet  and  reviewed  the  plan  section,  the 
supermarket knew that it had, through error, been gifted an area of land at the 
expense of its neighbours. Why, the SLC asks, when that error is corrected, 
should Safeway be entitled to receive indemnity? The land did not belong to it; 
it  has  suffered  no  loss,  and accordingly  no  indemnity  payment  should  be 
made.
The position under P1-1 may be less forgiving of administrative error. If rights 
flow from the register, a person registered as the owner of an area of land is 
the owner of that area of land. The fact this registration may have come about 
as a result of administrative error would not seem to be relevant. Accordingly, 
if the error is corrected through rectification, that ownership will be lost. The 
state  action  taken  in  rectifying  the  title  would  result  in  deprivation  of 
ownership. P1-1 would be engaged. 
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As  with  registration,  the  Strasbourg  jurisprudence  might  suggest  that 
rectification of the register here is no more than a control of use. However the 
position is not the same: it is a positive, albeit mistaken, act of the state which 
created the possession in the first place. The ownership of the area registered 
in error is exactly opposite to the position reflected in the underlying law. The 
state has expressly given a real right to the title holder where the underlying 
law would not have done so. On that basis, it would seem impossible to argue 
that the registration, or the subsequent rectification, is simply a control of use. 
If rectification following on administrative error is a deprivation, compensation 
would usually be required to render the deprivation proportionate. The SLC 
proposal to remove indemnity in such a situation would therefore create an 
imbalance in P1-1 terms which is likely to result in a violation of the article. 
If  a  switch  is  made to  a  negative  system of  registration,  this  difficulty  will 
evaporate.  Again,  if  real  rights  no  longer  flow  from  the  Register,  an 
administrative error cannot confer a right of ownership on the "wrong" person. 
Rectification therefore does not  engage P1-1,  since the  person incorrectly 
registered as the owner  never  had any right  of  ownership  in terms of the 
underlying law.  It  will  be important,  however,  to reconsider the proposal to 
remove indemnity for administrative error if that proposal seems likely to be 
implemented, but the proposed switch to a negative system does not.647 
5.5.4 Servitudes
Another area where the Keeper's discretion may interfere with property rights 
on a practical level concerns his policy on registration of servitudes. In Scots 
law,  servitudes can be created  in  a  variety  of  ways,  not  all  of  which  are 
express  or  involve  creation of  a deed.  The policy of  the Keeper  is  not  to 
register servitudes created by prescription or implication. 
647 Even in that event, it may be unlikely that the ECtHR would demonstrate much sympathy towards a title holder 
who had obtained land through an administrative error which was subsenquently rectified. To date the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence suggests  the Court  are not keen to protect “windfall  benefits”:  see, for example,  Jahn v Germany 
(2006) 42 EHRR 49 at p163 above, and National and Provincial Building Society v United Kingdom  25 EHRR 127 at 
p145 above.  
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Robert Rennie points out that this creates real difficulties in practice. He uses 
the  example  of  a  solicitor  purchasing  a  farm  in  1997.  The  solicitor  has 
received affidavit evidence which supports the view that a servitude right of 
access has been created  over  neighbouring  land through prescription.  He 
accepts this is correct as a matter of property law, and considers that the 
servitude exists, even though the Keeper will not register as such. When the 
farm  is  sold  again  in  2009,  however,  the  conveyancing  landscape  has 
changed. The purchasing solicitor will look for the servitude on the title sheet 
and will not be prepared to proceed with the sale if the servitude is not there. 
The tile will not be considered "safe" if the servitude is not registered by the 
Keeper. Rennie notes:
It can of course be argued that really all that such a seller has to do is threaten the 
current  farmer  with  an  action  of  declarator  of  servitude  and  the  farmer  will 
immediately capitulate and grant the necessary deed for no consideration. Frankly 
that does not happen in the real world. If the action of declarator is defended it can 
last for years and no seller can, generally speaking, afford to wait that long nor would 
any purchaser be prepared to maintain an interest in such property for that length of 
time.648 
There is an argument that P1-1 should be engaged in this situation, as the 
action of the Keeper can be construed as a de facto interference with property 
rights. In Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden,649 the ECtHR accepted that, even 
where rights continued to exist formally, their exercise could be restricted so 
extensively  that  in  reality  they  lose  all  substance.  Servitudes  created  by 
prescription or implication continue to exist as a matter of property law, but 
does the Keeper's refusal to register these rights make them so difficult to 
enforce in practice that they could be said de facto to have ceased to exist?
It  should  be  recalled  that  the  ECtHR  apply  a  stringent  standard  in 
determination  of  the  existence  of  de  facto deprivation.  In  Sporrong,  the 
properties  belonging  to  the  applicants  had  been  subject  to  expropriation 
permits for years with the result that the land could not be developed and was 
648 "Land Registration and the Decline of Property Law," p8, due for publication in Edinburgh Law Review, January 
2010.
649 (1983) 5 EHRR 35
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virtually impossible to sell. This was not enough, in the eyes of the Court, to 
amount to a deprivation, since the land could still be used for other purposes 
and sale could still potentially occur, albeit at undervalue. The permits were 
considered to be an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, 
and that interference was ultimately found to be lawful, in the public interest 
and proportionate.
A similar approach seems likely in respect of servitudes. There is no question, 
in  terms  of  property  law,  that  a  servitude  created  through  prescription  or 
implication continues to exist regardless of the Keeper's refusal to register. 
That  servitude is difficult  to prove and enforce,  but  it  is  possible  to do so 
through an action of declarator. The fact that recourse to the courts to enforce 
the servitude has virtually become necessary could possibly be construed as 
an  interference  with  the  peaceful  enjoyment  of  that  right,  but  based  on 
Sporrong,  it  seems unlikely that an outright  deprivation would be found to 
exist. 
If  the  Keeper's  policy  on  registration  of  servitudes  does  result  in  an 
interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, can that interference 
be justified? The Keeper's  policy is  clearly expressed and seems likely to 
meet the lawfulness requirement. The aim behind the policy is to restrict the 
likelihood of indemnity claims arising from improperly constituted servitudes 
being registered. Although there may be an argument about whether reducing 
indemnity  claims  in  more  clearly  in  the  public  interest  than  maintaining 
existing servitude rights,  it  seems unlikely that the decision of the state to 
prioritise one over the other would fall beyond the margin of appreciation in 
such  matters  that  the  state  is  afforded  by  the  ECtHR.  The  final  issue  of 
proportionality would be likely to turn on the individual facts of an application 
in  which  the non-registration of  a  servitude had impacted negatively  on a 
proprietor. However, it should be noted that the existence of a domestic right 
of appeal is a factor which usually weighs in favour of proportionality rather 
than against it. The broader picture of the delay and expense inherent in the 
domestic court system seems unlikely to be something that the Strasbourg 
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court  will  consider as inherently unreasonable. In the big picture, it  seems 
unlikely that a violation of P1-1 would be found to exist in this type of situation. 
5.5.5 Prescription
A final discussion which it may be useful to have in this context concerns the 
law of prescription. Very shortly put, prescription is a mechanism by which a 
person  can  acquire  ownership  over  a  piece  of  land  through uninterrupted 
possession over a period of ten years. Prescription played a vital role under 
the previous Scottish system of registration of deeds in the Sasine Register. 
Since prescription  "cured"  any defects  in  title  provided the land had been 
continuously possessed by the seller  and his predecessors throughout the 
prescriptive period, there was no need to investigate the legal position any 
further back. From a practical point of view if nothing else, this was a matter of 
major  importance.  With  the  introduction  of  land  registration,  however,  it 
seemed to be thought that prescription was no longer important. Since title 
flowed from the Register, and was guaranteed by the Keeper, there could be 
no defect in a title.  Accordingly,  the argument ran, there was no need for 
prescription  to  run  on  Land  Register  titles.  Prescription  was  accordingly 
excluded by s10 of the 1979 Act.
In the first discussion paper, the SLC doubt whether this exclusion ever made 
sense in the first place. In any event, with the move to a negative system of 
land  registration,  they  suggest  that  now  would  be  a  sensible  time  to 
reintroduce the running of positive prescription on titles registered in the Land 
Register.  If  real  rights  are  not  to  be  conferred  by  the  Land  Register,  but 
regulated  by  the  underlying  law  and  reflected  in  the  Land  Register,  it  is 
obviously important to be sure that the underlying law is P1-1 complaint in 
itself. 
The indications of P1-1 compliance here are positive. As mentioned above, 
the English law of adverse possession was discussed by both a Chamber and 
a Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in JA Pye (Oxford) 
Land  Ltd  v  UK.650 Having  decided  that  the  registration  of  the  adverse 
650 (2008) 46 EHRR 45
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possessors' ownership in that situation was no more than a reflection of the 
underlying law,  the Court  considered whether that underlying law could be 
compliant with P1-1. There was no difficulty in finding the adverse possession 
doctrine  both  lawful,  as  it  was  encapsulated  in  statute,  and  in  the  public 
interest, as it could be seen that it fulfilled a useful role in "curing" title defects 
and ensuring an absence of "ownerless" land. The issue of proportionality 
was also considered in detail. It was noted that very simple action on the part 
of the applicants – such as asking for payment of rent –  could have stopped 
the clock of adverse possession from running at any point during the 12 years 
it took for the title to be lost. The rules of adverse possession were clear cut 
and  well  known,  and  the  applicants  had  the  opportunity  of  review of  the 
outcome through the domestic courts.651 The Court was also swayed by the 
fact similar doctrines exist in most legal systems with sound policy reasons 
underlying that. By ten votes to seven, it was concluded that the doctrine was 
proportionate, and accordingly there had been no violation of P1-1. 
The  Scottish  system  of  prescription  is  not  identical  to  the  English  law  of 
adverse possession, but  if  anything,  the differences may serve to make it 
more likely  that  prescription is  P1-1 compliant.  The relevant  statute  is  the 
Prescription and Limitation (Scotland)  Act  1973.  Section 1 of  the Act  lays 
down three criteria: 
(i) the interest in land concerned must be possessed for 10 years; 
(ii) the possession must be open, peaceable and without judicial interruption; 
and 
(iii)  the  possession  must  be  founded  on  and  follow  the  recording  or 
registration of an ex facie valid title to the land in question. 
If  these  criteria  are  fulfilled,  the  validity  of  the  title  shall  be  exempt  from 
challenge at the conclusion of the ten year prescriptive period. 
651 This option had, of course, been exercised without success by the applicants before they took recourse to the 
ECtHR.
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The differences between the two jurisdictions are small, but important. The 
period of possession required is 10 years, as opposed to the 12 years needed 
in England. In Scotland, possession must be peaceable (ie not secured or 
maintained through force),  which is not required by the English legislation. 
Finally,  in Scotland possession must be founded on a writ  recorded in the 
Register of Sasines or a title registered in the Land Register, both of which 
are available for public inspection. There is no mirror to this provision under 
the English law.  The ultimate effect  of our law is to purify any defect in a 
purported title already on one of the registers, rather than, as in the English 
system, extinguishing the title that appears, on the face of the register, to be 
valid. 
The proportionality argument would seem to be sound. As with the English 
law of adverse possession, the rules of prescription are well known and have 
been in  operation for  some time.  The effect  of  their  application is  entirely 
foreseeable. The running of the prescriptive clock can be halted with very little 
action  on  the  part  of  the  owner,  and  the  additional  requirement  that  the 
possession be peaceable will, if anything, assist the original owner here. The 
dispossessed  owner  has  the  opportunity  to  dispute  the  application  of 
prescription in the courts. The same consideration of windfall benefits would 
presumably be applied.
 
To tip the proportionality scales further in favour of the individual, prescriptive 
possession must be based on a registered or recorded ex facie valid title. This 
requirement will be strictly construed: for example, a disposition purporting to 
be from a person to himself has been held to lack ex facie validity.652 It should 
be clear from an inspection of the registers that the possessor is in a position 
to obtain title through the process of prescription. In adverse possession, the 
only publicity comes from the possession itself, which maybe ambiguous if the 
owner believes the possession to have a legal basis such as a lease.653 In 
Scotland,  the  rules  of  prescription  operate  to  confirm  the  publicly  stated 
652 Aberdeen College v Youngson 2005 1 SC 335
653 English  law has  been  altered  subsequently  by  the  Land  Registration  Act  2002 to  provide  that  an  adverse 
possessor must notify the “paper owner” before expiry of the limitation period in order that the paper owner can take 
action if he wishes to do so. This change in itself did not, in the eyes of the Grand Chamber, mean to say that the 
previous English law was incompatible.
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position, rather than to undermine it. The publicity afforded to the process of 
prescription  in  Scotland  must,  if  anything,  lessen  the  burden  the  original 
owner is forced to bear, making a finding of a fair balance more likely. 
Based on the conclusions of the Grand Chamber in  J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v 
United Kingdom,  there  seems no reason to  believe  that  the  Scots  law of 
positive prescription is not entirely compliant with P1-1. 
5.6 Conclusion
The  argument  has  been  made  in  the  earlier  chapters  of  this  thesis  that, 
despite  the  ambiguity  that  formed  part  of  P1-1  since  its  inception,  the 
jurisprudence of both the Strasbourg and domestic courts have allowed the 
right to evolve into a meaningful protection. Although it is clear that certain 
elements of the right and its application remain uncertain, and in places the 
protection may not be as strong as had been hoped by the authors of the 
Convention,  nevertheless  a  decision-making  process  does  exist.  In  this 
chapter, an attempt has been made to apply this process to a series of issues 
of  topical  importance  either  globally  or  within  the  United  Kingdom.  The 
purpose of this exercise was, in the first place, to demonstrate the stage of 
development which the property right has currently reached, emphasising its 
attributes  whilst  identifying  the  flaws  which  remain.  Secondly,  this  chapter 
offers support to the notion that P1-1 is a highly relevant protection in the 
present  day,  and one which  may continue to  grow in  importance into  the 
twenty first century.  
In each of the topics analysed in this chapter, different elements of P1-1 have 
been brought to the fore. In relation to the economic crisis, the application of 
the five step decision-making process to the new legislation and its impacts 
has  thrown  light  on  some  potentially  problematic  issues,  particularly  as 
regards  the  provision  for  compensation  as  between  nationals  and  non-
nationals. The confusion which had been noted in respect of the jurisprudence 
earlier on this topic makes it appear likely that further litigation will be required 
to resolve this new manifestation of a pre-existing problem. 
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The  international  move  towards  dismantling  the  infrastructure  of  terrorist 
financing has also raised questions in respect of P1-1. The latitude of the 
legislation introduced to combat the problem has produced some unexpected 
results  in  its  application  to  the  collapsed  Icelandic  bank  Landsbanki.  The 
requirement of lawfulness demanded by the property right has been subject to 
a test in this context. However, he likelihood that no violation of P1-1 would be 
found may stand less as an indictment of the protection offered by P1-1 than 
as a red flag in respect of the breadth of the provisions drafted by domestic 
legislators under the banner of anti-terrorism.
Scotland's new and wide-ranging Climate Change Act gives an opportunity to 
demonstrate that the key challenges with which we are presently faced on a 
global  basis  are  likely  to  create  significant  issues  in  respect  of  P1-1 
domestically. It is hard to imagine that the authors of the Convention could 
possibly have foreseen a scientific development of this kind. Nonetheless, the 
manner in which the property right has evolved allows for an examination of 
this new legislation from a human rights perspective. The development of a 
positive obligation imposed on stated by P1-1, a relatively recent development 
in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court,  may also be in the frame for 
deeper analysis in this context.
     
Finally,  consideration of  the  Land Registration  system with  an  eye  on the 
reforms that seem likely to be implemented soon allows for a P1-1 analysis of 
a key aspect of Scots private law. There is scope for discussion of issues both 
of law and of practice within the framework of the existing P1-1 jurisprudence. 
It is reassuring to note that, although human rights issue do arise, in most 
cases they are satisfactorily resolved, with the proposed reforms taking Scots 
law further in the direction of Convention compliance. 
The fact that it  is possible to carry out an analysis  of this type on such a 
diverse range of topics evidences the fact that the existing jurisprudence has 
developed the property right into a robust and yet flexible safeguard. The five 
step  decision-making process goes some way to  assist  in  navigating  new 
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issues  from  a  P1-1  perspective,  allowing  for  the  twin  goals  of  political 
autonomy and  human  rights  protection.  At  the  same  time,  the  continuing 
ambiguities  in  the  judicial  understanding  of  the  right  continue  to  create 
uncertainty in its real world application, and it may be that further litigation is 
required in some areas. 
Overall, the findings of this chapter suggest that the property right has evolved 
to  a  point  where  it  can  be  meaningfully  applied  in  novel  situations.  The 
inherent  conflict  in  the  article  nonetheless  continues  to  create  some 
difficulties. The evolutionary process is not complete.  
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CONCLUSION
“Oh, how I wish I could shut up, like a telescope! I’m sure I could if only I knew how to 
begin.”654
6.1  Introduction
A right to protection of property was in the contemplation of the Convention 
drafters from the outset. The aim of this research has been to examine the 
evolution of the right from its initial  conception, with  a view to establishing 
what a meaningful protection of property might entail.
The  central  thesis  of  this  research  was  set  out  as  follows:  although  a 
framework  has  been  established  within  which  determination  of  P1-1 
applications  will  be  made,  there  is  still  considerable  work  to  be  done  in 
strengthening the parameters of the framework in order to create a protection 
that, whilst sufficiently flexible to deal with changes in law and society,  still 
offers  a  clearly  defined  and  meaningful  safeguard  against  unnecessary 
intervention by the state in every context.  This concluding chapter will attempt 
to establish how the critical analysis carried out in the preceding chapters has 
demonstrated the accuracy of the central thesis.   
In  the first  place,  it  is  made clear that  a decision-making framework  does 
exist, built upon the three rules in Sporrong and Lönnroth.655 These rules form 
the  foundation  of  the  five-step  process  extrapolated  from  the  Strasbourg 
jurisprudence in chapters two and three, which has been seen to operate in a 
domestic context in chapter four. 
It will then be submitted that the framework is effective in providing a certain 
level of safeguarding of property rights. The limits suggested by the case law 
in chapters two, three and four have been applied to novel topics in chapter 
five, demonstrating that a meaningful protection does exist. 
654 Alice in Wonderland, p13
655 (1983) 5 EHRR 35
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It  will  finally be argued, however,  that this protection is not as robust as it 
should be.  Ambiguities remain as to the extent  of  the right.  It  is  not  clear 
whether the intentions of the state are adequately reviewed or controlled by 
the judiciary and serious questions remain over  the application of  P1-1 in 
certain areas of particular conflict. These criticisms require to be addressed if 
the right is to continue to evolve into a flexible yet robust protection.   
6.2 The existence of the decision-making framework
The detailed review of the Strasbourg jurisprudence carried out in the second 
and third  chapters of  this  work  indicate that,  following an initially  tentative 
approach to interpretation and application of P1-1, over time a clear decision-
making  framework  has  emerged  within  which  the  ECtHR  operates  in 
determining P1-1 cases. 
It  is  not difficult  to understand the length of  time taken to develop such a 
framework. The genesis of the property right was fraught with political and 
ideological conflict, and the wording of the article which was ultimately agreed 
represented  such  a  compromise  that  its  meaning  was  deeply  ambiguous. 
Working  with  such  an  instrument,  and  without  a  coherent  set  of  cross-
European legal principles to unite the bench, it should be of little surprise that 
the initial incursions of the ECtHR into the P1-1 jurisprudence were hesitant 
and lacking in conviction. 
The  turning  point  occurred  with  the  landmark  decision  in  Sporrong  and 
Lönnroth v Sweden, in which the Court set out its lynchpin "three-rule" dicta. 
Briefly  put,  Sporrong determined  that  state  action  must  be  capable  of 
construction as a deprivation of ownership, a control of use or a more general 
interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions before P1-1 will be 
engaged.
Engagement  with  P1-1,  however,  is  not  synonymous  with  breach  of  the 
article. The property right is a qualified right: it can be compromised where 
such compromise is justifiable in the interests of broader society. Over time, 
and building upon work that it had done in defining and limiting human rights 
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protection in respect of other articles of the Convention, the ECtHR clarified 
the requirements that would justify compromise of P1-1. 
As a basic standard in keeping with the rule of law, any action of the state has 
to be lawful, in the sense of having a clear and easily accessible basis in law 
which produces a non-arbitrary result. Protection of human rights demands 
that law produce foreseeable results in order that legal persons can know how 
to regulate their conduct. 
A lawful state act must also pursue a legitimate aim in the public or general 
interest.  State  intervention  with  property  rights  must  be  motivated  by  the 
needs  of  the  wider  society,  as  only  then  can  interference  with  individual 
property rights be justified in a moral sense. The essence of this requirement 
is contained within the wording of the article itself. 
Finally,  the  action  of  the state  must  be  proportionate,  meaning that  a  fair 
balance requires to be struck between the needs of society served by the 
interference and the impact on the person whose property rights have been 
qualified. A single person should not be expected to bear an individual and 
excessive  burden  for  the  benefit  of  the  wider  community.  This  notion  of 
proportionality is inherent within the construction of the Convention as a whole 
and its terms are repeated in the jurisprudence of every qualified right.
Thus a five step decision-making framework emerges: 
1. Does the applicant hold a possession?
2. Does the action of the state fall within the definition of one of the "three 
rules"?
3. Was that action lawful?
4. Was that  action carried out in  pursuance of  a legitimate aim in  the 
public or general interest? 
5. Did  that  action  strike  a  fair  balance  between  the  impact  on  the 
applicant  and  the  needs  of  the  community  such  as  to  satisfy  the 
requirement of proportionality?
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The first two questions must be answered in the affirmative for the article to 
be  engaged.  If  one  of  the  latter  three  questions  is  then  answered  in  the 
negative, the result will be a violation of the article, followed by a ruling as to 
the appropriate remedy.
This framework, developed over time through the Strasbourg jurisprudence, 
has been followed to a greater or lesser extent in the majority of the domestic 
opinions. The review of Scots and English cases in the fourth chapter of this 
work indicates that, where the five-step process has not been followed, it is at 
least arguable that the deviation is not the result of principled opposition to the 
Strasbourg  approach  on  behalf  of  the  domestic  judiciary,  but  rather  an 
oversight based on lack of a nuanced understanding as to how the ECtHR 
determines the outcome of P1-1 applications.656 
The first  element of  the central  thesis of  this research has therefore been 
demonstrated.  It  must  now be  asked whether  the  framework  allows  for  a 
meaningful  protection.  Subsequently  the  limits  of  that  protection  must  be 
identified. 
This evaluation of the five-step approach must be prefaced by a restatement 
of the central conflict inherent in a human right to enjoyment of possessions. 
The importance of the political autonomy afforded by a protection of private 
ownership  is  not  in  question  in  this  work.  However,  it  is  recognised  that 
ownership of property is, first and foremost, an economic interest which plays 
a variety of roles in society beyond allowing political participation on the part 
of its holder. In the European free market, economic interests are not held as 
an absolute moral good in the way that some political interests, such as the 
right to a fair trial, may be. Economic rights must be subject to qualification to 
allow  the  operation  of  systems  of  taxation,  laws  of  succession,  welfare 
benefits,  protection  of  the  environment  and  a  multitude  of  other  essential 
656 This is not to say, however, that principled objections to the framework do not exist. These criticisms will be 
addressed below.
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facets  of  western  society.  In  some  cases,  economic  rights  must  be 
compromised in order to uphold the absolute moral standard of other rights 
protected by the ECHR. A viable approach to the protection of property must 
be  flexible  enough  to  allow  for  these  competing  demands  in  a  rapidly 
changing world.  However,  such flexibility  must have clear and enforceable 
limits, or else the political importance of possession of property will no longer 
be protected. A human right plainly stated on paper will, in reality,  become 
meaningless.            
6.3 The protection offered by the framework 
In the spirit of optimism in which the right was originally conceived, it seems 
apposite to focus first on the successful elements of the evolution of P1-1. 
The thesis contends that the right, as developed in the jurisprudence, does 
offer a flexible yet meaningful protection to a certain extent. The existence of 
this protection is evidenced by the jurisprudence.
Considered in the broad sense, the decision-making framework is sufficiently 
clear to allow for a reasonably sound prediction as to the P1-1 implications of 
new legislation or other legal innovation. That this is the case is demonstrated 
by just such an analysis comprising the contents of the fifth chapter of this 
thesis.  The  significant  achievement  represented  by  the  clarity  of  this 
framework  should not  be overlooked.  The ambiguity in the wording of  the 
article itself is impossible to ignore, and the overarching discussion throughout 
the thesis of the construction of P1-1 terminology indicates that a myriad of 
interpretations  of  the  text  is  possible.  In  that  context,  the  fact  that  a 
foreseeable  outcome to  a  P1-1  application  is  possible  in  many situations 
indicates in itself that the protection has some value. 
The courts both in Strasbourg and domestically have grasped the need for a 
wide definition to be given to the key terms in the article, allowing in turn for 
protection to  be given to  a broad range of  interests.  This seems to  be in 
keeping with the goal of the drafters that such interests as allow for economic 
and political participation should be included within the right. It also has the 
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benefit  of  allowing  P1-1  to  apply  easily  to  "new"  possessions  such  as 
intellectual property rights in internet addresses. It is encouraging to see that 
the  courts  will  work  over  a  period  of  time  to  refine  the  parameters  of  a 
definition,  as  occurred  with  the  series  of  cases  on  pensions  and  social 
security benefits, and it is hoped that a similar path will be followed in areas 
where the definitions of key terms are still subject to some doubt, as with the 
position of court decrees as a type of possessions, or the uncertainty over the 
interaction  between  the  term  "deprivation"  and  the  term  "control."  It  was 
always the case that a property protection would require to be flexible enough 
to cope with continual developments in law and society. It is possible for this 
flexibility to be maintained within the five-step framework which has evolved. 
In a similar sense, it is obvious that the courts do not have a closed mind as to 
the various ways in which property rights may require to be protected to meet 
the aims of P1-1. The recent suggestion of a positive obligation on the state to 
allow  peaceful  enjoyment  of  possessions  to  continue,  first  explored  in 
Oneryildiz v Turkey,657 indicates that the right is continuing to evolve. 
Perhaps the most striking indication that P1-1 offers a meaningful protection 
comes from individual  cases themselves.  In  situations  which  most  closely 
mirror the circumstances originally envisaged by the Convention drafters as 
likely to infringe upon property rights, violations have indeed been found to 
exist. In the Strasbourg jurisprudence,  Broniowski v Poland658 indicates that 
large-scale deprivation of possessions still takes place. This scenario is one in 
which  the  property  right  seemed  to  play  the  exact  role  which  had  been 
envisaged for it. In the domestic jurisprudence, more quotidian examples such 
as  the  trio  of  customs  cases  –  Lindsay  v  Customs  and  Excise 
Commissioners,659 R  (Hoverspeed)  v  Customs  &  Excise  Commissioners660 
and  International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home  
657 (2005) 41 EHRR 20
658 (2005) 40 EHRR 21
659 [2002] 1 WLR 1766
660 [2002] 3 WLR 1219
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Department661 – still  demonstrate situations where a violation finding by the 
Court must have had a real and important effect for the individual applicants. 
Ultimately,  P1-1 has,  as a matter of  fact,  protected the rights  of  individual 
applicants  within  the  five-step  framework  outlined.  The  parameters  of  the 
protection  as  established  to  date  do  offer  a  flexible  and  yet  meaningful 
protection  in  certain  contexts,  as  contended  in  the  central  thesis  of  this 
research. 
6.4 Limitations of the right as currently understood
Despite  these  positive  indications,  there  are  undoubtedly  areas  in  which 
serious question marks arise over the ability of the framework as currently 
formulated to offer a real and effective protection of property rights. 
In the first place, due regard must be given to the significant influence that the 
necessity  for  compensation  has  played  in  the  application  of  the  decision-
making process overall. The Strasbourg court has established that, where a 
deprivation of possessions has occurred, compensation must be paid to the 
deprived party or else the interference will  fail  the test of proportionality.  In 
most  day-to-day  examples  of  deprivation  by  a  state,  such  as  compulsory 
purchase, or nationalisation, such compensation will be provided as a matter 
of  course.  The  principle  seems  solid  and  is  backed  up  by  the  general 
principles  of  international  law.  However,  there  are  situations  in  which  it 
creates difficulty, and in these situations the courts have not coped particularly 
well. 
The most obvious example is cases in which confiscation and forfeiture has 
occurred by way of penalty in furtherance of a political policy. Confiscation of 
the proceeds of crime is a useful example which has been discussed both by 
the ECtHR662 and in the domestic courts.663 In confiscation cases, possessions 
are often permanently removed from their  owner  by state officials or by a 
court  decree.  The  possessions  are  not  returned.  In  every  logical 
661 [2003] QB 728
662 Phillips v United Kingdom (41087/98) 5 July 2001 
663 See discussion at page 194 et seq.
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understanding of the term, such action must amount to a deprivation. Yet the 
courts are almost universal in determining such interventions to be a control of 
the use of possessions. Given that no logical explanation can be given for 
making such a determination, an alternative reason must be sought. In such 
cases,  it  is  impossible  to  resist  the  suggestion  that  the  requirement  of 
compensation  for  deprivations  is  what  leads  the  courts  to  conclude  that 
confiscation is a control. The courts look at proportionality first, and then fit 
their definition of the state action around the result they wish to achieve. The 
tail is wagging the dog. 
There can, of course, be no argument that compensation should be paid for 
confiscations of this type. Such a result would be nonsensical. However, it is 
submitted that the ECtHR and the domestic courts must find an alternative 
approach to dealing with such cases if integrity in the five-step process is to 
be maintained. As discussed in the course of the thesis, it may be germane in 
some situations, such as confiscation of the proceeds of crime, to reason that 
possessions obtained through illegal means are not possessions which merit 
the protection of P1-1. That would seem to create no conflict with the aims of 
the  article.  Alternatively,  where  a  confiscation  results  from  breach  of,  for 
example, a border control policy, there may be scope for a rule that penalty 
confiscations do require compensation to meet the test of proportionality.  It 
may be that more than one solution is required. It is submitted, however, that 
continuing to adhere to the current approach is not tenable in the long term if 
P1-1 is to be seen as a solid and effective protection. 
Whatever  solution  is  adopted  in  resolution  of  this  difficulty,  it  must  be 
explained  in  a  principled  and  detailed  manner  which  will  allow  for  clear 
application  of  the  new  rules  to  novel  sets  of  facts.  What  would  not  be 
desirable is the introduction of another doctrine as ambiguous and open to 
political  abuse  as  the  rule  on  "exceptional  circumstances"  so  bizarrely 
implemented  in  Jahn  v  Germany.664 Although  it  is  not  contended  that 
circumstances exceptional enough to warrant an absence of compensation for 
deprivation are impossible, it is argued that such circumstances did not, in 
664 (2006) 42 EHRR 49
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fact, exist in  Jahn. The reunification of Germany, although no doubt political 
tumultuous,  seems no more exceptional  than other instances of  European 
regime change as witnessed, for example, in Poland and Greece. It remains 
unclear why the German reunification should be considered exceptional in the 
eyes of the Strasbourg court. At present, it appears that Jahn may be a fairly 
singular  example,  but  it  still  stands  as  a  warning.  If  the  decision-making 
framework is to be reliable enough to offer an effective protection, cases must 
be decided within that framework, even where the decisions are difficult. 
One  other  issue  of  significant  concern  in  any  evaluation  of  the  five-step 
framework is the evident weakness of the third step in the process. The courts 
will ask whether the state action served a legitimate aim in the public interest. 
As discoursed on at  length in  chapters three and four,  the answer  to this 
question  appears  always  to  be  "yes",  omitting  the  unusual  situation  in 
Zwierynski v Poland665 in which no public interest argument whatsoever was 
put forward by the state. 
The question of public interest is the one in which the conflict inherent in the 
notion of  a property protection is most  clearly apparent.  The ECtHR often 
repeats that states must be given a wide margin of appreciation to implement 
political  policy  free  of  interference  from  Strasbourg.  The  electorate  of  a 
signatory state did not vote to be governed by the ECtHR; accordingly it would 
be undemocratic (and, of course, contrary to human rights) for the ECtHR to 
substitute its political judgment for that of the state government. 
However,  the  political  independence of  signatory  states  should  not  be  an 
absolute barrier to any evaluation of the question of public or general interest 
either by the ECtHR or by the domestic courts. It seems difficult to understand 
why the courts should not at least seek to establish that the state action taken 
will, at least prima facie, lead to promotion of the interest which is said to be 
pursued.  It  is  not  suggested  that  a  detailed  investigation  should  be 
undertaken, but the state aim should appear to be met by the state action at 
least on the basis argued before the Court. It is unsettling that the ECtHR, 
665 (2004) 38 EHRR 6
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even when expressing doubt in the judgment itself as to whether the stated 
public  interest  will  be  served  by  the  action  taken,  still  has  no  difficulty  in 
holding that the public interest requirement has been met.666 
      
The  ECtHR has  also  indicated  that  it  will  not  accept  that  state  action  is 
justified where the public interest being served is "manifestly unreasonable." 
At the present time, there is no reported case in which such a finding has 
been made by the courts either in Strasbourg or domestically. It is difficult to 
draw  even  a  tentative  conclusion  from  this  fact.  It  is  submitted  that  the 
concept of manifest unreasonableness should operate as an absolute moral 
safeguard  in  as  much  as  such  a  thing  is  possible  in  the  context  of  an 
economic right. Simply put, the court should not accept "silencing the political 
opponents of the government" as a legitimate aim in the public interest, even 
if a democratically elected government asserts that this is so. The standard of 
manifest unreasonableness to be met here is obviously, and, it is submitted, 
correctly,  set very high. It  is hoped that no such finding has, as yet,  been 
made because no state has acted in the manner feared by the drafters of the 
Convention.
Each of the criticisms outlined serves to impair the strength of P1-1 overall. 
Ambiguity in interpretation and lack of rigour in application of the protection 
must be avoided, even in circumstances where the facts are complex and the 
answers to the five step process may not be easy to decide. It is in these 
areas that the parameters of the framework require to be strengthened, as 
contended in the central thesis of this work.  
6.5 Final conclusions
In  the  final  analysis,  the  strength  of  the  property  protection  can  only  be 
measured by its results to date. The huge volume of case law which has been 
discussed through the course of this thesis serves to demonstrate that P1-1 is 
far from a forgotten right. The complexity of protecting an economic right was 
recognised by the authors of the Convention from the very earliest stages. Its 
666 See discussion at 3.5.3.
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jurisprudential  development  has  accordingly  been  slow,  faltering  at  times, 
plagued with ambiguities and doubts which continue to give rise to serious 
questions. Nevertheless, basic principles for resolution of P1-1 applications 
have been articulated. A decision-making framework has been developed and 
implemented to varying degrees of robustness. These guidelines have been 
adopted and applied domestically with some degree of success. It is apparent 
that  the  property  protection  continues  to  be  of  significance  in  respect  of 
current issues of major importance.
It  would  be  foolish  to  argue  that  the  property  protection  is  a  clear  and 
unambiguous  right  or  that  its  implementation  has  been  an  unqualified 
success. P1-1 has, at its heart, conflict between intervention and autonomy. 
The ideological and political complexities of the economy are layered on top 
of this inherent clash of ideals. In places, injudicious jurisprudence creates an 
additional, undesirable level of uncertainty. 
Nevertheless, the case law demonstrates that clear breaches of the right can 
and have taken place. The Strasbourg court has remedied violations arising 
from circumstances as dramatic regime change through to inequalities in the 
law of succession. In the domestic jurisprudence, P1-1 has played a part in 
alleviating unfairness in forfeiture schemes, litigation practices and licensing 
decisions. From its inauspicious beginnings, the property protection is slowly 
developing into a human right worthy of the name. Current issues of global 
concern suggest the right will continue to have an important role to play over 
the coming years and decades. It is hoped that, with further jurisprudence, 
article  one  of  the  First  Protocol  will  continue  to  evolve  into  a  meaningful 
protection in every context. 
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